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Abstract 
 
 
 
Learning is frequently regarded as facilitating factor for policy outcomes across mul-
tiple levels of governance. Learning however competes with alternative explanations 
such as bargaining, actor’s interests and organisational objectives. This thesis exam-
ines from an institutional perspective the link between individual learning of policy-
makers and learning among governmental institutions and analyses to what extent 
learning matters for the policy outcome. It finds that policy entrepreneurs play a key 
role in transferring learning to the organisational level and in achieving policy out-
comes. 
 
The empirical focus is on learning in climate policy integration, which carries increas-
ing importance for effective environmental governance as it can help create synergies 
for economic development and climate mitigation. The European Union is a frontrun-
ner in integrating climate objectives into energy, transport and agriculture policy via 
regulatory instruments setting overall targets and conditioning financial resources 
upon compliance. This thesis uses qualitative methods to examine learning in the poli-
cymaking aspects of climate policy integration at the examples of the Renewable En-
ergy Directive, its controversial biofuels component and the greening measures in the 
Common Agricultural Policy.  
 
This research makes several original contributions to the agency aspects of environ-
mental governance: the meta-theoretical framework on learning allows a more nu-
anced analysis of what learning aspects occur in governance such as knowledge- and 
experience-based learning versus changes in different types of underlying beliefs. It 
also allows determining the extent to which a policy outcome results from learning or 
alternative explanations. This contribution clarifies the under-researched link between 
the learning individual, changes in beliefs and the factors hindering learning from be-
ing transferred to the organisational level where policy decisions are made. Policy 
outcomes resulted predominantly from policy entrepreneurs using previously acquired 
knowledge and experience to achieve a policy outcome aligned with their pre-formed 
deeper beliefs and policy objectives. Overall, the thesis provides a fresh perspective 
on the relevance of learning in the policymaking process and of bureaucrats as policy 
entrepreneurs. 
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Chapter 1 
Learning in Governance … does it matter? 
 
 
 
 
Policymaking is a human, personal learning endeavour. It is different from working in 
a sausage factory. It is more like an art.  
 
(European Commission 2012) 
 
 
 
Policy changes over time frequently mirror evolutions in societies’ political prefer-
ences, advances in scientific knowledge and experiences with previous actions, unin-
tended consequences or even catastrophic events. Regional cooperation can be moti-
vated by the prospect of economic prosperity and the hope of reducing negative envi-
ronmental impacts through collective action. As interests of key actors change, addi-
tional knowledge is taken into account or experiences with previous policies are re-
flected upon, changes in policies can occur and result in further reactions of key ac-
tors. These developments could be summarised as learning in the process of governing 
institutions, rules and practises that frame the (co-)existence of societies. The question 
is whether policy outcomes are necessarily a result of learning among policy-makers 
and to what extent they occur independently. The rich literature in public policy on 
learning as well as the discipline of organizational learning in management studies 
and social psychology suggest that there is a role for learning in the governance of 
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societal cooperation as the process of devising rules to support peaceful coexistence 
and economic prosperity.  
This thesis contributes to gaining a fuller picture of the empirical and theoretical 
puzzle on what determines outcomes in governance and more precisely in the policy-
making process. The key question is to what extent learning,1 which is widely re-
garded as a facilitating factor, contributes to policy outcomes. Learning can be a result 
of reflecting on failure (Ravenal 1978) or occur in the form of drawing lessons (Rose 
1991) from the policies of other countries that serve as inspiration for policy diffusion 
(Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett 2007; Gilardi 2010; Perkins and Neumayer 2004). Pol-
icy transfer contains more coercive elements such as increasing group pressure among 
countries at the UNFCCC negotiations to present their domestic climate mitigation 
and adaptation strategies (Rietig 2014b forthcoming) that point towards elements of 
policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Stone 2000) as supplementary explanation 
for policy outcomes.  
Learning can be regarded as an intervening variable among many other factors 
such as in Steven Bernstein and Benjamin Cashore’s (2012) analysis of forest govern-
ance, which concludes that “findings regarding learning and its conditions may offer 
insight into creating greater coherence at multiple levels in complex institutional envi-
ronments” (Bernstein and Cashore 2012: 604). Overall, learning is frequently re-
garded as facilitating factor for policy outcomes on multiple levels of governance. 
 
This leads to the central research question:  
What role does learning play in public policy-making? 
Two sub- research questions are:  
(1) How does learning occur in the policy process, i.e. can we analytically 
differentiate aspects of learning? 
 
(2) Under what conditions does learning matter for the outcome of the poli-
cymaking process? 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For a detailed definition, see 2.1.1 
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In short, this thesis systematically examines how relevant learning is in govern-
ance. The central hypothesis is that different aspects of learning only occur under cer-
tain circumstances, but not as soon as actors communicate or engage in a policymak-
ing process. To transmit individual learning to the organisational level and thus 
achieve a policy outcome, policy entrepreneurs acting as learning brokers and institu-
tional dynamics are crucial.  
There are many relevant contributions in the governance literature, particularly 
on learning in the European Union. However, as the literature review (chapter 2) will 
illustrate, there is no comprehensive theoretical framework on learning that would al-
low to answer the research questions and to investigate the key hypothesis. The link 
between learning and policy outcomes is rarely systematically questioned in the gov-
ernance and public policy literature. Although the explanation of learning as policy 
process or of learning as relevant factor for a policy outcome is convenient due to its 
positive connotation, it does compete with alternative explanations such as bargaining 
in negotiations, policy entrepreneurs, actor’s interests and organisational objectives 
(Moravcsik 1993; Rietig and Perkins 2013; Roberts and King 1991).  
Learning is particularly relevant in challenging policy areas where individual in-
centives to enjoy short-term benefits are misaligned with the long-term needs of future 
generations. Addressing such a global challenge like climate change (IPCC 2013) first 
and foremost means reducing greenhouse gas emissions while adapting to its unavoid-
able consequences. Although there are several policy instruments available with the 
single purpose of reducing emissions such as carbon taxes and emission trading via fi-
nancial incentives and absolute emission caps (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2009; 
Wettestad 2009), it is traditional sectoral policy fields such as transport, energy, in-
dustry and agriculture that will need to integrate climate objectives into their areas if 
emission reductions are to be achieved (Rietig 2013) of over 80 per cent from 1990s 
levels in 2050 (IPCC 2007). Climate policy integration is an emerging policy area 
with increasing importance for effective environmental governance that can help 
countries to meet their international climate commitments and further increase ambi-
tions to avoid the most dramatic consequences of climate change (for key contribu-
tions see Adelle and Russel 2013; Mickwitz et al. 2009; Nilsson and Nilsson 2005). 
This thesis examines from an institutionalist perspective what aspects of learn-
ing occurred and whether learning influenced outcomes in European climate policy 
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integration. The learning process of integrating environmental and climate objectives 
into sectoral policy areas is seen to provide an important contribution to climate miti-
gation (e.g. Nilsson and Nilsson 2005; Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007). This literature 
predominantly focused on learning in the implementation of policies on different lev-
els of governance. However, learning in policymaking has been less widely examined. 
The EU is a key actor in climate governance due to its strong interest in climate miti-
gation (Biermann 2005) and its leadership aspirations (Jordan et al. 2010: 77; Schreurs 
and Tiberghien 2007) which have been criticised as deficient (Jordan et al. 2012: 44) 
following the Copenhagen ‘disaster’ (Blühdorn 2011). However, the EU’s leadership 
role can be regarded as restored following the strong and successful push for a post-
Kyoto regime with binding commitments from developing countries in exchange for a 
second and final commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol that was brokered by the 
European Commissioner for Climate Action at the UNFCCC negotiations in Durban 
2011 (Interviews 2011; Rajamani 2012).  
Following the rationale provided by Schreurs and Tiberghien (2007) and more 
recently Jordan et al. (2012), this thesis focuses in its empirical analysis of the role of 
learning in the policymaking process and the importance of learning for the policy 
outcome within the case study of climate policy integration in the EU. The rationale 
for choosing the EU as geographical case study focus has several justifications. First, 
the international commitments of the EU “are much more ambitious than other large 
parties (…) [what is] expected to have an important bearing on the world’s efforts to 
avoid dangerous climate change. Second, its efforts offer governance theorists a range 
of insights into whether ambitious policies can be produced in multi-levelled political 
systems (…). [Furthermore,] what happens at the EU level can deeply affect national 
and local political life across Europe, through processes of emulation” (Jordan et al. 
2012: 45-46). These semi-federalist (Nedergaard 2008: 180; Rozbicka 2013: 844) and 
multi-level governance characteristics (Piattoni 2010), as well as the aspirations for an 
international leadership role in global climate governance (Schreurs and Tiberghien 
2007) that are restrained by the EU’s inherent structural inflexibility (Afionis 2010), 
make the EU with its 28 member states an ideal test case for learning.  
A further rationale for focusing on the EU as case study area is the rich empiri-
cal literature on learning in policymaking within the EU. Particularly the last decade 
brought a development of empirical evaluations of learning and the related concept of 
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policy transfer in areas such as Regulatory Impact Assessment (Radaelli 2004; 2009), 
the Common Agricultural Policy (Feindt 2010), the Open Method of Coordination 
(Kerber and Eckardt 2007; Nedergaard 2007) and regional integration (Farrell 2009). 
A number of studies focus on agency such as Elizabeth Bomberg’s (2007) analysis of 
environmental non-governmental organisations as ‘teachers’ in the context of Euro-
pean enlargement and Diane Stone’s contribution on the transfer of policies in trans-
national governance including the EU (Stone 2004), as well as Anthony Zito’s analy-
sis of agencies as agents for learning in the “numerous potential fora for learning” 
(Zito 2009: 1221). For these reasons, the remainder of the thesis focuses on the EU as 
case study area to analyse empirically when, how and why learning occurs in the poli-
cymaking process.  
The thesis synthesises the learning literature into a coherent meta-theoretical 
framework of learning (chapter 3), as the literature review results in the conclusion 
that the literature on learning is dominated by overlapping terminology and thus re-
mains ambiguous on what can, and cannot be regarded as learning (chapter 2). Chap-
ter 4 discusses methodological aspects by explaining the research design and qualita-
tive research methods used for data collection and data analysis to allow reproduci-
bility of the study on other levels of governance and/ or in other sectoral policies.  
Chapter 5 briefly introduces the policymaking process in the EU and concep-
tualises climate policy integration as background for the empirical chapters. The em-
pirical part of the thesis applies the theoretical framework developed in chapter 3 to 
two case studies using qualitative methods: The Renewable Energy Directive with its 
controversial biofuels component (chapter 6) and the greening of the Common Agri-
cultural Policy (chapter 7) aim to integrate climate objectives into sectoral policies on 
the European level. The key findings point towards alternative explanations for learn-
ing, which are discussed in comparison with the findings of the empirical literature on 
learning in the EU (chapter 8): Bargaining among the actors based on their organisa-
tion’s interests dominated in the policymaking process. ‘Normal’ aspects of learning 
occurred such as gains in experience and knowledge, but these could be expected in 
any policymaking process. The policy outcome however was less a result of changing 
underlying beliefs as an indicator for deeper learning, but rather a result of policy en-
trepreneurs making use of their previously acquired knowledge and experience to 
achieve a policy outcome aligned with their pre-formed deeper beliefs and policy ob-
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jectives. The concluding chapter (9) provides a synthesis of the findings and original 
contributions to the governance and public policy literature before offering an outlook 
on implications for practise in the EU as well as implications for the EU-specific 
learning literature.  
This research makes several original contributions to the agency aspects of envi-
ronmental governance: the meta-theoretical framework on learning allows a more nu-
anced analysis of what aspects of learning occur in governance. It furthermore allows 
more precision in determining the extent to which a policy outcome results from 
learning or alternative explanations. The thesis clarifies the under-researched link be-
tween the learning individual and the factors hindering learning from being transferred 
to the organisational level where most policy decisions are made. In addition, the Re-
newable Energy Directive and the Common Agricultural Policy case studies allow a 
fresh perspective on the key role of bureaucrats as policy entrepreneurs and learning 
brokers. Overall, learning does matter in governance, but rather as an intervening 
variable with limited influence on the policy outcome. The effectiveness of govern-
ance can rather be improved by learning about strategies most suitable for influencing 
the governance process, by strategically creating or using windows of opportunity and 
particularly making use of existing experience and knowledge by acting as policy en-
trepreneur to pro-actively steer a policy proposal through the process of policymaking 
towards its outcome while avoiding institutional and political veto points. 
 The literature review in the following chapter analyses the policy learning and 
organisational learning literature. It thus serves two purposes. It critically discusses 
the learning literature in public policy and organisational studies, which results in the 
conclusion that the confusing and overlapping learning literatures can be synthesised 
into a meta-theoretical framework of learning (in chapter 3). Furthermore, it analyses 
the findings of the empirical literature on policy learning in the EU context as basis 
for synthesising the empirical findings on learning in climate policy integration pre-
sented in the later chapters.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review on Learning in Governance  
 
 
 
 
 
Is there a theoretical framework in the literature capable of identifying and explaining 
different types of learning in the policymaking process and the influence of learning 
on the policy outcome? This review of the political science and management literature 
finds gaps on how learning among individuals interacts with learning on the collective 
level of policymaking. It examines to what extent the literature provides a basis for a 
meta-theoretical framework that would facilitate the empirical analysis of learning in 
policymaking. This chapter has a dual objective. It provides a review of the theory-
based and empirical literature on learning while distinguishing between the learning 
literature in political science and the literature based in management studies. It synthe-
sises this diverse literature with different relevant elements of learning into a ‘learning 
continuum’ as basis for the meta-theoretical framework on learning (chapter 3).  
Especially in the 1990s a diverse range of learning frameworks emerged, pre-
dominantly in the scholarship on public policy. Authors use different ‘labels’ for a 
multitude of learning types, which are frequently overlapping and as a result the litera-
ture has become confusing, widely imprecise and indistinguishable in what aspect of 
learning is examined on what level of governance (see also Rietig and Perkins 2013). 
To remedy this confusion in the literature - instead of perpetuating it with yet another 
‘label’ for learning or by following one of the existing yet imprecise ‘labels’ - this re-
view deliberately draws upon the original theories and supplements the discussion 
with more recent analyses that made significant theoretical contributions. However, it 
does not attempt to provide a complete overview of the more recent, diverse and nu-
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merous applications of these theories to empirical cases as this would be beyond its 
scope. The empirical studies on learning and their findings relevant to the case studies 
on learning in climate policy integration are reviewed following a synthesis of the 
theoretical frameworks they are based upon.  
Several disciplines are concerned with the question of learning among policy-
makers. Political science with its notion of policy learning predominantly asks how 
learning can be used as a tool to improve governance procedures involving different 
actors (for key contributions see Levy 1994; May 1992; Nye 1987; Radaelli 2009; 
Sabatier 1987; Zito and Schout 2009).2 It further links changes in beliefs to learning 
(see Nye 1987). Management studies is predominantly interested in the question how 
an organisation can improve its learning to optimise its performance, which overlaps 
with social psychology that is concerned with the question how individuals and or-
ganisations learn or do not learn in a certain context. This is referred to as Organiza-
tional Learning (see Argyris 1976; Argyris and Schön 1978; Easterby-Smith and 
Lyles 2005; March and Olsen 1975). A related further strand of learning is non-
learning, i.e. when actors avoid engaging with a problem in a meaningful way that 
would lead to learning (see Janis 1972; Janis and Mann 1977). 
 
 
 
2.1 Policy learning 
 
 
When several state and non-state actors are involved in the exchange of knowledge on 
past experiences in a public policy setting, the overall term is ‘policy learning’. The 
following section provides an overview of theoretical frameworks on learning in poli-
cymaking. Policy learning is frequently regarded as an aspect of the wider concept of 
policy diffusion, which is split up into policy transfer (Page 2000) and policy learning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The special issue in the Journal of European Public Policy (2009) sparked renewed interest in policy 
learning, which resulted in a multitude of research articles being published after the research design 
was finalised and data collection for this thesis commenced in January 2012. Contributions published 
after this date could thus not be taken into consideration for developing the meta-theoretical framework. 
These articles include Heikkila and Gerlak (2013), Radaelli and Dunlop (2013) on learning as well as 
Adelle and Russel (2013) on Climate Policy Integration. 
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with the overlapping concept of lesson-drawing (Evans 2004; 2006; Rose 1991) that 
focuses on learning from experience with past mistakes and successes as well as copy-
ing policies from other countries or levels of governance and adapting them to similar 
domestic circumstances. Related to this notion is also the concept of political/ stra-
tegic and instrumental learning, which focuses on how individuals and organisations 
learn to better navigate politics and how to use regulatory instruments to achieve their 
objectives (e.g. May 1992; Radaelli 2009). Another stream of policy learning litera-
ture is concerned with changes in beliefs either as a wider socio-political phenomenon 
or among individual policy-makers and in their governmental institutions (Haas and 
Haas 1995; Keohane and Nye 1987; Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007). This literature ev-
olves around social learning among policymakers in policy- and knowledge networks 
that are capable of changing underlying beliefs (Nye 1987;  Sabatier 1988) or learning 
in the process of implementing policy (Nilsson and Nilsson 2005).  
 
 
2.1.1 What is learning? 
 
The term “learning” carries different meanings and connotations, depending on the 
context in which it is used. This literature review follows the trend in the political sci-
ence literature to widen the focus towards the rich and well-developed organisational 
learning literature (see also Dunlop 2010; Gerlak and Heikkila 2011; Koch and Lin-
denthal 2011; Zito and Schout 2009). Learning is frequently defined as the acquisition 
of skills and knowledge (or action and thought); it thereby carries the components of 
skills as ‘know-how’ or the physical ability to act, and of knowledge as ‘know-why’ 
or the ability to communicate an understanding of an experience (Kim 1993: 38). 
Learning can further be seen as acting upon experiences and correcting errors. Argyris 
presents a widely accepted definition explaining learning  
 
as the detection and correction of errors, and error as any feature of knowledge 
or of knowing that makes action ineffective. Error is a mismatch: a condition of 
learning, and matching a second condition of learning. The detection and correc-
tion of error produces learning and the lack of either or both inhibits learning.  
 
(Argyris 1976: 365) 
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A further widely accepted definition was provided by Heclo (1974): 
 
Learning can be taken to mean a relatively enduring alteration in behaviour that 
results from experience; usually, this alteration is conceptualized as a change in 
response made in reaction to some perceived stimulus. 
 
(Heclo 1974: 306) 
 
This experiential learning-focused definition, which is applicable to both indi-
viduals and organisations, was picked up by Gerlak and Heikkila in their theoretical 
framework on factual and experiential learning of collectives: 
 
Collective learning involves both (1) a ‘collective process,’ which may include 
acquiring new knowledge through diverse actions (e.g., trial and error), assessing 
information and disseminating new knowledge or opportunities across individuals 
in a collective, and (2) ‘collective products’ that emerge from the process, such as 
new shared ideas, strategies, rules, or policies. 
 
(Gerlak and Heikkila 2011: 623) 
 
The first definition provided by Kim (1993: 38) contains conceptual traces to-
wards action and understanding and the second definition by Argyris (1976) emphas-
ises experience and correction of errors. Both the definitions by Heclo (1974) as well 
as Gerlak and Heikkila (2011) focus on learning facts and reflecting on experience 
within a group of individuals, whereby the latter also includes the outcome of a learn-
ing process. As there are many different kinds of learning in the distinctive disciplines 
and sub-areas, each discipline provides a more or less slightly different definition and 
understanding of what learning is, depending on the context of analysis. Sommerer 
(2011) defines policy learning from a policy outcome-focused perspective:  
 
the process of observing a policy model from another country or the own past by po-
litical decision-makers, who want to improve the status quo for personal or idealistic 
reasons by choosing a rational model. Thereby their individual cognitive resources, 
but also institutional rules and political interests restrict them. At the same time they 
are able to profit from the capacity of information processing of bureaucratic organi-
sations. Observing a policy model results in voluntary imitation or convergence with 
a relatively stable change of current policy.  
 
(Sommerer 2011: 40-41; translated from German language by author) 
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Sommerer’s definition is useful as it is focused on actors and capabilities of 
political decision-makers striving to improve the status quo for personal or idealistic 
reasons by choosing a rational model and being restricted by their individual cognitive 
resources, institutional rules and political interests (Sommerer 2011: 40; translated 
from German language by the author). However, not only political decision-makers 
learn in public policy, but also civil servants, and for learning to occur in democratic 
policymaking, so does the unit or government department they are working for and 
potentially also wider society. Furthermore, learning does not necessarily occur when 
another policy model is being observed, what again must not necessarily lead to vol-
untary imitation or policy convergence. Policies can have other sources than learning 
such as necessity, legislative pressure via international agreements or coincidence 
with countries deciding on policies without knowing that similar policies already exist 
in other countries. A review of these different definitions of learning allows to identify 
elements common to most learning conceptualisations. The following definition con-
solidates the diverse understandings of the learning literature and provides an overall 
conceptual basis to the analysis. This thesis consequently defines learning as a 
 
reflection and judgment based on an input, which leads the individual 
and/ or organisation to select a different view on (1) how things hap-
pen, i.e. additional knowledge or (2) what course of action to take, i.e. 
the reflection on individual or collective experience or advise from oth-
ers on such previous experiences. The judgement can lead to an indi-
vidual or collective change in beliefs. Policy outcomes can either be a 
result of learning or of alternative explanations. 
 
 
2.1.2 The relation of policy learning to policy diffusion and policy transfer 
 
Policy learning is a sub-category of the wider literature on policy diffusion 
(Nedergaard 2007: 426). This provides an important link between the policymaking 
process and the policy outcome as the more specific policy diffusion and policy trans-
fer literature comes from the result of the policy process, i.e. the policies that have be-
come more similar across horizontal or vertical levels of governance (Benson and 
Jordan 2011; 2012). There are however limitations to the applicability of policy trans-
fer and lesson drawing to policy research (James and Lodge 2003). Gilardi defines 
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diffusion as influencing “policy choices in one country (or another relevant unit) (…) 
by prior decisions in other countries (or relevant units)” (Gilardi 2010: 651).3 Drivers 
of policy diffusion and thus policy learning and policy transfer are politicians, politi-
cal parties, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs, global financial institutions as well 
as supra-national institutions (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). Particularly civil servants 
play an important role, as they can also act as legislators (Page 2003). 
 The basis to policy learning and policy transfer is drawing lessons from ex-
perience with policy programmes in other places or organisations. Lesson drawing is 
not an innovation itself but rather the utilisation of available experience, frequently 
motivated by dissatisfaction with the status quo (Rose 1991; 1993). For lesson draw-
ing to occur, government officials embark on a search for ideas on how to improve the 
status quo. Frequently they turn to epistemic communities (Haas 1992), which act as 
agents of change due to their capability to provide policy-makers with input on what 
lessons can be drawn from experience elsewhere (Rose 1991). Other central actors for 
lesson drawing in public policy are civil servants, especially due to their permanent 
position and input in situations of ‘collective puzzling’ when elected officials are act-
ing on the system-inherent uncertainty and wonder what to do (Heclo 1974).  
Once lessons have been drawn in the form of adopting programmes from other 
institutions, organisations, levels of government or jurisdictions, policy transfer and 
diffusion can occur. The key difference is that policy transfer can be a result of coer-
cion by a powerful actor, while diffusion and lesson drawing are neutral means behind 
policies becoming more similar over time (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; 2000; 2012). 
Policies can be either transferred horizontally, i.e. from other jurisdictions on the same 
governance level or vertically in a top-down multilevel governance setting. Especially 
in the top-down transfer there are frequently pressures in the form of legislation or fi-
nancial incentives involved (Asare and Studlar 2009). Policy transfer can occur as a 
marginal adjustment in the status quo when the settings of policy instruments are 
changed, as a change of the policy instruments themselves or as a change to the policy 
goals such as attitudes or ideas, with cognitive obstacles, environmental obstacles in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Gilardi defines “learning (…) as a mechanism of policy diffusion” (Gilardi 2010: 651), which is 
problematic given that learning is more than a mere spreading of policies as illustrated in 2.1.1 at the 
example of Sommerer (2011) who follows a similar approach like Gilardi (2010). His conceptualisation 
of policy diffusion as policies becoming more similar across different jurisdictions is however a useful 
approach. 
 24	  
the implementation phase and public opinion as central factors that have the potential 
to constrain policy transfer (Evans 2004: 38).  
Policy transfer is frequently framed as a result of lesson drawing (Rose 1993; 
Evans 2004). Lesson drawing can occur by looking to other actors who have already 
found and implemented a response to a policy problem. The dimensions of lesson 
drawing include the same policy problem on other levels of governance (vertical) or in 
another policy field on the same level (horizontal). There are five possible modes of 
lesson drawing. First, the policy-maker could simply copy the other policy, i.e. verti-
cally or horizontally adopt an existing policy or emulate it by adoption with modifica-
tions for European conditions (Rose 1991: 21-22). The policy-maker can also use hy-
bridisation by combining two programmes, synthesis (a combination of several ele-
ments of several programmes) or inspiration, where other programmes serve as intel-
lectual stimulus for developing a completely new policy solution (Rose 1991: 22-23).  
A further stream of literature examines learning and policy diffusion from a 
game-theoretic and decision-science perspective. Sommerer (2011) examined policy 
diffusion in environmental policy making across predominantly OECD countries and 
made inferences about learning based on converging policies. In contrast, Volden, 
Ting and Carpenter point out that there is no automatic connection between policy dif-
fusion and learning arguing that countries can have similar policies in place while be-
ing unaware of policies in other jurisdictions (2008: 330). They proposed a model to 
analyse policy diffusion among states across a horizontal governance level based on 
factual and experiential learning with a focus on gaining additional knowledge from 
experimenting with policies or studying the policy experiences of others (Volden, 
Ting and Carpenter 2008). The theoretical frameworks used by the game-theory litera-
ture are useful for a large-n approach taking a macro-perspective and comparing 
learning across different jurisdictions, but have limited applicability to the micro-
perspective of identifying learning in the policymaking process. 
In conclusion, it is important to make a clear distinction between lesson draw-
ing, policy transfer and policy learning, which is frequently missing in this strand of 
literature and has led to the confusion of some of these concepts (Rietig and Perkins 
2013). As Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 344) point out, Rose uses the terms of policy 
transfer and lesson drawing interchangeably. They distinguish between lesson draw-
ing as a process in which decision-makers voluntarily draw lessons from one or more 
 25	  
countries and apply the conclusions to their own policymaking, whereas policy trans-
fer can also be forced upon decision-makers (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996).  
 
 
2.1.3 ‘Normal’ learning: Instrument(al) learning, governance learning, 
government learning and political learning 
 
 
The learning literature has come up with a wealth of different ‘labels’ for learning in 
the policymaking process and most new reviews add another label. The result is a con-
fusing cocktail of labels that are in danger of becoming meaningless due to their over-
laps and incoherent usage (Rietig and Perkins 2013). Furthermore, there are a number 
of empirical analyses on learning in European policy making, including European 
climate policy integration, which make use of these theoretical frameworks. This sec-
tion attempts to clarify their main aspects and summarises these key empirical contri-
butions to allow a comparison of the empirical findings presented in chapter 6/ 7 in 
the discussion chapter. 
 
 
Learning about modes of governance and policy instruments: Governance Learning 
and Instrument(al) Learning 
 
Learning processes are a prominent side-theme in the EU governance literature on 
‘New’ Governance, comitology and best-practise and can be understood as receiving 
information about policy instruments and how they can be applied. The governance 
literature focussing on the EU makes references to learning as part of the ‘new’ modes 
of governance, for example within the Open Method of Coordination (Eberlein and 
Kerwer 2004: 123), monitoring mechanisms (Schout, Jordan, and Twena 2010: 159) 
and network governance (Coen and Thatcher 2008: 54). This strand of literature em-
phasises the diffusion of policymaking on a vertical and horizontal level involving dif-
ferent actors with shifting institutional links and hierarchies (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 
2008). An example for the ‘new’ modes of governance is the Open Method of Co-
ordination (OMC). The OMC is an EU-specific governance approach established in 
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2000 on employment strategy, economic policy, vocational training and social protec-
tion. Central elements are benchmarking/ target development, learning and mutual in-
formation with the objective to direct the activities of member states towards an 
agreed policy target within a set timetable and evaluating their success with peer-
pressures and information disclosure incentives to be monitored by the European 
Commission, while leaving the details of how the targets should be achieved to be de-
termined by the member states and without issuing legislation (Kerber and Eckardt 
2007; Nedergaard 2006a; 2007; Trubek and Mosher 2003). This stream of literature 
carries the implicit assumption that the institutionalised regular meetings between pol-
icy-makers and the quality evaluation processes linked to the OMC help policy-
makers exchange their experiences and learn from each other.  
In his social constructivist model of learning Nedergaard (2006) defines learn-
ing as a change in terminology, thus emphasising the view of knowledge as a “socio-
cultural process in which learning occurs through communicative processes among 
people contrary to conventional perspectives that focus on cognitive characteristics” 
(Nedergaard 2006b: 314). His approach takes a wide perspective, also regarding 
changes in terminology, i.e. re-framing of an issue as learning, what also includes lip-
service, following orders and manipulation. Understanding the OMC as a mutual 
learning process in itself, Nedergaard (2006b) took a normative approach of proposing 
how learning in OMC committees can be improved to arrive at ‘better’ policy out-
comes. The frequent interactions of members and the partial presence of policy bro-
kers as authoritative persuaders facilitates learning (Nedergaard 2006b: 321) as well 
as when indisputable evidence of policy failure is presented to the committee (Neder-
gaard 2006b: 318). Learning is hindered by time constraints. Furthermore, the Euro-
pean Commission is seen as a political actor and policy outcomes are not reached by 
consensus and persuasion, but by political bargaining resulting in negotiated compro-
mises in a highly politicised environment (Nedergaard 2006b: 318). Building on the 
2006 study of OMC committees, Nedergaard (2007) tested 14 hypotheses on the con-
ditions that make policy learning more likely in OMC committees. Nedergaard con-
cludes that the committee should support participants in their preparation and provide 
adequate resources including empirical data from trustworthy sources such as the 
European Commission. It should not be fragmented into coalitions. Countries per-
forming as leaders should be paired with laggards. To attract well-qualified and moti-
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vated participants, the work should be made prestigious and the presidency should act 
as neutral authoritative persuader (Nedergaard 2007: 540-541). 
 A more recent analysis of governance learning was put forward by Schout 
(2009). His contribution of a new typology for ‘governance learning’ was motivated 
by new preferences for governance instruments. Governance learning is defined as 
“learning about the major governance modes and how they can be employed effec-
tively” (Schout 2009: 1125). Governance learning means switching between markets 
and networked governance such as communication as well as hierarchies in the form 
of legislation (Schout 2009: 1127). It has two aspects, instrument learning and organi-
sational learning. Following May (1992: 332), he defines instrument learning “as the 
development in instruments and entailing lessons about the viability of the individual 
policy instruments” (Schout 2009: 1125). These include obtaining information about 
laws, soft coordination such as the OMC and steering through the use of tax incen-
tives, innovation, fiscal policy and agencies (Schout 2009: 1127). The other aspect of 
‘governance learning’ was labelled as ‘organisational learning’, which could be con-
sidered as a confusing choice of taxonomy as this term also describes the discipline of 
Organizational Learning that is concerned with learning among individuals and of 
public/ private organisations. In Schout’s terminology (2009: 1127), it refers to accu-
mulating information and experience about bureaucratic capacities, standardisation of 
objectives, training as well as horizontal coordination mechanisms such as task forces 
or teams. With a focus on governance reform and ‘new’ policy instruments in the EU, 
Schout (2009) compares learning on the European level with the Netherlands as 
national level. To develop a normatively ‘better regulation’ agenda, he hypothesised 
that governance learning, instrument learning and organisational learning need to oc-
cur in parallel both on the European and on the national level. He finds a match on the 
European level but a mismatch on the national level. The European Commission made 
progress on governance learning in the sense of normatively better implementing poli-
cies and engaged in organisational learning in the form of increased capacities. 
‘Instrumental learning’ can be triggered when a government organisation seeks 
to improve its administrative and governance performance. Dissatisfaction with the 
performance of policy programmes can initiate a search for alternative modes of gov-
ernance, i.e. “ways of doing business” (May 1992: 341). These types of policy failure 
can not only improve the modes of governance and the content of policy instruments, 
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but also provide the opportunity for reflection on the overall objectives. Instrumental 
learning is defined as mechanism for updating “subjective probability assessments 
when the information set available to actors changes” (Radaelli 2009: 1149) and oc-
curs in organisations that find themselves under the pressure to deliver. Policy instru-
ments and assessment tools such as Regulatory Impact Assessment are used by pol-
icy-makers when they want to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of regulation 
(Radaelli 2009: 1149), thus using knowledge as an instrument to achieve a given pol-
icy objective. In the arena of international cooperation between the EU and Africa as 
well as its influence on intra-African coordination Farrell (2009) finds that first and 
second order learning in the sense of shifting policy instruments and learning from 
experience occurred, but that the EU continued to understand itself as a normative ac-
tor promoting its values such as multilateralism, the promotion of democracy and pro-
tection of human rights (Farrell 2009: 1178). 
Learning during the drafting and adoption of the European Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU 2003b) was analysed in accurate detail by Braun (2009) who makes re-
ferences to experiential and factual learning in the policymaking process. He however 
also points towards alternative explanations for policy change other than learning as 
intervening variable between the policy driver as independent and the policy outcome 
as dependent variable. The individual policy-makers at the European Commission in 
the Directorate General of Environment were the actors who predominantly learned 
facts about emissions trading and invited experts who had experience with emissions 
trading to share their experiences. This learning about policy instruments gave them a 
strategic advantage in the policymaking process within the European Commission but 
particularly in the negotiations with the European Parliament and the Council. This al-
lowed the key actors to play leadership roles during the negotiations by acting as pol-
icy entrepreneurs, thus creating a window of opportunity for introducing the proposal 
and getting it adopted. A conditioning outside factor was the need to implement the 
Kyoto Protocol, whereas a carbon tax was not regarded as an alternative given experi-
ence with the opposition of member states in the early 1990s. This dynamic was also 
explained with the same findings by Skjærseth and Wettestad (2010) without learning 
but using a liberal institutionalist and multilevel governance frame.  
A contribution that emphasises the existence of policy learning as opposed to in-
tergovernmental bargaining in EU negotiations is the paper from Eising (2002) on the 
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the Renewable Electricity Directive from 2001 and the wider issue of liberalising the 
electricity market. Member states are the agents of learning, particularly Germany, 
France and the UK who reflect on information from the European Commission. They 
learn from the policy proposals, especially if they promote new ideas, are complex or 
relate to multidimensional domestic situations making it difficult to assess the effect 
of the proposed legislation on the domestic structures. The outcome of the learning 
process is a change in member states’ policy preferences given that a mismatch be-
tween the current arrangements and the political interests of the states was discovered 
and remedied (Eising 2002: 116). Learning is evidenced when states understood that 
market liberalisation was in their interest although they were initially opposed for 
economic or social reasons. Information and discussions in the EU context changed 
their initial preferences. Eising sees evidence for learning when states go beyond the 
directive in their domestic implementation. States detect and subsequently correct er-
rors in their initial preferences so that their position accurately mirrors their actual in-
terests. The European Commission was able to pursue its interest of market liberalisa-
tion in the negotiations with the member states based on its formal role in the deci-
sion-making process. Eising (2002) also emphasises that EU decision routines provide 
standardised conflict resolution mechanisms and information on policy impacts, po-
tentially altering member states’ domestic preferences. 
 
 
Political Learning as learning about strategies to more effectively participate in the 
policymaking process 
 
The concept of political learning dates back several decades and depending on the def-
inition of learning, defensive avoidance (Janis and Mann 1977), buck-passing and 
‘muddling through’ (Lindblom 1979) could also be included in this category. Based 
on the definition of learning provided above, latter aspects of political behaviour do 
not qualify as learning and are therefore addressed separately under ‘non-learning’ 
(see section 2.2.3).  Political learning relates to tactical behaviour. The common ele-
ment of political learning conceptualisations is that it is concerned with “lessons about 
manoeuvring within and manipulation of policy processes in order to advance an idea 
or problem” (May 1992: 351). In essence, individuals reflect on their previous experi-
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ence or advice about the ‘machinery’ of policymaking and use this knowledge and ex-
perience to more effectively participate in the process; influencing the policy outcome 
using sophisticated political tactics. Political learning includes judgements whether 
proposals are politically feasible, i.e. have a realistic chance at succeeding, and a good 
understanding of the policymaking process (May 1992: 339). 
Policy-oriented learning occurs within a domain due to differences in the be-
lief systems (deep core, policy core, secondary matters of detail; see Sabatier 1988). 
The extent of policy-oriented learning is influenced by the level of commitment be-
tween the actors, fundamental legal norms, the desire of one advocacy coalition to 
‘outlearn’ another coalition and the existence of niches providing an area for policy 
experimentation. Policy-oriented learning especially occurs in secondary aspects such 
as revisiting policy programmes, but is very rare in the area of changing core beliefs 
(Sabatier 1987; 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Sabatier describes sub-
system learning as a function of “(1) individual learning and attitudinal change; (2) the 
diffusion of new beliefs/ attitudes among individuals (…); (3) turnover in individuals 
within any collectivity (…); (4) group dynamics, such as the polarization of homoge-
neous groups (…); and (5) rules for aggregating preferences and for promoting (or 
impeding) communication among members” (Sabatier 1988: 149). Learning can be 
facilitated when members of a coalition exchange their interpretations regarding solu-
tions to problems in a forum (Sabatier 1988). Actors use different strategies to win 
over the other advocacy coalitions and achieve decisions by governmental authorities 
in line with their fundamental deep core and policy beliefs (Sabatier 1988; Weible, 
Sabatier, and McQueen 2009: 123). Policy-oriented learning can either occur within 
advocacy coalitions or between advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1988). If conditions 
such as hurting stalemates, effective leadership or a focus on empirical issues are ful-
filled, learning across advocacy coalitions can occur. This usually happens within pro-
fessional forums that offer an institutional framework for negotiating, agreeing and 
implementing agreements (Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009: 124). 
Most empirical studies that find political learning base their analytical frame 
either on Sabatier’s policy-oriented learning or on May’s (1992) political learning. 
Radaelli extended the concept of political learning by widening the typology to three 
different usages of knowledge: strategic use of knowledge to increase the core exec-
utive control on regulators, substantiating use of knowledge in support of a specific 
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policy paradigm and symbolic use of knowledge to increase the actor’s popularity 
(2009: 1149). He examined also factual and experiential learning on the organisational 
level following the question whether Regulatory Impact Assessments enable gov-
ernmental organisations to learn, particularly the EU and Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the UK. He makes an analytical distinction between instrumental learn-
ing, political learning and legitimacy-seeking emulation. Learning occurred in emula-
tion, when the Netherlands diffused policies to the European Commission, the UK, 
Denmark and Sweden. He also found political learning in the Netherlands and the UK. 
The analysis found less evidence for instrumental learning (Radaelli 2009: 1160). 
Overall, learning was predominantly symbolic or political in the form of more effec-
tive participation in the policymaking process, but less in the sense of arriving at nor-
matively ‘better’ regulation. The most relevant finding is that “learning should not be 
correlated with policy improvement. It is obvious that policy-makers have learned 
symbolically and politically” (Radaelli 2009: 1161). This final thought points towards 
the importance of constructivist learning as opposed to the ‘normal’ factual and ex-
periential learning. 
 
 
2.1.4 Complex learning: changes in beliefs 
 
‘Normal’ learning focuses on gains in knowledge and experience in the process of 
policymaking. Another strand of literature links learning to changes in beliefs. There 
are two major perspectives: Those regarding wider change in policy frames as learn-
ing process and those aspects of social learning who more closely examine what as-
pects of beliefs changed such as deep core, policy or secondary beliefs (Sabatier 
1988). Based on organisational learning theories, Nye (1987) suggested a distinction 
between ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ learning, whereby ‘simple learning’ refers to changes 
in means (such as policy instruments) based on new information while the ends, i.e. 
policy objectives, remain stable. This is however different from ‘normal’ learning, 
where only knowledge and experience increases without necessarily resulting in 
changed means or ends. ‘Complex learning’ refers to “a recognition of conflicts 
among values [that] leads to a modification of goals as well as means” (Levy 1994: 
285). Complex learning can be regarded as including a change in underlying beliefs 
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on what means or goals should be pursued with the policy and which policy options 
should be followed to achieve a modified goal. This section examines theoretical and 
empirical studies that include changes in beliefs, values or worldviews in their analy-
sis and thus go beyond the more ‘normal’ conceptualisations of learning via increased 
knowledge and experience. 
 
 
Changes in the policy environment as learning 
 
A set of literature that is empirically focused on the implementation of energy and 
agriculture policy in Sweden and the United States conceptualises Environmental Pol-
icy Integration as learning (Fiorino 2001; Nilsson and Persson 2003; Nilsson 2005; 
Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007). They define environmental policy integration “as a pol-
icy-learning process in which perspectives evolve and sectoral actors reframe their ob-
jectives, strategies, and decisionmaking processes towards sustainable development” 
(Nilsson and Persson 2003: 207). This conceptualisation links back to Jachtenfuchs 
(1996), who used the concept of learning as a change in frames which as “needs, re-
sources and preferences of actors are socially constructed” (Jachtenfuchs 1996: 175). 
Jachtenfuchs examined the development of climate policy in the European Com-
munity during the 1980s until the 1992 Rio Summit. He found that the framing in the 
European Commission changed from ‘classic environmental policy’ to ‘sustainability’ 
and thus concluded on the occurrence of learning. Furthermore, he emphasised that 
the sustainability frame is politically more convenient as it allows a win-win approach 
to also achieve the other goals of economic growth, reducing distortions in the com-
mon market and facilitating the implementation of environmental policy in the mem-
ber states, whereas the ‘negative’ frame of classic command-and-control envi-
ronmental regulation was frequently at odds with these more traditional goals. This 
very broad definition of learning relates to changes in worldviews (Jachtenfuchs 1996: 
175).  
While Jachtenfuchs also includes the organisational level, Nilsson appears to focus 
implicitly on wider changes in the socio-political sphere. He uses a narrower defini-
tion of frames as “ways of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a 
complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analysing, persuading and acting” 
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(Nilsson 2005: 209) and limits this to wider changes in the policymaking envi-
ronment. Yet, a key aspect of the ‘Environmental Policy Integration as learning’-
literature is that it has a distinctive focus on the implementation of policies on the na-
tional and local level and thus takes a broader approach to learning across the full 
policymaking cycle. ‘Learning by doing’ and ‘trial and error’-learning are typical oc-
currences in policy implementation. In a follow-up study Nilsson, Eckerberg et al. 
provide an empirically thick analysis of environmental policy integration into energy, 
agriculture and biofuels policy in Sweden using the same learning frame. Envi-
ronmental policy integration is concluded to be learning, but it rather happens in wider 
societal frame-changes. Nilsson and Eckerberg (2007: 158-159) acknowledge the 
possibility of political learning but see this as potential basis for triggering “learning 
processes and EPI by constructing argumentative ‘bridges’” (Nilsson and Eckerberg 
2007: 158). Once the policymaking process is entered, political interests can take over 
and hinder learning so that “the learning approach is in this sense not completely in 
resonance with the nature of democratic politics” (Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007: 159). 
 
 
Social learning 
 
This type of learning relates to changing beliefs among individuals involved in the 
policymaking process or overall shifting objectives of the individual’s wider organisa-
tion. Key contributions emphasised in the review articles (Bennett and Howlett 1992; 
May 1992; Zito and Schout 2009) are from Hall (1993), Sabatier (1987; 1988; 1998), 
and date back to Heclo (1974). It can be understood as a “reaffirmation or revision of 
the dominant causal reasoning about policy problems, interventions, or objectives. 
(…) Learning occurs when beliefs among policy elites about key aspects of policy 
within a given policy domain are either reaffirmed or changed. Demonstrating social 
learning requires showing that the dominant policy elite’s beliefs have either been al-
tered or reaffirmed in light of policy experience” (May 1992: 337-338). The key agent 
for social learning is the social interaction of experts who are either bureaucrats, poli-
ticians or members of epistemic communities (Hall 1993: 277). Hall defines social 
learning “as deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response 
to past experience and new information. Learning is indicated when policy changes as 
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the result of such a process” (Hall 1993: 278). Hall goes on to point out that learning 
is the result of policy-maker’s reflection on policy-relevant knowledge or past experi-
ence and thus attempts to adjust a policy (Hall 1993: note 20). 
A key contribution of Hall’s (1993) paper on social learning is the typology of 
three order changes, which is very similar to Sabatier’s (1988) model but does not in-
clude a normative connotation of beliefs. Hall points out three possible changes: 1st 
order change describes changes in policy instruments in the light of experience or 
knowledge with a frequently incremental character, 2nd order change implies changes 
in policy instruments and the wider instrument settings in which the policy instru-
ments are applied and 3rd order change means that the hierarchy of goals behind the 
instruments and the instrument settings are changed (Hall 1993). Most of the aspects 
of Hall’s conceptualisation of learning are about the policy outcome given that he de-
fines learning as adjustment of policies of different scopes following the provision of 
new information. The conceptual challenge with this framework is that it does not en-
courage an analytical differentiation between learning in the policymaking process 
and the policy outcome. The change in policy instruments, instrument settings or hier-
archy of goals can be a result of learning, but there are also numerous alternative ex-
planations to this outcome that are not covered by Hall’s framework. 
 Feindt (2010) analyses learning in Environmental Policy Integration within the 
paradigm shift in the Common Agricultural Policy from 1973 until 2004. The study 
focuses on wider changes in society and the EU’s response. He finds that policy 
change in the Common Agricultural Policy has become the norm while learning is 
limited to increases in knowledge and experience. The constant change is due to the 
institutional role of the European Commission given that the Council never rejected a 
reform proposal in its entirety. As long as the European Commission promotes policy 
change, the institutional setting supports incremental changes and the evolution of 
paradigms (Feindt 2010). The Advocacy Coalition Frame (Sabatier 1988), which is 
combined with Hall’s (1993) social learning and order changes, identifies learning as 
taking place within and across coalitions. The European Commission introduces 
changes and the Council favours the status quo. In the 2003 Fischler reforms, Feindt 
finds that the European Commission acted as policy broker by changing the frame-
work conditions and creating hurting stalemates with the ‘surprise reform proposal’ 
approach of Commissioner Fischler. Social learning occurred (Feindt 2010) as de-
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coupling and cross-compliance did not change the policy paradigm of income support. 
Therefore, rather an integration of new paradigms (EPI and market liberalisation) into 
the older paradigm of income support occurred, but it was not replaced. 
 
 
Belief changes as learning in the international relations literature 
 
Particularly the theory streams of institutionalism and constructivism within the inter-
national relations literature point towards the importance of beliefs and belief changes 
for decision-making processes and outcomes. Early key contributions (e.g. Haas 1980; 
Keohane and Nye 1987; Nye 1987; Wendt 1992) included learning as a relevant fac-
tor, both in terms of drawing lessons from collective experiences, including potential 
changes in underlying beliefs and foreign policy approaches following military inter-
ventions (e.g. Jervis 1976 and Ravenal 1978; see Levy 1994: 280) as well as explain-
ing shifts in ideological framings such as the revolutionary changes in the Soviet Un-
ion under Mikhail Gorbachev (Breslauer 1992) and experiences of key individuals 
leading up to these changes (Gross Stein 1994). Some international security contribu-
tions went even further and linked learning to the evolution of social and political sys-
tems (Modelski 1990) as well as successful nuclear deterrence (Nye 1987). 
There is a conceptual distinction between ‘normative change’ and ‘normative 
learning’ to be made. ‘Normative change’, as it is used by Robert Keohane and Joseph 
Nye (1987), refers to “new values [that] are desired as ends in themselves, as in a reli-
gious revelation” (Levy 1994: 286). In contrast, normative learning refers to changes 
in beliefs for example regarding the national interest, which is seen as means, i.e. “in-
strumental to the achievement of higher order national values (…) [such as] paradig-
matic shifts, including Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’” (Levy 1994: 286). Keohane and 
Nye defined learning as “to alter one’s beliefs as a result of new information; to de-
velop knowledge or skill by study or experience” (Keohane and Nye 1987: 749). This 
definition carries three types of learning: an addition in knowledge via study, more 
experience and a change in underlying beliefs resulting from factual and/ or experien-
tial learning. They distinguish a mere shift in the national interest from learning by il-
lustrating how powerful individuals can influence the national interest as a result of a 
change in leadership, for example following an election, but without reflecting wider 
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shifts in societal beliefs (see also Nye 1987: 378). Alternatively, a change may be a 
result of adjusted societal preferences and thus national interest. Actors as members of 
society can change their views when norms evolve (i.e. through ‘normative evolution’ 
and ‘normative change’), subsequently making practices such as slavery or colo-
nialism illegitimate in a later period (Nye 1987: 378). They also separate learning via 
changes in beliefs from judgements whether this learning resulted in more effective or 
morally superior policies (Keohane and Nye 1987: 749). ‘Normative learning’ is 
based on Ernst B. Haas’ definition and occurs between states when “new knowledge 
is used to redefine the content of the national interest. Awareness of newly understood 
causes of unwanted effects often results in the adoption of different, and more effec-
tive, means to attain one’s ends.” (Haas 1980: 390; see also Nye 1987: 378). 
Ernst B. Haas’ (1980: 390) definition of learning as gaining better knowledge 
and skills to adjust strategies for achieving one’s political objectives can be seen as 
falling into the category of experiential learning or, as May (1992) later referred to it, 
as ‘political learning’ or ‘policy-oriented learning’ (Sabatier 1987). This distinction 
also points towards a relevant observation made by Keohane and Nye when they 
pointed out that beliefs can change as a result of reflecting on previous experience 
such as failure to react appropriately to another countries’ military aggression against 
a third country. But even if these beliefs changed, individuals or states may still lack 
the capabilities to react accordingly and thus to translate the learning into policy 
change (Keohane and Nye 1987: 750).  
Furthermore, they introduce a distinction between incremental learning and 
discontinuous learning, which refers to major landmark events such as catastrophes, 
declarations of war or economic crises. Particularly international regimes as widely 
agreed-to rules, plans and regulations guiding organisational resource allocation 
(Ruggie 1975: 569) can facilitate incremental learning as they can  
 
1) change standard operating procedures for national bureaucracies; 2) present 
new coalition opportunities for subnational actors and improved access for third 
parties; 3) change the attitudes of participants through contacts within institu-
tions; 4) provide information about compliance with rules, which facilitates learn-
ing about others' behavior; and 5) help to de-link one issue from others, thus fa-
cilitating learning with specialized groups of negotiators. 
 
(Keohane and Nye 1987: 751) 
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There is also a relevant link between individual and organisational learning, as 
individual learning of policymaking elites is an important yet insufficient precondition 
for learning among societal actors on a collective level. Nye (1987: 381) points out 
that not all individuals within governments and societies learn at the same rate, 
whereby organisations require an institutional memory and procedures that again dif-
ferently affect new and old members of that organisation. On a societal level, there are 
different interests and willingness to engage with new information and common ex-
periences across societal groups and generations, all affecting “the transmission belts 
between mass public opinion, societal groups, and political elites” (Nye 1987: 381). 
The prior beliefs of individuals further influence their willingness to engage with new 
information that could potentially alter their beliefs as well as the way they interpret 
the new information (Nye 1987: 379) such as in bargaining situations dependent upon 
how individuals interpret their experiences from previous negotiations based on their 
existing prior beliefs (Nye 1987: 379; see also Leng 1983). These prior beliefs are 
formed through political leaders’ reflection on previous experiences, while early ex-
periences are particularly influential (Jervis 1976; Nye 1987: 380-381). 
 In his keystone paper on the ‘social construction of power politics’, Wendt 
(1992) picks up Keohane and Nye’s (1987) conceptualisation of simple and complex 
learning. His discussion on how the influence of states’ expectations based on other 
states’ previous behaviour influences states’ interests and identities can also be linked 
to learning based on a reflection of past experiences and subsequently adjusted beliefs 
(i.e. ‘complex learning’) where “the process by which egoists [in the prisoner’s di-
lemma] learn to cooperate is at the same time a process of reconstructing their inter-
ests in terms of shared commitments to social norms (…) [whereby] these norms will 
resist change because they are tied to actor’s commitments to their identities and in-
terests, not merely because of transaction costs” (Wendt 1992: 417). Although Wendt 
focuses on international cooperation among states in the face of anarchy, his theoreti-
cal conceptualisation is also relevant to learning as it describes how actors come to see 
an issue differently or adjust their interests after reflecting on experiences and struc-
tural incentives for international cooperation. These newly formed beliefs are stable 
based on their link to the actor’s adapted identity, which can also be interpreted as a 
‘deep belief’ (Sabatier 1988). 
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 The link between learning and policy outcome is explored in detail by Peter 
and Ernst Haas when they asked how international organisations can learn to do better 
(Haas and Haas 1995). They take a constructivist perspective and understand learning 
as a change in the values and interests of actors (Haas and Haas 1995: 258), which can 
be regarded as overall beliefs. A key element to learning is that actors realise the 
complex links between problems on an international organisation’s agenda, whereby 
they label the process of learning becoming more embedded in an organisation as Or-
ganizational Learning and the “broader international process by which state entities 
and other actors learn and assimilate some of these lessons” (Haas and Haas 1995: 
259) as Institutional Learning. Overall, their learning frame contains references to 
changing beliefs, consensual knowledge and experience in the interaction of collective 
state actors within international organisations. 
Again focusing on international institutions as arenas for state cooperation and 
actors in their own rights, Haas (2000) analyses social learning among and within 
these institutions. He discusses the factors that enable institutions to learn via chan-
ging their perception on options for problem solving, i.e. beliefs, and subsequently 
their behaviour, i.e. the policy outcome (Haas 2000: 569). Comparing the activities of 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) on global climate governance, he illustrates how factual learn-
ing and policy outcomes depend on the actions of powerful individuals in leadership 
positions who reflect on scientific findings and draw lessons from past experiences 
(Haas 2000: 568-569). When they made active use of their leadership positions, indi-
viduals were able to translate their individual learning into policy change via their in-
ternational organisation’s actions. International institutions furthermore facilitate 
learning as ‘teachers’ when they have a high legitimacy, encourage the dissemination 
of innovations and information as well as build capacities for national governments to 
act, mostly via providing a negotiation forum for these activities (Haas 2000: 570-
571). Haas uses the ‘label’ of social learning, whereby the learning discussed in this 
contribution is closely linked to factual learning and experience-based lesson drawing 
(albeit within the international context), which is also mirrored in later contributions 
by Oran Young (2008; 2010). The next section turns towards the Organizational 
Learning literature to integrate a closer understanding of cognitive and individual 
learning processes. 
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2.2 Cognitive and Organizational Learning literatures  
 
 
Cognitive learning asks how individuals such as decision-makers learn and analyses 
the mental, frequently experience-based frames that determine thinking, memory and 
learning. Cognitive learning is based in psychology and therefore takes a micro-
approach as opposed to the macro-approach of political science. Organizational learn-
ing is a diverse research discipline grounded in social psychology and management 
studies and is concerned with the scholarly analysis of what an organisation is and 
what it might learn (Argyris and Schön 1978; Easterby-Smith and Lyles 2005). The 
following section examines and summarises two cognitive approaches to learning: the 
linear learning process by Popper/ Swann as discussed in Swann (1999) and the cent-
ral explanation of learning as experiential learning cycle resulting from reflection on 
trial-and-error (Argyris and Schön 1978). The second section turns towards Organiza-
tional Learning, which connects cognitive and constructivist learning theories and of-
fers very useful elements to answer the research questions. It identifies Argyris’ 
framework of single/ double loop learning (1976) together with the complete cycle of 
choice by March/ Olsen (1975) as useful explanatory elements.  
 
 
2.2.1 Cognitive and experiential learning  
 
Swann (1999) provides an overview on learning from a psychological-philosophical 
perspective based on Karl Popper’s theory of learning (Popper 1979; cited after 
Swann 1999; Figure 1): 
 
Figure 1.  Cognitive Learning Process. 
 
Source: Adapted by author from Swann 1999: 266. 
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Attempts are undertaken to solve the initial problem, what leads to a new set of 
problems or an outcome. The learning individual develops a trial solution to solve the 
initial problem that initiates the learning process. Any trial solution can be either suc-
cessful to solve the problem or pose further challenges, leading to a process of error 
elimination that finally presents a new problem or outcome. The main elements of 
what happens when learning occurs are changes in the learner, activity, creativity, trial 
and error as well as attempts to solve a problem (Swann 1999). The learning literature 
in education is concerned with how students learn and how they use, store and retrieve 
knowledge either through memorising in the form of declarative learning or pro-
cedural learning as forms of surface learning, or if they use deeper-level knowledge 
(Hay 2007) and incorporate reflections on learning in learning cycles (Kim 1993). 
One central concern of the learning literature is to determine how humans 
learn. As outlined in the definition of learning (2.1.1), learning can be understood as a 
process of drawing conclusions from experiences such as errors made in the past, re-
flection as well as adoption of a different course of action (Argyris 1976), thereby 
generating knowledge or skills. Argyris and Schön describe this model of learning 
from experience as “discovery-invention-production-generalization” (1978: 140) pro-
cess. It was taken up and modified several times by subsequent authors to match their 
respective analytical focus on the learning environment. At the core of these individ-
ual experiential learning cycles is the observation that an individual lives through an 
experience, observes the consequences (which might be the detection of an error), as-
sesses the situation by reflecting on the observations made during the experience, 
thereby cognitively designs abstract concepts or theoretical explanations, and imple-
ments them via testing (see Kim 1993: 39). Kolb referred to it as “observations and re-
flections [leading to the] formation of abstract concepts and generalizations [leading 
to] testing implications of concepts in new situations [leading to] concrete experience” 
(1984: 21, cited after Kim 1993: 38). Figure 2 visualises this simple model of individ-
ual learning, which is based on Argyris’ (1976) experiential learning cycle. 
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Figure 2.  Simple model of individual learning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Kim 1993: 40, based on Argyris 1976. 
 
 
March and Olsen improved the understanding of how individual and organisa-
tional learning work together in their “complete cycle of choice” (March and Olsen 
1975: 149). They describe a circular and reinforcing relationship between the individ-
ual, its’ organisation, the environment and how individuals perceive the world. This 
framework is situated within the realm of learning from experience.  
Individuals act or participate in a situation that requires a choice. Their behaviour 
in these decision-making situations is being influenced by their cognitions and prefer-
ences (element 1, March and Olsen 1975: 149). How individuals behave and partici-
pate influences the choices of the organisation they are affiliated with, thereby leading 
to a set of organisational outcomes or policies (2). In a third step, these organisational 
choices stimulate responses or actions from the environment the organisation is situ-
ated in or related to, which can be of spatial, political or societal character (3). These 
reactions of the environment affect individuals, which may have a relation to indi-
viduals within the organisation. Their individual cognitions and preferences, the way 
in which they understand the world they are living in, can be altered as a consequence 
(4). The learning cycle closes when these preferences of individuals change how they 
act or make decisions (see Figure 3, March and Olsen 1975: 150). 
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Figure 3. Complete cycle of choice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: March and Olsen (175: 150). 
 
A consolidation of different learning approaches was recently suggested by 
Gerlak and Heikkila (2011; Heikkila and Gerlak 2013). Based on key literature dis-
cussed in this chaper, they proposed to both analyse the learning process and the 
learning outcome (see also Heclo 1974) for examining learning among a collective 
(e.g. within an organisation) with a focus on the collectives’ experience and addition 
in knowledge. A contribution by Dunlop (2009) applies an approach to adult learning 
from the educational literature to determine what decision-makers learn from epi-
stemic communities. This is a rare contribution that focuses on the individual level. It 
applies typology on adult learning to a comparative case study between the EU and 
the US on how decision-makers learned about the milk yield enhancer bovine somato-
trophin (rbST). She finds that all four aspects of learning were present to different de-
grees over the three decades examined. The study follows the dimensions of decision-
makers’ control over the content of learning and their control over the learning objec-
tives. These included self-directed learning (high control of content and objectives), 
informal learning (high control of content, low control of objectives), non-formal 
learning (low control of content, high control of objectives) and formal learning (low 
control of content and objectives). In the US, decision-makers moved from non-
formal learning to self-directed learning whereas in the EU the development was re-
versed (Dunlop 2009: 301). 
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A similar comparative perspective between the EU and the US with a focus on 
individual policy-makers was provided by Montpetit (2009). He conducted a survey 
of individual policy-makers involved in developing biotechnology policy and asked 
them about their learning while involved in policymaking. The findings are interesting 
as they falsify the EU literature’s	  assumption that learning is particularly supported by 
the deliberative governance structure of the EU, which is seen as a more consensual 
political system as compared to the adversarial character of the US although these two 
systems are moving closer together (Sabatier 1998). The 666 survey answers indicate 
that both US and EU decision-makers and those in the EU member states engage simi-
larly in learning, thus calling for a “significant revision of the theories suggesting that 
governance in the EU is particularly conducive to policy learning. In fact, policy de-
velopment in nation states, including North American states, features policy learning 
in much the same way as in the institutions of the EU” (Montpetit 2009: 1999). 
 
 
2.2.2 Single-, Double Loop and Deutero Learning  
 
Argyris and Schön (1978) developed a conceptual framework to analyse how an or-
ganisation learns based on the observation that it frequently knows less than its’ em-
ployees. The paradox of organisational learning is that it encompasses more than the 
learning experienced by individuals, but learning happens through the actions and ex-
periences of the individuals within the organisation (Argyris and Schön 1978: 9). 
They developed their “Theory of Action” (Argyris and Schön 1978) to understand 
how individuals (i.e. policy-makers) learn to improve their effectiveness and compe-
tence by both taking action and learning from the experience through reflection. This 
deliberate action has a cognitive basis reflecting strategies, norms and assumptions of 
the individual’s world and constitutes a theory-in-use, the way an individual actually 
acts in a given situation. This however is not necessarily the same as the ‘theory-in-
action’, which refers to a behaviour the individual communicates as its’ principled 
course of action (Argyris and Schön 1978: 6-11).  Within an organisation, individuals 
construct their own but incomplete image of the overall ‘theory-in-use’, which is con-
stantly being modified and makes organisational learning “an active process of orga-
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nizing which is, at root, a cognitive enterprise” (Argyris and Schön 1978: 16) leading 
to what Argyris and Schön call Single-Loop-Learning:  
 
Members of the organization respond to changes in the internal and external envi-
ronments of the organization by detecting errors which they then correct so as to 
maintain the central features of organizational theory-in-use. These are learning 
episodes which function to preserve a certain kind of constancy.  (…) There is a 
single feed-back loop which connects detected outcomes of action to organiza-
tional strategies and assumptions which are modified so as to keep organizational 
performance within the range set by organizational norms. The norms themselves 
(…) remain unchanged.   
(Argyris and Schön 1978: 18-19) 
 
Central elements of single-loop learning are unchanged norms and the ob-
jective of error elimination by developing new strategies to solve the problem; 
however for individual learning to become organisational learning, the evalu-
ations need to be transferred to organisational memory (Argyris and Schön 
1978): 
 
Organizational learning occurs when individuals, acting from their images and 
maps, detect a match or mismatch of outcome to expectation which confirms or 
disconfirms organizational theory-in-use. In the case of disconfirmation, indi-
viduals move from error detection to error correction. (…) From this it follows 
(…) that individual learning is a necessary but insufficient condition for organiza-
tional learning.  
(Argyris and Schön 1978: 19-20)  
 
While the single-loop learning process or error detection and -correction rather 
depicts individual or  –  in the case of organisational learning – non-individual/ social 
perspectives of cognitive learning, Argyris and Schön introduce “double-loop learn-
ing”. This becomes especially relevant when the correction of errors cannot be 
achieved through simply raising the effectiveness (as with single-loop learning), but 
when the norms defining effective performance need to be reconsidered and altered 
(Argyris and Schön 1978: 21-22). In sum, double-loop learning refers  
 
to those sorts of organizational inquiry which resolve incompatible organiza-
tional norms by setting new priorities and weighting of norms, or by restruc-
turing the norms themselves together with associated strategies and assump-
tions.  
(Argyris and Schön 1978: 24) 
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A third level of learning within organisations is “deutero-learning” (Argyris and 
Schön 1978: 26). This occurs when individuals reflect on the experienced contexts for 
learning or failure to learn, thereby evaluating current strategies and coming up with 
new strategies for learning. As this learning process is being encoded in previously 
introduced individual images, it can also be reflected in the learning practise of an or-
ganisation. This concept of deutero-learning is referred to as organisational learning 
cycle (Argyris and Schön 1978: 27-28) and has thus similarities with the “complete 
cycle of choice” discussed in the previous section. Single-, double- and deutero learn-
ing thus all fall within the remit of reflecting on experiences and detecting errors.  
A large number of empirical studies used or adapted the organisational learning 
framework, both in management and policy studies.  Two particularly relevant studies 
in the area of learning in climate policy integration within the EU were published by 
Dunlop (2010) on biofuel policy in the UK and by Koch and Lindenthal (2011) on en-
vironmental policy integration in the European Commission. Dunlop's study (2010) is 
predominantly focused on the UK government level. It examines UK biofuels policy, 
particularly the implementation of the 2003 Biofuels directive (EU 2003a). The learn-
ing agents are decision-makers in the UK, predominantly in the Department for 
Transport, who learn from the scientific community. The content of the learning pro-
cess is the introduction of new evidence of the mixed and partly negative climate per-
formance of biofuels. The timing of this input was however unfortunate as the 2003 
biofuels directive was already being implemented, a biofuels industry had formed and 
the first policy instruments were being legislated (the Renewable Transport Fuel Obli-
gations), what resulted in a strong path-dependency and lock-in of the policy outcome. 
Consequently, the new evidence did not result in learning and changing beliefs about 
the viability of biofuels as means to address climate change and reduce emissions. In-
stead, the new evidence was being ignored for political and economic reasons. An-
other aspect was the strategic technological advantage actors hoped to gain by achiev-
ing a leadership position in supporting first generation biofuels, so that the infrastruc-
ture and know-how was already in place to gain a leading edge on more sophisticated 
second and third generation biofuels from non-food crops. This was interpreted as 
‘learning by doing’. Learning was analysed as either single- or double-loop learning 
based on Argyris and Schön (1978). Particularly the ‘learning by doing’ in the form of 
ignoring the evidence due to hopes of long-term climate benefits from second/ third 
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generation biofuels was interpreted by Dunlop (2010) as single-loop learning, whereas 
there was no clear evidence for double-loop learning, which would have required a 
shift in goals due to reflection on the evidence. While the single/ double-loop frame-
work is well applied conceptually, the actors rather seemed to have entered into a 
mechanism of defensive avoidance as described by Janis and Mann (1977; see section 
2.2.3) than into single-loop learning. 
Koch and Lindenthal (2011) published a study on Environmental Policy Integra-
tion within the European Commission’s Directorate Generals of Enterprise as well as 
Energy and Transport (DG TREN/ later split up into DG Energy and DG Transport). 
The learning actors are these DGs, who learn from DG Environment about integrating 
environmental objectives into their policy areas (from the late 1980s until early 
2000s). They find three aspects of what they regard as learning as well as non-learning 
(i.e. no change). Non-learning refers to disregarding any demands to integrate envi-
ronmental objectives, which was exercised by DG Enterprise in the late 1980s. The 
three aspects of learning are lip service, following orders and ignoring orders (termed 
compliant single-loop learning, compliant double-loop learning and non-compliant 
double-loop learning respectively). Lip service occurred when DG TREN/ Enterprise 
acknowledged the importance of the environment, while failing to integrate envi-
ronmental objectives, resulting in a mismatch between what they said and did. This 
was the case in DG Transport in the 1990s and 2000s, DG Energy in the 1980s and 
1990s, and DG Enterprise in the 1990s. Following orders occurred by acknowledging 
that environmental policy integration was important, evidenced by setting up envi-
ronmental units and acknowledging the environment in management plans as well as 
reflecting on the importance of the environment in day-to day activities. This was 
found empirically to be the case in DG Transport in the 1990s and 2000s, DG Energy 
in the 1980s and 1990s and DG Enterprise in the early 1990s. Ignoring orders is 
understood as reflecting on orders and deciding to ignore them – and instead carrying 
on with business-as-usual with no change in output. While the empirical findings are 
interesting and merit further attention, the use of terminology is potentially mislead-
ing. What seemingly occurred in the past 20 years were different aspects of defensive 
avoidance, non-learning and alternative explanations to learning (see 2.2.3) such as 
the interest of continuing with business-as-usual. Overall, there is a mismatch between 
the DG’s objectives, which are opposed to each other.  
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2.3	  Alternative	  explanations	  to	  learning	  
 
 
So far, this literature review focused on the learning literature in the search for a theo-
retical framework that might be suitable to answer the key research questions. Particu-
larly the public policy literature has examined policy change in detail, frequently 
without paying much attention to the role of learning. Thus, this section gives a brief 
overview of relevant alternative explanations for policy change other than learning, 
some of which will be taken up in more detail throughout the meta-theoretical frame-
work and the empirical analysis (in particular Janis and Mann 1977; Kingdon 1995; 
Sabatier 1988). Overall, numerous contributions in political science and beyond have 
focused on the influence of power, national interests, the interests of private actors in-
fluencing decision-making using lobbying strategies and following pre-set objectives 
by carrying out orders from higher levels of the political hierarchy. These alternative 
explanations are too numerous to provide a comprehensive overview.  
 Much has been said about the importance of power in policymaking (e.g. 
Clegg 2010; Haas 2004; Saurugger 2013), the power relations between the European 
institutions (e.g. Costello and Thomson 2013; Häge and Naurin 2013) and among 
states (e.g. Haas 2004; Keohane and Nye 1987; Moravcsik 1993; Wendt 1992), as 
well as among non-governmental actors (e.g. Coopey 1995). At the same time, actors 
within the European institutions such as those chairing committee meetings have a 
considerable power resulting in asymmetries, which allow these actors to achieve their 
objectives via procedural tactics, behind-the-scene deals with negotiation partners and 
forming coalitions to secure a voting majority (see e.g. Tallberg 2004; Warntjen 
2008). Theories of the policy process also emphasise the important role of policy en-
trepreneurs (Kingdon 1995; Roberts and King 1991), policy brokers (Sabatier 1988) 
and policy middlemen (Heclo 1974) to find a compromise solution between policy 
coalitions as emphasised for example by the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier 
1988; Weible and Sabatier 2009). They furthermore emphasise the importance of 
windows of opportunity, in which the framework conditions are conducive to allow 
actors to address policy problems (e.g. Kingdon 1995; see chapter 3).  
Linked to power, windows of opportunity and policy entrepreneurs are lobby-
ing, bargaining and national interests as further key alternative explanations for policy 
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change that occurs independent of learning. The lobbying literature emphasises the 
power of industry and vested interest groups (e.g. Baumgartner 2007; Broscheid and 
Coen 2007; Klüver 2013; Marshall 2012). They use various strategies to influence 
policymakers so that these change their position in line with the lobbyists’ interests. 
Particularly incentives in the form of future political support by important stakehold-
ers, previous affiliations or loyalties as well as quid-pro-quo support for other policy 
proposals can influence policymaker’s willingness to adopt a position that matches the 
lobbying group’s interests. This change in position could thus not be attributed to 
learning given that no reflection occurred and the policymaker would have supported 
another position had the influence via the lobbying group not taken place. This litera-
ture can also be linked to power critiques in the stream on critical political economy 
problematising the influence of industry lobbying organisations and powerful eco-
nomic interests (e.g. Newell 2000).  
In a similar vein, political preferences of member states in the form of national 
interests also play an important role. Member states lobby the European Commission 
and Members of the European Parliament in negotiations before and after a policy 
proposal has been published to make their national interests in the matter clear (Panke 
2012). They also form coalitions with other like-minded countries to improve their 
bargaining power (Elgström and Jönsson 2000; Slapin 2008) both in terms of votes 
and side-payments via concessions in other policy areas being negotiated in parallel or 
expected in the near future. Member states also rationally determine their benefits 
from implementing EU directives and depending on the gains from EU membership, 
the number of legal infringement cases varies (Perkins and Neumayer 2007). This 
finding points towards the relevance of ‘gains’ from EU membership and voting 
power within the European institutions and thus ultimately the importance of member 
states’ ability to protect national interests. The stream of Intergovernmentalism em-
phasises the key role of member states in European policymaking, which act based on 
their national interests with little attention to the actions of supranational actors such 
as the European Commission (Moravcsik 1993). 
A common element to most of the more recent studies on learning is their 
‘positive’ focus on learning and less on hindering factors that make learning difficult. 
Looking back to case studies on learning in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, 
May (1992) finds that there is less learning than could be expected given his differ-
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entiation of learning types into instrumental, social and political learning. This is 
caused by a wealth of hindering factors. The findings on instrumental learning in men-
tal health care policy and nuclear waste policy indicate deficient understandings of the 
policy problem and consequently means of improving policy performance in their 
technical, organisational and political constraints, what opens up the space for oppo-
nents to construct different views (May 1992: 349). Even where the knowledge ex-
isted to improve policy performance in the form of instrumental policy learning, pol-
icy-makers could not act on that knowledge as they were constrained by political fac-
tors. Similarly, the polarisation of beliefs among coalitions competing for political in-
fluence hinders social policy learning, as the beliefs are too different to allow finding 
common ground (May 1992: 349). Political learning is often opposed to policy learn-
ing in American politics as coalitions become more sophisticated in defending their 
beliefs. Examples include local protest groups that challenge federal beliefs on the 
suitability of their site for nuclear waste disposal, beliefs about potential harm and 
economic growth (May 1992: 350). Overall, May finds in his review of empirical 
studies that policy learning can be hindered by a lack of knowledge, experience and 
particularly stable beliefs. At the same time, the stable beliefs motivate actors to en-
gage in political learning. 
While the literature on alternative explanations for policy change other than 
learning is extensive and diverse, a relatively small body of literature originating 
mainly in management studies and social psychology is concerned with the opposite 
of learning (also referred to as ‘non-learning’) on the individual and micro-
organisational level. This includes avoiding to reflect on an input, forgetting about 
previously acquired knowledge, reactive governing and simply ‘muddling through’ 
the process towards an outcome (e.g. Hedberg 1981; Hughes and Tight 1995; Huber 
1991; Janis and Mann 1977; Lindblom 1959; 1979; Nystrom and Starbuck 1984). This 
literature provides indirect links to the well-developed literature on power and more 
state-centred explanations for policy change discussed above. Unlearning was intro-
duced by Hedberg (1981) and picked up by Nystrom and Starbuck (1984). It is de-
fined as “a process through which learners discard knowledge” (Hedberg 1981: 18; 
cited after Huber 1991: 104) that is considered to be obsolete and may thereby not 
only be unconscious, but also intentional (Huber 1991: 104). Yet the term ‘unlearn-
ing’ suggests that the decision-maker or organisation has previously acquired the ne-
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cessary knowledge but chose to ignore it or lost the capability to use it. Reasons could 
be that the expert in the field left the organisation or the decision-maker forgot that 
s/he dealt with a similar issue in another context.  
Janis and Mann (1977) suggest that decision-makers may avoid addressing a 
problem using defensive avoidance. This form of psychological defence gives rise to a 
defective search as it interferes with information processing and is frequently con-
nected to unconscious sources of unresolved conflict regarding a decision (Janis and 
Mann 1977: 98). Especially policy-makers, when confronted with a problem that re-
quires a resolution, are usually faced with two options: either they address the prob-
lem by designing a trial solution and thereby enter a process of learning, or they enter 
a state of defensive avoidance. This state can have personal consequences of a posi-
tive or negative nature. Options of defensive action are procrastination, buck passing 
and bolstering (Janis and Mann 1977: 107). Especially in large, government-related 
organisations decision-makers frequently consider the option of buck passing, i.e. 
delegating the decision to another department or somebody below/ above them in the 
hierarchy of their own department to avoid liabilities for a wrong or – especially in 
public office – unpopular but adequate decision or they procrastinate over the decision 
and hope that temporal circumstances or further developments take the decision off 
their shoulders (Janis and Mann 1977). An alternative option of unclear decision-
making is bolstering. In this case, policy-makers reach an ill-considered decision that 
is based on shared rationalisations and a collective sense of being protected against 
threats of failure, which is also called ‘groupthink’ (Janis 1972). If policy-makers are 
confronted with certain conditions, they are likely to resort to groupthink, which may 
reduce the quality of their decisions (Janis 1972).  
While the power-related literature points towards alternative explanations for a 
policy change other than learning (i.e. no learning occurred, but a policy outcome em-
erged nevertheless), the ‘non-learning’ literature emphasises that there are hindering 
factors that prevent individuals or organisations from reflecting on knowledge or ex-
perience and thus to enter a learning process. Both can occur during the policy making 
process: actors can learn, but their learning is not transferred to the policy outcome 
due to lobbying, powerful opposing coalitions or missing majorities. Similarly, a pol-
icy outcome emerges although actors entered defensive avoidance or followed orders 
from higher levels of the hierarchy, for example from a policy entrepreneur who used 
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conventional bargaining and negotiation tactics to achieve a voting majority in support 
of a policy proposal.  
In conclusion, the analysis needs to take into account not only conventional 
explanations for policy change such as power, national interests, lobbying and bar-
gaining, but also instances where decisions are avoided through procrastination, wish-
ful thinking that the situation resolves itself, delegating the decision to others or ill-
considered decisions based on groupthink (Janis 1972). These forms of defensive 
avoidance hinder policy-makers from entering into a learning process, and therefore 
point towards alternative explanations for policy change. The following section syn-
thesises the different theoretical frameworks for learning discussed in sections 2.1 
through 2.3 into a ‘learning continuum’ that allows to pinpoint how the different 
learning frameworks fit together as a first step towards developing a coherent meta-
theoretical framework that involves the key components of existing frameworks.  
 
 
 
2.4 The learning continuum 
 
 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 examined different types of policy- and organisational learning 
and uncovered a mature research literature that resulted from a complex development 
over several decades. Each learning frame covers different aspects, levels and stages 
of the policymaking process, but none provides a comprehensive frame that allows 
analysing collective and individual learning. There have been attempts to address as-
pects of the criticisms brought forward by Keohane and Nye (1987) on the short-
comings of the learning literature, which were however re-confirmed by Radaelli 
(2009) 22 years later. Few contributions on theoretical frameworks succeeded at ad-
dressing key shortcomings of the literature such as failure to differentiate learning 
from alternative explanations for policy change, mistaking learning for lip-service or 
defensive avoidance, setting learning and policy change equal as well as failure to 
separate different levels of collective learning (Levy 1994: 282).  
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This section categorises above discussed theoretical frameworks on learning 
into a ‘learning continuum’. It comes to the interim conclusion that the policy learning 
literature within political science has the highest relevance for determining and detect-
ing learning among decision-makers in (European) policymaking. The reason is that 
the policy learning literature emphasises the central importance of networks among 
different actors in policymaking as new form of governance (Eberlein and Kerwer 
2004), the change in underlying beliefs by engaging in coalitions for policymaking 
(Sabatier 1987) and policy entrepreneurs (Roberts and King 1991).    
Although the policy learning literature is very good at pointing out the exist-
ence of learning processes in policymaking and possible underlying factors, it partly 
falls short of providing an answer to the question of how exactly this learning hap-
pens. Furthermore, the policy learning literature points towards the role of epistemic 
communities and experts as agents of change with influence on the policymaking pro-
cess (Haas 1992; Zito 2001) and links them with policy entrepreneurs (Braun 2009), 
but it does not systematically integrate those aspects into one coherent theory of pol-
icy learning. With a few notable exceptions (Dunlop 2009; Keohane and Nye 1987; 
Nye 1987; Radaelli 2009; Zito and Schout 2009), there is also a gap in the policy 
learning literature regarding the link of learning processes occurring on the individual 
and organisational level. 
Above discussed diverse bodies of learning literature do have commonalities 
that point towards a larger set of factors influencing how decision-makers learn. Con-
sequently, they can be placed in a learning continuum of two major characteristics. 
First, the learning continuum distinguishes who learns. Theories can be placed inside 
a continuum between individual learning and collective learning, while some theories 
expand to the link between the learning of an individual and how the learning result is 
transmitted to the broader community of that individual, for example the organisation 
or a network of different governmental, non-governmental or transnational actors. 
 Second, the learning continuum distinguishes between three modes of learn-
ing that also overlap in some learning theories and concepts. Learning occurs when 
there is a positive change, i.e. an increase, in the knowledge base of an individual or 
an organisation initiated by an internal or external information input that can lead to 
the development of certain skills. The most dominant mode of learning is by doing, 
i.e. ‘experiential learning’ that is based on drawing lessons from an experience (Ar-
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gyris and Schön 1978). Individuals and organisations can also arrive at ‘constructivist 
learning’ when they change their underlying beliefs based on an experience or in-
crease in knowledge and thereby come to see the situation differently (Haas and Haas 
1995; Nye 1987), what in turn leads to a more informed and reflected reaction. Figure 
4 provides an overview of the major learning literatures. The bodies of literature can 
be situated in the learning continuum along the individual or collective (organisa-
tional/ institutional or socio-political) dimension. The other dimension is the mode of 
learning, i.e. an increase in knowledge, experience or a change in underlying beliefs. 
Cognitive learning theories and concepts are predominantly situated on the 
dimension of individual learning with increases in knowledge and, in the case of the 
experiential learning cycles, an increase in experience. The organisational learning lit-
erature frequently links the individual with the organisational, i.e. collective dimen-
sion of learning and focuses on how individual learning experiences are transferred to 
the larger organisation based on experiences and/ or a change in underlying beliefs, 
thus introducing also a constructivist element. The policy learning literature is pre-
dominantly concerned with the dimension of collective learning among institutions 
involved in policymaking. It is furthermore interested in how individuals react within 
their networks to changed outside conditions and adapt policies from other levels of 
horizontal or vertical policymaking. The non-learning literature can be situated either 
on the individual level where there is a lack of reflection on the new information (de-
fensive avoidance) or on the collective level where decision-makers resist to take into 
account new knowledge (groupthink). The next chapter consolidates above discussed 
learning theories into a meta-theoretical framework that allows analysing what types 
of learning occur under what conditions in policymaking. 
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Figure 4. Categorisation of major learning frameworks within the learning con-
tinuum. PL = Policy Learning; OL = Organisational Learning; Non-L = Non-
Learning. Compiled by the author.  
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Chapter 3  
Meta-theoretical framework on learning in governance  
 
 
 
 
 
Given that the literature review did not identify a suitable existing theoretical frame-
work that allows to detect learning among decision-makers across multiple govern-
ance levels, this chapter develops a meta-theoretical framework based on the learning 
literature. The most widely used labels of learning are ‘political learning’ (May 1992; 
Sabatier 1988), ‘government learning’ (Etheredge 1981), ‘governance learning’ 
(Schout 2009), ‘social learning’ (Haas and Haas 1995; Heclo 1974; Nye 1987), ‘les-
son drawing’ (Asare and Studlar 2009; Rose 1991), ‘instrumental learning’ (May 
1992; Bennett and Howlett 1992), ‘organizational learning’ (Argyris and Schön 1978; 
March and Olsen 1975), ‘single-/double loop learning’ (Argyris 1976), ‘envi-
ronmental policy integration as learning’ (Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007) and further 
aspects summarised under the term ‘policy learning’ (e.g. Jachtenfuchs 1996; 
Nedergaard 2006a; 2006b). Chapter 2 identified two modes for learning. First, learn-
ing can occur within a single policy-maker (on the individual level) in a relatively 
closed sub-system such as an organisational unit consisting of a limited number of in-
dividuals. Second, learning can occur in a wider collective context that includes a 
large number of individuals involved in the overall policymaking process on the or-
ganisational level. Developments on the socio-political landscape can have feedback 
effects on policymaking based on the public’s overall willingness to accept a policy 
proposal as socially and politically desirable. 
The core element to identifying learning among policy-makers is to define 
learning, especially as opposed to classic bargaining behaviour and the representation 
of pre-formed interests in negotiations (see also Radaelli 2009). The literature and the 
definition of learning (see chapter 2.1.1) led to the conclusion that learning in a poli-
cymaking setting consists of three core components: the actor(s) reflect on a stimulus 
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such as new information, leading to an increase in knowledge, experience or even 
changes in underlying beliefs. These different types describe a horizontal aspect of 
learning, which can occur across the individual and collective levels as discussed by 
the cognitive learning literature (e.g. Argyris and Schön 1978; Kim 1993; March and 
Olsen 1975). The collective level can further be divided into learning within and be-
tween organisations and overall shifts in the socio-political landscape.  
The first section discusses the epistemological background for the theoretical 
framework, i.e. the underlying theoretical assumptions. The second section of this 
chapter clarifies how learning can be identified in the policymaking process and how 
the different aspects of learning presented in the ‘learning continuum’ (chapter 2) re-
late to each other. The third section illustrates the interdependence between learning 
and the policy process to determine how learning affected the policy outcome. 
 
 
 
3.1 Epistemological background 
 
 
The empirical research on indentifying learning approaches the research ques-
tion from an institutionalist perspective in the tradition of comparative public policy 
similar to the research of John Kingdon (1984), Paul Sabatier (1988; Weible et al. 
2011a; 2011b), as well as James March and Johan Olsen (1975; March et al. 1998), 
yet without ascribing to a specific sub-category such as ‘old’, ‘new’, ‘historic’ or 
‘sociological’ institutionalism. However, the basic assumptions particularly of the 
meta-theoretical framework for learning are shared with the perspective of ‘new insti-
tutionalism’ and wider implicit institutionalist approaches in the International Rela-
tions literature (e.g. Bernstein and Cashore 2012). In its empirical perspective, the re-
search also relates to ‘European Multilevel Governance’ (Jordan 2001; Marks and 
Hooghe 2001; Hooghe and Marks 2003) when it acknowledges diffuse power and 
multiple entry points for actors.  
This thesis does however not intend to relate to either the European Integration 
literature that emphasises deliberation, persuasion and the unique evolution of the EU 
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(Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008; Risse 2005), constructivist perspectives emphasising 
the subjective construction and use of knowledge (Jasanoff 1990; Saurugger 2013), 
critical perspectives focussing on the role of power in governance  or the intergov-
ernmentalist perspective emphasising the dominant role of states (Moravcsik 1993). It 
is primarily interested in examining learning within the policymaking process (i.e. 
law-making) that takes place in the interaction of governmental institutions. Above 
perspectives would divert attention from the core research questions if decision-
makers learn, how this learning can be identified and under what conditions it occurs. 
The research questions are thus focusing on the interplay of actors and institutions, not 
the normative implications of the interplay. For example, critical approaches to gov-
ernance research would at the stage of identifying learning processes complicate the 
analysis and theory development unnecessarily. So for the benefit of parsimony, the 
selected starting point for the research is an institutionalist tradition. 
Basic assumptions are rational actors trying to achieve their political objec-
tives which are based on the goals of the actor’s institution, the existence of shared be-
liefs that guide the actor’s behaviour and political preferences, a pluralist decision-
making arena with multiple interests, actors, and levels of governance as well as the 
opportunity for individuals to take on active roles in influencing the governance archi-
tecture of the institution, its objectives and policy outcomes. Most of these assump-
tions are mirrored by the institutionalism literature (Bell 2011; March and Olsen 
1984). It does however not take a normative approach making value judgements of 
how policymaking ought to be, it only examines how and why policymaking works 
the way it does and to what extent the intervening variable of learning matters. These 
assumptions are mirrored by new institutionalism, which “argues that preferences and 
meanings develop in politics, as in the rest of life, through a combination of education, 
indoctrination, and experience. They are neither stable nor exogenous” (March and 
Olsen 1984: 739). 
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3.2 Overview of the framework 
 
 
The meta-theoretical framework presented in this section draws on aspects of two 
theoretical frameworks of the policymaking process to more accurately analyse the 
empirical findings on the factors that facilitate or hinder learning. It does however not 
seek to apply them in their entirety or tries to ‘square the circle’ of combining non-
compatible basic assumptions (for discussions on their weaknesses and limited com-
patibility see Ackrill, Kay, and Zahariadis 2013; Capano 2009; Zahariadis 2007). It 
only uses them as auxiliary additional lenses from which to borrow key aspects miss-
ing in the learning literature to answer the research question and to test the hypothe-
ses. Combining the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) by Kingdon (1984; 1995) 
with aspects of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) by Sabatier (1988; 1998) is 
not straight-forward as they are not compatible on various grounds, each addressing 
key epistemological and theoretical dilemmas differently (see Capano 2009: 18-21).  
The meta-theoretical framework presented in this chapter is intended as a 
‘stand-alone’ framework that borrows empirically proven concepts from existing 
frameworks and thus takes a similar approach as Sabatier in his 1987 and 1988 papers 
on the ACF (Sabatier 1978; 1988). The following section explains the epistemological 
and theoretical choices following the analytical framework presented by Capano 
(2009). It however understands the choices as different options along a scale and not 
as a binary of ‘either - or’. Public policy is understood from an output perspective in 
the form of a piece of hard or soft legislation (for definitions, see Abbott and Snidal 
2000) that has been negotiated by different governmental and non-governmental ac-
tors on one or across multiple levels of governance. Policy change is defined as the 
difference between the status quo at a certain time and the progress compared to the 
status quo at a later time, whereby this also includes policy stability: an example for 
policy change would be the difference between the policy measures in the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy of the years 2000 and 2013 or the outcome documents of 
the negotiations within the UNFCCC between 1997 and 2012. 
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The meta-theoretical frameworks’ basic epistemological choices relate to the 
ideal type of the ‘life cycle’ (Capano 2009: 10, based on Van de Ven and Poole 1995): 
It assumes that there is a driver for policy change such as a policy problem that re-
quires a response in the form of a policy outcome. This can be compared to a key 
metaphor of organic growth with a prefigured sequence containing a relatively linear 
progression of events based on institutional rules (see Capano 2009). For example, the 
legislative process embedded in treaties regarding the functioning of a political system 
has a linear nature with a sequence of events and involvement of different actors at 
each stage (e.g. Craig 2010; Weidenfeld 2006) based on a constitution or similar 
treaty. Thus, the motors of change propel along a process of policymaking resembling 
the prefigured program. Institutions regulate this process of policymaking, whereby 
the outcome of the change also contains a certain level of irreversibility (Capano 
2009: 10, based on Van de Ven and Poole 1995) given that each existing piece of 
legislation benefits certain actors who form vested interests. These in turn result in 
lock-in effects into a continued existence, making non-incremental change unlikely. 
The dynamics of policy development are rather evolutionary with incremental chan-
ges along reform processes that are initiated as a result of reflection on previously ex-
isting policies (i.e. the driver for policy change). The emphasis on ‘reflection’ as a 
pre-requisite for learning also allows for more rapid developments.  
The meta-theoretical framework on learning takes a ‘co-evolutive perspective’ 
while linking macro and micro levels as discussed by Capano (2009). This is useful as 
it allows to understand both the micro-factors such as learning and the influence of in-
dividual policy entrepreneurs but also to take wider developments on the macro-level 
within the socio-political landscape into account. The framework requires a co-
evolution approach in the form of process-tracing the development of a policy from its 
origins (i.e. the driver for policy change) to its outcome to be able to pinpoint the mi-
cro-processes of learning at different stages. This is important, as learning is not even-
ly distributed across different stages of the policymaking process. The “structure/ 
agency dilemma” (Capano 2009: 16) is addressed via the linkage between the individ-
ual level and the organisational level of learning as well as possible alternative expla-
nations to learning. The process-tracing methodology suggested for the empirical 
studies allows identifying when individual action of policy-makers was translated into 
the “’behaviour of [the] social unit’ (…) to show how individual actions combine to 
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produce a social outcome’” (Coleman 1986: 363, cited after Capano 2009: 16). It is 
based on a combinative causality that takes the interdependence of levels on which 
learning occurs and alternative explanations to policy change into account. The key 
explanatory variables are policy entrepreneurs, organisational hindering factors, po-
litical interests, and changes in the socio-political landscape. 
Table 1 compares the epistemological and theoretical choices of the ACF and 
MSF and thus makes their differing underlying assumptions clear. It also summarises 
the epistemological and theoretical assumptions of the meta-theoretical framework to 
identify learning in policymaking presented in this chapter, which is important to un-
derstand “the viewpoint to be taken when considering reality” (Capano 2009: 11) and 
to allow reproducibility by applying the framework in an empirical context; while also 
taking into account the fit with basic assumptions to make informed choices of its 
applicability and limitations (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). 
 
Table 1. Epistemological and theoretical choices in the ACF, MSF and meta-
theoretical framework on learning in policymaking.  
 
 Multiple Streams 
Framework 
Advocacy Coalition 
Framework 
Meta-theoretical 
framework of learning 
in policymaking 
Epistemological choices 
Way of event 
progression 
Non-linearity (am-
biguous and 
unpredictable) 
Linearity (partially 
predictable) 
Linearity (from driver to 
address policy problem 
to policy outcome in the 
form of legislation) 
 
Dynamics of de-
velopment 
Not prefigured but 
predominantly evolu-
tionary 
Not prefigured Predominantly evolu-
tionary 
Motors of 
change 
Partially constrained 
chance and entrepre-
neurship 
 
 
External factors, par-
tisan change, con-
frontation, learning 
External factors (changes 
in the socio-political 
landscape) and internal 
factors (learning, entre-
preneurship) 
Theoretical choices 
Definition of 
policy develop-
ment and 
change 
Particularly focused 
on agenda setting. No 
distinction among dif-
ferent types of policy 
change 
Covering the entire 
process. Tripartition 
of content of changes 
(based on a triparti-
tion of policy beliefs) 
Covering the entire poli-
cymaking process (not 
implementation), takes 
previous policies into 
account (reform proc-
esses), focus on learning 
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Type of change 
(incremental or 
radical) 
Not prefigured even 
incremental oriented 
Both Not prefigured even in-
cremental oriented 
The output of 
change 
Not prefigured Reversible Limited reversibility due 
to lock-in effects over 
time 
The level of ab-
straction 
Co-evolutive perspec-
tive 
Linking macro, meso 
and micro levels 
Co-evolutive perspective 
while linking macro and 
micro levels within the 
meso-level of a policy 
subsystem (effect of so-
cio-political landscape 
on learning on the organ-
isational and individual 
level) 
The structure-
agency dilemma 
Structural prevalence 
but with room for in-
dividualistic strategic 
behaviour 
Linking constantly 
structure and agency 
Linking structure and 
agency: individuals and 
actors learn, but policy 
outcome is also deter-
mined by institutional 
structure and other fac-
tors 
 
Causal mecha-
nisms 
Random combinative 
causality mixing ex-
ogenous and endoge-
nous variables, but the 
exogenous ones seem 
prevalent 
Combinative causal-
ity – the composition 
of which depends on 
the type of change. 
Major changes are 
exogenously deter-
mined. 
Combinative causality, 
interdependence of lev-
els of learning and alter-
native explanations to 
policy change 
Explanatory 
variables 
Critical external 
events (technological 
change, electoral vic-
tory, systemic or in-
ternational crisis) plus 
the eventual role of 
single individuals 
Critical events, ideas 
and beliefs, competi-
tion, learning. 
Policy entrepreneurs, or-
ganisational hindering 
factors, political inter-
ests, changes in the so-
cio-political landscape 
Configurative 
dimensions 
Semi-chaotic mix of 3 
dimensions (policy as 
arena of power, as 
ideational forum, and 
as target of political 
institutions’ influence) 
Focused on the inter-
action of three con-
figurative dimen-
sions: policy as arena 
of power, as set of 
networks and as 
ideational forum 
Policy as institution 
(law, rule, norm) 
 
Source: Capano (2009: 20-21) on MSF/ ACF and author on the meta-theoretical 
framework. 
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As illustrated in table 1, both frameworks make use of concepts that occur at 
different stages of the policymaking process as discussed by the rich empirical litera-
ture that applied both frameworks over the last 25 years (e.g. Weible et al. 2011a; 
2011b; Zahariadis 2007). The following sections conceptualise the different stages of 
the meta-theoretical framework, whereby the section on drivers for policy change 
draws predominantly on certain elements based on Kingdon (1984) such as policy en-
trepreneurs and the socio-political landscape. The sections on learning and the policy 
outcome draw on Sabatier’s (1988) elements of conflict, hindering factors, the import-
ance of policy brokers, policy-oriented learning as aspect of experiential learning and 
the tripartition of beliefs. All of these elements however are reconciled in the episte-
mological and empirical assumptions discussed above and can thus be combined in 
the proposed meta-theoretical framework to identify learning in policymaking. 
Figure 5 summarises the meta-theoretical framework. Learning processes can 
occur on the individual and/ or collective level. A driver for policy change initiates the 
policymaking process that can include learning. A policy outcome emerges either as 
result of learning or of alternative explanations that were independent from whether 
learning among individuals or on the organisational level occurred. The following sec-
tions examine the key elements of the framework in detail. 
 
Figure 5. Learning in policymaking.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compiled by author; based on Argyris and Schön 1978; Janis and Mann 1977; March 
and Olsen 1975; Nye 1987; Sabatier 1987; Swann 1999. 
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3.3 Driver for policy change 
 
 
There are different drivers for policy change that can ultimately also initiate learning 
among the individuals and organisations involved in the policymaking process. The 
underlying assumptions of this framework are based on analytical frameworks of the 
policy process that conceptualise policymaking embedded in a wider continuum of in-
terests, choices, actors and influential external factors with rational actors. It also as-
sumes that multiple places of entry and exit without one centralised decision-maker 
but rather a multitude of actors and levels that interact and influence the policy pro-
cess at different times and stages. These basic assumptions were used by Kingdon’s 
Multiple Streams Framework (Kingdon 1984; 1995; Zahariadis 2007), which provides 
a powerful explanation of agenda setting and how different problems, the wider public 
mood, external shocks and changes in political leadership influence policymaking. 
Two key assumptions are that policymaking happens in an environment of “organized 
anarchy” (Ackrill, Kay, and Zahariadis 2013: 871) and that the ‘solutions’ to the prob-
lems already exist in theory, but so far there was no opportunity for these ‘solutions’ 
to be translated into policies (Kingdon 1995). Empirically, the Multiple Stream 
Framework can be applied to federal and semi-federal political systems such as the 
United States, the EU (Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis and Allen 1995) or Germany, 
whereby Keohane also suggested an extension of the ‘garbage can model’ (Cohen, 
March, and Olsen 1972) as mother concept to be applied to Intergovernmental Orga-
nizations (Keohane 2002).4  
The Multiple Streams Framework by John Kingdon emphasises the existence 
of wider societal demands in the form of a problem stream as well as agency with the 
role of policy entrepreneurs making use of windows of opportunity (Kingdon 1984). 
There are three independent, parallel streams in the ‘policy primeval soup’ that con-
tains policy communities. This is based on the garbage can model on organisations as 
organised anarchies introduced by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) with the assump-
tion that policymaking is a chaotic, complex process and occurs when the three paral-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This thesis favours Kingdon’s framework as it can be understood as a further development of the gar-
bage can model originating in the 1970s. Kingdon’s framework of the policy process has been updated 
in the 1990s and successfully applied to the EU (Ackrill, Kay, and Zahariadis 2013; Zahariadis and 
Allen 1995), on which the empirical focus of this thesis rests. 
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lel streams of problems, politics and policies join in a window of opportunity that is 
seized by policy entrepreneurs. 
The problem stream consists of different issues and policy problems wider so-
ciety and policy-makers are concerned with. Together with the political stream, it 
served as inspiration for the socio-political landscape in this research. Kingdon’s 
problem stream contains more conditions and stages such as the shift from a situation, 
e.g. ‘poverty’ or climate change that exists independently from policymaking, to a 
‘problem’ when individuals in policymaking come to believe that they “should do 
something about them” (Kingdon 1995: 109). The definition of the problem is fur-
thermore influenced by the values of the actors involved, comparative and distributive 
aspects and in particular which ‘category’ a situation is attributed to, for example 
whether navigation is regarded as a part of water resources policy or transportation 
(Kingdon 1995: 111) or whether renewable energy policy is seen as energy policy 
serving the objective of energy security and economic growth or whether it is seen as 
climate change mitigation. Thus, if society and policy-makers care about an issue (or 
‘situation’) and thus regard it as a ‘problem’, it is more likely to enter agenda setting 
and ultimately the policymaking process.  
Two other streams are equally important, the politics and the policy stream. 
The politics stream is characterised by party ideology, pressure group campaigns and 
the national mood. Especially the national mood is of relevance to policy-makers as it 
reflects wider societal demands and the thinking of a large number of individuals 
along common lines, which changes over time. The national mood relates to an initial 
openness to the ideas among policy-makers, whose “sense of the national mood serves 
to promote some items on their policy agendas and restrain others from rising to 
prominence” (Kingdon 1995: 147). Other factors of relevance in the political stream 
are personnel turnover as result of elections or administrative changes, while the new 
individuals are likely to hold different ideological beliefs particularly if they are from 
opposing political parties (Zahariadis 2007: 73). The policy stream contains a large 
number of policy proposals introduced by various actors. Which one emerges from 
this ‘primeval soup’ depends on the acceptability of underlying values (e.g. privatisa-
tion), the technical feasibility and anticipation of future constraints. As a few leading 
ideas become more prominent, are discussed more frequently and are taken more seri-
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ously so that ultimately a consensus emerges among the policy experts such as civil 
servants and epistemic communities (Kingdon 1995: 140-141).  
To initiate a policy process and arrive at a policy outcome, these three streams 
need to merge in a window of opportunity to ‘lauch’ the policy proposal that was 
waiting to be attached to a particular problem and to push it through the decision-
making process. Particularly changes in the national mood, external ‘shock’ events, 
scheduled reforms or changes in political leadership open up these windows of oppor-
tunity (Kingdon 1995: 165-169). Recent examples are rising concern among the pub-
lic about environmental degradation and climate change, the nuclear disaster in Fuku-
shima in March 2011 that resulted in Germany’s exit from using nuclear power, Pres-
ident Obama’s healthcare reform or an incremental greening of the Common 
Agricultural Policy with each reform attached to the 7-year European budget cycle. 
A particular aspect of the problem stream is dissatisfaction with the status quo 
especially if bureaucrats initiate policy proposals (Kingdon 1995). Dissatisfaction 
with the status quo can be a driver for learning in the policy process as policy-makers 
often do not have an incentive to change established administrative routines or strive 
for policy change (Rose 1991: 10-11). This does not contradict the idea of co-existing 
drivers for policy change along problem, policy and political streams waiting for their 
window of opportunity to open. Actors aspiring change can establish dissatisfaction 
with creating a gap by “raising aspirations about what (…) is possible to attain” (Rose 
1991: 11-12). Reasons for dissatisfaction can furthermore be uncertainty among pol-
icy-makers based on the complexity of an increasing number of policy programmes, 
changes in the policy environment leading to negative effects although the policy pro-
gramme remained unchanged, shifts in political values or the threat of sanctions to 
policy-makers unless they change insufficient policy programmes (Rose 1991: 11-13). 
A crucial precondition for learning is that the policy-maker reflects on available in-
formation and that solving the problem is in the policy-maker’s interest. Not only ra-
tional interest, but especially the individual’s beliefs determine preferences and cogni-
tions of the problem, the ‘models of the world’ (March and Olsen 1975) – in short 
how the policy-maker sees and understands the problem. In conclusion, this frame-
work draws on the MSF to explain drivers of policy change, which can be summarised 
as shifts in the socio-political landscape encouraging policy change. 
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3.4 Learning typology – how learning can be identified  
 
 
Resulting from the review of learning literature across disciplines, there are three key 
elements to learning (see chapter 2). Learning in policymaking occurs when an indi-
vidual or a group is exposed to an input and reflects upon it. Factual learning refers to 
an increase in knowledge. The individual received new information or rearranged ex-
isting knowledge given a new context, processed the new information cognitively and 
added it to the knowledge base (Argyris and Schön 1978). Depending on the forma-
tion of cognitive links to existing knowledge, revision and the use of different infor-
mation processing modes such as visualising, hearing, discussing or feeling, the 
knowledge is stored in memory and can be retrieved if required (as discussed by the 
cognitive/ educational learning literature, e.g. Hay 2007). In a policymaking context, 
factual learning refers to an increase in knowledge about policy instruments (e.g. how 
market-based instruments such as emission trading work) and facts on the policy area 
such as technological details about the carbon performance of biofuels. It requires the 
individual or organisation to reflect on information provided to them either via publi-
cations, information by outside actors such as experts and other government depart-
ments, as well as information gained via their own fact-based research activities. 
Experiential learning requires the reflection on an increase in experience. This 
occurs when the individual made an experience regarding a policy, reflects upon it 
and adds the conclusions from the experience to their set of skills. Experiential learn-
ing refers to the ability to reflect on working experience accumulated over a certain 
time frame. A key aspect of experiential learning in the policymaking process is learn-
ing how the policymaking system works and becoming skilled at using strategies and 
tactics to influence policymaking. This is widely referred to as ‘Political Learning’ in 
the political science literature (May 1992; Radaelli 2009). Sabatier’s (1987) policy-
oriented learning also falls into this category as it describes how individual policy-
makers learn using different tactics and strategies to manipulate the policymaking 
process according to their predetermined objectives. Furthermore, most aspects of 
single-/ double loop learning in Organizational Studies (Argyris and Schön 1978) fall 
within the experiential learning category as it focuses on identifying and eliminating 
errors following the reflection on past experiences in policymaking. Individuals and 
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organisations either adapt their current actions based on the previous experience in the 
form of ‘learning by doing’ (single loop learning; Argyris 1976) or they also adapt 
their objectives following their reflection on past experiences with single loop learn-
ing (i.e. double loop learning; Argyris 1976; Dunlop 2010). Both forms of learning 
can occur together when the individual or organisation gains knowledge about an is-
sue by experiencing it in practice (see March and Olsen 1975).  
 If underlying beliefs change, resulting in a different view of how the individ-
ual or organisation ‘sees things’ (Nye 1987), constructivist learning occurs. Based on 
Sabatier (1988) and Hall (1993) as well as the further developments by Jachtenfuchs 
(1996) and Farrell (2009), four types of beliefs can be differentiated, depending on 
their stability and what they refer to. Beliefs are defined in this thesis as a person’s or 
organisation’s views of the world and normative understanding of how things ought to 
be, which can mean maintaining or changing the status quo. This definition is close to 
Sabatier’s (1988) understanding of beliefs. A normative understanding of beliefs in-
cludes the policy process that may or may not be reflected in the outcome. Conse-
quently, there are four aspects of constructivist learning, depending on which beliefs 
change. Deep-core beliefs (Sabatier 1988) refer to very fundamental worldviews and 
values that are extremely stable and very rarely subject to change. These include for 
example whether a person has a conservative or a leftist political leaning and funda-
mental views on the role of the state and its legitimacy to limit individual freedom. 
This theoretical framework regards these very fundamental deep core beliefs as stable 
and not subject to change and thus less relevant for learning.  
The additional aspect that was not mentioned by Sabatier (1988) and later pub-
lications (e.g. Weible et al. 2011b) are deeper beliefs such as realising that climate 
change or poverty are important problems. Individuals or organisations at some point 
in time form these deeper beliefs, usually when they are confronted with information  
that makes them form their viewpoint. These deeper beliefs are an important factor in 
self-sustaining and self-reinforcing policymaking dynamics as they change individual 
and organisational objectives and create a desire within the individual or organisation 
to contribute to their solution making use of the means and competencies available to 
them. Learning in the area of deeper beliefs occurs when individuals or organisations 
form an understanding that a societal or environmental challenge exists and requires a 
solution. The deeper beliefs thus facilitate the development of a new or changed ob-
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jective within an individual or organisation and can lead to action or a realignment of 
less stable and more action-oriented beliefs.  
Policy design beliefs are based on Sabatier’s (1988) conceptualisation. They 
refer to an individual or organisation’s view of what overall direction a policy should 
take such as the choice of wider policy instruments. For example, a policy design be-
lief would be an individual’s perspective on whether the agricultural sector should re-
ceive European subsidies or whether renewable energies such as biofuels are an ap-
propriate means to mitigate climate change. How exactly these policy instruments 
should be designed and implemented falls into the category of policy detail beliefs, 
which are close to the secondary beliefs described by Sabatier (1988). These refer for 
example to views on how high the share of first generation biofuels in the energy mix 
should be or whether European agricultural subsidies should depend on environmental 
services and farmer’s compliance with environmental standards.  
Both policy design and policy detail beliefs are less stable than deeper beliefs 
and more easily subject to change. If an individual or organisation reflects on informa-
tion and as a result changes deeper, policy design or policy detail beliefs, constructiv-
ist learning occurred. To identify such constructivist learning, it is important to com-
pare the individual or organisation’s beliefs at the end of the examined time frame to 
the beliefs at the beginning of the time frame (Radaelli 2009; Sabatier 1988). Figure 6 
visualises the typology of learning among policy-makers. It illustrates factual learning 
with its increase in knowledge, experiential learning with the additional experience 
and constructivist learning with a change in underlying beliefs. Identifying a change in 
each of these areas means that learning occurred, whereby they can also overlap with 
each other and thus exist simultaneously. Both the change in knowledge and in ex-
perience can overlap with a change in the underlying beliefs.  
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Figure 6. Learning typology (change in knowledge, experience or beliefs) and alter-
native explanations involved in policymaking. Compiled by author. 
 
 
 
 
 
There are several factors internal and external to the policy-maker’s organisa-
tion or personal way of dealing with a situation that can hinder learning from occur-
ring. Even if learning occurred on the individual level, it is not automatically trans-
ferred to the organisational level and ultimately the policy outcome. Although there is 
stimulation towards increased knowledge, experience or changed beliefs encouraging 
reflection, the policy-maker might not experience that change. Instead, the policy-
maker is preoccupied with organisational hindering factors such as faulty leadership 
or time pressures, with political interests, defensive avoidance or simply following or-
ders (Janis 1972; Janis and Mann 1977). If individuals did not reflect on input but a 
policy outcome nevertheless emerged, this points towards alternative explanations. 
Consequently, the key to determine whether learning occurred is to establish whether 
the individual decision-maker reflected on the new information and as a consequence 
changed beliefs, gained new expertise or experience (as defined in 2.1.1). 
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3.5 Levels of learning 
 
The theoretical frameworks on learning presented in the learning continuum (Figure 4/ 
chapter 2) are concerned with either individual or collective learning. The literature is 
split in the area of collective learning along the disciplinary boundaries of organisa-
tional learning (e.g. Argyris 1976; Argyris and Schön 1978; March and Olsen 1975), 
which is concerned with the interaction of learning processes between individual em-
ployees and their organisation, and the policy learning literature that predominantly 
examines the learning of political collectives (e.g. Egan 2009; Farrell 2009; Zito and 
Schout 2009). The literature indicates that learning can occur on the individual level 
and the organisational level, whereby wider changes in the socio-political landscape 
can be relevant to stimulate reflection on an experience or new information, which in 
turn can result in learning.   
Based on the definition provided in chapter 2.1, learning on the individual 
level refers to an individual policy-maker that reflects on input in the form of new in-
formation and thus engages in factual learning, in the form of an experience resulting 
in experiential learning (based on conceptualisations provided by Braun [2009] and 
May [1992]) and potentially also changes underlying beliefs based on the input and 
reflection, which can be understood as constructivist learning. The organisational 
level includes the notion of organisational learning linking the individual learning out-
comes to a learning process in the organisation and related government institutions in 
the wider sphere of multi-actor and multilevel governance. Policy entrepreneurs are 
central actors that can facilitate learning between individuals and learning across the 
governmental institutions in issue networks, policy communities and coalitions (for 
previous similar conceptualisations, see Argyris and Schön 1977; Jachtenfuchs 1996; 
March and Olsen 1975). The organisational level begins where official negotiation 
positions of for example a governmental institution are formed. Once individuals 
speak ‘on behalf of’ their division, governmental ministry, company, non-
governmental organisation or country, policymaking takes place on the organisational 
level. In the case of the EU, learning on the organisational level would for example 
occur between Directorate Generals of the European Commission, between represen-
tatives of the European Commission and the Council as well as the Parliament. Once 
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individuals do not represent their own personal opinion but a position that was formed 
to represent an organisation, the learning can be attributed to the organisational level.  
A key distinction between the individual level and the organisational level be-
yond personal opinion is the legitimacy to participate in the political decision-making 
process, which is not attributed to individuals, but to representatives of a gov-
ernmental organisation or public office. This is also where the interdependency of 
these two levels becomes clear. An individual policy-maker holds both a personal 
opinion which is linked to personal deeper, policy design and policy detail beliefs, but 
the individual may not be permitted to represent this personal opinion as it does not 
match the organisation’s official position. The organisation’s negotiation position 
however would usually be aligned with its deeper beliefs (i.e. the problem is important 
to the organisation’s purpose and seen as worth dealing with), beliefs on the overall 
policy design (e.g. whether public funds should address the policy problem) and be-
liefs on the policy details, such as the credibility of scientific data to justify a certain 
policy action. Individual constructivist learning is transferred to constructivist learning 
on the organisational level if the individual succeeds in influencing the organisational 
position so that it is aligned with the individual’s beliefs.  
Factual learning within the organisational level occurs when the overall or-
ganisation reflects on new input and adds the knowledge to its existing knowledge 
base such as archives, databases or communicates the knowledge to its employees. 
Experiential learning within the organisational level is closely linked to the individual 
level as the employees of the organisation accumulate working experience on certain 
issues and thus collectively form the organisational experience. If this experience is 
managed via reports, it can be used after the individual moved on to another position 
within or outside the organisation. Thus, there can also be a link between organisa-
tional learning in the past, when a group of individuals gained working experience on 
for example a policy proposal and moved on to positions outside the organisation but 
left detailed records of their experience. New policy-makers engage in factual learning 
when they reflect on the information left behind by their predecessors and they gain 
working experience (i.e. experiential learning on the individual level), which in turn is 
also experiential learning of the organisation once several individuals are involved. 
This aspect of experiential learning and the link between the individual and organisa-
tional level was described in detail by March and Olsen in their ‘complete cycle of 
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choice’ (1975: 150) and was picked up by Kim (1993). Argyris’ Single and Double 
Loop Learning (1976) also falls in the category of experiential learning on the indi-
vidual and organisational level with its focus on error elimination and learning by 
doing. 
The socio-political landscape can be conducive to learning and stimulate re-
flection on experiences or new information and thus initiate learning processes on the 
individual or the organisational level. It is the wider sphere of society that is interde-
pendent with the organisational level via politicians and the media, who both influ-
ence the public debate and are influenced by it. This can best be described as learning 
in a landscape development on the meta-level which influences and is being influ-
enced by the government institutions and law making organisations with parallels to 
Kingdon’s (1995) ‘public mood’ and ‘problems stream’ that exists and changes over 
time, whereby policy-makers pay close attention to its development as their re-
election depends on it or they strive to serve the public demand. Once voters are con-
vinced that a policy is desirable, this provides a strong rationale for politicians to sup-
port the policy development, thus leading to requests from politicians to develop re-
spective policy proposals. On the other hand, civil servants, politicians and non-
governmental actors communicate and negotiate in their policymaking networks with 
each other. They exchange positive messages about the desirability of the policy, cre-
ating further momentum for the policy rationale to be widely accepted in a self-
reinforcing dynamic. Examples include renewable energy, animal welfare, envi-
ronmental policy and climate policy integration (Jordan et al. 2010; Urwin and Jordan 
2008; Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007).  
Thus, to identify learning among decision-makers and especially to determine 
where learning occurred, it is essential to formally introduce a second dimension to 
learning. It contains two levels: the individual level and the organisational level, 
which are strongly influenced by developments in the socio-political landscape. These 
levels are interdependent with each other. This means that shifts in societies’ prefer-
ences can motivate the government institutions to address policy problems. As indi-
vidual civil servants are tasked with the development of a policy that meets the socio-
political demands, they engage in their policymaking networks, interact with other 
policy-makers and potentially transfer a policy from another vertical or horizontal lev-
el of governance to their own level (Rose 1991). Thus, they engage in experiential 
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learning, gain more knowledge in the process and potentially also change their under-
lying beliefs by reflecting on the importance of the policy they have been working on 
and form a normative view of how it should be designed (Sabatier 1988).  
By developing a new policy and negotiating this policy proposal in the other 
government institutions such as in the Council working groups (Goloub 2012) or in 
the European Parliament, individual policy-makers can become policy entrepreneurs 
by actively promoting their policy proposal and convincing other actors of its import-
ance by repeating arguments, emphasising facts and positive outcomes of impact as-
sessments or scientific studies and using their personal capabilities (Braun 2009; Rob-
erts and King 1991). These activities of individual policy entrepreneurs can result in 
convincing other actors within the institutions of the importance to support the policy 
proposal by changing their underlying beliefs via an increase in knowledge and higher 
awareness of the problems related to the policy proposal. Thus, learning processes on 
the individual level can also influence learning on the organisational level.  
In conclusion, the three learning types (factual, experiential and constructivist 
learning) can occur both on the individual and on the organisational level. Both levels 
are independent with each other and are influenced by wider developments in the so-
cio-political landscape. Figure 7 visualises the interdependence of the two learning 
levels with their embedded changes in knowledge, experience and/or underlying be-
liefs symbolised through the smaller overlapping circles within each level of learning. 
 
Figure 7. Factual, experiential and constructivist learning on the individual and or-
ganisational level. Compiled by author. 
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3.6 Is learning reflected in the policy outcome? 
 
 
Assuming that political hindering factors in parliament, upper house or stakeholders 
such as lobbyists, public and media do not ‘table’ the policy proposal based on politi-
cal bargaining (Arregui and Thomson 2009; Moravcsik 1993; Slapin 2008), an out-
come in the form of a change in policy can be observed. This is a policy change that 
can be measured by comparing the outcome with the former policy dealing with the 
problem. However, the simple existence of a policy outcome does not imply that 
learning occurred in the policymaking process, let alone changes in underlying beliefs 
in the form of constructivist learning. A policy outcome can also be attributed to alter-
native explanations when policy-makers simply follow orders from higher levels of 
the hierarchy, responding to socio-political pressures (Janis and Mann 1977), engage 
in ‘classic’ bargaining based on political power or when policy entrepreneurs have a 
high influence on the decision-making process.  
Particularly bargaining based on political power and the influence of policy 
entrepreneurs are two key alternative explanations to the policy outcome, both based 
on established frameworks of the policy process (e.g. see Kingdon 1995; Sabatier 
1998). This is useful to remember as these frameworks explain policy outcomes that 
are independent of learning. One key factor are policy entrepreneurs who ‘push things 
through’ without teaching others or the whole institutional setting. They can either be 
members of an coalition advocating a certain political objective or ‘neutral’ power 
brokers who help the coalitions settle on the lowest common denominator as com-
promise solution based on bargaining (see Sabatier 1988). The second aspect is politi-
cal power. If one coalition is more powerful and in possession of the power to arrive 
at a policy outcome for example by the majority of votes in a parliament or commit-
tee, this alternative explanation overshadows learning. Policy entrepreneurs play an 
important role in arriving at a policy outcome (Kingdon 1995). Once windows of op-
portunity open as a result of the coupling of the policy, political and problem stream, 
policy entrepreneurs are crucial in advocating a particular policy proposal. The ability 
of an individual to act as policy entrepreneur however depends on their readiness in 
terms of expertise, ideals and proposals: 
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People who are trying to advocate change are like surfers waiting for the big 
wave. You get out there, you have to be ready to go, you have to be ready to pad-
dle. If you’re not ready to paddle when the big wave comes along, you’re not go-
ing to ride it in.  
 
(Kingdon 1995: 165). 
 
 
Policy entrepreneurs are “advocates who are willing to invest their resources – 
time, reputation, money – to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in 
the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits” (Kingdon 1995: 179). They en-
gage in a number of activities crucial for arriving at a policy outcome: advocating new 
ideas and mobilising public opinion, defining and reframing problems, developing 
proposals and specifying policy alternatives and particularly brokering these ideas 
among the different policy actors (Roberts and King 1991: 148; see also Kingdon 
1984; 1995). Thus, policy entrepreneurs play an important role in arriving at the pol-
icy outcome. The policy proposals already exist, as does a problem to which they 
could be attached and learning in the process may well occur; but to arrive at the out-
come windows of opportunity and policy entrepreneurs are crucial. 
While policy entrepreneurs are members of a certain coalition advocating a 
policy objective, policy brokers are neutral actors who do not strongly represent their 
own political objective. Instead, policy brokers are usually high-level civil servants or 
politicians and have an interest to keep the conflict between actors within acceptable 
limits (Sabatier 1988: 152). They play a crucial role in ‘brokering’ a deal and resol-
ving negotiation deadlock situations so that decisions can be reached regarding institu-
tional rules and resource allocations, which ultimately result in policy outputs and pol-
icy impacts (Sabatier 1988; Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009: 123). The Advo-
cacy Coalition Framework distinguishes paths for policy change within a policy sub-
system. Events external to the subsystem, i.e. on the socio-political or wider organisa-
tional level, can result in changing beliefs. Internal subsystem events, i.e. on the more 
immediate organisational level, can emphasise failures in the current practices of the 
subsystem (Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009: 124). 
 Obviously, different actors advocate certain ‘solutions’ to the policy problem 
that is being addressed in the policymaking process. While there may be countless dif-
ferent perspectives, they do tend to cluster together in groups of actors who share 
similar policy beliefs to leverage power in the democratic political process that is 
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dominated by the need for majorities. The Advocacy Coalition Framework emphas-
ises that such coalitions with diverging beliefs and policy objectives engage within an 
issue-related policy subsystem, which usually contains one to four such major coali-
tions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). It assumes that actors group together in ‘ad-
vocacy coalitions’ based on their shared normative and causal beliefs. Actors engage 
in their advocacy coalition group “in a non-trivial degree of co-ordinated activity over 
time” (Sabatier 1998: 103). Membership in these groups is open to all actors holding 
similar beliefs in the policy subsystem including interest groups, government repre-
sentatives, legislators and members of epistemic communities. 
They use different strategies to win over the other advocacy coalitions and 
achieve decisions by governmental authorities that are in line with their beliefs 
(Sabatier 1988; Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009: 123). In the case of conflict, it 
is useful to understand the interest groups as coalitions, whereby the policy outcome 
ultimately depends on which of these coalitions holds more political power. The more 
influential group is thus the coalition which is better able to influence the policymak-
ing process based on their policy-oriented, i.e. political learning on how to more effec-
tively manipulate the bargaining or if the coalitions arrive at a deadlock situation, the 
outcome depends on the intervention of policy brokers. Overall, political power and 
policy entrepreneurs are important alternative explanations for a policy outcome that 
may emerge regardless of learning in the policy process. 
 
 
 
3.7 Conclusion on the framework for learning in the policy process 
 
 
In conclusion, the policymaking process can be conceptualised with learning as an 
important intervening variable. The independent variable is a driver for policy change, 
which has been conceptualised using key elements of the Multiple Streams Frame-
work and the assumption of policymaking in an ‘organised anarchy’ that is character-
ised by multiple actors across different levels of governance. Intervening variables are 
learning and alternative explanations in the form of defensive avoidance, organisa-
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tional and political hindering factors such as opposing political interests and the power 
of opposing coalitions who succeed in achieving their political objectives. Conse-
quently, the dependent variable of the policy outcome can contain evidence of learn-
ing - or alternative explanations may be dominant such as powerful coalitions protect-
ing their political interests, policy entrepreneurs pushing their ‘pet topic’ through the 
institutional decision-making machinery or classic, intergovernmental bargaining 
among the actors aimed at achieving pre-set negotiation objectives.  
Table 2 provides an analytical framework for the analysis of learning pro-
cesses in policymaking. There are two levels of learning: the individual level as iden-
tified in the cognitive learning literature and the organisational level. Both are influ-
enced by shifts in the “political mood” (Kingdon 1995), the socio-political landscape. 
On each level learning processes can occur in the form of changes in knowledge, ex-
perience and underlying assumptions. The combination of the two levels plus the 
socio-political landscape as key independent variable and the four learning types leads 
to eight possible instances of learning, which can be further extended with the three 
sub-aspects of constructivist learning and the wider shifts in the socio-political land-
scape. These can be identified by tracing the behaviour and activities of actors within 
a policymaking process and asking them about their changes in knowledge, experi-
ence and underlying assumptions as well as if their actions resulted in changes within 
other actors, the institutional or even the socio-political landscape; as well as explor-
ing to what extent their own perspectives changed based on instructions from higher 
levels of hierarchy, interactions in networks and wider societal consensus. 
 
Table 2. Analytical framework to determine and measure the type of learning that oc-
curred on the individual and/ or organisational level. Compiled by the author. 
 
 
 Alternative 
explanations 
for the out-
come 
Factual 
learning 
(change in 
knowledge) 
Experiential 
learning (change 
in experience) 
Constructivist learning  
(change in underlying 
deeper, policy or policy 
detail beliefs) 
Individual 
 level 
    
Organisa-
tional level 
    
 78	  
This framework of learning in the policymaking process borrowed aspects 
from Kingdon’s MSF (Kingdon 1984; 1995) to situate the driver for policy change 
and from Sabatier’s ACF for alternative explanations to learning such as the power of 
advocacy coalitions in the policy process and the role of policy brokers intervening to 
resolve conflicts. This explains policy outcomes despite a lack of learning. In its learn-
ing components this framework borrowed from Argyris’ single-/ double loop learning 
(1976; Argyris and Schön 1978) and the ‘learning cycle’ from March and Olsen 
(1975) and adopted these to the policymaking process. The key elements are the re-
flection on an input, the development and testing of a trial solution and the spill-over 
of learning to the organisational level, which is crucial for a policy outcome to em-
erge. It is however important to emphasise that this framework does not apply or situ-
ate itself within any of these ‘mother concepts’ but only borrows key aspects from 
them that help explain learning in the policymaking process, which none of them 
comprehensively do. The following chapter discusses the research methodology used 
for the collection and analysis of the empirical data. 
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Chapter 4  
Research Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter introduces the empirical part focused on identifying learning in European 
climate policy integration via case study research and process tracing. This research 
takes a deductive approach, that empirically applies the meta-theoretical learning 
framework to two case studies on climate policy integration: the European Renewable 
Energy Directive as aspect of energy policy and the Greening of the Common Agri-
cultural Policy as aspect of agricultural policy. The first section explains the research 
design and justifies the methods used, while the second section explains how the data 
was analysed.  
 
 
 
4.1 Research design 
 
 
The research design follows a case study approach (Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wicki 
2008; Yin 1994; 2009). It tests the previously developed meta-theoretical framework 
introduced in chapter 3 to identify learning in the policymaking process. This section 
justifies the use of case studies and process tracing to answer the research questions. 
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4.1.1 Case study approach and process tracing 
 
 
There is a clear rationale for a qualitative case study approach using process tracing, 
which is the dominant and established method of approaching learning in policymak-
ing and has been used by most empirical studies introduced in the previous chapter. 
The only exemption was Montpetit (2009), who asked government representatives 
about their learning using a survey. The other option, a quantitative analysis of learn-
ing, has been attempted by Sommerer (2011) on the question whether states can learn 
from each other. In his method section, he concludes that 
 
given unavoidable simplifications, even precise econometric methods will never 
be able to provide sufficient evidence for the occurrence of learning. At best indi-
cations can be provided for the existence of patterns and correlations that could be 
interpreted as hints for learning processes with the help of theoretical frameworks. 
This is because the data does not allow including information into the analysis on 
causes of cognitive processes and motives for learning. 
 
(Sommerer 2011: 95-96; translated from German language by author) 
 
Consequently, this thesis follows the existing empirical literature on learning 
in its research approach as this allows adhering to the established research standards. 
DeVaus emphasises that “case study designs are particularly suited to situations in-
volving a small number of cases with a large number of variables, [thereby making the 
approach] (…) appropriate for the investigation of cases when it is necessary to under-
stand parts of a case within the context of the whole” (DeVaus 2001: 231). The large 
number of variables and the complexities on the micro-level suggests an in-depth case 
study approach that traces the conditions for the core types of learning throughout the 
process of policymaking to determine if and how different actors learn. The case study 
design facilitates the inclusion of the large number of variables and facilitates the 
understanding of learning in climate policy integration on the micro-level without los-
ing the overall big picture (DeVaus 2001; Yin 1994). The central criterion for select-
ing a suitable case study is that it provides a valid and challenging test of the initial 
theory, i.e. theoretical sampling (DeVaus 2001; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).  
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One methodological core question is how learning can be detected in climate 
policy integration or in any other policy. The most appropriate approach to identifying 
learning is to process trace the development of one policy, in this thesis the Renew-
able Energy Directive and greening in the Common Agricultural Policy, from their 
origin throughout the policy formation process in the European institutions and to 
identify learning processes that occurred on the individual and organisational level in-
fluencing the development of the policy. This ‘process tracing’ is used in political sci-
ence to determine the influence of actors on a certain policy (e.g. by Betsill and Corell 
2008; George and Bennett 2005; Kittel and Kuehn 2013; Tansey 2007). George and 
Bennett define process tracing as “attempts to identify the intervening causal process 
– the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (cause) 
and the outcome of the dependent variable” (2005: 206). Process tracing has recently 
received more attention in the academic literature (e.g. Collier 2011; Deters 2013; 
Hall 2013; Rohlfing 2012). In this thesis it serves the purpose of testing the meta-
theoretical framework on learning, but the research does not have the ambition to gen-
eralize the specific case study findings to a large population. The generalizeability 
based on external validity (Kittel and Kuehn 2013) is rather in the applicability of the 
framework, which identifies different patterns of learning across cases. 
Process tracing seeks to examine causal relationships (Collier 2011; George 
and Bennett 2005; Hall 2013) between the variables. It allows to identify what type of 
learning occurred at which state of the policy formation and policymaking process by 
asking the different actors involved about their changes in knowledge, experience and 
underlying beliefs as well as why these changes occurred and what or who has led to 
those changes. The learning processes can be identified in the interviewee’s answers 
and compared with the answers of other interviewees the first interviewee interacted 
with in the policymaking process (Betsill and Corell 2008; George and Bennett 2005). 
This also allows to pinpoint when in the policymaking process individual actors 
learned or did not learn based on the categories of learning identified in the theoretical 
framework.  
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4.1.2 Scope of the case studies 
 
 
Qualitative research based on case studies needs to be limited to a realistic temporal 
and issue-related frame that allows a thorough analysis and is yet finite in scope 
(Creswell 2009; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Tracing learning along the policy-
making process of a specific piece of legislation provides advantages in terms of depth 
and clarity with a clear temporal start and end point, e.g. from the first prompt to pol-
icy-makers in the European Commission to develop a policy to the final decision in 
the European Parliament and Council. It also limits the number of key actors involved 
and allows mapping out the conditions for learning in relation to the external circum-
stances. Two core factors to control for are the influence of lobbyists when decision-
makers only adopted their position, and classic bargaining as it occurs in negotiations, 
especially where national or vested interests are involved (see also Moravcsik 1993). 
The analysis differentiated if a policy change occurred due to learning, especially in 
the case of constructivist learning, or if the change could be traced back to the influ-
ence of other actors, to power-relationships or bargaining central to negotiations. 
However, there were also disadvantages to this approach. Narrowing down the 
analysis to one specific case of policymaking could have led to difficulties in tracking 
down the relevant actors for interviews, who might have been unavailable or unwill-
ing to share their insights. Furthermore, there were potential research ethical consider-
ations involved in safeguarding the anonymity of the interviewees, as there were fre-
quently only a handful of individuals involved on certain stages of the policymaking 
process. There were a number of situations when learning could have potentially oc-
curred, however it depended on certain conditions and reactions of the policy-makers 
involved. Using only one case study would have meant that the research would have 
likely missed out on generally relevant factors and conditions for certain learning 
types to occur only because they were not present in the specific case examined. For 
this reason, the empirical part of the thesis was based on two case studies with differ-
ent determinants that cover the spectrum of climate policy integration.  
The Renewable Energy Directive with its biofuel component and the greening 
of the Common Agricultural Policy were selected as case studies as they were among 
the few existing empirical examples of climate policy integration. Furthermore, both 
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were major flagship legislations that were part of a longer policy development, which 
allowed a process tracing of learning over more than a decade. This is the time em-
phasised by previous studies as appropriate frame for meaningful results (Radaelli 
2009; Sabatier 1988). The European Renewable Energy Directive (EU 2009a) is fur-
thermore a major component of the European Climate Package (Townshend et al. 
2013) and much like the Common Agricultural Policy a major flagship policy of glo-
bal interest and impact. 
 
 
 
4.2 Research Methods 
 
 
The following section explains in detail how the data was collected and analysed. The 
data collection used qualitative methods and predominantly elite interviews to process 
trace learning through the case studies and identify when and why it occurred. The 
second part explains how the data was analysed and the third part reflects on the chal-
lenges encountered and how these were addressed to ensure validity of the results. 
 
 
4.2.1 Data collection  
  
The research strategy was not divided into the classic clear distinction between data 
collection and data analysis but favoured the sequential approach proposed by King, 
Keohane and Verba (1994). This approach uses several stages of data collection, fol-
lowed by data analysis and conclusions that form the basis for refined and more tar-
geted data collection in sequential cycles. The qualitative methods literature suggests 
that a sequential triangulation approach leads to more precise and theoretically valu-
able research results than a ‘one-shot’ approach (Esterberg 2002; Miles and Huberman 
1994; Patton 2002). Before the actual data collection period that focused on inter-
views, the author conducted a scoping phase over three months of observing interac-
tions between policymakers on the European level in the form of working with the 
 84	  
European Commission in the Directorate General for Climate Action as trainee in the 
organisational unit dealing with climate finance and deforestation (October – Decem-
ber 2011). This background knowledge serves as validation baseline for the informa-
tion collected in interviews and through document analysis. It enables the researcher 
to compare the information of interviewees with previous experience and observations 
of learning in the policymaking process. All data reported in this thesis is however 
based on the interviews conducted in 2012-2013 and document analysis. 
 
 
Elite Interviews 
 
The primary data sources are in-depth semi-structured interviews with the key indi-
viduals involved in the policymaking process. The research presented in this thesis is 
based on 72 elite interviews with 66 key actors between March 2012 and August 
2013. This number is close to the total population of individuals deeply involved in 
the relevant policymaking processes, whereby 8 individuals were involved in both the 
Renewable Energy Directive and the Common Agricultural Policy and 6 individuals 
had different roles and institutional affiliations during the time frame, what made the 
assignment of different codes to the same person necessary (e.g. Member State and 
industry or MEP and NGO). All interviewees who responded positively to the inter-
view request or reminder were interviewed. Particularly Members of the European 
Parliament and a few high level policy-makers at the European Commission declined 
due to a lack of time. Some actors could not be contacted as they had left their posi-
tions without a trace/ contact details or were deceased. 
The interviewees were representatives from the European Commission (Direc-
torate General/ Cabinet for Agriculture and Rural Development, Directorate General 
for Environment, Directorate General/ Cabinet for Climate Action and Directorate 
General/ Cabinet for Energy and Transport), environmental NGOs, industry lobbyists, 
Members of the European Parliament from green, liberal-democrat, conservative and 
social-democratic parties and their advisors, as well as representatives from relevant 
member states such as Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Neth-
erlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The sampling was based 
on identifying who was involved in initiating, drafting, negotiating and deciding on 
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on the legislative proposals. All relevant actors were sent interview requests and those 
who responded positively were interviewed, predominantly in a one-on-one meeting 
in their office and on rare occasions via skype/ telephone when a meeting was not 
possible. Following the initial round, interviewees were asked about other key actors 
allowing snowballing to a high level of saturation.  
Each interview lasted between 30 and 110 minutes with a mean of 60 minutes. 
All interviewees were sent an information sheet on the research with the initial inter-
view request. At the beginning of the interview, the researcher explained the purpose 
of the interview as part of PhD research conducted at the LSE and agreed with the in-
terviewee that the interview data would be treated anonymously to the extent that the 
information could not be traced back to the individual. To encourage an open and 
honest conversation, the interviewees were offered the option to declare comments as 
‘confidential’ or ‘off the record’ during the interview, whereby few interviewees made 
use of this. When they declared information as confidential, it had frequently already 
been provided by other interviewees without this restriction or was already part of the 
public domain. Following this agreement, the interviewee was asked for permission to 
audio record the interview. All interviewees gave their permission. 
The audio-recordings from these elite interviews were transcribed. The re-
searcher transcribed all interviews from key decision-makers and all those containing 
confidential information, while time pressure and opportunity costs made the use of a 
certified transcriptionist who signed a non-disclosure agreement necessary to tran-
scribe interviews of lesser relevance/ from individuals only involved in some aspects 
such as NGOs, lobbyists or representatives of member states in the Council working 
groups. To gain reliable results and to allow for improvements of the research design, 
interviews were made in concurrent order, i.e. interview data was collected over a cer-
tain time period such as a week or in blocs of several interviews (e.g. 10-15 inter-
views). Before the next round of interviews, the data was reviewed and analysed. If 
patterns emerged that were not considered previously in the analytical framework, 
these were included in the next round of interviews as additional hypotheses to be 
tested, validated or discarded. Elite interviews were conducted with relevant actors 
until no new information was gained through subsequent interviews and the researcher 
had indications that the sources had been exhausted. The questions asked followed the 
analytical framework as they aimed to identify learning in the policymaking cycle.  
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Interview questions 
 
The interviews were a semi-structured conversation between the researcher and the 
interviewee. The interviewees were asked to provide a detailed account of their in-
volvement in the policy development including their educational background and pre-
vious experience on the issue to determine their level of expertise. It also helped to es-
tablish a conversation and put the interviewee at ease. Furthermore, this helped the re-
searcher to ask more targeted/-individualised questions later on. These introductory 
questions served the purpose of identifying possible instances of learning on the indi-
vidual or organisational level, which were then explored more in-depth. This part took 
anytime between 10 and 50 minutes, depending on the interviewee. Some interview-
ees automatically answered all possible questions and it was thus helpful not to inter-
rupt them, while others provided short, precise answers. Here it was important to keep 
the conversation going with follow-up questions. 
The next part provided the core information for the analysis. The researcher 
indicated that the following questions might be unconventional compared to questions 
the interviewee may usually get from journalists and that this is due to the overall re-
search question. The questions focused on the three types of learning across the learn-
ing levels and on alternative explanations. They were rephrased to be more easily 
comprehensible for the interviewee. Frequently conversational pointers sufficed to 
prompt the interviewee to talk about these aspects. The interview questions were in-
tended to cover as many aspects of the meta-theoretical framework the interviewee 
was knowledgeable about. Thus, the key areas covered were related to the question 
when factual learning, experiential learning or constructivist learning occurred or if 
there were alternative explanations. Interview aspects in this part were: 
 -­‐ Did the interviewees change their level of knowledge or gain more experience 
while being involved in the policymaking process? -­‐ Did the interviewees change their perception of the issue through reflection? -­‐ How did the interviewees approach other actors, did they convince them and 
how? In other words, was there a policy entrepreneur? -­‐ Were there other actors that took on a very active role, pushing the policy pro-
posal forward? Why did they do that? -­‐ How did the decision-making process between the key actors and institutions 
unfold? Were there knowledge transfers/ experience exchanges/ did one insti-
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tution convince the other based on persuasion and changes in beliefs due to 
evidence or previous experiences (learning on the organisational level)? -­‐ What were the (political) interests of the actors involved? -­‐ Were there any factors that hindered reflection and subsequent changes in 
knowledge/ experience/ beliefs? -­‐ Was it just negotiation/ bargaining, political horse-trading/ quid-pro-quo or did 
actors convince each other using persuasive arguments? -­‐ Did the overall support in society for the policy change over time? How? 
Why? What was the role of the media/ other external actors? How was the 
European Commission involved? 
 
The final part concluded the interview by letting the interviewees reflect on their 
own and others’ learning processes. The researcher explained the analytical distinc-
tions of learning in terms of changes in knowledge, experience and/ or underlying be-
liefs (how the interviewees’ perspective on the issue changed) and linked those to the 
individual level (i.e. the interviewee or colleagues in the immediate work envi-
ronment), the organisational level (i.e. between the interviewee’s DG and other DGs, 
between the DG/ European Commission and the Parliament/ Council) and to wider 
shifts in the socio-political landscape as potential driver for learning (i.e. wider social 
perceptions of the policy issue, also influenced by the media). Depending on the situa-
tion and the interviewee’s previous responses, alternative explanations were also con-
sidered. How the question was framed depended especially on the interviewee’s bias 
either in favour of learning or opposed to it. In either case, questions were framed 
from the opposite direction to control for potential interviewee bias. At the end the re-
searcher thanked the interviewee for taking the time and exchanged contact details or 
followed up on suggestions regarding other key individuals involved. 
 
 
Document analysis 
 
To test the theoretical framework and further develop the conceptualisation of climate 
policy integration, the first step was to analyse the available grey literature regarding 
learning and climate policy integration (e.g. Ahmad 2009; Medarova-Bergstrom et al. 
2011; Mickwitz et al. 2009). The document analysis included but was not limited to 
reports, records of speeches and debates, committee reports, white and green papers, 
policy briefs from experts, civil society representatives and lobbyists as well as a re-
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view of the organisational structure within the European Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Council (see bibliography/ empirical chapters). Document analysis 
served as supplementary method of data analysis. Especially the legislative proposals 
and further material such as impact assessments and stakeholder statements were ana-
lysed to gain a background understanding of the case studies on the Renewable En-
ergy Directive and the Common Agricultural Policy.  
 
 
4.2.2 Data analysis 
 
The qualitative research approach yielded a richness of interview data. All interviews 
were recorded digitally and transcribed as to the level of detail required, usually ver-
batim but without stutters. In a few cases interviews were conducted in German. 
These were transcribed in German, however translation was only undertaken to the 
extent of providing relevant information or quotes to be included into the thesis. The 
collected data was stored in a data basis. As research ethics demand that the names of 
the interviewees must not be revealed, the coding-key regarding the identity of inter-
viewees was only shared with the supervisors. The option remains to make it available 
for validation to examiners under the condition that the identity of the interviewees is 
kept confidential. 
The interviews were analysed using the qualitative software programme 
NVIVO and highlighting/ colour coding functions in a comprehensive word docu-
ment, which was compiled for each case study. The information was compared and 
triangulated, i.e. whether the ‘stories’ of the key actors matched. A relevant limitation 
preventing descriptive quantitative analysis was that each actor experienced a specific 
part of the process from a specific angle and only contributed a ‘piece of the puzzle’. 
Thus, there was no benefit in using structured questions that would have made the in-
terviews comparable to each other as all interviewees reported on their distinctive role 
within the policy making process, which rarely covered its full development over a 
decade. Thus, the narrative was process traced and to verify and triangulate the ac-
counts of interviewees, the researcher indentified and interviewed other individuals 
who worked closely with previous interviewees. A further control measure was the 
validation of information from the elite interviews via document analysis.  
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The data was coded based on a comprehensive codebook developed by the re-
searcher. The codebook was a direct application of the meta-theoretical framework 
developed in the previous chapter and allowed linking interview data and quotes to the 
learning types and further conditioning factors. The presentation of the findings may 
appear to be disconnected from the codebook given that findings are not descriptively 
reported. As this type of analysis would have resulted in a rather undesirable descrip-
tive account of how many times codes were mentioned by the interviewees, the re-
searcher opted instead for presenting the findings in an analytical narrative organised 
into sections on learning types (see empirical chapters 6 and 7). Thus, first dominant 
codes such as experiential and factual learning among individuals, the role of policy 
entrepreneurs or wider changes in the socio-political landscape were identified via the 
codebook. In a second step, the relevant quotes were combined into another docu-
ment, which served as basis for presenting the empirical findings within distinctive 
story lines. Table 3 provides a brief summary of the categories used in the codebook, 
which can be found in appendix 1. 
 
 
Table 3. Summary of coding categories used for the empirical analysis.  
 
 
 
Code 
Definition Inclusion  
criteria  
Exclusion 
criteria 
Examples Corresponds to 
learning type 
 
Key concepts and aspects of learning 
Receive information 
Reflection 
Change 
Individual level 
Organisational level 
Socio-political landscape 
Factual learning 
Experiential learning 
Constructivist learning 
Learning (reflection on input and subsequent change) 
Knowledge 
Experience 
Underlying beliefs 
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Alternative explanation (reflection on input, but no change) 
Political interests 
Following orders 
Institutional process of policy-
making 
Negotiation/ bargaining 
Lobbying 
Non-Learning (no reflection on input, no change) 
Defensive avoidance 
Group think 
External constraints 
Conditioning factors with positive/ negative effect on learning types 
Academic background 
Working experience on topic 
Leadership style of superior 
Network to other actors 
Policy entrepreneur 
Institutional capacity 
 
Compiled and developed by the author. See Appendix 1 for the full codebook. 
 
 
4.2.3 Challenges and limitations to the research strategy  
 
Some of the more specific challenges during the data collection phase have already 
been outlined in previous sections. This section deals with the central limitation of this 
research, which is its scope/ generalisability in terms of case studies, the limitations 
dictated by research ethics, temporal bias and dealing with interviewee bias. 
 
Resource and time limitations 
 
The theoretical framework of the learning process and how policy-makers learn can 
be tested in many different cases, with climate policy integration being one especially 
interesting case given its cross-cutting nature. The meta-theoretical framework can 
also be applied to any other kind of policy. It would be beyond the scope of this re-
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search to test learning in other policies such as foreign or fiscal policy. Furthermore, it 
is also due to time and budget constraints that climate policy integration in energy, 
transport and agriculture policy is only being analysed in the EU and not on other lev-
els of governance, whereby particularly multi-level reinforcing processes between the 
national and international level provide an interesting case within global governance 
(e.g., see related paper on the UNFCCC negotiations: Rietig forthcoming 2014b). 
 
Research ethics 
 
The LSE research ethics checklist (LSE 2011) indicated the need to address issues of 
confidentiality and documentation of the research data as elite interviews may yield 
sensitive information that could be harmful to the interviewee if published in direct re-
lation to the person’s name. The primary safeguard is the researchers’ experienced 
judgement in those matters and commitment not to harm the interviewee. The inter-
view data was coded and names or references that allowed indentifying the person 
were removed to safeguard their anonymity. If identification could not be avoided, the 
result was not included into the reporting. Every interview was conducted after obtain-
ing informed consent from the interviewee, what involved the agreement that informa-
tion identified by the interviewee as sensitive information would not be included into 
the interview transcripts. The data was stored safely (password protected and not vul-
nerable to theft, accidental loss or commercial third-party data privacy violations) and 
access was restricted to the researcher and supervisor. Some of the interviews without 
confidential information were transcribed by a transcriptionist who signed a non-
disclosure agreement (no communication/ dissemination of the information, deletion 
of all records after the submission of the project).  
 
Temporal bias 
 
The nature of research interviews requires individuals to recollect and remember their 
experiences with a certain activity that happened in the past. This makes research in-
terviews vulnerable to temporal bias by the interviewees. Particularly in cases where 
the involvement of interviewees was several years in the past (e.g. those involved with 
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the 2002/2003 Fischler Reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy or in the drafting 
of the Renewable Energy Directive 2006 – 2009), a potential bias remains that indi-
viduals did not recall details and facts correctly or that they were rather providing 
their personal, biased interpretation of perceptions and changes in beliefs than their 
actual learning at that point in time. Furthermore, later experiences that are directly or 
indirectly related to the topic of the interview may also have unconciously altered the 
interviewees’ response to the questions.  
This temporal bias is a challenge to all research interviews enquiring about 
personal experiences that happened several years ago. The researcher addressed this 
temporal bias directly prior to the interviews by sending a note that indicated the re-
searchers’ interest in the interviewee’s involvement in the relevant policy. To prevent 
the interviewees however from re-interpreting their involvement prior to the inter-
view, no detailed interview questions were provided beforehand. This required the in-
terviewee to react spontaneously to the interviewer’s questions, which in most cases 
yielded straightforward and plausible answers. Furthermore, the researcher triangu-
lated the interviewee’s answers in the analysis as much as possible with similar ac-
counts by other interviewees to determine whether their accounts matched. As the 
quote in the next section indicates, some interviewees may however have underesti-
mated their personal and their organisation’s learning in the interviews as a result. 
 
Interviewer and interviewee bias 
 
Besides the influence of communication and interpersonal skills in posing questions 
during semi-structured interviews (Graves 1993) and the importance of rigour in in-
terviews (Baxter and Eyles 1997), the attitude and expectations of the interviewee 
played an equally important role. Especially if the interviewees were interested in the 
research project and intrigued by the prospect of contributing to the development of a 
framework that allows identifying learning, which in turn might help them to design 
and implement more effective regulation, they may have unconsciously tried to pro-
vide disproportionally positive information. This phenomenon of learning as positive 
evaluative connotation is well known in the literature. Nye pointed out that “when the 
observer approves of the new conception of self-interest, it is called ‘learning’; dis-
liked changes are not” (Nye 1987: 379). However, learning occurs independent from 
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the value judgement of the observer and depends solely on whether the definition of 
learning introduced in chapter 2 is fulfilled.  
This interviewee bias was controlled for by being aware of this issue and by 
using a negatively framed hypothesis that defensive avoidance may be dominant when 
initial answers suggested a positive bias towards learning. This hypothesis required 
critical questions targeted at identifying alternative explanations and hindering factors. 
Thereby the negative framing helped to provide a fuller picture of the examined cases. 
However, the overwhelming majority of interviewees was rather critical of interpret-
ing too much learning into the policymaking process and sometimes required positive 
pointers to identify instances of learning. Because of this de-facto negative bias, the 
researcher kept reformulating the questions on learning to determine whether there are 
some aspects after all that may be classified as learning. Furthermore, the experience 
gained during the scoping phase of the research within the European Commission en-
abled the researcher to compare the information provided with direct experience and 
thereby to make an educated judgment whether the information was accurate. 
 Another source of bias was the potential impact the interview itself had on the 
policy-makers. Many commented after the interview informally that they usually do 
not reflect on whether they learned, why certain decisions were taken and how they 
came about. Therefore, there is a possibility that the interview questions also led to a 
reflection process of policy-makers on their own learning or a wider evaluation of the 
dynamics within the policymaking process as a basis for lesson-drawing in the future: 
 
Through the conversations back and forth, I was more aware of incidences of learn-
ing if you like than I was before you first called. I was slightly intrigued by your 
topic because I was thinking “well there wasn’t a lot of learning at all.” I mean now 
thinking about it a little bit, between member states, certainly, I think was a lot 
more than what perhaps we originally realised. Certainly there were some individu-
als that were more influential than others, but I think the learning was more subcon-
scious than conscious though. You see what I mean? I’m not sure we all went into 
it with a “well if we learn from each other, we could get the best out of it.” I think a 
lot of it was more subconscious.  
 
(NMS 10) 
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4.3 Conclusion on the research methodology 
 
 
This methodology chapter provided a detailed account of the research design and 
strategy for determining learning among policy-makers in European governance. The 
research design identified the qualitative case study approach as appropriate for test-
ing the meta-theoretical framework presented in chapter 3 and discussed issues of en-
suring rigour. It also introduced the research strategy for data collection. The final sec-
tion discussed challenges such as safeguarding the interviewee’s anonymity, limita-
tions to data collection and further research ethical considerations. 
Following the typology established by Yin (1994; 2009) and Gib-
bert/Ruigrok/Wicki (2008) of internal and external validity, construct validity and re-
liability, the research design was adapted to meet these criteria. Internal validity refers 
to the causal relationships between the variables (Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wicki 2008: 
1466) and is met as the research framework was developed based on existing literature 
and theories were triangulated from different theoretical lenses. The discussion sec-
tions of the case studies furthermore match the patterns found in the case studies to the 
meta-theoretical framework.  
The construct validity, i.e. if the case study measures what it seeks to measure 
(Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wicki 2008; Yin 1994), was challenging and has been given 
particular consideration during the data collection stage. Three measures suggested by 
the research literature (Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wicki 2008; Yin 1994) were used to 
achieve a construct validity as high as possible within the time and budget constraints 
of this research. First, the chain of evidence presented in the empirical chapters fol-
lows a timeline of how one specific policy was developed. This allows to process 
trace the development of the legislation between the actors involved and to identify 
instances of learning. Second, the data and conclusions of the research were reviewed 
by academic peers (via conference papers and workshop-/ research seminar presenta-
tions) and also discussed with key actors, whereby both the peers and the key actors 
confirmed the analysis and conclusions. Third, the primary interview data was trian-
gulated with supplementary data from document analysis. 
The external validity, i.e. the generalisability of the findings was best ensured 
as possible within the constraints of qualitative case study research. The case studies 
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were selected within a ‘nested approach’ (Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wicki 2008: 1468), 
i.e. both case studies were within the EU and involved the European Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council. This allowed comparing the findings within the 
context of European governance and drawing conclusions on learning in the EU. 
While the findings retain a limited generalisability due to the nature of qualitative case 
study research (which is certainly one of its greatest limitations), the empirical find-
ings allow conclusions on the wider applicability of the meta-theoretical framework 
on learning as it can be applied in the context of European governance, but also in 
case studies that contain a policymaking process dominated by governmental actors in 
a system of complex governance. 
Reliability refers to the reproducibility of the research and the results (Gibbert, 
Ruigrok, and Wicki 2008) by other researchers. The triangulation and wide sampling 
approach taken in this thesis remedied most randomness associated with one-on-one 
elite interviews, which are ultimately about personal accounts of events and percep-
tions. The cross-comparison of the interview data across the actors and the triangula-
tion with official documents allowed to control for personal bias and randomness, i.e. 
that the interviewees might have told a different story to another interviewer or at an-
other point in time. The research is reproducible since the question catalogue detailed 
in this chapter should provide an appropriate basis to extend or repeat the interviews. 
It is furthermore important to note, similar to the external validity, that the wider con-
tribution of this research is less in its detailed empirical findings, but in the meta-
theoretical framework presented in chapter 3, which should allow other researchers to 
examine other cases of policymaking and to identify learning in the policymaking 
process. The next chapter zooms in on the empirical aspects of this research, which 
focuses on learning in European climate policy integration. Therefore, the next chap-
ter introduces the policy making process in the EU and examines the concept of cli-
mate policy integration. 
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Chapter 5  
 
Introduction to case studies:  
EU governance and climate policy integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How does learning matter in European governance, particularly in the emerging pol-
icy field of climate policy integration? To answer this empirical research question, it 
is important to understand the particularities of the case study area. This chapter 
contextualises the empirical research on learning in climate policy integration within 
the EU. It explains the key underlying governance principles of the EU, the 
policymaking process among the European institutions and conceptualises what 
climate policy integration means, which in its conceptual and empirical development 
has widely focused on the EU. The rationale for focusing on the EU is its self-
understanding as a leading actor in global climate governance (Jordan et al. 2012) 
with advanced climate policy that is primarily motivated by the need to implement 
international commitments such as the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, the EU provides 
two of the few existing empirical cases for climate policy integration in the form of 
the Renewable Energy Directive and the greening of the Common Agricultural.  
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5.1 The policymaking process in the EU and key actors 
 
 
This section provides the context for examining learning in the EU, which is a com-
plex system of multiple layers and venues of governance with diffuse leadership struc-
tures. The process of European Integration resulted in debates on the character of the 
EU between the extremes of a collection of nation states (Moravcsik 1993) and a 
semi-federal system (Nedergaard 2006a), while particularly the Lisbon Treaty (Craig 
2010) moved the EU closer to the latter characteristic. Undoubtedly, it is a system of 
complex multilevel governance (Jordan 2001; Jordan et al. 2012) that, like any politi-
cal system, holds its own unique particularities that need to be acknowledged before 
the results of the empirical analysis can be interpreted and examined for their wider 
lessons. This section examines the policymaking process in the EU and the role of the 
European Commission as key actor. 
 
 
 
5.1.1 The policymaking process in the European Union 
 
 
The process of policymaking in the EU is a negotiation process among multiple actors 
representing the local level and political parties (European Parliament), the national 
level (Council of the EU and its Council system such as working groups, meetings of 
the permanent representatives/ COREPER etc., referred to as ‘the Council’) and su-
pranational level (European Commission). The negotiations are iterative and begin 
with an initial motivation at the European Commission as the institution with the sole 
power to make policy proposals (Hix 2005; Nugent 2001). This motivation can in-
clude a request from the European Parliament, the Council or input by external stake-
holders such as interest groups or individual member states. It can also be internal to 
the European Commission at the initiative of a Commissioner or a member of staff, 
mostly within the unit that is responsible for the respective policy area (Sabathil, Joos, 
and Kessler 2008). At the drafting stage of the policy proposal, the unit in charge 
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within the European Commission frequently commissions studies, organises meetings 
with experts, takes into account information provided by relevant stakeholders includ-
ing lobbyists and undertakes impact assessments of different policy options (Nugent 
2001). Depending on the exact nature of the policy proposal and the administrative 
culture of the Directorate General, this process has a varying level of formality. Fol-
lowing this early drafting and policy formation stage, the Directorate General of the 
European Commission that is in charge of the policy proposal needs to coordinate 
with other Directorate Generals that have similar or diverging interests within the 
‘Interservice Consultations’. In this process, other Directorate Generals formally pro-
vide their input. The policy proposal is then negotiated by the Heads of the 27 cabi-
nets (HEBDO meeting) and finally decided by the ‘College of Commissioners’, which 
includes all 27 European Commissioners in charge of their different issue-based 
portfolios (Hix 2005; Hooghe 2001). If agreement is difficult to reach, the President of 
the European Commission or his secretary general intervenes as policy broker to 
suggest a solution (Nugent 2001: 243). 
The European Commission publishes its policy proposal, which is subse-
quently negotiated among the member states in the working groups of the Council of 
the European Union. If the policy proposal falls within the remit of co-decision, the 
European Parliament’s issue-specific committee discusses the proposal before its vote 
(for a detailed description of the concept of co-decision, see Häge and Naurin 2013; 
Huber and Shackleton 2013). Representatives of the European Commission partici-
pate in all meetings to answer questions and facilitate the negotiations. If no consen-
sus can be reached, a ‘trilog’ between key actors representing the European Commis-
sion, the European Parliament and Council is initiated (Hix 2005; Nugent 2001; 
Rasmussen and Reh 2013). This negotiation and policymaking process is based on 
agreement among key actors that include civil servants at the European Commission 
and those representing their member state’s national interests, as well as politicians in 
the European Parliament and Council.  
Overall, the power of the European Parliament has been strengthened with the 
recent treaties, especially the Lisbon Treaty (Craig 2010). The role of the European 
Commission has increasingly moved towards a facilitating and brokering position 
within the “triangular interinstitutional relationship” (Nugent 2001: 261; for a more 
detailed description of the European policymaking process, see Nugent 2001: 234-
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261). While the debate between (neo-)functionalism and intergovernmental perspec-
tives on European Integration dominated the second half of the 20th century (see 
Moravcsik 1993; Risse 2005), more recent contributions argued for multilevel gov-
ernance approaches and concluded that the use of public policy literature is appropri-
ate in analysing the EU policymaking process (Hix 2005) due to “the fact that the EU 
political system has become more and more a ‘normal’ political system” (Nedergaard 
2006a: 394). While the European Parliament represents the interests of European citi-
zens via its elected Members belonging to national political parties in a similar fashion 
to national parliaments (Egeberg et al. 2013; Marshall 2012) and the Council repre-
sents the national interests of the member states from an intergovernmental perspec-
tive (Beyers 2005; Häge and Naurin 2013; Warntjen 2010), the European Commis-
sion’s role in policymaking is more complex (Egeberg 2012).  
 
 
 
5.1.2 The special role of the European Commission as policy entrepreneur 
 
 
The European Commission has a significant steering role in the policy process and – 
although its ‘formal’ role ends with the publication of a policy proposal – also a large 
influence on the policy outcome, making it “the world’s most powerful international 
executive” (Hooghe 2012: 88). While intergovernmental approaches downplay the 
supranational characteristics of the European Commission’s bureaucracy (e.g. 
Moravcsik 1993) and point towards the interests of the member states instead, empiri-
cal studies of the 1990s concluded that the European Commission can be understood 
as a ‘policy entrepreneur’ that plays a leading and even steering role (Cram 1994; 
Krause 2003; Hooghe and Keating 1994; Laffan 1997). This role links back to the Eu-
ropean bureaucracy’s origins and the visions of Jean Monnet:  
 
He envisaged European administration as a small body of officials from different 
backgrounds who would work together to produce solutions to common prob-
lems (…) and maximise the chances of survival and influence in a world of en-
trenched bureaucratic interests.  
 
(Page 1997: 5) 
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The power of the European Commission stems from its political role that in-
cludes the unique competence to initiate EU legislation and the need to persuade other 
groups and stakeholders before proposing legislation with the intention to have a high 
chance of being adopted with as few changes as possible (Page 1997: 146-147). The 
European Commission’s leadership role and its key objective of driving European In-
tegration forward towards an increasingly closer Union (Hix 2005; Hooghe 2001; 
Nugent 2001) is widely acknowledged in the European Integration literature.  
The European Commission is frequently treated as an unitary actor given its 
role based on the treaties (Koch and Lindenthal 2011) with little attention to the inter-
play of the different Directorate Generals or even the individual bureaucrats as key 
policy-makers. This argument has two dimensions. First of all, upon a closer examin-
ation of the European Commission, a bureaucracy emerges that has not only unique 
characteristics, but also remains to share elements with both continental national bu-
reaucracies and international bureaucracies while at the same time having no clear 
leading figure but many points of exercising leadership (Page 1997). The different Di-
rectorate Generals with their specific policy areas can be compared to national minis-
tries whereby each takes the lead in developing policy proposals within their own area 
of competence. This needs to be shared in cross-sectoral policies that involve two or 
more Directorate Generals, while one maintains ‘ownership’ of developing the policy 
proposal (Nugent 2001; Sabathil, Joos, and Kessler 2008). 
The second dimension is the role of the individual bureaucrat, both on the top 
level as Commissioners appointed via elected politicians, and the individual civil ser-
vant. Both types of actors within the European Commission have been found to act as 
policy entrepreneurs, going to extraordinary lengths to steer their policy proposals 
through the decision-making process and to strategically use aspects of leverage 
within the institutional machinery to achieve their objectives (Braun 2009; Skjærseth 
and Wettestad 2010; Wonka 2008). In this context it is important to note that the 
“goals, objectives and even strategies of those who participate in decision making are 
influenced heavily by their organizational affiliation and position” (Page and Wouters 
1994: 446). Recent studies also emphasise the central role of individuals at other posi-
tions of coordinating power than the European Commission such as the rapporteurs in 
the European Parliament (Egeberg et al. 2013; Marshall 2012; Huber and Shackleton 
2013) and the presidency of the Council. This indicates that the earlier findings from 
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the 1990s remain relevant for current policymaking after the Lisbon treaty (Craig 
2010) entered into force. 
These findings point towards a notion of ‘collective leadership’, which appears 
to be based more on a shared ‘institutional objective’ linked to individual’s organisa-
tional affiliation and current position as well as shared beliefs about the overall policy 
objectives and wider goals of the organisation, which is the deepening integration 
among the member states towards a supranational polity with “semi-federalist charac-
ter” (Nedergaard 2008: 180) as envisaged by the EU’s founding fathers. The shared 
belief among most civil servants at the European Commission and its overall objective 
is to serve the common good of Europe and to further European Integration. In the in-
terinstitutional triangle of the EU institutions, the European Commission has tradi-
tionally been described as supranational actor, whereas the member states represent 
the intergovernmental pole via the Council: 
 
 
Since Ernst Haas’ The Uniting of Europe (1958), the history of European integra-
tion has been perceived as a contest between two fundamentally different strat-
egies for collaboration in Europe: intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. 
(…) The protagonists in this ongoing play have long since been identified: the 
member states defending national sovereignty on the one hand, and the European 
Commission guarding the common European interest on the other (…) [leading to 
the view] that the European Commission has an institutional interest in advancing 
supranational empowerment.  
 
(Hooghe 2001: 95-96) 
 
However, detailed research on the beliefs of representatives of the European 
Commission across multiple levels of hierarchy arrived at a picture consisting of a tri-
angle between supranationalism, where the College of Commissioners provides politi-
cal guidance and its civil servants “defend the Commission’s role as Europe’s exec-
utive and help usher in a federal Europe” (Hooghe 2012: 91), institutional pragmatism 
where both the Commission and the Council provide political guidance with a focus 
on shared needs and European solutions, and finally more traditional state-centrism 
with member states remaining in the “driver’s seat” (Hooghe 2012: 91).  
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5.1.3 Conclusion on policymaking in the European Union 
 
 
This section provided a brief overview of the policymaking process in the EU as the 
geographic focus for the empirical analysis of learning in climate policy integration. It 
zoomed in on the key role of the European Commission, which can be understood as a 
collective policy entrepreneur in the European policymaking process based on its 
special role as the only institution with the power to propose legislation. The 
European Commission also understands its mission as driving forward European 
Integration. To a certain extent, these characteristics are unique to the European 
Commission. However, the notion of policy entrepreneurs in public administration, 
both as institution and as individual, is not new or limited to the European 
Commission. Originally developed in a predominantly US-American or international 
context (Howard 2001; Kingdon 1984), the notion of policy entrepreneurs finds an 
increasing uptake in the literature on the EU with some contributions focussing on the 
European Commission who as an institution acts as policy entrepreneur (Krause 2003; 
Mintrom 2013) and on individuals taking on the roles of individual policy 
entrepreneurs from within the European Commission (Bauer 2008; Braun 2009; 
Skjærseth and Wettestad 2010). The next section reviews the policy aspect of the case 
studies. Climate policy integration is a fairly young policy area that is enjoying 
increasing attention given its important role in addressing climate change while 
‘single purpose’ climate policies remain of limited scope.  
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5.2 Climate Policy Integration in the European Union5 
 
 
To justify its image and leadership ambitions on the international level (Schreurs and 
Tiberghien 2007; Wurzel and Connelly 2011), the EU designed a number of specific 
climate policies such as the European Emission Trading Scheme to implement its 
Kyoto commitments (Skaerseth and Wettestad 2009). Yet many sectors remain rela-
tively unaffected from specific climate policies such as agriculture, regional and eco-
nomic development, trade and parts of the transport sector (Kettner, Kletzan-
Slamanig, and Köppl 2012). Examples for the integration of climate objectives into 
other policy sectors include energy efficiency, the use of renewable energies and the 
conditionality of regional development funds (Persson 2009) upon priority for low 
carbon technology and infrastructure, which does not exclude nuclear power or hy-
dropower. It is crucial to move beyond understanding the related concepts of sustain-
able development, environmental policy integration and climate policy integration as 
‘fuzzy’ principles (Dupont and Primova 2011; Lafferty and Hovden 2003: 5) or politi-
cal constructs (Nilsson and Persson 2003) that are interpreted differently by actors. In-
stead, clear-cut conceptualisations are required to enable their implementation across 
governance levels (Watson, Bulkeley, and Hudson 2008).  
This section makes a distinct contribution to the environmental policy and 
governance literature. It answers the question of what exactly climate policy integra-
tion is by consolidating the existing research literature and discussing what does and 
does not count as climate policy integration. It identifies climate policy integration as 
a separate concept that has a limited overlap with environmental policy integration. In 
terms of policy design, climate policy integration is a parallel stream besides single-
purpose climate policies. The focus is on climate mitigation, but the framework is also 
applicable to policies targeted at adapting to the unavoidable consequences of climate 
change as discussed by Urwin and Jordan (2008). Criteria to evaluate the success of 
climate policy integration include the extent of synergies in the sectoral policies’ ob-
jectives with climate mitigation/adaptation in relation to innovation, technology and 
infrastructure, the extent of state intervention required and political factors including 
policy stability, economic feasibility and societal consensus.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This section overlaps with a paper that was published as part of this PhD research (see Rietig 2013). 
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5.2.1 What is climate policy integration? 
 
 
The concept of ‘Policy Integration’ goes beyond ‘Environmental Policy Inte-
gration’ and can be traced back over three decades, although Environmental Policy In-
tegration can be understood as its ‘mother concept’ (Adelle and Russel 2013; Jordan 
and Lenschow 2010). Underdal (1980) is widely acknowledged as having provided 
the first academic analysis of ‘policy integration’ (Dupont and Primova 2011; Jordan 
and Lenschow 2010). However, developing a common conceptualisation and an ana-
lytical framework for environmental policy integration has proven challenging. Gov-
ernment-issued reports (e.g. Mickwitz et al. 2009) are not based on a common concep-
tualisation. One reason might be the requirement of political consensus and a desire to 
not clearly define the concept similar to the relatively flexible use of ‘sustainable de-
velopment’ in policymaking to avoid complications based on different party-political 
and ideological interpretations (Jordan 2008). 
Normative and legal aspects make it problematic to model climate policy inte-
gration after the concept of environmental policy integration by assigning it the status 
of a ‘principled priority’ as suggested by Dupont and Primova (2011) based on the 
principled priority of environmental policy integration (Lafferty and Hovden 2003). 
While it is desirable as an ideal-type policy, the realities of policymaking should be 
measured as a benchmark of what constitutes successful climate policy integration. 
Other than environmental policy integration (Collier 1997) it has no strong quasi-
constitutional basis in international/ European treaties and therefore a far weaker 
standing both in international law and as a policy principle. To date, it remains a mere 
theoretical idea. Given the lack of a legal basis in national or European law, there are 
no provisions for implementation. It remains unclear who should oversee, evaluate 
and carry out the integration of climate policies, let alone have appropriate legal, pol-
icy and administrative instruments available for enforcement.  
Climate change is frequently seen as an environmental problem (Dupont and 
Primova 2011; Nilsson and Nilsson 2005; Nilsson 2006). However, the core distinc-
tion between environmental and climate policy integration is that measures to address 
climate change can be contradictory to environmental objectives. Incentives for in-
stalling hydropower stations as opposed to fossil fuels-based power plants are a posi-
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tive contribution to climate change mitigation. However, changing water levels have 
negative consequences for biodiversity and can destroy large areas of sensitive eco-
systems. Biofuels and biomass constitute a major component of the EU’s and US’ re-
newable energy strategies to reduce carbon emissions. However, there is not only an 
increasing level of uncertainty regarding their positive contribution to climate mitiga-
tion targets given the high carbon intensity, but also increasing evidence of their nega-
tive environmental consequences including indirect land use changes when forests and 
peatlands are converted for intensive agricultural use (Searchinger et al. 2008; 
Sharman and Holmes 2010). Hydropower and bioenergy are widely regarded as re-
newable energies, forming a core measure to address climate change. Disastrous envi-
ronmental consequences of nuclear accidents and the disposal of nuclear waste are 
another example. Yet nuclear power is regarded by most countries as acceptable me-
dium-term choice to reduce emissions next to improving energy efficiency and in-
creasing the share of solar or wind power (Kulovesi, Morgera, and Muñoz 2011).  
 
 
5.2.2 Conceptualisation of climate policy integration  
 
As discussed above, climate policy integration cannot be simply regarded as a sub-
category of environmental policy integration, but should be rather seen as a distinct 
regulatory approach, which ideally has major overlaps with environmental policy 
integration. In consequence of the discussion of 5.2.1, this thesis conceptualises ‘cli-
mate policy integration’ as the integration of climate policies designed to combat cli-
mate change into local, national and international sectoral policies. Climate policy 
integration has a special relevance for policy fields where the use of regulatory in-
struments can increase synergies between climate mitigation/ adaptation and the sec-
toral policies’ objective. 
Climate objectives cannot be integrated into all other policy sectors with the 
same success (Rietig 2013). The core aspect is the level of synergies between the sec-
tor’s policy objectives and climate objectives. Synergies can exist in terms of technol-
ogy, innovation and infrastructure. The synergies depend on the potential for mitiga-
tion/adaptation and how easily the objectives of the policy sector can be harmonised 
with the climate objectives. Harmonisation can happen via regulatory instruments or 
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financial incentives. This section provides a conceptual framework for aligning the 
process and outcome of climate policy integration. It draws on research findings in the 
environmental policy integration and governance literature while taking into account 
the particularities of climate policy integration (Lenschow 2002; Jordan et al. 2010; 
Jordan and Lenschow 2010). 
Successful climate policy integration requires favourable conditions from all 
three forms of governance, i.e. hierarchy, market and network governance across 
multiple governance levels (Watson, Bulkeley, and Hudson 2008). The first condition 
for successful climate policy integration is continued political support beyond a 
change in government ensured by consensus within the governmental hierarchy or 
stable power equilibriums (Hamdouch and Depret 2010; Söderberg 2011; Weber and 
Driessen 2010). If there are frequent U-turns either in support of or against the inte-
gration of climate policy considerations, the successful implementation may prove 
challenging. An empirical example is the third U-turn in German nuclear policy, the 
most recent one following the Fukushima disaster in 2011. The second condition is 
societal consensus among all actors within the governance network and wider society 
in favour of integrating climate objectives into other policy sectors. The third condi-
tion is the economic feasibility of climate policy integration that includes low policy 
volatility and thereby low investment uncertainty. Only when market actors under-
stand upfront investment as advantageous for their innovation capacity and have a re-
liable, stable legal framework incentivising the investment in clean technologies and 
supporting infrastructure (Hamdouch and Depret 2010), they are likely to cooperate. 
Furthermore, where financial instruments are used to incentivise the integration of 
climate policies such as development funds, donors need to possess the capacity to en-
force conditionalities of payment upon compliance with climate policy integration 
priorities and to verify the use of funds via monitoring. 
It may prove challenging for governments to make appropriate legislative pro-
posals that integrate climate objectives due to internal coordination challenges. The at-
tempt to integrate climate objectives can result in conflicts between government de-
partments and other involved actors regarding policy priorities and competencies. Pol-
icy-makers need to take this challenge into consideration especially in cases where the 
affected policy sector has few automatic synergies with climate policy integration 
(e.g. cases examined by Söderberg 2011; Weber and Driessen 2010; Watson, 
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Bulkeley, and Hudson 2008). This can be addressed by introducing incentives for 
close cooperation among government departments across hierarchical levels and by 
setting up climate policy units within all government departments relevant for climate 
policy integration.  
The implementation of climate policy integration requires a considerable time 
span. Existing legislation to integrate climate objectives is vulnerable to on-going po-
litical dynamics, either via elections or external shocks. Those can reverse the deci-
sions made before the shock situation or by a previous government (Jones and 
Baumgartner 2012; Söderberg 2011). This opens up the necessity to design policies 
that ‘stick’ (Levin et al. 2012), i.e. create a path-dependency that is not easily rever-
sible by external political events. This could happen via the creation of industries with 
business opportunities around the new policy area that subsequently develop vested 
interests and would thus protest against policy change reversing the policy. Other op-
tions could be political decisions for an overall policy objective, while allowing gov-
ernments to implement appropriate interim steps towards the overall target via exec-
utive orders triggered by automatic interim monitoring and evaluation processes. Cli-
mate policy integration also requires a strong basis to remain resilient towards re-
occurring economic and financial crises around the globe, which have frequently neg-
ative repercussions on other countries. Companies and local authorities can hardly 
make investment decisions in infrastructure, power generation or production methods 
under the uncertainty that their additional short-term costs from integrating climate 
concerns may not provide medium and long-term benefits given the risk of the more 
stringent policy being discarded after a few years (see also Brunner, Flachsland, and 
Marschinski 2012).  
In consequence, government institutions (the European Commission in the 
European case) retain a steering role in climate policy integration. It needs to provide 
incentives for climate policy integration through regulatory and distributive interven-
tions (Brunner, Flachsland, and Marschinski 2012). The level of intervention required 
depends on how well each sector’s objectives match with the potential for climate 
mitigation/ adaptation (Swart and Raes 2007). These synergies in objectives also de-
termine the economic feasibility of climate policy integration in the respective sectors 
and the level of societal support for such policies. 
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This chapter paved the way to analyse learning in the EU case studies on cli-
mate policy integration. Based on the conceptual literature review and the meta-
theoretical framework for learning presented in the second and third chapter, this 
chapter provided the context of policymaking in the EU, a review of the literature on 
climate policy integration as well as a conceptualisation of this comparably novel but 
relevant area for climate governance.  
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Chapter 6 	  
Integrating climate objectives into European energy policy: 
Learning in the European Renewable Energy Directive 
 
 
 
 
The Renewable Energy Directive [RED] (EU 2009a) is the EU’s major flagship legis-
lation on renewable energy that serves the purpose of increasing the share of renew-
able energies in the EU to 20 per cent by 2020. It is one of the few existing examples 
of climate policy integration at a large scale as it integrates climate objectives into the 
‘core’ objective of providing energy (Rietig 2013). The Renewable Energy Directive 
is not climate legislation per se, although it emerged as part of the wider EU climate 
package 2008/09 that also includes a reform of the European Emission Trading 
Scheme (Wettestad and Skaerseth 2010), the Fuel Quality Directive (EU 2009b) and 
the Energy Efficiency Directive and it is linked to the EU’s climate targets of reducing 
emissions from 1990 levels by 20 per cent in 2020 as well as increasing energy effi-
ciency by 20 per cent (EC 2008a). The Renewable Energy Directive can be regarded 
as an overarching policy that combines the three aspects of electricity, biofuels and 
heating/ cooling. The Renewable Electricity Directive (EU 2001) and the Biofuels Di-
rective (EU 2003a) form the basis for the Renewable Energy Directive, which as a 
third component also addresses heating and cooling. Its policy development was also 
influenced by the Fuel Quality Directives from 1998 and 2009 (EU 1998; EU 2009b). 
The interdependency of biofuels as part of transport policy with the Fuel Quality Di-
rective resulted in different learning processes than the overall development of the 
Renewable Energy Directive.  
Its long and gradual development makes the Renewable Energy Directive an 
ideal example of climate policy integration since renewable energy also serves the two 
objectives of energy security and economic development. This chapter identifies dif-
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ferent aspects of learning in the development of the Renewable Energy Directive and 
answers the central research questions of when, why and under what conditions learn-
ing occurred and to what extent there were alternative explanations for the policy out-
come. It focuses on the Renewable Energy Directive’s components of electricity, 
biofuels and to a lesser extent heating/ cooling.6 The first section provides a brief 
overview of the development of the Renewable Energy Directive within wider socio-
political shifts as potential driver for learning. The second section examines learning 
in the Renewable Energy Directive with a focus on its electricity component as exam-
ple of learning in a fairly uncontroversial policy environment. The third section zooms 
in on the biofuels controversy that emerged with new scientific evidence that was 
introduced during the policymaking process and thus provides a good example of 
learning in controversial policy settings. The final section links the findings and con-
cludes that policy change was rather the result of pre-existing beliefs and alternative 
explanations than learning during the policymaking process. 
 
 
 
6.1 Drivers influencing the development of the RED in the socio-
political landscape and review of the literature 
 
 
This section examines the key drivers that influenced the development of the Renew-
able Energy Directive. It serves two purposes. First, it recognises the considerable 
number of publications on renewable energy policy in the European Union and on the 
Renewable Energy Directive in particular. It identifies gaps in this literature, which so 
far has predominantly focused on explaining the debates around the Renewable Elec-
tricity Directive (e.g. Eising 2002; Nilsson and Ericsson 2009), the Biofuels Directive 
in a EU and national context (e.g. Dunlop 2010) and the biofuels component of the 
Renewable Energy Directive (e.g. Sharman and Holmes). Relevant conclusions of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 6 In the heating and cooling aspects of learning are difficult to be identified due to its recent develop-
ment and lesser focus during the policymaking process (see Nedergaard 2008; Sabatier 1988). They are 
thus included in the wider development of the Directive, but none of the interviewees identified this as-
pect as an area where particular discussion and reflection as prerequisite to learning occurred. 
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these contributions in relation to the empirical findings of this research are discussed 
throughout the chapter and taken up in the discussion chapter 8. Many elements pre-
sented in this chapter, for example on coalitions, policy brokers, differing interests of 
actors and overall support for renewable energies have also been identified by the pre-
vious literature. This suggests that the findings from the interviews are accurate. A 
key gap remaining in the empirical studies on European renewable energy policy in 
general and the Renewable Energy Directive in particular is however that we know 
little about the role learning played in the policy making process. 
The academic literature has so far focused on advocacy coalitions and wider 
collective policymaking processes in the development of the Renewable Electricity 
Directive (see Held, Ragwitz, and Haas 2006; Knudsen 2010; Nilsson and Ericsson 
2009; Nylander 2001; Rowlands 2005; Verhaegen et al. 2007) and more widely on 
national implementation of renewable electricity policy with a large number of contri-
butions in the journal Energy Policy. These frequently focused on the political econ-
omy of different policy instruments such as feed-in tariffs (e.g. Mitchell, Bauknecht, 
and Connor 2006). Another strand of literature focused on the biofuels aspect of the 
Renewable Energy Directive (EU 2009a) and its predecessor (EU 2003a) on the 
European level (e.g. Sharman and Holmes 2010) and on its national implementation 
(Dunlop 2010; Jacobsson 2008; Palmer 2010). Toke (2008) and Johnston et al. (2008) 
provided an early analysis of the negotiation process of the RED with a focus on bar-
gaining among the member states and the European Commission, while Hildingsson 
et al. (2012) recently published an analysis of the governance dilemmas related to 
policymaking in renewable energy on the European level. Consequently, a gap re-
mains as the key role of the European Commission and the aspect of learning were 
less at the centre of attention. Especially the European Commission played an import-
ant role in initiating the policy proposal and gathering support for it. A number of pol-
icy entrepreneurs pushed its development towards an unexpectedly quickly adoption 
within the wider climate and energy legislative package. Thus, the following sections 
analyse the role of the European Commission and windows of opportunity as key dri-
vers for developing the RED and influencing the importance of learning therein.  
 112	  
 
6.1.1 The European Commission as key driver 
 
 
Motivated by the oil shocks of the 1970s, the EU increased research and development 
into ‘alternative energies’ to improve energy security. This was reframed in the 1990s 
as triple objective of energy security, economic development (depending on the focus, 
also rural development or competitiveness) and climate change. In the mid-2000s, it 
became part of the EU climate package and was thus reframed as a contribution to 
climate mitigation (for details, see Hildingsson, Stripple, and Jordan 2010):  
 
With policy in mind (…) we talked about the pillars of energy policy and the re-
newables contributed toward them (…) so it contributed to climate policy, it gen-
erated jobs, and (…) contributed to the energy supply discussion so in that sense 
we all thought the arguments supporting renewables were broader than pure cli-
mate change. 
 
(EC 8) 
 
Thus, renewable energies and their biofuels component were not primarily de-
veloped to solve climate mitigation and thus address environmental objectives: 
 
They added [environment and climate change] (…) on top. They said it’s good for 
agriculture in addition it’s good for the environment so it’s one more way of sell-
ing it basically but it was never something that was developed primarily for envi-
ronmental purposes. 
 
(EC 12) 
 
This triangle proved to be a ‘magic formula’ as it played to different member states’ 
domestic interests promising co-benefits: 
 
Member states probably understood that using increased shares of renewables, there 
could be something in for them in terms of industrial policy, in terms of energy policy, 
less energy dependence, because renewables are exceptionally domestic, I think eve-
rybody was sort of, renewables have always been quite popular in most countries.  
 
(EC 2) 
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Particularly biofuels, which were also regarded as energy from renewable sour-
ces, are not a new development. Their use has been motivated as a consequence of the 
oil crises of the 1970s. Member states explored their use and invested in their devel-
opment as response to worries about energy security in transport and in particular in 
the agriculture sector: 
 
In 1973 there was the danger that there would be no fuel available. And then count-
ries reacted. (…) In the ministry for agriculture we began discussions in 1974 how 
we could address this problem so that the harvest and supply of the agricultural 
sector with fuel could be ensured. (…) Someone remembered that vegetable-based 
oil can be used in motors. There was research dating back to the war.  
(NMS 1) 
 
The European Commission can be understood as a key driver in promoting the 
use of renewable energies in Europe. After the oil shocks of the 1970s, a unit on ‘Al-
ternative Energies’ (later renamed ‘Renewable Energies and Energy Efficiency’) was 
established to promote the uptake of renewable energies. It prepared green and white 
papers setting out a renewable energy plan (EC 1996; 1997). 
 
In the year 2000, new leaders arrived and said ‘its been 20 years that we have 
been spending money and time to promote alternative energy and it’s not enter-
ing into the market, so we need to force the penetration of renewables into the 
market, that is why we want to develop a directive obliging electricity producers 
to produce renewable energy.’ 
(EC 1) 
 
 
 This push for a directive promoting the uptake of renewable energies, espe-
cially renewable electricity generated from solar, wind and hydropower, coincided 
with the arrival of a new Commissioner for Energy and Transport, Loyola de Palacio. 
She was very supportive of pushing the market penetration of renewable energies and 
was described as a “quite tough, strong personality, [who] fought for that” (EC 1), 
while there was general consensus among decision-makers on the European level that 
an increase in renewable energies would be a desirable objective. This prompted the 
development of the 2001 Renewable Electricity Directive (EU 2001), which already 
sets the frame for climate policy integration, links to the international climate mitiga-
tion efforts as well as to the objective of sustainable development from an envi-
ronmental, social and economic perspective:  
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The Community recognises the need to promote renewable energy sources as a 
priority measure given that their exploitation contributes to environmental pro-
tection and sustainable development. In addition this can also create local em-
ployment, have a positive impact on social cohesion, contribute to security of 
supply and make it possible to meet Kyoto targets more quickly.  
 
(EU 2001: Recital 1) 
 
The Renewable Electricity Directive required member states to set national in-
dicative targets (EU 2001: Article 3) resulting in political conflicts and compromises 
regarding countries’ exact targets (Rowlands 2005; Verhaegen et al. 2007). What fa-
cilitated the adoption of the directive was the overall consensus among stakeholders 
and decision-makers that alternatives to fossil fuels should play a larger role in the Eu-
ropean energy mix. In consequence, there was a consensus regarding actor’s beliefs 
on normative policy objectives (policy design beliefs), but also distributive conflicts 
regarding the exact instruments and targets based on national interests. These can be 
regarded as beliefs on policy details (see chapter 3).  
The key motivation for European decision-makers’ increased support for renew-
able energy was the necessity to deliver on the international climate change commit-
ment and consequently reduce emissions. Two landmark events on the international 
level resulted in increased efforts by the EU and the European Commission in particu-
lar to promote the uptake of renewable energies. The first event was the United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD)’s Rio Earth Summit in 
1992, which established the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and pushed the necessity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions on 
national agendas. The EU played a leadership role in international climate negotia-
tions (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007) and wanted to be regarded as a “role model” 
(Fouquet 2012: 1). This brought the need to save face by implementing the ambitious 
commitments the EU had pushed for on the international level domestically. The sec-
ond landmark event was the UNFCCC conference in Copenhagen in 2009, where 
countries tried to agree on a post-Kyoto climate treaty, which provided time pressure 
and turned out to be an important driver for the quick adoption of the Climate and En-
ergy package (Rietig forthcoming 2014 b): 
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In terms of the EU taking over a leading global role, this was a wonderful oppor-
tunity so it was clear to President Barroso and others that we needed to have an 
agreed European position to be able to be a strong entity at Copenhagen. That 
meant making rapid progress in developing the European consensus [on the cli-
mate package] first internally before turning up in Copenhagen.  
 
(EC 8) 
 
The Framework Convention also contained an article on civil participation in 
implementation, thus pointing towards the importance of cities and the local level to 
reduce emissions. As part of the implementation of the Framework Convention’s arti-
cles on civil participation, the European Commission engaged with mayors across Eu-
rope and set up several networks to promote the uptake of renewable energies and en-
ergy efficiency measures on the local level from 1993 onwards (Hildingsson, Stripple, 
and Jordan 2012). These networks included the Covenant of Mayors, the Greater 
London Energy Efficiency Network and the global network ICLEI. Furthermore, the 
European Commission set up programmes to promote the uptake of renewable energy 
and raise awareness among citizens, companies and member states (ALTENER) as 
well as energy efficiency (ENERGY CITY and FEDEREN) with seed-funds: 
 
It was very enthusiastic, a lot of people were really enjoying it, it was really dy-
namic. (…) Everyone wanted to deal with renewables, and when I arrived there 
[in the cities] and said ‘you know, you should deal with renewables and there is a 
network that can help you’, they were interested because it’s a positive message. 
So local authorities have been very keen to enter into this concept. And we started 
with this concept of financing local authorities to create local agencies, but the 
concept was just to prime the thumb with some seed money. And we ended up 
with the Covenant of Mayors. 
 
                                 (EC 1) 
 
The European Council meeting in March 2006 set the overall rationale for de-
veloping a renewable energy strategy that would contribute to the overall objectives of 
addressing security of supply, climate change, the slow progress in the use of renew-
ables and the importance of improving transparency and integration of the energy 
market (European Council 2006a: 13-15).  
Heating as third component of renewable energies remained widely unad-
dressed. The European Commission was raising the profile of heating in renewable 
energies by introducing the topic into discussions at the European Parliament (EC 1; 
EC 4), which subsequently passed a resolution requesting from the European Com-
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mission to submit to the Parliament a legislative proposal on renewable energies for 
heating and cooling by 31.7.2006 (European Parliament 2006). The European Parlia-
ment’s resolution contained a detailed annex on the expected content with concrete 
measures to be proposed (European Parliament 2006: I). Shortly thereafter the Euro-
pean Commission received a request to prepare a proposal that integrated all three as-
pects of renewables, what resulted in the Renewable Energy Road Map (EC 2007a). It 
already contains the landmark targets on Renewable Energy that were adopted at the 
European Council meeting in March 2007 (European Council 2007; EC 2).  
 The European Commission proposed in the Renewable Energy Road Map set-
ting a legally binding target to achieve a share of 20 per cent of the overall energy mix 
from renewable energy sources including a mandatory minimum target for biofuels of 
10 per cent share in 2010, what would require a “substantial strengthening of the EU 
regulatory framework” (EC 2007a: 18), i.e. a new directive. The Renewable Energy 
Roadmap of January 2007 therefore had a significant impact on the decisions reached 
in the European Council and the subsequent proposal of the Renewable Energy Direc-
tive put forward by the European Commission: 
 
It was sort of all happening at the same time. (…) In the informal Council (...) in 
the end of 2006 (…) was when [DG Energy] (…) proposed the idea of renewables 
targets and there were very few member states who were interested (…) so there 
was not much enthusiasm but then in the beginning of 2007 we published the Re-
newable Energy Road Map impact assessment and a suggestion that 20	  per cent 
was an appropriate objective for 2020 and that we should have binding targets and 
that these would be useful and all of this worked very well with a 20	  per cent cli-
mate change objective and so we published that in January and then a combina-
tion of very intensive discussions by everybody evolved, (…) we persuaded 
enough people that we were utterly right so that by March of 2007 the European 
Council actually endorsed the approach and called for the proposal to have a le-
gally binding 20	  per cent renewables target. 
 
(EC 8) 
 
Interview data across different actor groups suggests that the European Com-
mission was a key driver behind the renewable energy targets. Although there is a 
considerable literature on the development of the RED and its predecessor the Renew-
able Electricity Directive (EU 2001), the academic literature has so far said surpris-
ingly little about the role of the European Commission as key driver in creating a win-
dow of opportunity for renewable energy policymaking although it has been regarded 
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as key actor in other sectors such as the European Emission Trading Scheme 
(Skjærseth and Wettestad 2010; Wettestad 2005) or social policy (Wendon 1998). The 
European Commission not only set up and promoted the networks supporting the up-
take of renewable energies on the local level, but it also fulfilled its role in paving the 
way for a directive by raising the profile of renewable energies in the European Par-
liament and in the European Council, which subsequently followed the Commission’s 
recommendations both in the aspect of heating/ cooling and in the overall 20 per cent 
target for renewable energy and 10 per cent for renewable energy sources in transport.  
 
 
6.1.2 Windows of opportunity 
 
The Renewable Electricity Directive was the result of a window of opportunity op-
ened up by the European Commission’s outreach activities on the local level, changes 
in the leadership and the pressure to implement international commitments: 
 
So Kyoto, plus the Greens, plus the new Commissioner, plus the willingness of 
people saying okay, we know we need to do more for renewable energies and 
Sustainable Development in general… the time was right to make this.  
 
(EC 1) 
 
 
The Renewable Energy Directive in turn was the result of another window of op-
portunity in 2006/ 2007 that raised the profile of climate change as an important prob-
lem high on the political agenda. This was driven not only by the European Commis-
sion’s internal efforts to address heating as aspect of renewable energies, but espe-
cially by external events, in particular the publication of the 2007 fourth assessment 
report by the IPCC with alarming scientific evidence and the resulting media debate 
(IPCC 2007). Especially important was Al Gore’s documentary movie ‘An Inconveni-
ent Truth’ (Guggenheim 2006), which presented the evidence on accelerating climate 
change in an easily to comprehend and emotional way. It reached millions of people 
and was seen as having considerably raised the awareness of climate change as a 
problem in the public domain (EC 2; EP 1; EP 2; NMS 7):  
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At the time there was compared to now a different sort of atmosphere on climate 
change. The Al Gore Film was out, and it was pre-Copenhagen, there was still quite 
a lot of enthusiasm trying to do something about climate change.  
 
(EC 2) 
 
A survey conducted by the University of Oxford/ Nielsen (Butts and Boykoff 
2007) found that 66 per cent of those who saw the documentary by Al Gore reported 
that it had ‘changed their mind’ about global warming, i.e. climate change, and 98 per 
cent reported they had an increased awareness of the problem. The change in beliefs is 
also indicated by the claim of 74 per cent of respondents who reported to have 
changed their behaviour as a result of ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ (Butts and Boykoff 
2007). Al Gore can be identified as a key policy entrepreneur as defined by Roberts 
and King (1991) with a large influence on bringing about this change in deeper beliefs 
among the public. Many came to understand that it is normatively important to act on 
climate change. His presentation of scientific evidence is interrupted by personal stor-
ies, including how a science class changed his underlying beliefs and values as he re-
flected on the knowledge, i.e. the scientific evidence presented to him and motivated 
him to not only push hard for emissions trading and the Kyoto Protocol in the interna-
tional climate negotiations of 1998, but also to act as a policy entrepreneur and con-
front the public with the climate crisis (Guggenheim 2006). 
Between 2004 and 2007, there was a combination of mounting scientific evi-
dence, increasing public awareness and concern about climate change, which was 
fuelled by Al Gore’s movie and environmental NGOs who strongly lobbied for action 
on climate change (ENGO 1; ENGO 2; ENGO 8; ENGO 9). This was intensified by 
the political need to deliver on the Kyoto Protocol targets by designing a climate pol-
icy capable of meeting the objectives, which in turn resulted in proposals from the 
European Commission as well as national governments and legislation such as the 
European Emission Trading Scheme (Ellerman and Buchner 2007; Wettestad 2005).  
These factors combined resulted in a window of opportunity to place decisions on 
climate mitigation on the agenda of Europe’s Heads of States and to develop a Euro-
pean climate strategy with targets beyond 2012 towards as a short-term objective (i.e. 
2020) and 2050 as a long-term perspective. It resulted in the European Council con-
clusions in 2005 to address climate change and to develop a coherent climate strategy 
with emission reduction targets (European Council 2005). Certainly, this climate 
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strategy was also made possible by the fact that it is easier for Heads of States as poli-
ticians to agree on a socially desirable objective that remains abstract and strategic 
with deadlines requiring deliverables when the decision-makers will most likely be 
out of office by 2020 than on concrete implementation measures (Betsill 2008). 
Political leaders especially from Germany, France and the UK pushed for a Eu-
ropean climate strategy, which resulted in the 2007 European Council conclusions on 
a ‘20-20-20 target’ (EC 2009; European Council 2007; 2008). Germany’s Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, who held the presidency of the European Council meeting, strongly 
pushed for an European climate strategy and convinced together with the President of 
the European Commission Manuel Barroso the French president Sarkozy and the Brit-
ish Prime Minister Tony Blair to support the proposal (EC 3; NMS 8). This finding on 
political leadership of the Council presidency confirms the expectation in the EU lit-
erature that the country holding the presidency of the Council has a decisive role in 
steering the debate towards the policy outcome (see Arregui and Thomson 2009: 658; 
Tallberg 2004; Thomson 2008; Warntjen 2007; 2008) much like in intergovernmental 
meetings (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010). Tony Blair was advised by his govern-
ment not to support the decision given that the United Kingdom at that time had less 
than two per cent of renewable energy and would most likely not be able to deliver on 
its corresponding renewable energy target by 2020 (NMS 8). Given that this was his 
last European Council meeting before the end of his term and as he was alone with the 
other Heads of States while making the decision, he agreed to the 20 per cent overall 
European target on increasing the share of renewable energy in the EU (NMS 8). This 
meant another window of opportunity in the form of a lack of opposition that would 
be strong enough to mobilise enough opposition to block the policy proposal. There 
was also strong support from the President of the Commission: 
 
 
Well it became clear I think to President Barroso that this was one of the key pol-
icy areas where there was a clear European dimension so it was an area where 
there was a fair consensus that they needed European, not national action and it 
was a chance for the EU to take the lead in terms of broader European cohesion 
and cooperation. 
 
(EC 8) 
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The Renewable Energy Directive was proposed in 2008 and passed unusually 
quickly (EC 2; EC 3). This was not the result of an overall consensus and persuasion 
of all actors as deliberation theory would suggest (Risse and Kleine 2010) given the 
intensive disagreements between coalitions especially in the area of biofuels (EC 4; 
EC 9; EC 12), but due to the fact that it was part of the large climate package, which 
was fast-tracked by all actors involved before the window of opportunity facilitated by 
economic prosperity and enlargement closed with the emerging financial and eco-
nomic crisis:  
 
We had an incredible political momentum with the climate and energy package. So 
the Renewable Energy Directive was riding on that wave and was part of a bigger 
package, which enjoyed the support from the European Council, from Barroso per-
sonally and so it was part of a bigger vehicle that was very hard to stop. It was for-
tunately very heavily prioritised by the French presidency and although the crisis 
had actually kicked in, they pushed it through as one of their prizes of the French 
presidency, so it was agreed actually some months after the big crisis. But we were 
lucky that they really pushed so hard in getting it through. It’s often easier when its 
part of a big package, to then get things through quickly. 
 
(EC 3) 
 
Nevertheless, the question of how the target should be achieved and what com-
mitments it would require from the member states was very controversial. The politi-
cal debate focused on whether the targets should be indicative or mandatory and on. 
the share of renewable energy member states would be required to achieve (NMS 8): 
 
I realised very quickly that we couldn’t sell it. So we had to make a target that had 
a methodology that was simplistic and the same for everybody.  
 
(EC 6) 
 
The RED was also adopted unusually quickly due to a successful pre-negotiation 
process managed by the European Commission before the publication of the official 
proposal with a formula that would be acceptable by the member states (EC 6). 
In conclusion, there are several factors that explain why the 2009 RED (EU 
2009a) was adopted unusually quickly and how it became a central policy for integrat-
ing climate change objectives into energy policy. All of these are linked to wider 
shifts on the socio-political landscape that made the development of renewable ener-
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gies desirable and stimulated learning during policy development on the organisa-
tional level. First, it was the result of a four-decade long development process that had 
started with the first oil shocks and worries about energy security, there were two pre-
vious directives and it was part of a larger climate legislative package. Secondly, re-
newable energies were in principle regarded by all actors as a desirable technology, 
leading to a strong overall societal consensus in their favour. Thirdly, although it re-
quires specific action from member states and is therefore less likely to be accepted 
than generic political declarations (Betsill 2008), the RED was adopted during a win-
dow of opportunity with overall societal support for an ambitious climate change 
strategy. As renewable energy was considered by the European Commission as inher-
ently contributing to the mitigation of climate change (EC 2007a; 2007b), it became 
the core vehicle to achieve the climate targets and therefore served as integral compo-
nent of the overall climate 20-20-20 legislation package (European Council 2008). 
Overall, policy entrepreneurs at the European Commission, in civil society and the 
emerging window of opportunity brought about shifts in beliefs within the wider 
socio-political landscape. These shifts resulted in reflection on this input on the indi-
vidual and organisational level. The following sections thus focus on learning among 
decision-makers and how this was transferred to the organisational level. 
 
 
6.2 Learning in negotiating the overall RED 
 
 
This section examines what aspects of learning occurred on the individual and organi-
sational levels as well as the extent to which learning influenced the policy outcome. 
It first analyses the individual level of decision-makers predominantly at the European 
Commission, in the European Parliament and in the European member states. The 
second part sheds light on the extent of learning on the organisational level and links 
the interdependencies between the two levels to the impact of learning on the policy 
design of the RED. It applies the theoretical framework presented in chapter 3 as well 
as the methods for data collection and analysis discussed in chapter 4. 
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6.2.1 Factual and experiential learning on the individual level 
 
To identify learning on the individual level, the accounts of decision-makers 
would need to reflect a change in knowledge in terms of a better understanding of pol-
icy instruments and how they can be applied (factual learning) or increased experience 
by being involved in the drafting and/or negotiation process and gaining experience in 
negotiation strategy (individual experiential learning). Reflection on this ‘normal’ sin-
gle-loop or double-loop type learning (Argyris 1976) can potentially result in con-
structivist learning via changed underlying beliefs (see chapter 3; Nye 1987). The key 
determinant for learning on the individual level is the previous experience and exper-
tise the individual had at the outset of engaging with the new legislative proposal. 
Learning can be measured as a change in the status quo, the difference between the 
point in time when the individual began to engage with renewable energy policy and 
the adoption of the Directive as the final step (this could continue if the individual was 
also involved in implementation or reform, but is excluded from this policymaking-
focused research). Reflection requires time (Radaelli 2009) and a certain autonomy 
from hierarchical pressures (Janis and Mann 1977). Learning on the individual level 
occurred among those involved during the drafting phase of the RED in terms of in-
creases in knowledge and experience, but less in terms of changing underlying beliefs.  
For individual learning to occur, the atmosphere for learning is crucial, which 
is strongly influenced by the leadership style of the individuals in management posi-
tions (see chapter 2 and 3). There were only a limited number of individuals involved 
in the direct development, drafting and negotiation of the RED7 given that the Euro-
pean Commission is the only European institution with the right to make legislative 
proposals (Costello and Thomson 2013; Hix 2005; Weidenfeld 2006). The responsi-
bility for the RED was at the Directorate General for Transport and Energy (DG 
TREN), which has been split up into the Directorate General on Energy (DG Energy) 
and the Directorate General on Transport (DG MOVE).8 DG TREN had a unit of 10 
to 15 civil servants dealing with renewable energies (RE). The RE Unit consisted of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The author interviewed most key individuals. These individuals were pointed out by different actors 
in the European Parliament, the Council and in the community of non-governmental actors.  
8 For accuracy, this thesis uses the designations that were in use at the time the policy was being 
negotiated. Further to the split of DG TREN, DG Environment was also split into DG Climate Action 
and DG Environment in 2010. 
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policy officers who were each or in a small team responsible for aspects of the legisla-
tive proposal, the ‘file’, with input from other policy officers who were experts on 
sub-fields of the file. Other key individuals were the rapporteurs and shadow-
rapporteurs of the Environment and the Industry, Research and Energy committees in 
the European Parliament (Marshall 2012) as well as the advisors to the heads of states/ 
member state representatives in the Council working groups. The remainder of this 
section examines the learning of the involved key individuals. 
The atmosphere in the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Unit has 
been described by individuals who at the time of the interview had moved on to other 
positions outside DG TREN as constructive, friendly and supportive with a high level 
of autonomy, based on trust into the individual’s capabilities. The colleagues were de-
scribed as ‘dedicated’ and ‘motivated’, holding the belief that they were contributing 
to an important and normatively ‘good’ endeavour (EC 3; EC 7). This can frequently 
be observed inside the European Commission (EC 4; ENGO 1; Koch and Lindenthal 
2011). Two key reasons can be identified from the empirical data as enabling this at-
mosphere of openness to learning and reflection in the RE Unit. The first reason is the 
topic area of renewable energy, which has an overall positive connotation of ‘doing 
something good for society and the environment’ as opposed to potentially harmful 
policies. The field of renewable energy, similar like environment and climate, attracts 
people with a ‘green mindset’, who care about the environment and share deeper be-
liefs that favour environmental protection and mitigating climate change (EC 2; EC 3; 
EC 4; EC 14; NMS 8). Interviewees agreed that people working in this area were es-
pecially motivated and dedicated as they were contributing to something ‘bigger’: 
 
It is also something related to the area. (…) I think people who work in climate 
issues are reinforced by the idea that they are doing something good. (…) And 
probably it also attracts people who have this special drive. 
(EC 3) 
 
The second key determinant for reflection and therefore learning on the indi-
vidual level is the leadership style of the immediate superior, in this case the Head of 
Unit. If the team members are not simply following orders as a major reason for a lack 
of learning (see Janis and Mann 1977), but have a certain level of autonomy in their 
day-to-day work, it can have a positive influence on their motivation and dedication. 
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In the case of the RE Unit, the atmosphere was described as “very good. Very dy-
namic, we were very busy and very dedicated (…) I think we were quite enthusiastic 
about the whole thing. [The Head of Unit] was good at motivating people” (EC 3) and 
“very supportive and at a high pace” (EC 7). A key strategy was to let the policy offi-
cers as experts on the different aspects of the RED speak on behalf of the European 
Commission in external meetings and explain the issues under discussion, what placed 
a significant responsibility on them but also had a very motivating effect (EC 2): 
 
 
I mean it meant that at one point every week we would go into a council 
workgroup or parliamentary committees or both to discuss texts, to look at 
amendments, to argue about what was right and what was wrong.  Doing that on a 
very regular, frequent weekly basis was great learning from my perspective, but 
there was a whole team of us doing it, led by my head of unit (…) and he made 
sure it all went smoothly and it did and it was also all great fun. 
 
 (EC 8) 
 
 The Head of Unit had recently moved to the topic area of renewable energy af-
ter working for over a decade on other energy-related issues and had thus a limited 
background knowledge on renewable energy and its key components of electricity, 
biofuels and heating/cooling: “I knew bits about renewables, but I didn’t know the de-
tails, so for me it was a learning process as well” (EC 2). He learned important facts 
about renewables from his policy officers who had been in the unit previously and 
who were experts on specific areas of renewable energy. The reliance on their exper-
tise was very high. To understand the technical details, they had many meetings and 
discussions in a ‘mini seminar’ setting (EC 2). Given that the Head of Unit’s know-
ledge of renewables was limited at the time of appointment and he had to present and 
negotiate the RED over the next three years, both his level of knowledge on technical 
details of renewables increased as did his experience by being deeply involved in the 
topic and at the same time carrying the main responsibility for the feasibility of the 
policy proposal: 
 
And then, like everything else, it is learning by doing at the Commission, that’s 
the way it is, as Head of Unit you are thrown into it, you have to present eventu-
ally what you think should be done, once the Commission has made the proposal 
you have to present the proposal, you have to negotiate the proposal. 
 
(EC 2) 
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 The leadership style of letting the technical experts present their part in the Eu-
ropean Council working groups and allowing the policy officers high autonomy in 
drafting, presenting and negotiating their aspects of the RED (such as heat pumps), 
opened up the space for experiential and factual learning among the policy officers. 
Those with limited specific knowledge on their tasked area engaged deeply with the 
material including reading scientific studies (EC 4), reflected upon the material to de-
termine its usefulness for their task and adopted aspects they concluded to be useful, 
thereby adding to their base of knowledge (EC 5; EC 9; ENGO 1). Especially the fre-
quently unusual experience for junior or expert policy officers to be negotiating on 
behalf of the European Commission in the Council working groups or in the European 
Parliament resulted in experiential learning in terms of negotiation strategies and tac-
tics (i.e. political learning, see chapter 2 and 3), the positions of the member states on 
the issue, and improved understanding of the member states’ positions and determina-
tion to defend national interests (EC 3). In conclusion, the members of the RE unit as 
key actors can be regarded as having learned by engaging with the issue.  
 
 
 
6.2.2 Changes in beliefs via constructivist learning? 
 
 
Constructivist learning that goes beyond ‘normal learning’ can be identified by chan-
ges in deeper beliefs, policy design beliefs relating to the overall policy and beliefs re-
garding the exact policy instruments (see chapter 3; for related concepts, see Farrell 
2009; Sabatier 1988). Here the result is rather mixed as few of the key actors involved 
changed how they viewed renewable energies, neither by being presented with new 
evidence nor through the process of accumulating working experience in the practical 
aspects of policymaking. Two key reasons can be identified for this.  
 The first reason is that the RED’s objectives were already aligned with per-
sonal beliefs. This has been suggested and confirmed by the majority of key inter-
viewees involved in the drafting and negotiation process. When asked about their 
background and experience of working in the area of renewable energies, energy or 
environment they reported either very long working experience in the area that accu-
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mulates to far over 10,000 hours regarded as the hallmark for true expert status 
(Gladwell 2009; Simonton 1999) and/ or an academic background in the specific dis-
cipline at Master, PhD or even senior researcher level.  
Many emphasised their deeper beliefs by self-identifying as ‘greens’ or ‘envi-
ronmentalists’ who since their teens care about the environment, partly motivated by 
the environmental movements of the 1970s and 1980s (EP 3; EP 4; NMS 6; NMS 8) 
or can be identified as such based on their strong affinity to ecological arguments (EC 
10; EC 11; EC 14). None of these actors reported a change in deeper beliefs or in their 
normative beliefs of how the overall policy should be designed or how the exact pol-
icy instruments should look like (with the exception of biofuels, which will be ad-
dressed in the next section), i.e. in ‘how they saw the issue’ and their conclusions on 
the course of action to take. The reason is that their ‘change’ in beliefs and therefore 
constructivist learning occurred prior to their involvement with the RED. It thus did 
not lead them to either reflect or change their underlying beliefs as their beliefs were 
already aligned with what their position required of them.  
In cases where the position decision-makers were asked to take as part of their 
job description or organisational affiliation was not in line with their personal under-
lying values, the individuals rather tried (mostly successfully) to change their organi-
sations’ position and align it with their personal deeper beliefs by acting as policy en-
trepreneurs and convincing the top decision-makers that it was in the organisation’s 
interest to support the RED (e.g. NMS 8). One reason for the lack of change in under-
lying beliefs during the drafting and negotiation of the RED was that the individuals 
involved reflected on the changes in the socio-political landscape before their in-
volvement with renewable energies, when their policy design beliefs that renewable 
energies were a good option to achieve co-benefits for climate mitigation, local devel-
opment and energy security were formed. This was also true for political leaders that 
influenced decision-making in the European Council. One particular example is the 
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who went against the advice of his administra-
tion by supporting a renewable energy target instead of blocking it. This was the result 
of readjusted beliefs regarding the realisation that climate change exists and that all 
countries, including the UK, needed to act on it. This can be understood as a change in 
deeper beliefs (i.e. that climate change is a major challenge) and beliefs regarding pol-
icy design (i.e. that Britain and Europe need to address climate change via policies) 
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and the more detailed policy instruments (i.e. the upscale of renewable energies and 
legislation supporting a low carbon economy): 
 
He wasn’t interested in this in the beginning as he became later on, he became ab-
solutely obsessed by it, I mean before Copenhagen he became really quite incred-
ibly focused on it. Why did [Gordon Browns] point of view change? I think he 
was convinced by the arguments. I think he came to understand that climate 
change was a massive problem and we had to act on it. He was very taken by the 
distribution of consequences that developed countries were causing and had 
caused a huge problem for developing countries, it was deeply unjust, so it fits in 
with his views on development. He came to believe the economic arguments that 
you can build a low carbon economy and that it was good for us. 
 
(NMS 8)  
 
The individuals that were involved in the drafting of the RED had previously 
aligned their personal underlying beliefs towards seeing renewable energies as some-
thing uncontroversial and normatively ‘good’ and as a desirable alternative to fossil 
fuels and nuclear energy. This view did not change during their involvement with the 
drafting of the RED or previous related directives (as emphasised by EC 1; EC 3; EC 
4; EC 6; EC 8). The policy-makers’ reflection on wider social developments demon-
strates a direct link between the socio-political landscape and the individual level of 
learning with regards to constructivist learning.  
 Overall, learning did occur on the individual level. Factual learning and ex-
periential learning happened among the policy-makers involved in drafting the RED, 
mostly by being involved in the process. How much they learned depended on their 
previous experiences and expertise on the issue. For individual learning to occur and 
for the learning process to be initiated, policy-makers required enough autonomy to 
reflect on the new information and to design their own “trial solutions” (Swann 1999: 
260). This was facilitated by an appropriate leadership style as in the case of the Re-
newable Energies Unit within DG TREN/ DG Energy that further motivated already 
dedicated policy-makers to go the extra mile and aspire to design even ‘better’ poli-
cies. However, this autonomy can also have negative effects if scientific knowledge is 
contested and if this uncertainty leads to un-reflected conclusions that later on turn out 
to have negative impact on the environment or society (see section 6.3). 
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6.2.3 Organisational objective or learning?  
 
By engaging with the topic of renewable energy for almost four decades, the Euro-
pean Commission accumulated wide-ranging experience and, at least partly, holds re-
cords of this experiential learning in the form of ‘lessons learned’. This is similar to 
the concept of ‘lesson drawing’ discussed by Richard Rose (1991; 1993), however 
‘lesson learning’ rather relates to learning from the own collective organisational ex-
perience than drawing lessons from the experiences and actions of others. A certain 
but random continuity among senior civil servants also preserved this experience, 
which can be reflected upon when new policy proposals are designed. For example, 
when drafting the proposal on the use of renewables for heating and cooling, the tem-
plate of the two previous directives was used (EC 1). By establishing organisational 
units, directorates and directorate generals that deal with certain issues as their main 
objective, institutional memory is built allowing a continuous engagement with the is-
sue beyond changes in personnel and thus the transfer of  experiential learning from 
the individual to the organisational level (for similar observations, see Jachtenfuchs 
1996: 35).  
There is one deeper belief that drives policymaking at the European Commis-
sion: it “acts not on behalf of national or group interests, but for the EU and its citi-
zens in general” (Sabathil, Joos, and Kessler 2008: 7; Vahl 1992). Its’ key tasks are to 
take the initiative aimed at the promotion of further integration including harmonisa-
tion, guarding the European treaties by guaranteeing the compliance with legal acts 
and serving as executive body of the EU, including outside representation in several 
policy areas (Sabathil, Joos, and Kessler 2008: 5-8). It became clear during the inter-
views that most civil servants at the European Commission share the deeper belief of 
serving the citizens of Europe and acting for the good of the EU with a mind-set of in-
dependence from national or particular interests that is neither mirrored by representa-
tives of the European Parliament, who serve their constituency, their party and fre-
quently particular industry interests (EP 1; EP 2; EP 4; EP 5; EP 9), nor by representa-
tives of the member states who serve national interests including the objectives of 
their political party and interest groups (NMS 1; NMS 2; NMS 6; NMS 8; NMS 9; 
NMS 10; SMS 3). This shared deeper organisational belief is a key driver for policy-
making initiatives and for determining a position on the issues under consideration: 
 129	  
 
We have a common interest to build a Union for the benefit of everyone. We cannot 
say that the member states have exactly the same aim because they have to defend 
their national interest and there is nothing bad, it’s just normal. But we are the EU in-
stitution that wants to defend a common interest.  
 
(EC 1) 
 
By engaging in policymaking, which can include experiential learning by 
long-term engagement with a topic or the addition of knowledge; the deeper belief of 
a shared common interest to serve Europe remains unchanged. This common interest 
is mainly understood as increased harmonisation, economic prosperity and overall 
sustainable economic development. The institutional objective is embedded in the or-
ganisational structure. The European Commission built up the institutional capacity to 
develop proposals in the specific issue area, such as the staff members of the renew-
able energy unit dedicated to facilitate the uptake of renewable energies. This results 
in automatically self-sustaining and reinforcing dynamics towards increased 
harmonisation and integration, which is also described as the “machinery of 
policymaking” (EC 8; EC 24) that delivers on the overall strategic objectives because 
it is tasked to come up with new policy proposals supporting these objectives. Even if 
the European Commission was met with opposition from the member states regarding 
specific proposals on renewable energy, the overall direction remained unchanged as 
the example of harmonisation of the electricity market, including renewable energies, 
demonstrates: 
 
You need to repeat the same thing, its common sense. Sugar can move around, cars 
can move around, why not electricity? Why can a company from the UK go and de-
velop a business in Portugal, but not in electricity. You cannot oppose to that! You 
can find excuses and say ‘well, we need time, it’s difficult’, but you cannot say no! 
 
 (EC 1) 
 
The discussion was less about the direction of the overall desirability of the policy 
objective, in the examined case the desirability of renewable energies, than about the 
details of implementing them in the most cost-effective and efficient way. This shifted 
the debate from ‘yes versus no’ towards discussing the ‘how to implement the yes’. In 
conclusion, most policy-makers at the European Commission involved in drafting the 
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RED overall shared the common belief of serving the European citizens as intended in 
the European treaties (Craig 2010). While there was agreement to serve the common 
interest as overall deeper belief, the question of how this common interest exactly 
looks like (i.e. policy design and detail beliefs) was strongly debated and was the 
cause for disagreements between the different actors within the European Commis-
sion. This embedded organisational objective however also became an active policy 
objective within the negotiation process that went beyond the role of the European 
Commission as neutral facilitator as the following section illustrates. 
 
 
6.2.4 Setting the national targets: bargaining with the member states 
 
By following this overall objective of serving the European interest of deepened inte-
gration, harmonisation and maintained economic development, the European Com-
mission has an interest of proposing legislation that is likely to be adopted with only 
minor changes (EC 2; EC 3; EC 6; EC 14). This means frequently to find the ‘middle 
ground’ between the Council and the European Parliament through extensive pre-
negotiations to fine-tune the political feasibility of a proposal (EC 2; EC 3; EP 3).  
In the case of the RED the objective of the European Commission was to “come 
forward with something that has the chance of being adopted” (EC 6). The European 
Commission wanted to avoid distributive bargaining conflicts. Therefore, in order to 
get to an agreement on the national targets for the share of renewable energies, the 
European Commission chose the approach of extensive consultations with the mem-
ber states, especially on political issues regarding the national targets for renewable 
energy before formally bringing forward the proposal (EC 6). The unit in charge of 
drafting the legislative proposal within the Directorate General on Transport and En-
ergy also consulted with the Cabinet of the Energy Commissioner Andres Piebalgs 
early in the process, as well as involved the other Directorate Generals, especially the 
Directorate General on Environment in the Interservice Consultations before formally 
discussing the proposal in the College of Commissioners and Council working groups 
(EC 2; EC 6; EC 10; EC 11). Finding an agreement that would be acceptable to all 
member states turned out to be challenging to an extent that when Andres Piebalgs 
 131	  
was asked about the most difficult issue during his time as Energy Commissioner, he 
concluded that it was setting the national targets for renewable energies (EC 6). 
Different ideas regarding the design and distribution of the 20 per cent target 
were considered and tested for their political feasibility with the member states. Sub-
sequently, the civil servants at the European Commission reflected on the feedback 
regarding what would be acceptable and what would meet fierce opposition. One pro-
posal tested by the Directorate General was to set targets according to the ‘Green-X 
model’ for the member states based on their technological potential and natural en-
dowment to cost-effectively install renewable energies, such as focussing on wind in 
North sea regions and solar energy in Mediterranean countries (EC 2; EC 3; EC 6). 
Upon being presented by the European Commission with what their individual targets 
for renewable energies should be, the member states refused to agree to the proposal: 
 
We told them what we thought their potential was and I remember ministers 
going red in their face and raising their voices saying “but that is preposter-
ous, we can’t do that, there are many reasons why it can be windy, but we 
can’t put wind turbines in the sea or land!” So very quickly it was apparent 
[to us] (…) that we didn’t have enough knowledge to contradict the member 
states that rubbished the whole thing and said, “this is crazy, your analysis is 
all wrong!” (…) We realised that we were getting nowhere and if we repli-
cate this 27 times, you’ve got a lot of trouble. And another approach was 
needed. And that was okay with me, because I didn’t have much faith in the 
power of administrators to set targets for cost effective technologies.  
 
(EC 6) 
 
 
The technology-based modelling approach was not a politically feasible propo-
sal, which resulted in a new Commission proposal targeted at finding a simple, fair and 
equitable solution the member states could agree to. Starting from the existing gap of 
11.5 per cent to the target, the European Commission proposed a flat rate target of an 
increase of 5.25 per cent with the remaining overall 5.25 per cent differentiated accord-
ing to GDP per capita. This economic formula took into account the different eco-
nomic capabilities for investment in renewable technologies within the required time 
frame. To increase flexibility and cost-effectiveness, the Commission also proposed a 
trading mechanism allowing countries with a lower target (but the potential to achieve 
a higher share of renewables cost-effectively) to do so and to transfer their over-
achievement to another member state struggling to achieve its target (EC 6).  
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The further reaching proposal on energy trading resulted in a considerable dis-
agreement (Toke 2008: 3001). Germany most strongly objected as it would have inter-
fered with the successful feed-in tariff, while some countries were reluctant to subsi-
dise other countries’ energy production (EC 6; Toke 2008: 3007). Consequently, the 
attempt to harmonise the energy market did not get far in the negotiation process. This 
was not the first time that member states protected their national interests regarding 
feed-in tariffs and objected to harmonisation efforts. The European Commission al-
ready proposed an EU-wide tradable green certificate scheme in the preparation of the 
2001 Renewable Electricity Directive, which was strongly opposed by Germany and 
Spain, but the European Commission did not give up on putting “pressure on member 
states to change their support policies” (Hildingsson, Stripple, and Jordan 2010: 110) 
as the 2008 case illustrates (see Toke 2008).  
Yet, this example of disagreement about beliefs of what policy instruments 
would be most appropriate also illustrates how actors at the European Commission 
tried to protect and further realise their beliefs linked to their organisational objective 
of furthering European integration via harmonisation and proposing a policy that was 
likely to be acceptable to the member states. In that sense, the European Commission 
was looking for ‘win-win’ opportunities and alternatives that would still allow achiev-
ing the actual beliefs of the overall policy design and the use of the specific policy in-
strument. It also shows that once a specific policy instrument became unobtainable, 
another policy instrument was pursued to still realise the overall policy objective.  
In the next step the European Commission designed a proposal that was likely 
to provide a compromise solution and presented it to the member states to gain their 
support. In the case of the RED, the European Commission put together a high level 
delegation consisting of the President, the Commissioner, Heads of Cabinet, Heads of 
Units and technical experts from DG Energy and Environment who visited the member 
states to present the proposal, try to convince the member states of its feasibility for 
implementation and gather support (EC 1; EC 2; EC 5; EC 6). 
 
Then what we did was Piebalgs got into an airplane with [Environment Com-
missioner] Dimas, because he was selling the EU ETS targets and the effort 
sharing decisions targets, and we flew around Europe (…) and we told everyone 
what their target would be and people breathed in, but they accepted it.  
(EC 2) 
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Following the publication of the official proposal, the European Commission 
accompanied the negotiation process with the other institutions, especially in the 
European Council’s working groups, where representatives of the national energy and 
environmental departments met. The European Commission also presented the propo-
sal in the European Parliament’s Committee for Industry and Energy as well as in the 
Environmental Committee, where several amendments were prepared before the final 
vote in the Parliament (EP 1; EP 3). Especially the negotiations in the Parliament op-
ened up the space for non-governmental actors such as industry and environmental 
NGOs to provide their input and amend the RED proposal via Members of the Par-
liament, who handed in the amendments prepared by non-governmental actors 
(ENGO 1; ENGO 2; ENGO 3; EP 3). The intensive testing and pre-negotiation activi-
ties of the European Commission resulted in the national renewable energy targets 
remaining unchanged and an overall fairly quick adoption of the proposal: 
 
What subsequently happened was that the Commission made its proposal having 
already had its prior information, everyone knew what their targets would be, and 
in the end the negotiation process of co-decision did not touch those targets, that 
was remarkable. That was remarkable because everybody knew if they touched it 
just a little bit, it would not add up to 20 per cent. (…) The European Parliament 
had seen that the targets had been very carefully worked on beforehand, they didn’t 
touch them either. So all the discussion on the RED was how the modalities would 
work, not the targets. It was extraordinary.  
 
(EC 6) 
 
Once the European Commission published a policy proposal it has theoretically 
fulfilled its role in the political system of the EU (Weidenfeld 2006) and the negotia-
tion takes place between the member states and within the European Parliament. 
However, in practise the European Commission continued to play a central role. More 
than that, depending on the individuals involved who had already invested significant 
efforts in making a proposal that was realistic enough to get adopted and was deemed 
politically feasible, the Directorate General in charge of the policy proposal had its 
own political interests and negotiation position beyond the official facilitating role: 
that of getting the policy proposal adopted with as few changes as possible in line with 
its own deeper and policy design beliefs of what is best for Europe. This organisa-
tional objective is not always acknowledged by the EU literature (notable exceptions 
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are Hooghe 2012; Wonka 2008) that widely regards the European Commission as a 
neutral actor as set out in the treaties (Sabathil, Joos, and Kessler 2008; Weidenfeld 
2006). The European Commission however followed its own objectives. It played a 
key role as advisor in the negotiations with the European Parliament and the Council 
via its advantage in expertise: 
 
You give them only as much as they need to know at the moment. Well, you 
don’t want to give more than you need. You don’t want to overload with informa-
tion, then you just create more questions. And of course if the Commission has a 
specific position, you would want to defend that specific position. You want to 
make it go where you want, so you make it go! So you of course present the 
things in a way that would support your position, unless you not really care at all. 
 
(EC 3) 
 
This was also confirmed by members of the European Parliament: 
 
The Commission is of course very political, but it is again individual-dependent on 
how they get to their position. (…) But very clearly in the end the Commission is a 
political body and they try to find a ground already beforehand, which is right be-
tween Council and Parliament, so that they know that in the negotiations the final 
compromise is getting very close to the original position. For that they have of 
course to communicate a lot beforehand to see where they can expect the institu-
tions to end up beforehand. 
 
(EP 5) 
 
The European Commission can therefore be understood as an actor in the nego-
tiations with asymmetric powers. In the negotiations in the European Parliament and 
the Council working groups the Commission representatives benefitted from the high 
standing as experts on the issue and their formal roles as facilitators:  
 
Every exchange of views we have in the Committee, it is always a representative of 
the Commission asked to give their input, and very clearly what the Commission 
says is important for the debate. Everyone is listening very closely to what the 
Commission is saying, and if they say something like ‘well those and those 
amendments are interesting’, then of course in the negotiations you use this as an 
argument, ‘well, even the Commission thought it’s an improvement on that propo-
sal’. So what they say is always important for the negotiations. 
 
(EP 5) 
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6.2.5 Conclusion on learning in the wider RED drafting and negotiation 
process 
 
 
Overall, there was little learning on the organisational level that could be identified in 
the interviews on the RED’s negotiation process beyond ‘normal’ incremental experi-
ential and factual learning (see Rietig and Perkins 2013). Learning on the individual 
level did occur, but it was not transferred to the organisational level, which was domi-
nated by bargaining behaviour among negotiation parties. A notable exception was 
Gordon Brown’s change in deeper beliefs on climate change. The European Commis-
sion’s negotiation behaviour could be interpreted as that of a collective policy entre-
preneur actively protecting its beliefs on the ‘right’ overall policy design by giving in 
on (non-essential) policy detail beliefs regarding the exact policy instruments, as long 
as the key deeper and policy design beliefs of serving the greater European good by 
acting on climate change, furthering economic development and improving energy se-
curity were protected. This detailed account of the European Commission’s strategy to 
pre-negotiate the individual mandatory renewable energy targets for member states so 
that they would add up to the overall target of 20 per cent illustrates how those acting 
on behalf of the European Commission followed the institutional objective, which 
could be understood as the equivalent to national interest among the member states. 
These findings portray the European Commission as a rational, independent political 
actor that followed its organisational objectives based on the European treaties beyond 
electoral political cycles and domestic politics.  
One crucial challenge in determining learning among decision-makers in gen-
eral and on the organisational level in particular is to differentiate learning defined as 
a change because underlying beliefs were altered from negotiation tactics and bargain-
ing behaviour that did not result in learning but only served the pursuit of political ob-
jectives. On the side of the member states no relevant change could be detected that 
was not explained as acting in the national interest, resulting in the conclusion that 
taking a different position would have resulted in a loss of face in the negotiations or 
defeat in the final vote, such as when a member stated bargained for lower targets and 
attempted to water-down the national target by trying to create loopholes: 
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But we did this in the normal manner of EU negotiations, in which every country is 
fighting for its own interests. And everybody knows that and you expect it. So (…) 
you don’t have really be disguised about that. Everybody knows that countries fight 
their own interests and we did it in a very normal kind of way. (…) Rather than believ-
ing we could persuade them we would be looking for the compromise, or looking for 
the give and take. ‘Okay, we’ll agree to that, but then we want something in return.’ 
So, you do listen, because you then find where the compromise is or the trade-offs are.  
 
(NMS 8) 
 
Personal relationships do matter as well as the image of the negotiator as per-
sonable, trustworthy and knowledgeable (EP 1; EP 2; NMS 8; NMS 10). As negotia-
tions on the international level among member states are characterised by repeated 
meetings over years, the negotiators form working relationships with each other that 
facilitate signalling on possible bargaining chips and negotiation preferences. If nego-
tiators trust each other they may be willing to engage in informal negotiations by ex-
changing their ‘briefing scripts’ and informing each other on which points they could 
move and what is absolutely crucial national interest that may not be touched (NMS 4; 
NMS 8; NMS 10). This also happened in the case of the negotiations on the RED in 
the Council and in the Parliament, yet none of the involved negotiators made refer-
ences to changed beliefs. One key conclusion could be that because it was a negotia-
tion setting, it did not help to convince the negotiator as even if the negotiator had 
changed his/her beliefs as a result of constructivist learning, s/he would most likely 
not have been able to move on the national position given that civil servant’s negotia-
tion mandates are limited and even ministers face political constraints back in their 
home countries (although this can also be used as bargaining chip across the two 
governance levels, see Putnam 1988). So even although constructivist learning may 
have occurred on the individual level, it remained unlikely that this was transferred 
into constructivist learning on the organisational level in the form of changed negotia-
tion positions  that resulted from modified beliefs. 
 The following section zooms into the ‘biofuel debate’ as the most controver-
sial aspect of the RED, which was also linked to the Fuel Quality Directive (EC 
2009b) and the reform proposal on Indirect Land Use Changes (EC 2012). This more 
detailed analysis provides insights into the relevance of scientific consensus and il-
lustrates how disagreements between coalitions of policy-makers affect learning and 
policy outcomes. 
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6.3 Learning in the biofuels controversy 
 
 
 
The legislative proposal of the RED contained three aspects that became the subject of 
major disagreement among the actors involved. While the question regarding the indi-
vidual member state targets was resolved before the proposal was made (EC 2; EC 6; 
see 6.2), the issue regarding the trade in green electricity certificates (guarantees of 
origin) was subject to major disagreement between Directorate Generals in the Euro-
pean Commission, member states, environmental NGOs and industry lobbying groups 
(Rowlands 2005; Toke 2008). This was due to their negative implications for stable 
investment decisions (see Nilsson and Ericsson 2009 for a detailed analysis). The dis-
cussions were centred on the market frame, security of supply frame and innovation 
frame (Nilsson and Ericsson 2009). While these disagreements concerned distributive 
issues among the member states, the controversy regarding the mandatory 10 per cent 
target on biofuels, which was later on reframed as mandatory target for 10 per cent re-
newable energies in transport (EC 9; EC 11; Sharman and Holmes 2010), was more 
fundamental and concerned a central aspect of energy provision within the RED.  
The biofuels aspect merits further attention as it indicates alternative explan-
ations to learning as a result of defensive avoidance among actors who were reluctant 
to reflect on the other groups’ positions (Janis and Mann 1977). Key reasons for this 
controversy were contested scientific knowledge at the time of policymaking, path-
dependency and policy lock-ins as well as incremental steps to ‘correct’ policy out-
comes made under scientific uncertainty after the evidence pointed towards policy 
failure. The policy development can however also be seen as an incremental experien-
tial learning process on biofuels policy from first to third or fourth generation biofuels 
that allow for competitive advantages later on (as argued by Dunlop 2010: 356). The 
side effect of this approach however was a further lock-in effect into first generation 
biofuel technologies that cannot easily be substituted with second/ third generation 
biofuel technologies as these are fundamentally different and benefit diverse in-
dustries (e.g., food crops as first generation biofuels benefit predominantly farmers, 
while algae in sea-water farms as third generation biofuels benefit entirely different 
actors). 
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This section examines learning during the development of the biofuels compo-
nent within the Renewable Energy Directive, including relevant links to other biofuel 
policies in the EU such as the Fuel Quality Directive (EU 2009b). This serves the pur-
pose of more closely determining what drives and hinders learning on the organisa-
tional level and to more clearly differentiate alternative explanations to learning such 
as institutional culture from constructivist learning. While the overall development of 
the RED dates back over 40 years, the biofuels component also allows examining 
learning processes over the medium-term between 2002 and 2012 as appropriate time 
span suggested by Sabatier (1988) and confirmed by Radaelli (2009). The analysis is 
focused on the differing beliefs, which form the basis for constructivist learning.  
This section thus makes several contributions to the literature. First, it explains 
why this aspect of the RED resulted in what looks like a policy failure. To date, there 
is only one contribution (Sharman and Holmes 2010) examining the emergence of the 
biofuels aspect of the RED, however it restricts its analysis to a normative envi-
ronmental perspective. This analysis adds an additional layer by using elements of the 
advocacy coalition framework developed by Sabatier (1988; 1998; Weible et al. 
2011b) to avoid analytical bias against the dominant policymaking coalition. Its sec-
ond contribution is thus to widen the scope for understanding ‘policy failure’ from a 
perspective of contested beliefs, which results in different interpretations of scientific 
evidence and also highlights the difficulties of ‘escaping’ policy lock-ins and path-
dependencies that were created during periods of scientific uncertainty. It thus im-
proves our understanding of the underlying beliefs and mechanisms leading to policy 
outcomes that require in-built reforms remedying unintended (environmental) conse-
quences to “avoid another ‘biofuels’ disaster” in the future (EC 12). Therefore, it adds 
to the literature on path-dependencies in policymaking, which has already examined 
the case of biofuels policy in the UK (Dunlop 2010; Palmer 2010) resulting from the 
2003 Biofuels Directive (EU 2003a). It furthermore contributes to the rich literature 
on the role of science and knowledge in policymaking, which more or less explicitly 
makes references to learning (e.g. Dunlop 2009; Jasanoff 1990; Owens 2010; 2012; 
Radaelli 1995; Weible, Sabatier, and Lubell 2004). Both literatures are predominantly 
focused on the national level and have a lesser focus on the role of learning for the 
policy outcome. 
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The first section finds that two coalitions with differing beliefs tried to frame 
the issue and to influence EU biofuels policy. It also identifies aspects of the Advo-
cacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as useful analytical lens to analyse conflict among 
interest groups in policy learning while at the same time controlling for different types 
of beliefs (Sabatier 1988; 1998; Weible and Sabatier 2009). However, this chapter on-
ly uses some aspects of the ACF as auxiliary analytical lens without applying all its 
aspects (for a detailed discussion, see 3.1). Therefore, this analysis is only ‘inspired’ 
by the ACF and does not fully adopt it. The second section concludes that factual and 
experiential learning occurred on all levels, whereby the results for constructivist 
learning were mixed as this can be confused with alternative explanations for learning. 
 
6.3.1 Belief changes resulting in conflict and the key role of timing  
 
The biofuels component emerged from actions across different Directorate Generals 
between 2003 and 2007 with a less-clear cut focus on climate mitigation as the other 
two aspects of the RED. This multiple purpose of biofuels was a key reason why dif-
ferent coalitions formed after its relevance for climate mitigation became contested.  
 
 
Origin of biofuels policy 
 
DG Agriculture was working on a biofuels strategy that resulted from the implementa-
tion of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform, which included not only 
greening measures, but also reducing subsidies in the sugar regime (ENGO 1; Euro-
pean Council 2006b; Sharman and Holmes 2010):   
 
It all started with the sugar reform. (…) [Biofuels were] a new outlet for the sugar 
beet industry basically but they were going to get less money from the agricultural 
policy so developing biofuels was a way to compensate for that basically and if 
you look at documents from that time, like the first communications and so on 
you really see that that’s what they say and they don’t even mention [climate ob-
jectives], or only in passing. (…) In the EU it was the agricultural policy that was 
the main driver [for biofuels]. 
 
(EC 12) 
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This was confirmed by the environmental NGOs: 
 
Commissioner Fischer-Bohl, who was wrapping up the sugar reform, which was 
one of the reforms she actually had to do, so she had huge opposition from the farm 
lobby, and she found the magic way of sugar coating, the deal of saying ‘we lower 
your guaranteed price of sugar, but don’t worry, you’ll make lots of money through 
biofuels, and there will be a bright new future, and there will be lots of subsidies 
coming from that direction’.  
(ENGO 1) 
 
As well as other actors at the European Commission: 
There was the CAP reform. In the summer of 2005 DG Agriculture put together 
this Cabinet-level working group that was basically addressing biofuels as part of 
the response to the sugar reform that the Commission was pushing through. 
(EC 9) 
 
Between 2005 and 2007 DG Environment was working on the Fuel Quality Di-
rective. At the same time, DG Energy and Transport was drafting the biomass action 
plan (EC 2005) on how biomass could best be used, but “what it ended up being was 
very much a sort of selling job on why we needed more biofuels in transport, rather 
than looking at where it would be optimal to use biomass” (EC 9). Another parallel 
development were discussions regarding the carbon dioxide emission standards of 
cars (EC 2007c). Several actors including the car industry, the agricultural lobby in 
the member states and two Directorate Generals within the European Commission 
were pushing for a more reliable biofuels target that would go beyond the existing 
voluntary target of 5.75 per cent (EC 10; ENGO 1; EU 2003a), while “at that point it 
was specifically biofuels and not renewables in transport” (EC 11) and only later “it 
got changed at some point in the process to renewables in transport” (EC 12). The 
European Council requested the Commission to propose a set of directives that would 
deliver on the 2020 ‘20-20-20 Strategy’ that also included a 10 per cent share of 
biofuels (European Council 2007: 21; EC 2008b), while the targets were more based 
on political objectives than on scientific data (Sharman and Holmes 2010): 
 
It was biofuels at the beginning and I think what happened is that was before they 
had assessed [different targets]. (…) It was a bit random to be honest. They said 
“Oh, well let’s have something in the middle like 10 per cent” and I think it also 
suited much of the modeling exercises [DG Transport and Energy/ DG Agricul-
ture] did to see how they could reach the renewables target. 
 
(EC 12) 
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A shared assumption was that 
in 2003 it was fairly clear that there were clear greenhouse gas savings from near-
ly every process in biofuels and the consensus seemed to be that the indirect land 
use changes were insignificant, so that was 2003. I guess by the time we were 
drafting the directive that had changed completely (…). The anti-biofuels 
arguments (…) certainly occupied us thoroughly from 2007 onwards. 
 
(EC 8) 
 
 
Emergence of new scientific evidence on the climate performance of biofuels 
 
The economic development focused coalition developed the biofuels aspects of the 
RED based on these assumptions. After the lock-in into the 10 per cent target follow-
ing the European Council’s decision, new scientific evidence was introduced into the 
debate between 2007 and 2010. The new evidence emphasised that not all types of 
biofuels had a positive effect on climate mitigation but in parts had a worse carbon 
footprint than fossil fuels (Bergsma et al. 2010; Fargione et al. 2008; Melillo et al. 
2009; Searchinger et al. 2008). Furthermore, ethanol from sugar and maize as well as 
biodiesel from rapeseed was found to compete with the provision of food either di-
rectly in the case of sugar and maize (Runge and Senauer 2007) or indirectly as food 
needed to be produced elsewhere, what led to the conversion of carbon sinks such as 
forest covered areas into agricultural land, thus resulting in carbon emissions from in-
direct land use changes (Lange 2011). The increased demand for agricultural areas 
and direct competition of biofuels with food production was linked to rising food pric-
es and the food crisis of 2007/08 in several developing countries, what resulted in a 
‘food versus fuel’ debate fuelled by the NGOs and in the media (Keyzer, Merbis, and 
Voortman 2008; Kullander 2010; Runge and Senauer 2007).  
The fairly stable consensus that renewable energies were ‘good’ was challenged 
by the scientific evidence that not all renewable energies had the same carbon neutral 
performance, especially when their indirect effects for land use changes was taken in-
to account. The new scientific evidence that was presented by scientists both in the 
United States (Searchinger et al. 2008) and in Europe (Dehue, Meyer, and Hettinga 
2008) regarding the negative climate mitigation performance of certain types of 
biofuels was picked up by the nongovernmental organisations and the media and en-
tered the public sphere via the ‘food versus fuel’ debate between 2008 and 2009. Yet 
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even the environmentalists had until then been either indifferent or in support of 
biofuels: 
 
The negative reaction first came from the social NGOs, and it took several years 
for environmental NGOs to take notice and to talk about the problem while sav-
ing face. Because it is also not possible that you are pushing for an ambitious tar-
get and two years later you are saying that the target is causing a problem. So they 
needed a few years and a few changes in personnel and terminology to explain 
themselves, but others who were not implicated in the early push in favour of 
biofuels, they were much quicker to react. 
(EC 10) 
 
 
Until the new scientific evidence emerged, there was a consensus in the policy 
design and policy detail beliefs among most of the key actors involved that climate 
change needed to be addressed and that renewable energies, including biofuels, were a 
suitable policy instrument to achieve this objective. Thus, new scientific evidence 
challenged the underlying policy design and policy detail beliefs that had formed be-
tween the 1970s and 1990s as a form of long-term constructivist learning and that had 
developed into a societal consensus in favour of renewable energies by the early 
2000s. Not all groups involved reflected on the scientific input in the same way. The 
economic development focused actors did acknowledge the new evidence, but viewed 
it as contested with regards to its effect on food prices: 
 
[Biofuels] have the highest criteria (…) to meet before they can be used. Every-
one talks about using palm oils for biofuels, nobody cares that palm oil is used in 
our toothpaste, in cosmetics, in medicine, in lubricants and everything. And basi-
cally an only small fraction of about 3 per cent ends up as biofuels. And every-
body wants sustainability criteria for biofuels, but nobody cares about what hap-
pens to the rest.  
 
(EC 4) 
 
 
Which was framed similarly by another key actor within the European Commis-
sion: 
 
The timing was such that all sorts of practically everything was bad in the world 
was being blamed on biofuels. (…) The fact that EU biofuels demand was so triv-
ial and barely significant didn’t matter at all. People just saw high food prices and 
EU demand and said that it was EU energy policy driving all of this.   
 
(EC 8) 
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This resulted in two coalitions with differing policy detail beliefs. Especially the 
environmentally focused actors such as environmental NGOs and environmentally 
minded departments within the European Commission and in the member states re-
flected on the new scientific evidence and came to change their beliefs on the climate 
performance of biofuels:  
 
It was also the scientific community that was having different ideas and giving con-
tradictory advice, so that certainly did not help in giving policy-makers a clear sig-
nal, and that was giving room to different lobbies to go for their own interests. So 
from a political perspective you had the agricultural lobby in favour, you had more 
the environmentalists being more concerned about the issues, but science was in a 
way not giving a clear signal to either of the two, and that caused a difficult discus-
sion where the Commission was quite dominant, because there was a lot of argu-
ments going back and forth, and if the science is not very clear, then it is the Com-
mission who can play around with that.  
 
(EP 4) 
 
 
Shared and diverging beliefs of the coalitions 
 
The controversy between the environmentally-minded and the economic develop-
ment-minded coalition was based on diverging deeper beliefs and policy detail beliefs 
related to the new scientific evidence. Actors shared the wider policy beliefs that car-
bon dioxide emissions needed to be reduced to mitigate climate change, but they had 
very different perspectives on how exactly this should be achieved and how scientific 
evidence should be interpreted. The disagreement within the European Commission 
regarding these policy detail beliefs was so strong that it could not find a common 
language to respond to the media debate during the drafting process in 2007/ 2008: 
 
 
[The food versus fuel debate] took off during the year when we were drafting the di-
rective. And during that year, because there were different views inside the Commis-
sion, it was not possible for the Commission to externally express any opinion or 
even any scientific response to the statements that were being made.  
 
(EC 5) 
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The food versus fuel debate also affected the effectiveness of policymaking 
within the European Commission given the need to nevertheless respond:  
 
The experience was rough and the timing [of the food versus fuel debate in 
2007/08] was unfortunate.  At one point I think two thirds of [the renewable en-
ergy] (…) unit were occupied with bio-energy discussions and sustainability dis-
cussions so it took up a vast amount of effort and resources  
 
(EC 8) 
 
 
The coalitions disagreed about the biofuels component across the European in-
stitutions, mostly due to different underlying beliefs. Similar to other policy areas in 
the EU and the US, each coalition included governmental and non-governmental rep-
resentatives (Baumgartner 2007). Members of the economic development focused co-
alition came predominantly from the Directorate Generals for Energy and Transport 
(DG TREN), Agriculture (DG AGRI) and Trade (DG Trade) within the European 
Commission, the biofuels industry, automotive industry and conservatively leaning 
parties in the European Parliament as well as from several member states. Members of 
the environment focused coalition came predominantly from the Directorate General 
of the Environment within the European Commission, the Green Alliance in the Euro-
pean Parliament, environmental and social non-governmental organisations and from 
different member states.  
These two groups had characteristics similar to Sabatier’s advocacy coalitions 
(Sabatier 1988; 1998; Weible and Sabatier 2009), where coalitions with diverging be-
liefs and policy objectives engage within an issue-related policy subsystem such as 
biofuels policy. The RED coalitions used different strategies to win over the other co-
alition and achieve decisions by governmental authorities that were in line with their 
underlying beliefs. The two coalitions used these strategies to align the policy 
outcome with their beliefs on the importance of acting on climate change (deeper be-
liefs), what overall policy approach should be taken (policy design beliefs) and how 
exactly the policy instruments should be designed (policy detail beliefs), whereby the 
scientific knowledge affected their positions differently. The key change compared to 
learning in the overall RED was the introduction of new scientific evidence in 2007/ 
2008 that resulted in contested scientific evidence regarding first generation biofuels’ 
contribution to climate mitigation. The biofuels controversy can be seen as reaction to 
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developments in the socio-political landscape: the introduction of new but contradic-
tory scientific evidence and the overall negative public reaction to the discrepancy be-
tween the new evidence and the policy development. 
There was a shared policy design belief among stakeholders and decision-
makers that alternatives to fossil fuels should play a larger role in the European energy 
mix. The policy detail beliefs however, i.e. the exact means of achieving this policy 
objective, became contested. The negotiations were less based on scientific evidence 
but on political horse-trading (EC 6; EC 9; EC 12) and policy-based evidence gather-
ing (Sharman and Holmes 2010). Renewable energies including biofuels were still 
widely regarded by the economic development coalition as desirable alternative to 
fossil fuels from an energy security, economic development and increasingly climate 
mitigation perspective until 2008 (EC 1; NMS 1; NMS 7; NMS 8; SMS 4).  
Actors however who were deeply involved in promoting all renewable energies 
as desirable policy instrument to address climate change did not explicitly change 
their policy detail beliefs. Some reflected on the evidence and decided to ignore it, 
thus entering defensive avoidance (Bouckenooghe et al. 2007; Janis and Mann 1977), 
which was facilitated by group think (Janis 1972) as they were in the ‘driving seat’ of 
negotiating the details of the legislative proposal. It is important to recognise that the 
economic development focused coalition had not the ‘luxury’ of reflecting on the new 
evidence to subsequently change its position. Dunlop (2010) arrived at a similar con-
clusion in her analysis of the implementation of the 2003 biofuels directive in the UK. 
Instead, actors entered into defensive avoidance (Janis and Mann 1977) to avoid hav-
ing to reflect on the scientific evidence. A key observation is also that the scientific 
debate shifted towards a consensus on the negative impacts of biofuels after the eco-
nomic development minded coalition had succeeded in gaining a political mandate for 
the 10 per cent target in the European Council in 2007 and was therefore ‘locked-into’ 
a position that was difficult to change without losing face: 
 
What was also very clear that from the Commission’s perspective, they were al-
ready married to their 10 per cent target so to say, so they didn’t want a too funda-
mental discussion on the targets, because that was the basis of the RED, and they 
were afraid that if this discussion on the biofuels was getting too loud, it would also 
be fundamentally in the discussion whether the targets should be dropped or not. 
And therefore the European Commission was also very much pushing of keeping 
these targets and trying to downplay the scientific debate there.  
(EP 5) 
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While the environmentally minded coalition understood scientific evidence from 
a positivist point of view, key actors in the economic development minded coalition 
pointed towards the competing scientific findings and the lack of a scientific consen-
sus between scientists from a food, energy and environmental perspective (EC 5; EC 
9; EC 28; EP 5). Therefore, the scientific studies provided were framed through a po-
litical lens in support of the political objectives that included interests of the industry 
and agricultural lobby as well as many policy-makers in the member states, who had a 
high regard for rural development and energy security:       
 
There was also a debate on what do to with the specific target of the transport sec-
tor, and interestingly this was a kind of classical political deadlock we had there, 
because the politicians already agreed to come forward with a 10 per cent target 
on renewables for transport, and politically it was already impossible to give up 
that target, that would have been seen as a loss of face, you know these kind of 
political issues that sometimes become more important than scientific arguments. 
 
(EP 4) 
 
The lack of a clear scientific consensus either in favour or against biofuels opened 
up the space for interpretation of scientific studies in favour of political objectives, 
what exacerbated the controversy (see also Sarewitz 2004):  
 
 
There was this study by Tim Searchinger in early 2008 and we started the discus-
sion inside the Commission about what we should do and so on. (…) It was very 
difficult for the Commission as a body to take into account the new scientific evi-
dence because it questioned the legitimacy of the policy basically.  
 
(EC 12) 
 
And: 
 
There was another study by [a] Professor (…) who was basically sponsored by the 
biodiesel industry and came out with different factors for ILUC which funnily 
enough gave biodiesel quite a low ILUC factor (…) that certainly came out of 
nowhere. 
 
(NMS 11) 
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This was confirmed by an observer from a large member state: 
 
These governmental agencies are making a lot of scientific studies, as do we with 
our research projects, and then we pull a few numbers out that support our argu-
mentation. And it has been confirmed that these studies are a good basis for the 
Commission’s argumentation to defend its proposal. 
 
(NMS 4) 
 
 
The proposal put forward by the European Commission on revising the biofuels 
aspects of the 2009 RED to take into account indirect land use changes (EC 2012) in-
dicates limited learning on the individual level, but to a lesser extent on the organisa-
tional level as the ongoing negotiation deadlock between the coalitions illustrates. 
Changes in policy detail beliefs would have meant to take a stronger precautionary 
approach towards the use of biofuels and to not simply limit the amount of first gen-
eration biofuels that can be counted towards the 10 per cent target on renewable ener-
gies in transport. Instead, phasing first generation biofuels out and only accepting sus-
tainable biofuels would have evidenced changes in beliefs (as emphasised by ENGO 
1; ENGO 2; ENGO 3; NMS 7). Members of the economic development minded coali-
tion did not change their deeper beliefs to acknowledge the overall planetary boundar-
ies and negative environmental consequences of the dominant neo-liberal economic 
development model. 
Evidence for this conclusion is that the policy proposal on indirect land use 
changes put forward in 2012 only mitigated the worst consequences, but did not take a 
strong precautionary approach to biofuels (EC 2012) as demanded by the envi-
ronmental coalition. It rather continued with incremental changes to the business-as-
usual status quo. In particular, the European Commission proposed to limit the 
amount of food-crop based biofuels and bioliquids that can be counted towards the 10 
per cent target to the current consumption level of 5 per cent (EC 2012: Article 2(2c) 
ii), what effectively means that the remaining 5 per cent of renewable energies in 
transport would have to come from second generation (non-food based) biofuels or 
they would not count towards the overall target. It also included incentives for electric 
cars and especially second/ third generation biofuels with no or low indirect land use 
change emissions via avoiding to create additional demand for land. These include a 
focus on longer types of straw, different types of waste and algae (EC 2012; EC 4; In-
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dustry 4). This quote illustrates that the expectation of some members of the envi-
ronment-minded coalition for learning would have been a shift in deeper beliefs that 
should also be reflected in the policy proposals:  
 
 
This is where I think we have failed to learn certain lessons. Because if you look at 
the biofuels debate, yes, we have ILUC, we have certification, there is a certain re-
cognition that we cannot use food crops biofuels, but this is where it generally 
stops. And wherever you go, you hear that ‘yes, we have to do second generation, 
which will be based on cellulars, that is the next step.’ But people are not question-
ing if that is going to be the best thing. 
(EC 10) 
 
The proposed changes to the directives indicate that there was no overall shift in 
deeper beliefs that would be reflected in the policy design and policy detail beliefs 
such as proposing more substantial safeguards to the use of biofuels than accounting 
rules. Thus none of the coalitions changed their deeper beliefs. Both continued to hold 
the same policy design beliefs that the problem of climate change needed to be ad-
dressed by reducing emissions and that renewable energies were overall a desirable 
policy to achieve this. We did however observe what appears to be a change in policy 
detail beliefs among the economic development focused coalition as they allowed the 
the European Commission to propose a modification to the RED. The next section 
‘zooms in’ to what appears to be a case of constructivist learning on the individual 
level that may have resulted in constructivist learning on the organisational level. 
 
 
6.3.2 Learning on the individual level?  
 
Individuals learn from experience when they are involved in the policymaking process 
or are presented with new information (Bennett and Howlett 1992; May 1992; Zito 
and Schout 2009; see chapter 2 and 3). The prerequisite for learning to occur is that 
individuals reflect on the information and its relevance for their policy proposal (fac-
tual learning). This can also include learning how to more effectively participate in or 
manipulate the process according to the actor’s policy objectives, i.e. political learning 
as an aspect of experiential learning. 
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Experiential and factual learning 
 
Key actors pointed out that there was a difference in the RED between the 
ways in which policy officers as experts and higher-level civil servants such as Heads 
of Units, Directors as well as politicians learned (EC 2; EC 3; EC 4; EC 7; EC 14). 
Experts engaged deeply with the available academic literature and scientific studies in 
the policy field. Depending on their previous knowledge, the learning curve was more 
or less steep. The higher-level civil servants and politicians learned predominantly 
from being involved in the policymaking process and attending meetings. Most had no 
deep expertise in the specific policy area but took on the role of managers, thus learn-
ing facts by being involved in the process: 
 
So when the industry comes to talk, they come to [the head of unit at the Euro-
pean Commission], and he always has an expert next to him. So he would give 
the general position and leave the specifics to the experts. If you do this a few 
times, you learn it (…). So you have some people who are trained, you need a 
good briefing, and you need to trust your people. And the moment you have that, 
it goes well because you participate in the meetings, you hear the NGOs and the 
industry speak, you hear what positions your technical and policy guy gives, and 
of course they are not stupid, so if you are interested in your job, you learn. So for 
all of them, there is a learning process. They have to be involved.  
 
(EC 4) 
 
This was confirmed by another technical expert: 
 
I guess to some extent once the subject matter becomes quite technical then the 
head of unit is happy for their expert task officer to play a role because they don’t 
necessarily know the material so sufficiently to be familiar with all the ins and 
outs and all the arguments so sometimes it has to happen because it’s technically 
complicated. 
 
 (EC 8) 
 
 
Yet it was problematic when top-level decision-makers only relied on the in-
formation they received from their experts as it had most likely been filtered in the 
process of summarising complex technical issues into briefing notes or short overview 
presentations (EC 4; EC 9; EC 12). Especially if there was no scientific consensus, 
technical experts may have been tempted for personal or political reasons to provide 
information that was biased in favour of one side. This carries the possibility that 
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higher-level decision-makers only learned what they were ‘taught’ (Bomberg 2007; 
Haas 2000). This may have been unintentional, especially when the value-laden char-
acter of science is taken into account (Jasanoff 1990; 2004).  
But even among those who could be considered experts with detailed technical 
knowledge on specific sub-elements learning occurred by their continued involvement 
in the negotiation process and debates among the competing coalitions: 
 
Also having to argue about it year after year. Those experts who were involved in 
this, they just could not but learn from each other. I learned a lot from it and I real-
ised issues that I did not consider as important before are important and some were 
confirmed, some were not, so it is an interesting exercise that will make an impact. 
The problem here is how you can make others accept what you have learned. That 
is a more difficult thing because you have to go through this process to appreciate 
certain factors, and it is very difficult to communicate this in a simplistic fashion to 
hierarchy or to outside stakeholders, because it is not so trivial. And this is why still 
so many people deny certain things. 
 
(EC 10) 
 
This type of learning however remains rather ‘normal’ learning (Rietig and 
Perkins 2013) that automatically occurs in any policymaking process. Of course indi-
viduals accumulate information and experience by being involved. Yet, as they need 
to defend their policy detail beliefs in their discussions with the other coalition, actors 
look for evidence to support their arguments, examine the issue from different angles 
and thereby also reflect on their own policy detail beliefs. While there is no conclusive 
evidence that the actors involved changed their policy detail beliefs (what would be 
constructivist learning), they did acquire more knowledge by looking for supporting 
arguments and evidence and also learned by being involved in the process and tried to 
improve their strategies in influencing the policymaking process. There is insufficient 
evidence allowing the conclusion that individuals within the economic development 
minded coalition changed their beliefs. However, even if they wanted to, their path-
dependent lock-in to the 10 per cent target would have meant a loss of face, what was 
avoided by entering defensive avoidance (EC 4; EC 12):  
 
I think the whole thing had gotten really emotional. (…) I also think there was 
this sort of psychological mechanism of denial, you know, that you don’t want to 
admit a piece of evidence that goes against what you really think is right. 
 
(EC 12) 
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Another aspect of defensive avoidance that occurred in the Council discussions 
regarding a policy reform of the indirect land use changes was the fact that in the 
meantime member states invested in an industry focusing on first generation biofuels. 
Changes to the RED thus came with significant economic costs and loss of trust in 
policymaking: 
 
Like especially I think the central and eastern European countries, they haven’t 
had the same boom in (…) wind, but biofuels they’ve done really well in so I 
think it’s quite frustrating then to have the rug sort of swept out from under their 
feet. (…) I don’t think they really recognise the need to change their direction. 
 
(NMS 11) 
 
Members of the economic development focused coalition however changed 
the way they behaved in the negotiations in a manner that could easily be confused 
with constructivist learning. This type of learning about how to best protect deeper be-
liefs by optimising political tactics is referred to as political learning (Gross Stein 
1994; Holbrook 2007; May 1992; Nadeau, Niemi, and Amato 1995). However, this 
kind of experiential learning is to be expected in any policymaking process. The eco-
nomic development minded coalition acknowledged carefully the need to address in-
direct land use changes between the adoption of the RED (EU 2009a) and the Indirect 
Land Use Change proposal (EC 2012): 
 
Yes, [there was reflection and learning in the Commission]. I think the argument 
has become a bit more nuanced, a bit more aware of the complexity and the sensi-
tivity of it all. (…)  It’s clear now that we had a huge increase in world food pric-
es in 2008-2009, which was triggered by a range of bad harvests, bad weather, 
and rapidly growing food demand. Food prices came down again so in that sense 
the absence of the correlation with EU biofuels demand is there. 
 
(EC 8) 
 
And:  
 
 
We learned a lot more about the land use stuff in the years after than we did at that 
time, so I could not really say that I learned it in the period that I was talking about. 
 
(EC 5) 
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Hindsight is useful. We took a very sectorial approach to dealing with the biofuels 
issue.  It’s quite complicated which made it difficult for people to understand and 
created quite a bit of hostility. I think it would have been better to take a much 
broader approach to the idea of sustainability in agriculture and forestry rather 
than focus purely on biomass in energy. 
 
(EC 8) 
 
This change in tactics to acknowledge the necessity to address indirect land use 
changes in the area of biofuels (EC 5; ENGO 1) however was rather a result of ex-
periential learning than constructivist learning based on changing underlying beliefs. 
By being involved in the negotiation process between two coalitions, actors also 
learned that “you have to give things and you can’t just say no and defend everything. 
Then the things that you do defend are more credible” (EC 5). Consequently, a shift in 
the negotiation position can also be the result of experiential learning on how to play 
negotiation tactics better under the involvement of long-term considerations or the 
protection of deeper beliefs and important policy detail beliefs, as illustrated by the 
observation of a member of the competing environmentally minded coalition:   
 
The fact that many people have realised that they won’t simply convince public 
opinion has also contributed that it is better to come up with some corrections, 
amendments or improvements.  
 
                                                                                                 (EC 10) 
 
 
Thus, there was also overall support within the European Commission for a 
correction of the RED on the indirect land use changes: 
 
On the ILUC side the whole impact of the first generation feedstock and the po-
tential for bad practice and higher emissions coming from that process has meant 
that there has been an overall agreement to try to limit the use we make of first 
generation in preference of second generation so that’s the key element of the 
ILUC proposal I guess is that we’re proposing to cap first generation and then 
provide extra incentives for second generation because they are generally better 
and more reliably sustainable than first generation so in that sense there’s a bit 
more clarity but not complete clarity on the issues, on the evidence, on the com-
plexity of the relationships and that’s, I think, the ILUC proposal shows progress 
compared to the discussions of the renewables directive and the sustainability cri-
teria there. 
 
(EC 8) 
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Public opinion may have been a major outside motivation for policy-makers to 
reconsider their policies. Especially in the case of biofuels, where the public debate 
and public criticism regarding the indirect land use factors remained and was further 
underpinned by a an emerging scientific consensus towards the mixed climate per-
formance of biofuels and their negative impact on food security (EC 28; Keyzer, 
Merbis, and Voortman 2008; Kullander 2010), there was considerable pressure on the 
economic development minded coalition to make concessions regarding indirect land 
use changes. This however does not automatically mean that the coalition changed its 
policy detail beliefs. It may have just been a tactical move based on public or political 
pressure, or gaining experience regarding unintended consequences of the original 
policy by observing its effects over several years: 
 
And because of the complexity of all this, there was an increasing realisation, but 
with [DG TREN] as well, they learned to be more careful with certain things be-
cause higher prices can undermine a policy and it’s not necessarily good, if you get 
too much, at some point it may come back and haunt you. I think people have be-
come more considerate about unintended consequences. Much of the ILUC discus-
sion was about that thing in that sense. (…) So it’s not just to get the right numbers 
in the model, but also more fundamental discussions about population growth, fu-
ture demands and so on. It made people think in a more nuanced way, so there was 
some kind of learning effect form the RED in the ILUC discussions. 
 
(EC 11) 
 
There is also evidence for experience-based learning on policy instruments, re-
sulting in a better familiarity with the implications of different instruments available 
in biofuels policy: 
 
There’s been a lot of learning in terms of the different instruments that were used 
and that’s one of the things that will be coming out in [the next Commission] 
guidance, the need for much greater flexibility in market responsiveness of in-
struments to be able to reflect things like the reduction in costs (…) from the scal-
ing up of industrial activity producing renewables. 
 
 
 (EC 8) 
 
The environmentally focused coalition did not only change its policy detail be-
liefs based on the new scientific evidence that was contrary to the assumption that all 
renewable energies contribute to climate mitigation, some if its key actors also re-
flected on the learning experience which can be regarded as constructivist learning on 
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the individual level and to a certain extent also on the organisational level within the 
respective government/ European Commission departments: 
 
I mean people have been a bit traumatised with this file (…). Everybody in the 
DG was telling me “Oh, it’s the worst file I’ve ever seen”. (…) It was extremely 
difficult and there was a lot of disgrace put on the Commission as well when you 
have admit that you’ve made a policy that doesn’t make any sense which results 
go contrary to the objective. It’s very difficult. (…) The Commissioner [said dur-
ing] an official [when he] (…) was talking about (…) another hot topic (…) 
“Yeah, we need to make sure we take France into account because want to avoid 
another biofuels.”  
 
(EC 12) 
 
A representative in the Council concluded on the RED that 
 
we put in place a policy that has massively incentivised the development of an in-
dustry and we didn’t take into account the full impact and this needs to kind of be 
corrected. 
 
(NMS 11) 
 
Based on above discussion it can be concluded that by being involved in the pol-
icymaking process there was experiential learning among all policy-makers and also 
an increase in knowledge about the specific policy issues during the drafting and 
negotiation period of the RED and the Fuel Quality Directive, but also afterwards as 
actors reflected on the increasing scientific evidence in favour of the environmentally 
minded coalitions’ policy detail beliefs. This is the most relevant finding on learning: 
The environmentally minded coalition changed its policy detail beliefs, but this resul-
ted in a ‘fierce fight’ with the other coalition that did not regard the contested scien-
tific evidence as sufficient to adopt a precautionary approach, especially as it was al-
ready locked-in to its policy development path before the scientific evidence emerged. 
The other hindering factor was the different framing of biofuels as they were not only 
seen from an environmental or climate change perspective, but also their economic 
benefits were taken into account. The key finding in the analysis of learning on the in-
dividual level in transport policymaking is that no changes in either policy detail or 
deeper beliefs could be identified and clearly process-traced to the key individuals in-
volved in the economic development focused coalition, although the proposal on Indi-
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rect Land Use Changes of the European Commission would suggest so at first glance. 
On the individual level, this was not a result of constructivist learning, but of political 
learning, both in terms of experience and knowledge, among key actors that became 
locked-in to a policy pathway due to insufficient information at a crucial time: 
 
We were also at the end of the era where we had huge food surpluses and very 
low food prices so that wasn’t even an issue on peoples’ radar when we first quot-
ed biofuels and circumstances have changed considerably since then so I guess 
it’s not only the learning that goes on through the analysis which is triggered by 
the political debate, it’s also, as with all social sciences, the circumstances, the 
environment in which we’re working changes and that has a very significant 
impact on the interrelationships with the policy and what the policy does in the 
real world.  If there’s not static as well as our own learning the whole cir-
cumstances of global food production, food demand, have changed significantly.  
 
 (EC 8) 
 
 
 
6.4 Discussion and conclusion on Learning in the Renewable Energy 
Directive  
 
 
The analysis of the drafting and negotiation process of the Renewable Energy Direc-
tive allows detailed conclusions on when, why and under what circumstances learning 
occurred and what factors hindered it. Overall, the empirical data confirms the theo-
retical framework for identifying learning and supports the hypothesis that learning 
predominantly occurred on the individual level in the form of factual and experiential 
learning, while on the organisational level bargaining, national and organisational in-
terests remained dominant and prevented individual learning from influencing the pol-
icy outcome. Especially on the organisational level power politics and normal bar-
gaining tactics as well as the prevalence of powerful vested interests voiced by lobby-
ists remained dominant.  
 The 20 per cent target of renewable energy by 2020 was part of a wider cli-
mate package that enjoyed strong support from the Heads of States in the European 
Council. The overall political consensus made it difficult for individual actors to dis-
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agree with the direction of moving towards ambitious climate mitigation. This was 
further supported by the progressive leadership role the EU took on within the interna-
tional climate change negotiations given the weakness of the United States and other 
developed economies on the issue. The favourable economic climate between 2005 
and 2008 also contributed to the window of opportunity allowing the RED to still ride 
on that ‘wave’ (EC 3). Actors agreed that by 2012 this window of opportunity had 
closed and even maintaining the current level of ambition was very difficult (EC 6; 
EC 24) as member state push-backs on negotiations around the 2050 Climate roadmap 
illustrate. The following table provides an overview of the findings on learning in the 
Renewable Energy Directive (Table 4): 
 
Table 4. Overview of findings on learning in the Renewable Energy Directive. Com-
piled by the author. 
 
 Alternative      
explanations 
Factual 
learning 
(change in 
knowledge) 
Experiential    
learning            
(change in experi-
ence) 
Constructivist learning  (change in 
underlying beliefs) 
Deeper 
beliefs 
No change 
Policy 
design 
beliefs 
No change 
Organi-
sational 
level 
Yes: Obligation to 
implement Kyoto 
Protocol 
Bargaining among 
actors on policy de-
tails (Commission, 
Parliament and 
Council) 
Limited: More 
information 
about available 
policy instru-
ments, but in-
cremental 
Limited: Several stag-
es of renewable energy 
development (2001, 
2003, 2007 /08) 
Policy 
detail 
beliefs 
Strategic change:  European 
Commission adjusted some 
policy instrument choices to 
protect is policy design beliefs  
Deeper 
beliefs 
No change 
Policy 
design 
beliefs 
No change 
Individual 
level 
Yes: following or-
ders and carrying 
out institutional ob-
jective (what re-
quires some ‘nor-
mal’ factual and ex-
periential learning) 
Yes: Senior 
level actors in-
volved gained 
expertise on re-
newable energy 
Yes: Members of Par-
liament and actors at 
the Commission/ in 
the Council gained ex-
perience by working 
on the RED, but over-
all limited as few key 
actors were deeply in-
volved (who were al-
ready experts) 
Policy 
detail 
beliefs 
No change: Defensive avoid-
ance among economic devel-
opment-minded coalition to ac-
knowledge scientific evidence 
contrary to policy detail beliefs 
 
Especially the interdependence between shifts in the socio-political landscape 
and the individual level of learning among policy-makers is crucial. This finding is in-
sofar a novelty as the policy learning literature has been focusing on the organisational 
level of regularly information exchange with special attention to changes in know-
ledge and experiential learning. Both the socio-political landscape and the individual 
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level with cognitive learning perspectives have rarely been taken into account by the 
literature on policy learning in the EU, with its focus on ‘normal’ learning on the or-
ganisational level (see Koch and Lindenthal 2011; Schout 2009; Zito and Schout 
2009). This finding however is not specific to the EU’s unique governance system. 
Following Nedergaard (2008), who regards the EU as ‘semi-federalist system’, the 
findings on learning in the EU are quite similar to the findings on learning in the Unit-
ed States (e.g. May 1992; Montpetit 2009; Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009). 
This conclusion underpins Montpetit's (2009) findings on a similar lack of learning 
between Europe and the United States. This case study however further improved the 
understanding of where learning occurs and when it matters. The second key finding 
is that little learning has been transferred to the organisational level and much less to 
the policy outcome. 
 The biofuel controversy also illustrated that learning is not necessarily always 
positive, but particularly political learning can also have normatively negative, unin-
tended consequences. This may happen if decision-makers learn how to use the ‘right’ 
scientific studies to support the desired position, learn how to push proposals through 
the European Parliament and Council working groups and especially when scientific 
knowledge is contested instead of consensual (Dunlop 2010; Sharman and Holmes 
2010). Especially on the organisational level alternative explanations such as power 
politics, normal bargaining tactics and the prevalence of powerful vested interests 
voiced by lobbyists remained dominant as compared to learning.  
Even if individuals in the RED had learned and as a result of strong personal 
beliefs pushed the issue forward they used negotiation tactics, power and personal re-
lationships to accomplish their objectives. Convincing others of the importance and 
desirability of their objective could clash with national or particular political interests. 
Even if individuals reflected upon other individual’s persuasive proposals and 
changed their underlying beliefs, they may not have been able to act upon it in a co-
herent manner. This may lead to learning on the individual and organisational level 
that appears as non-existent learning as it is hindered by policy path-dependencies of 
decisions based on incomplete information, lock-in into policy pathways creating in-
dustries with vested interests and resulting defensive avoidance in the struggle to rem-
edy some of the unintended policy consequences. Table 5 summarises the findings on 
the biofuels controversy. 
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Table 5. Overview of key findings on learning in the biofuels controversy. Compiled 
by the author.  	  
 
 Alternative      
explanations to 
learning 
Factual 
learning  
(change in 
knowledge) 
Experiential learning  
(change in experience) 
Constructivist learning   
(change in underlying beliefs and 
perspective) 
Deeper 
beliefs 
No change 
Policy 
design 
beliefs 
Change in long-term: 
formulation of beliefs that 
climate change exists and 
that policy must react with 
legislation 
No change in short term 
Organi-
sational 
level 
Yes: Lack of scien-
tific consensus due 
to competing studies 
in 2006/ 2007 op-
ened up political 
space for framing 
science based on in-
terests; once locked-
into position, change 
difficult as it would 
mean loss of face 
Yes: Increase in 
knowledge due 
to emerging sci-
entific evidence 
on negative en-
vironmental 
impacts of bio-
fuels 
Yes: By being involved in 
the process; improved ex-
periential learning as more 
decision-makers were in-
volved in discussion as 
usual since the disagree-
ments between the coali-
tions required intensive 
debates; also more people 
involved as biofuels policy 
is split across several di-
rectives with different Di-
rectorate Generals in the 
lead 
Policy 
detail 
beliefs 
Environmentalists: 
Change  
Reflected on evidence and 
changed their beliefs  
Economic development 
coalition: no change, de-
fensive avoidance 
Deeper 
beliefs 
No change 
Policy 
design 
beliefs 
No change 
Individual 
 level 
No: few alternative 
explanations as in-
dividuals involved 
were forced to en-
gage in discussion 
due to controversy; 
also no absolute ex-
perts as new policy 
field with evolving 
science 
Yes: Increase in 
knowledge 
among experts 
and higher level 
decision-makers 
by being in-
volved in pro-
cess and having 
to engage with 
details to defend 
their position in 
negotiations 
Yes: Learning by doing, 
learning to play negotiation 
tactics better and to agree 
to opposing coalitions de-
mands on minor issues to 
hold position on more im-
portant issues closer to pol-
icy detail/ policy design 
and deeper beliefs 
Policy 
detail 
beliefs 
No change: Defensive 
avoidance among eco-
nomic development-
minded coalition to ac-
knowledge scientific evi-
dence contrary to policy 
detail beliefs 
 
 
These empirical findings match with the political learning May (1992) en-
countered, which prompted conclusions on policy failure. Similarly, Radaelli (2009) 
and Koch and Lindenthal (2011) described behaviour that could be termed as strategi-
cally dealing with input to avoid deeper reflection and instead engaging in political 
learning or policy-oriented learning (Sabatier 1987) to protect deeper and policy de-
sign beliefs instead of adjusting them to the new input – in short, defensive avoidance 
due to organisational or political hindering factors such as policy lock-in and path-
dependence. These findings point towards the wider literature on power relations and 
policymaking dynamics in the EU. Overall, the different coalitions within the Euro-
pean Commission engaged in what could be regarded as strategically influencing the 
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policymaking process as active protagonists with their own political interests based on 
normative beliefs and differing perspectives about policy priorities.  
Thus, the findings are closer to contributions that address institutionalist per-
spectives of public policy focused on rational actors, political interests and the stra-
tegic use of knowledge to influence the bargaining process (Elgström and Jönsson 
2000; Warntjen 2008; 2010; Weible 2008) frequently associated with intergovernmen-
tal bargaining in the European Council and intergovernmental conferences (Clegg 
2010; Moravcsik 1999; Slapin 2008) as well as between the European institutions 
(Costello and Thomson 2013; Roederer-Rynning and Schimmelfennig 2012) or more 
adversarial policy subsystems such as the United States (Weible and Sabatier 2009; 
Weible et al. 2011b). There is a limited relevance of the findings to the constructivist 
notion of deliberation, persuasion and cooperation (Risse 2000; Risse and Kleine 
2007), or cooperation observed in the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (Nedergaard 
2007) and ‘new modes of governance’ literature (Eberlein and Kerwer 2004). These 
findings point towards alternative explanations for policy change rather than learning 
at the intersection of constructivist and institutionalist perspectives regarding the use 
of knowledge, rationality of actors, organisational/ political interests and the (limited) 
role of learning therein. While some learning occurred, it was not decisive for the pol-
icy outcome to emerge as the policy process was dominated by coalitions trying to 
achieve their policy objectives while saving face.  
The following chapter examines learning at the example of integrating climate 
mitigation and adaptation aspects into the Common Agricultural Policy, which pro-
vides an interesting contrast to the Renewable Energy Directive given its status as a 
core European policy that is constantly being reformed as well as its financial volume 
comprising a third of the EU’s budget. 
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Chapter 7 
Learning in policy reform processes: 
Greening the Common Agricultural Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter connects findings from the existing literature on policy change in the 
CAP with learning and thus contributes to a deeper understanding of the role of learn-
ing in policy reform processes and of the conditions for learning to impact the policy 
outcome at the example of climate policy integration. As suggested by Sabatier 
(1988), the appropriate time frame for analysis is about a decade starting with the 
2002/2003 ‘Fischler Reforms’/ Mid-Term Review and ending with the adoption of the 
2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy in the European Parliament and the Council 
in June 2013. The first part of this chapter reviews the literature on how the CAP ev-
olved over the past 3 decades, points out the value added of this research and analyses 
the greening of the CAP 2014-2020 reform (EC 2011b; EC 2011c) to determine the 
actors involved and the socio-political framework conditions. The second part dis-
cusses what aspects of learning occurred among the European institutions (i.e. on the 
organisational level) and among the individual policy-makers involved (i.e. on the in-
dividual level). It finds that learning occurred in several but not all aspects, that policy 
entrepreneurs played a key role in pushing for a policy outcome and that this policy 
outcome was less the result of learning on the organisational level, but rather the result 
of how the ‘institutional machinery’ of the EU works.  
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7.1 Review of the CAP literature and shifts in the socio-political 
landscape  
 
 
This chapter is concerned with climate policy integration into the European Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) as one of Europe’s largest and oldest policy areas occupy-
ing a major share of the EU budget. As a consequence of this characteristic, there is a 
considerable literature examining the CAP reform processes of the 1990s and early 
2000s, raising the suspicion that there is little new to be said about the CAP. This lit-
erature predominantly focuses on the political economy of the reforms (e.g. see 
Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007; Olper 2008), the interplay of advocacy coalitions (e.g. 
Feindt 2010; Nedergaard 2008) as well as the role of the European Commission and 
windows of opportunity at creating a ‘perfect storm’ for the reforms of the early 2000s 
(Swinnen 2008a). So far, only one contribution began to link aspects of learning to the 
CAP (Feindt 2010), yet stopping short at the 2003 Fischler reforms without systemati-
cally examining what aspects of learning occurred and whether these mattered for the 
policy outcome to emerge.  
All have however made valuable contributions on providing insights into the 
development of the CAP, including its greening aspects since the 1980. They calcu-
lated the appropriate levels of support, explained policy measures such as cross-
compliance and decoupling or discussed interdependencies with the World Trade re-
gime (see Daugbjerg 2003; Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007; Olper 2008). They also 
elaborated on wider shifts in the socio-political landscape, which have been also 
pointed out and confirmed by a number of interviewees involved in the CAP since the 
1990s. These shifts include the emergence of environmental NGOs as counterbalan-
cing actors to the agricultural industry lobby, an increased environmental awareness 
among the public, criticism of the CAP as wasteful and environmentally damaging, as 
well as increasing demands that public money also needs to serve the public good if 
taxpayer support for the CAP is to continue (see Feindt 2010; Swinnen 2008a). Fur-
thermore, previous contributions also analysed the relevance of windows of oppor-
tunity, advocacy coalitions, policy brokers as well as policy entrepreneurs such as 
Franz Fischler, who strongly shaped the policy outcomes of continuous reform rounds 
(see Feindt 2010; Nedergaard 2008; Swinnen 2008a). 
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However, little has been said so far about the extent to which learning among 
individuals and among the European institutions occurred in the policy reform process 
of the CAP and whether the outcome would have been any different in the absence of 
learning. Furthermore, this is the first case study to examine whether any more com-
plex belief changes occurred in the policy reforms that go beyond ‘normal’ learning 
such as increased knowledge and experience. This chapter also provides the first em-
pirical case study on the explicit integration of climate mitigation and adaptation ob-
jectives from 2008 onwards into the CAP, which initially appears to be a considerable 
change in a policy that is often regarded as ‘dinosaur’ (NMS 4) whose time has 
passed. The most recent analyses on policy change in the CAP (e.g. Feindt 2010) ana-
lysed the Fischler Reforms (until 2003), but so far there is no contribution in the aca-
demic literature that provides detailed insights into the more recent developments over 
the past decade, starting with the ‘Health Check’ in 2007/ 2008 and continuing to the 
post-2013 CAP reform. 
 This section focuses on providing a better understanding of how the greening 
aspects in the most recent post-2013 CAP reform came about as a result of changes in 
the wider socio-political landscape. This contains explanatory factors to learning as 
well as alternative explanations for policy change, which will be analysed in the next 
sections. Climate and environmental policy integration via financial instruments is re-
ferred to as ‘greening’ in the CAP, which emerged during decades of reform process:  
 
Normally the CAP is always depicted as a dinosaur-kind of policy but if you go 
back in the history of CAP then from the 1970s onwards it is a subject of reform  
(…).  In that sense people who say that agricultural policy in the EU is a dinosaur-
like policy in my view they are wrong. 
 
(NMS 4) 
 
Thus, one could expect a multitude of learning processes over the various re-
form rounds in the long term. To identify learning, it is important to separate long-
term changes in the socio-political landscape from actual learning processes in poli-
cymaking. Much has been published about the CAP reforms of the 1990s and early 
2000s (e.g. Daugbjerg 1999; 2003; Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007; Feindt 2010; 
Nedergaard 2006c; 2008; Swinnen 2008a) so that this review focuses on the greening 
aspects and the most recent ‘Ciolos-Reform’ for 2014-2020, which was concluded in 
the summer of 2013. 
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7.1.1 Early greening in the 1980s and 1990s 
 
 
The climate policy integration measures in the proposed 2014-2020 Common Agricul-
tural Policy appear as a discontinuation of previous reforms, particularly in connection 
with the objective to dedicate 20 per cent of the European Union’s 2014-2020 budget 
to climate actions. If climate policy integration is however examined in its compo-
nents relevant to agricultural policy such as increasing the carbon sink via measures 
that increase the share of green vegetation and adapt to unavoidable consequences of 
climate change, most of its aspects can be linked to the ‘greening’ of the CAP that can 
be traced back to the mid-1980s. This section illustrates the early origins of climate 
policy integration in the CAP, which were framed as reaction to wider shifts in the so-
cio-political landscape. 
In 1985 the concept of ecological set-aside areas and premiums for envi-
ronmentally friendly practises beyond compliance was introduced on a voluntary basis 
when the President of the European Commission Jacques Delors and the European 
Commissioner for Agriculture Frans Andriessen recognised the negative envi-
ronmental impacts of intensive agriculture as one of the CAP’s policy failures (Feindt 
2010: 303). The green paper emphasised the “choice of society in favour of a ‘Green 
Europe’” (Commission of the European Communities 1985: II; Feindt 2010). This 
green paper set out major reform elements the CAP followed over the next 28 years.  
The reform headed by the European Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural 
Development Ray MacSharry in 1992 marks the formal introduction of environmental 
considerations into the CAP (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007). It coincided with an in-
creasing public environmental awareness in the run-up to the 1992 Rio Earth summit 
(EC 25; ENGO 9) and a rising interest of green non-governmental actors in agricultu-
ral policy. The green movement strongly criticised the negative environmental conse-
quences of intensive agriculture, what prompted MacSharry to strongly emphasise 
farmer’s crucial contribution to a vivid rural society and their central role as stewards 
of the environment in an attempt to win the green movement’s support (Moehler 
2008: 78). The 1992 MacSharry reform responded to the environmental movement’s 
criticism in three ways. The key aspect was the shift from encouraging intensive agri-
culture towards supporting extensive agriculture. This included replacing price sup-
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port with direct payments to farmers (pillar one of the post-2013 CAP). Furthermore, 
setting aside land became obligatory, what was seen as major change in the policy 
paradigm (EC 21; EC 24; EC 25). Member states could reward farmers for going be-
yond minimum requirements for good agricultural practises with the ‘agri-
environmental programme’ and they could penalise insufficient compliance with envi-
ronmental protection requirements via reducing direct payments, using the so-called 
‘cross-compliance’ mechanism (Daugbjerg 2003; Moehler 2008: 79).  
In 1995 the European Council requested the European Commission to propose 
a set of reforms that would prepare the EU for the environmental, economic and social 
challenges of the 21st century, including the introduction of the single currency, the 
enlargement to more than 25 member states and reforming the CAP (Feindt 2010). 
This resulted in the Agenda 2000 reforms. The run-up to the Agenda 2000 reforms co-
incided with the Cardiff process on environmental policy integration, which also re-
quired the Agriculture Council to revise its contribution; whereby the environmental 
outcomes of both the MacSharry reforms and the Cardiff process remained far behind 
the aspirations (Feindt 2010: 305; Lowe and Baldock 2000). The Agenda 2000 reform 
was prepared by the European Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development 
Franz Fischler and adopted in 1999. It continued the 1988 and 1992 reform direction 
with the objective to make the CAP more acceptable to the average citizen and con-
sumer with higher direct payments and further price cuts (Swinnen 2008a). The in-
strument of ‘modulation’ served the purpose of decreasing incentives for intensive ag-
ricultural production. It allowed member states to cap premiums paid to farmers by up 
to 20 per cent and to redirect these funds to the second pillar on rural development. 
Key aspects were the introduction of a ‘second pillar’ on Rural Development, which 
supplemented the direct payments to farmers in ‘pillar one’. The second pillar also 
contained further environmental measures on a voluntary basis, while its overall fi-
nancial volume remained at less than 10 per cent (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007: 8; 
Feindt 2010: 305). 
The main actors recognise that there were interdependencies to the trade nego-
tiations, especially the GATT Uruguay round (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007; Olper 
2008) and that the CAP reforms facilitated the 1994 GATT agreement (Syrrakos 
2008: 117). However, the EU’s chief negotiator in the Uruguay round also emphas-
ised that the GATT/ WTO negotiations were rather a side-effect (Moehler 2008; 
 165	  
Pirzio-Biroli 2008) than a key motivation as hypothesised by some academic contribu-
tions (Olper 2008; Swinbank and Tanner 1996; Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007). EU-
internal considerations were more relevant drivers for CAP reform. 
In the 1990s, the public debate shifted, as various food-safety crises such as 
BSE and the dioxin-scandal became a major public concern, along with an increased 
awareness to improve standards on animal welfare (Moehler 2008; Syrrakos 2008). At 
the same time, environmental NGOs and consumer organisations entered the circles of 
agricultural lobbying in Brussels and in the member states. This new group of actors 
worked closely with the media and was seen as representing wider public concerns 
(Syrrakos 2008; Nedergaard 2008). Their presence changed the policymaking dynam-
ics, which until then had been dominated by the farm lobbies influencing their mem-
ber state’s ministries for agriculture within the Agriculture Council of Ministers and 
the Directorate-General of Agriculture and Rural Development in the European 
Commission (Nedergaard 2008: 185; Swinnen 2008b: 142).  
ENGOs based their criticism on scientific studies that confirm the negative en-
vironmental effects of agricultural production and criticised its negative implications 
for biodiversity and cruel practices regarding farm animals (ENGO 1; ENGO 2; 
ENGO 3; ENGO 8; ENGO 9). They used this knowledge to build momentum and 
convince society and decision-makers on the national and European level via the me-
dia, conferences and direct discussions to take into account wider societal perspectives 
and to question the ‘business-as-usual’ industrial production with its negative effects 
on the environment and food safety: 
 
The process is that we elaborate our own position, so we start from the science 
and the experience of the people on the ground. (…) Then we try to convince 
other people whether it is decision-makers or other stakeholders. (…) We dis-
cussed [ideas] with a group of five environmental and sustainable farming NGOs, 
we negotiated with them a joint vision for the CAP. This was a quite long and 
painful process. And then we took those proposals mainly to the Commission, but 
also to all sorts of other stakeholders, and some of those ideas in a bundled ver-
sion have made it into the Commission proposal. (…) Now we are engaging with 
the Parliament and the Council. 
 
(ENGO 3) 
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Another environmental NGO representative emphasised the importance of co-
ordination among the environmental lobbyists: 
 
We form common positions and then we go to the decision-makers with these 
positions, most of the time we also try to harmonise at least those positions also 
with other [environmental] organisations.  
 
 (ENGO 2) 
 
 This illustrates how ENGOs work to form a counter-balance to the agricultural 
industry lobby. They articulate environmental interests by taking on roles of ‘teachers’ 
(Bomberg 2007; Haas 2000) who educate policy-makers and the public by disseminat-
ing information on the negative environmental and social effects of agricultural pol-
icy. The line between ‘teachers’ and lobbyists blurs with political demands for envi-
ronmental focus areas, cross-compliance and decoupling or farm payments from agri-
cultural production. ENGOs were successful in influencing the European Commission 
to integrate these aspects into the 1992, 2000 and 2003 CAP reforms and to gradually 
tighten their applicability in the subsequent reforms (EC 14; EC 19; EC 24; EP 4).  
A key prerequisite is that environmental NGOs established a high level of trust 
with representatives of the European Commission so that they could be trusted to 
safeguard confidential information and act with high integrity. The European Com-
mission saw them as having “very convincing arguments and they certainly have a 
much stronger control over public opinion, a much better support in public opinion 
therefore than most farmers organisations” (EC 24). Yet the imbalance between envi-
ronmental and agricultural lobbyists involved in the CAP reforms is remarkable. Of 
the dozen major environmental NGOs represented in Brussels, only few individuals 
are deeply enough involved in the CAP reform discussions to effectively carry out 
lobbying work and engage with the European Commission on the technocratic level: 
 
[It is only] a handful that are really on the fight, I am not talking about people who 
come to meetings and follow because they don't add anything, they don't, they put 
their logo once in a while but they don't do any of the real footwork.  
 
(ENGO 2) 
 
With the overproduction of the 1980s, worries regarding food security gave way 
to worries about food safety, especially regarding beef, pork and chicken. Food safety 
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became a major issue of European concern with the BSE crisis of 1996 (Moehler 
2008: 79). Especially the food scares of the late 1990s and early 2000s such as BSE, 
dioxin, SARS, foot and mouth disease as well as the high use of antibiotics in animal 
feed raised questions regarding negative implications for human health. This sparked 
an interest in food production, what resulted in an increase in media reports and shift-
ing public opinion as well as increased consumer demand for organically produced 
food and higher food safety standards (Nedergaard 2008; Syrrakos 2008). The food 
scares pushed food safety and agricultural production higher on the political agenda, 
where it in turn influenced public opinion and resulted in reflection processes, as food 
scares were “still a top priority of EU citizens. Regardless of what the CAP really had 
to do with these food scares, the political reaction was to put these problems at the top 
of the agenda” (Olper 2008: 89). The media supported a change in public opinion, 
giving “the impression that there is something wrong with our farming industry” (EC 
24). Thus, a number of different factors opened up a window of opportunity: 
 
 There was, you know, a great increase in the criticism on the CAP’s impact on the 
environment, but and also food safety and the various crises alerted people. Also, 
the argument about wasteful production in agriculture and (…) this idea that I think 
Fischler was attached to, the family farm providing a certain role in society. And I 
think public opinion, this idea of organic farming, and I think you also had a 
general criticism of the CAP as wasteful. I think certainly the NGOs shifted their 
positions. I think this is a very important point. It was not only about agriculture 
which damages the environment, but also the role that agriculture plays in terms of 
land management, biodiversity and so on. Certain NGOs became very strong 
advocates in terms of a certain type of farming. (…) Good agriculture needed to 
provide a service to society.  
 
(EC 25) 
 
As a result,  
 
the CAP had lost its legitimacy among the EU public. In particular, the fact that the 
CAP was increasingly seen as at the same time hurting EU trade interests, having 
negative effects on the environment and [being] unable to address the food safety 
concerns of EU consumers was turning into a major call for reform. 
 
(Swinnen 2008b: 143) 
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7.1.2 CAP reforms of the 2000s and the post-2013 reform proposal 
 
 
Due to the EU’s enlargement process and the “partial failure of the Agenda 2000 re-
forms” (Olper 2008: 86), provisions for a Mid-Term Review in 2002/ 2003 were in-
cluded into the Agenda 2000 decisions. Commissioner Fischler used the Mid-Term 
Review to introduce more far-reaching reforms of the CAP, which were even coined 
as ‘radical’ by key actors and observers and facilitated by a window of opportunity 
(Swinnen 2008a). The Fischler reforms changed the policy instruments towards the 
introduction of a Single Payment Scheme by further decoupling farm income from 
production (Moehler 2008: 78). Farmers were allocated payments per acre of land ir-
respective of production (Olper 2008: 87). It also strengthened cross-compliance as 
payments became conditional upon farmers’ compliance with environmental and food 
safety regulations, animal welfare and overall sound environmental practises (Daug-
bjerg and Swinbank 2007: 8). However, as in the previous reforms, unavoidable 
compromises with the member states considerably watered down the original propo-
sals (Swinnen 2008a).  
 The 2008 mini-reform termed ‘Health Check’ first introduced the objective of 
addressing climate change into the CAP (European Council 2009). This marks the 
first instance of specific climate policy integration. It coincided with the 20-20-20 
strategy set out in the Climate and Energy Package (EC 27; EC 2008a; European 
Council 2007) and paved the way for re-framing environmental into climate policy 
integration. Besides phasing out milk quotas, assisting some sectors with special prob-
lems and improving intervention mechanisms, it further strengthened cross-
compliance and reduced ‘red-tape’ (i.e. bureaucracy) by simplifying rules (European 
Council 2009). Overall, the Health Check recognised climate change as a challenge, 
but did not address climate change via increased carbon sinks. It even made a step 
backwards by abolishing the requirement to farmers to set-aside ten per cent of their 
arable land for ecological focus areas (European Council 2009). 
‘Greening’ the CAP’ (EC 2011b; 2011c) was one of the flagship initiatives of 
the climate mainstreaming approach (EC 2013) proposed by the European Commis-
sion in 2011 for the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework of the EU (EC 
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2011a). This climate policy integration was applied to policies not automatically con-
tributing to climate mitigation, but requiring intervention through legislation, condi-
tionalities and financial instruments (Rietig 2013). The major change for pillar one 
was to dedicate 30 per cent of direct payments to agricultural practices that are benefi-
cial for the climate and the environment. The expected benefits for climate mitigation 
were furthermore enhanced carbon content of the soil (EC 20; EC 24). The second pil-
lar supports rural development through the European Agricultural Fund for Rural De-
velopment (EAFRD). A key objective of the second pillar on rural development was 
the sustainable management of natural resources and climate action. This was to be 
achieved by supporting the shift towards a low carbon and climate resilient economy 
in agriculture (EC 2011c; European Council 2013). 25 per cent of the total contribu-
tion from the EAFRD was to be devoted to the rural development programmes on 
climate mitigation, adaptation and land management (European Council 2013). These 
steps in themselves could be regarded both as climate and environmental policy inte-
gration according to criteria set forth in the literature (Lafferty and Hovden 2003; 
Jordan and Lenschow 2010; Rietig 2013). They contribute to reducing emissions by 
increasing carbon sinks (e.g. through set-aside of land), adapting to negative climate 
impacts and also to reducing negative environmental impacts of agriculture. The ac-
tual environmental and climate mitigation ambition of the Commission’s proposal 
(EC 2011b; EC 2011c) and the policy outcome (European Council 2013) were criti-
cised by environmental NGOs as too low, focussing on small political compromises: 
 
Everybody agrees with greening because they need to justify the money that is 
behind it but the problem is that, if you really go to, okay, and now we are talking 
serious, not big politics anymore, it's very difficult for them to really make it 
change. (…) The environment is very attractive to put a big green label on. 
 
(ENGO 2) 
 
 
Following Nedergaard (2008), there were three interest groups influencing the 
policy outcome of the CAP. Environmental NGOs can be regarded as members of a 
coalition calling for ambitious and far-reaching CAP reforms. Lobbyists from the 
agri-industry confirmed that their influence decreased in the 1990s and 2000s (In-
dustry 4; Industry 5) while environmental NGOs became a counter-balance to the 
agri-industry’s ‘status quo’ coalition, which retained close links to several agriculture 
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ministries in the member states (Nedergaard 2008). The environmental NGOs them-
selves however also pointed towards intrinsically motivated processes within the 
European Commission that were not necessarily linked to their lobbying activities but 
rather coincided with them and served as convenient argument for the European 
Commission to justify its reform course (ENGO 9): 
 
What was quite obvious is that the influence of the agricultural lobby, the German 
and the European, decreased recently, at least on the Commission and the proposals 
that came from the Commission. The influence of the agricultural lobby on Ger-
many is still immensely high, but Germany is only one player. The German Minis-
ter for Agriculture, Mrs Aigner, essentially represents the position of the agricultu-
ral lobby in Brussels.  
 
(NMS 4) 
 
Thus, the European Commission was the third key actor whose interests could 
be best described as ‘moderate reform’ coalition (Nedergaard 2008) with the ability to 
steer the reform process. When compared with the two previous major reforms in 
1992 (MacSharry Reform) and the 2003 Fischler Reform (Feindt 2010; Nedergaard 
2008; Swinnen 2008b), this 2013 reform could be understood as a continuation in the 
shift towards a ‘public-goods model’, which is especially emphasised by the European 
Commission (EC 21; EC 22; EC 23; EC 25; EC 26). Different actors questioned 
whether European agricultural policy should at all be organised through a system of 
subsidies and public monetary transfers (Nedergaard 2008). Especially finance minis-
ters in the member states, different environmental NGOs, social NGOs involved in 
developing countries and major trade partners voiced their demands to ‘scrap the 
CAP’ more or less forcefully since the 1980s (Moehler 2008; Pirzio-Biroli 2008: 104; 
EC 21; EC 24; ENGO 3; ENGO 5). The rationale behind the unacceptability of the 
impact and price support model was the argument of ‘public money for public goods’ 
requiring a strong justification why the public should subsidise a policy with negative 
environmental impacts that only seems to benefit a few: 
 
Why waste public money when people don’t do what they are supposed to do. I 
mean just cut them off when they don’t, why should we waste good public money 
that is so scarce to subsidise one sector out of many sectors, and at the same time 
they are undermining all the environmental values.  
 
(EC 14) 
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Key actors in the environmental NGO community also communicated the dan-
ger of a discontinuation of the CAP to increase the pressure on policy-makers: 
 
I’ve said now on a few occasions in conferences and in the media, I said “This was 
your last chance.  You won’t get another chance.  You won’t get 363 billion again. 
Because you blew it. You went for the whole thing.”  I don’t know if that’s true or 
not but it’s kind of useful to say, which is that you should have given more on the 
greening side if you wanted a more secure vote in 2020. (…) It reinforces the pub-
lic money for public goods, it reinforces the Pillar II. It says that the public money 
will be so scarce. 
 
(ENGO 9) 
 
While the motivations and associated worldviews behind this demand were very 
different and ranged from market-liberalisation and open competition to envi-
ronmental considerations in favour of the polluter-pays principle, governmental actors 
saw this coalition’s coherent demand as having had an impact on public opinion 
(Nedergaard 2008; Swinnen 2008b): 
 
What is clear from opinion polls (…) throughout Europe is that citizens want a 
more diverse landscape, that agricultural policy should not only pay subsidies but 
link these to public services. In this aspect citizens became more sensitive, on the 
issue that they are paying for something with taxes, the farmers can have this sup-
port but we can expect a little in return. (…) I think the public became a little more 
political. 
(NMS 4) 
 
The coalition in favour of abandoning the CAP and introducing a new, more 
market-based form of agricultural policy became strong enough to convince top deci-
sion-makers that the only way to ‘save the CAP’ would be to justify its existence by 
changing its objectives towards a public-goods model. This was achieved by trying 
“to change the image of the European agricultural sector as a major polluter jeopardis-
ing long-term sustainability, into that of a conservationist emphasising quality, health 
and sustainability” (Pirzio-Biroli 2008: 103). The main instrument of choice was de-
coupling farm payments from production and conditionality of the subsidy payments 
upon cross-compliance with environmental regulations: 
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Decoupling was driven by a number of different concerns, I mean; it is an idea 
which time had come. (…) In terms of the cross-compliance, this was once again 
something that was called for by environmental groups, but at the same time, it 
fitted into this idea that policies should be more in support of environmental 
expectations. 
 
(EC 25) 
 
The environmental NGOs’ emphasis of the need to link public money to the provision 
of public goods also supported this perception among European policy-makers: 
 
We did hammer that ‘public money for public good’ very strongly, not only in the 
CAP but in the whole MMF which is the context (…) and that’s been going on now 
for some time. 
 
(ENGO 9) 
 
Corrado Pirzio-Biroli, the European Commissioner for Agriculture’s Head of 
Cabinet and key architect of the Agenda 2000 and the 2003 Fischler reforms, pointed 
out the following changes in European public opinion and thus in the socio-political 
landscape as major drivers for pushing the CAP reform forward to increase popularity 
and avoid budget cuts: 
 
a) farmers had become a tiny minority, and farm organisations lost dynamism and 
clout; 
b) the widening of the EU and the proliferation of its policies against growing EU 
budget stringency had increased the competition for funds within both the Commis-
sion and the Council, as well as within the European Parliament; 
c) the image of the farmer, large and small, had become that of a polluter, although 
this was not directly because of the CAP, but because of the industrialisation of 
agriculture, which the CAP had entertained; and 
d) the CAP no longer had the votes to continue the status quo. 
 
(Pirzio-Biroli 2008: 102) 
 
Thus, the motivation to introduce greening objectives into the CAP can be seen 
both from an environmental perspective and as a tactical move in response to or at 
least in anticipation of perceived changes in public opinion to further tolerate its con-
tinued existence. A representative of the agricultural industry concluded on the mo-
tives for introducing environmental objectives that these resulted  
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more out of necessity than design. (…) The Fischler Reform in 2003 again was out 
of necessity to ensure that if you had a decoupled payment, it would have to be 
attached to something which meant that this concept of cross-compliance was 
introduced (…), that opened really the door for a wide discussion about the role of 
the CAP into the great environmental benefits and of course you've got a very vocal 
environmental lobby led by Bird Life International in particular, but WWF Friends 
of the Earth and other organisations who were all trying to ensure that more public 
money is spent on environmental causes and the CAP is a big source of public 
money at European levels. (…) Frankly it's not going to go away either and (…) 
our hope is that we can ensure that it's delivered in a way that doesn't compromise 
the competitiveness of farming businesses.  
 
(Industry 7) 
 
 
This section illustrated how moderate greening measures that were introduced 
gradually in Europe’s largest subsidy programme addressed several political interests 
of the actors involved. For the European Commission, the observed change in public 
opinion provided a rationale for greening as a means to justify the continued existence 
of the CAP. The agricultural industry also recognised this necessity to some extent, 
but was trying to minimise the economic impacts by calling for flexibility and volun-
tary measures, which was most successful via lobbying on the member state level. The 
environmental NGOs were strengthened by the shift towards environmental measures 
and began forming a counter-balance to the agricultural lobby. 
 
 
7.1.3 Conclusion on changes in the socio-political landscape  
 
 
Policy change in the CAP was a result of shifts in the socio-political landscape 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Environmental NGOs emerged as counter-
balance to the agri-industry. The food scares of the 1990s and subsequent shifts in 
public opinion were articulated via the media, which in turn influenced how politi-
cians and high-level civil servants perceived public acceptance of the CAP. This op-
ened windows of opportunity (as discussed by Kingdon 1995) for policy-makers to re-
flect on the CAP and reconsider the most criticised elements, both in terms of detailed 
policy instruments and also the wider goals and objectives of the policy. As discussed 
in chapter 3, such changes in the socio-political landscape can be drivers for policy 
change. The wider public (i.e. voters), politicians, civil society and representatives of 
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interest groups influenced the key actors. The media was a key intermediary between 
civil society and politicians as it conveyed messages that were frequently framed by 
interest groups. These influenced wider society in its process of forming medium and 
long-term preferences that could also have been carried into political elections. Politi-
cians were both recipients and actors as they could steer public opinion with mes-
sages, but at the same time also paid close attention to public opinion as a matter of 
political survival with an eye on the next election (EC 21; EC 24). The CAP however 
is a fairly complex policy not featuring high in public opinion and drawing limited at-
tention from the media. This limits the discussion to smaller circles: 
 
Clearly when the politicians feel the heat from public opinion, then they take ac-
tion. The big problem (…) [is that] the CAP is constructed in such an obscure and 
complex way, is that there is very little public debate about it. 
 
(ENGO 3) 
 
This was also pointed out by a member state representative: 
 
Most citizens don’t have a clue, sorry, what is going on in Brussels and what agri-
cultural policy is; there is only a very small percentage in the population [who 
knows and cares]. 
 
(NMS 4) 
 
Nevertheless, the food scares of the 1990s such as BSE resulted in increasing in-
terest of environmental NGOs, consumers and wider society in European agriculture. 
This group represents “the other 99 per cent” (EC 21) of stakeholders as agriculture 
has profound impacts on human health via food safety and environmental conditions. 
The policy outcome was a continuous adjustment of the CAP and a gradual shift to-
wards the public-goods model over a period of 30 years. This was both driven and 
supported by the changing public opinion on the CAP, that prompted policy-makers to 
agree to adjustments in order to preserve the CAP overall. Especially environmental 
NGOs were interpreted by key policy-makers in the European Commission and the 
European Parliament as representatives of public opinion that could not be ignored in 
policymaking. A key actor in the Fischler Reform concluded on the rationale behind 
introducing greening aspects: 
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So I think you have this shift in public opinion, the shift in the positions of NGOs 
and as well the role of the academic debate, you see concepts coming into play in a 
way which I think is much more talking to the agricultural debate on greening. 
 
(EC 25) 
 
 The next section closely examines what aspects of learning occurred on the in-
dividual and organisational level and to what extent they mattered for the policy out-
come. It finds that the reform heritage provided a strong incentive to ‘move on’ and il-
lustrates how the link between learning on the individual and the organisational level 
influences the policy outcome. Policy entrepreneurs in key positions played a central 
role in all successful reforms. However, while their influence on the policy outcome 
was very high, their careful orchestration and strategising did not always result in spil-
lovers to facilitate learning among the actors involved. 
 
 
 
7.2 Learning on the Individual Level  
  
 
The shifts in the socio-political landscape over the past 30 years resulted in a continu-
ous reform process and opportunities for individuals in the European Commission and 
the wider European policymaking community to justify greening. These changes 
however can rather be regarded as a driver for learning and not as learning itself. As 
outlined in chapters 2 and 3, factual learning among decision-makers occurs when in-
dividuals reflect on an input such as new information and as a result their expertise in-
creases. Experiential learning occurs when an individual reflects on being involved in 
a policy field and thus accumulates working experience (Argyris and Schön 1978; 
Kim 1993) or learns how to manoeuvre the political process to influence policymak-
ing (i.e. ‘political learning’, see May 1992). The most obvious learning on the indi-
vidual level is experiential learning among those involved in policymaking. It occurs 
as soon as policy-makers reflect on their experience and learn by doing. This section 
examines to what extent individuals learned in the CAP reform processes. It analyses 
learning while taking into account previous expertise and separating learning from al-
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ternative explanations for policy change such as bargaining and the dominance of po-
litical and economic interests. The time dimension is crucial in determining learning 
along the policy making process (see chapter 3). This chapter ‘measures’ learning as a 
change in knowledge, experience and/ or beliefs at the time of the policy outcome 
compared to when the actor became involved with the policy, but does not consider 
previously existing and unchanged knowledge, experience and/ or beliefs as learning. 
 
 
7.2.1 Learning and the role of previous knowledge  
 
 
Learning on the individual level depends strongly on the pre-existing knowledge of 
the involved individuals. The learning curve is very steep if the individual had only 
limited involvement with the policy field and takes in much new information within a 
short period of time.  
 
 
Members of the European Parliament 
 
The co-decision procedure for the CAP introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (Craig 2010; 
Roederer-Rynning and Schimmelfenning 2012) broadens the factual and experiential 
learning to the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). These were confronted 
with new information and more closely deliberated the post-2013 CAP reform as they 
did previously when the member state’s ministers in the Agriculture Council decided 
the CAP. Therefore, there was a considerable amount of factual and experiential 
learning among Members of the European Parliament (EP 1; EP 2; EP 3; EP 5; EP 6; 
EP 7; EP 8). At the same time, the learning of individual MEPs also depended on their 
previous expertise in agricultural policy, which was heterogeneous throughout the Ag-
ricultural Committee: 
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Some of the MEPs in Comm Agri, they have a wealth of experience and expertise 
and other people – agriculture might only be their second or third committee and 
it's very much of minority interest and you can tell from the sort of fairly superfi-
cial level of their questions and interventions that [their expertise is on a] rudimen-
tary level, so we have a very great range [of expertise]. 
 
(EP 10) 
 
They are presented with a large number of studies, position papers and requests 
to take the positions of interest groups into account. MEPs across different parties and 
from different member states pointed out that they listened to the input provided by 
the different interest groups and then reflected on what input best mirrored their po-
litical objectives and their electorate’s preferences (EP 1; EP 2; EP 4; EP 5). Thus, 
they filtered information based on its perceived usefulness with pre-existing political 
objectives (EP 2; EP 3).  
Experiential learning was stronger in the European Parliament than factual 
learning. The key reasons were time and resource constraints to closely engage with 
the studies and reports due to very full working schedules and individual MEPs’ in-
volvement with many different issue areas (EP 6; EP 7; EP 8). They reported that they 
lacked the time to sufficiently reflect on detailed factual knowledge and thus tended to 
prefer personal conversations with experts and representatives of interest groups to 
ask them about the key facts they needed to know: 
 
I have to be clear on that; a politician is only as good as his team. I am absolutely 
convinced of that. When I have 10, 14 appointments per day, (…) then I can’t sit 
in the office and read [scientific studies] for hours. I simply can’t. Okay, I can 
read a few things during meetings (…), but I am also limited and need my 6 hours 
of sleep. (…) I have to rely on my assistants to analyse the flood of knowledge, 
but even that is not possible. I prefer to talk to scientists rather than reading their 
studies. 
 
(EP 2) 
 
Engaging with stakeholders, lobbyists and experts was a key method for MEPs 
to understand their preferences, gain factual knowledge and form their own position: 
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They form their position listening what other people think and I mean (…), they 
need to listen what their party says, they need to listen to what the national people 
say, so they have to follow the government, if they are in government or they have 
to follow the position. 
 
(ENGO 2) 
 
Here the previous expertise and the quality of the advisors played a key role as 
MEPs frequently relied on their previous knowledge and the policy briefs they re-
ceived from their advisors (EP 1; EP 2; EP 5; EP 10). These however were frequently 
in weak positions to provide substantial technical advice as they were predominantly 
preoccupied with administrative and organisational issues: 
 
It's difficult for them. It's very difficult. [Advisors] only [gain expertise] if they 
really have a file that's their job to work on. Of course you have certain people, cer-
tain of the chairs they have advisers that work specifically on certain things then they 
have more capacity. But your average MEP assistant will have difficulties to follow 
things in depth, which is understandable, I mean I wouldn't want to go to their inbox 
everyday, they probably get like 200 or 300 emails that they have to deal with and 
they organise events (…). A lot of them have to deal with all the logistics (…). 
[They don’t have a] specific secretary for that. 
 
(ENGO 2) 
 
While advisors to MEPs frequently struggled to deeply engage in issues given 
their administrative duties, the advisors of the parliamentary groups had more scope to 
gain expertise and participate in the debate as knowledgeable advisors: 
 
I think it would be a fair generalisation to say the MEPs assistants they tend to be 
the youngest and the generalists. Then there is quite a large degree of influence and 
within the political groups resting on the shoulders of the political group advisers 
and they do have that background and specialisation and they are able to help the 
thinking and evolution of the policy positions amongst the political groups.  
 
(EP 10) 
 
This time pressure thus hindered the development of in-depth expert knowledge 
while being involved with the CAP negotiations; however experiential learning did 
occur because the meetings with stakeholders, interest groups and discussions among 
MEPs in their political groups took up a considerable time and MEPs learned by being 
involved in the policymaking process. The set-up of the European Parliament thus en-
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couraged MEPs to specialise in an area where they can draw on previous expertise 
based on their education or professional work experience (EP 2; EP 3; EP 4; EP 5). 
The level of previous expertise also influenced how easily an MEP changed policy de-
sign beliefs based on factual input. If an MEP knew little about the details of a policy 
proposal such as the CAP reform, s/he could be convinced by lobbyists more easily as 
this environmental lobbyist points out: 
 
Most of the time, you just convince people who don't know about an issue fully, 
which is part of the thing and then they will go check it of course and maybe they 
don't agree. 
 
(ENGO 2) 
 
It is also important to acknowledge that only a few individuals, the Rapporteur 
and the Shadow Rapporteur, were closely involved in the decision-making, drafting of 
legislation and chairing of the committee meetings and negotiations with the European 
Commission and the Council. These individuals were already experts in the policy-
area as expertise and personal affinity is a key self-selection criterion for engaging in 
certain committees and volunteering/ being proposed to serve as rapporteur (EP 4; EP 
5; EP 10). A long-time observer of policy process concluded that 
 
the standard of the debate in the Parliament is very poor (…). They [the MEPs] are 
not really engaged, it’s more like grand gestures, just irritating, some what they are 
discussing is more like a 1990’s version of farmer’s interests. (…) The lack of 
knowledge is a huge problem in the Parliament. They don’t understand the policy, 
it’s interests and politics. And we write reports to the secretariat (…) and when you 
go to a public hearing, there a few of them, not a lot, including the chairman, that 
are very informed, but a lot of them just listen to their lobbyists. At the end of the 
day, it’s boring studying policies, there thousands of studies, tedious regulations 
and details, it’s hard work frankly. So they are not really motivated, you know, and 
because they never really had to do it in the past. So they are not really on top of it. 
  
(ENGO 5) 
 
Therefore, experiential and factual learning did occur among MEPs, but it was 
also to be expected as a normal part of the policymaking process. These findings con-
firm other learning theories introduced in chapter 2 such as Argyris’ (1976) single 
loop learning, political learning and governance learning as basic forms of experien-
tial and factual learning (e.g. Radaelli 2009; Schout 2009). These learning types how-
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ever portray learning as a collective process, whereby the empirical findings strongly 
point towards the key role of individuals in powerful coordination positions such as 
the rapporteurs, who due to their high expertise had a less steep learning curve. As the 
European Parliament was involved in the co-decision process for the CAP for the first 
time (Roederer-Rynning and Schimmelfenning 2012), it remains too early to deter-
mine what changes in beliefs occurred among the MEPs as this process takes about a 
decade (Sabatier 1988). Belief changes are most likely to emerge between 2014 and 
2019, when individuals reflect on their involvement before the next CAP budget will 
be negotiated from 2018 onwards and if they remain in the European Parliament de-
pending on the next election’s outcome. 
This limited capacity for factual learning on the individual level due to a lack of 
resources and overwhelming time pressure became also a relevant hindering factor for 
the European Parliament’s overall effective participation in the trilogues as a member 
of the European Commission concluded after the negotiations: 
 
It was a problem of the proposals from the very beginning that they tackled too 
many things at once.  (…) Especially the Parliament was kind of overwhelmed.  
They did not have enough staff.  They always felt unfairly treated when the Com-
mission appeared with 20 people and the Council appeared with 20 people and they 
were sitting there with one rapporteur with one or two assistants and five shadows 
(…) so they were complaining about this lack of in depth knowledge and discus-
sions about these things. 
 
(EC 19) 
 
The deeper beliefs of individuals also matter, particularly as baseline to deter-
mine whether constructivist learning occurred, i.e. whether these deeper beliefs 
changed. As opposed to Sabatier’s (1988) deep beliefs that are regarded as virtually 
impossible to change, deeper beliefs are slightly weaker and are related to individual’s 
green beliefs, for example whether they think it is important to protect the envi-
ronment and address climate change (see chapter 3). These deeper beliefs were fre-
quently formed early on, but they do not necessarily determine the professional path-
way into a green political party or environmental ministry. Individuals can hold 
deeper beliefs in favour of climate policy integration while working in environmen-
tally unrelated areas such as this non-Green MEP in the agriculture committee of the 
European Parliament: 
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I have always been someone who is particularly mindful of the environment. I 
come from the anti-nuclear movement (…) and was leading every demonstration. 
(…) No, I did not change in this regard; I was already actively supporting the en-
vironmental cause as a young person. 
 
(EP 2) 
 
 
Learning among key actors in the European Commission 
 
In the European Commission factual and constructivist learning remained incre-
mental. Civil servants both in the Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural De-
velopment as well as in the European Commissioner’s cabinet had a very high exper-
tise in their field and usually more than ten years of experience working on CAP re-
forms. Especially the policy-sub field of agricultural policy and the CAP in particular 
has been a domain of specialisation that encouraged a close-knit network of experts. 
Almost all individuals involved in the close decision-making circles studied agricultu-
ral economics or agronomy and frequently held PhDs and postdoc qualifications in 
agricultural economics or related fields. Furthermore, several of them were farmers 
themselves or grew up on farms. They were therefore also familiar with the ‘situation 
on the ground’, at least in their home countries (e.g. EC 20; EC 21; EC 22; EC 24; EC 
25). Thus, they closely and critically reflected on new input they were presented with 
by external experts, stakeholders and interest groups from a peer-reviewer perspective 
and also constantly asked how the information was relevant to their immediate task of 
CAP reform (this was pointed out by EC 14; EC 16; EC 21; EC 23; EC 24; EC 25).  
For policy proposals to succeed through the different stages of the ‘hierarchy’, 
individual policy-makers needed to convince their colleagues at the European Com-
mission of the proposals’ economic soundness and political feasibility, whereby their 
personal reputation was also on the line: 
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If it is scientifically sound, also in terms of experience, [individuals can push pol-
icy proposals to the higher levels of the European Commission hierarchy]. But if 
you realise a proposal is not received well, in terms of expertise or politically, then 
you won’t let the colleague make the proposal alone or you motivate the colleague 
that he checks with the other [units or DGs]. (…) This is a learning process. If your 
proposal is received well, then you know you have the right message. (…) There 
are constant checks and balances. 
 
(EC 22) 
 
They emphasise their constant reflection on their own working experience and 
the input they received from experts inside as well as outside the Commission:  
 
I critically examine new input; I try to include the new input from my daily work 
into discussions, as well as to test ideas and their validity. In these discussions 
many new thoughts and aspects emerge. This is essentially a combination of new 
insights, new links, especially in empirical work, plus a consolidation and recon-
struction of experience and expertise. This needs to be re-developed within new 
framework conditions of fact-based parameters. 
 
(EC 21) 
 
This individual reflection process also widened towards reflection and knowledge 
gains on the intra-organisational level within the European Commission: 
 
Yes absolutely, [there were] permanently [reflection processes]. This is of course 
something that is not communicated to the outside. (…) [DG Agri] had a very in-
tensive phase throughout the first six months. I can show you how many hundred 
thousands of pages have been exchanged [between the Commission and the Coun-
cil presidency]. 
 
(EC 22) 
 
Reflection on the input primarily resulted in changed policy detail beliefs. 
Deeper beliefs and policy design beliefs were more difficult to change (see also 
analogies by Sabatier 1988; Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009). Interviewees em-
phasised that it was important to continuously repeat the key message and to keep pre-
senting evidence in order to convince individuals that were members of an opposing 
coalition (e.g. EC 15; EC 22; EC 23; EC 24; ENGO 3; EP 1; EP 2; EP 5; Industry 1; 
Industry 4; Industry 5). Several individuals changed their policy design beliefs, i.e. 
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about the overall direction of the CAP, when the dialogue with stakeholders widened 
their perspective to take into account aspects that were previously not part of their 
thinking and therefore decision-making (ENGO 3; EP 5). Environmental NGOs espe-
cially addressed this more emotional level when they facilitated policy-makers’ ex-
periential learning by trying to make policy-makers better understand the potential and 
real impacts: 
 
Part of it is emotional, moral issues. Picturing the things. One thing that makes a lot 
of difference with officials is if they see things, if you are able to take them to a 
countryside, or if you are able to talk to them about a place they know in their home 
country and you say ‘think about that region, and that other region, this is because 
this has happened here and that has happened there’. Then sometimes it clicks and 
you get through. So there is a more rational knowledge part and there is a more if 
you want emotional identification thing because as long as something is a statistic it 
does not really talk to you, but if you in your summer house you spend the summer 
holidays and you know there is ‘ah yes, there is always this beautiful grassland with 
lots of flowers, but now they have ploughed it up and the flowers are gone’. It often 
helps people to actually open up to the facts because the facts on their own don’t 
really turn around people. 
 
(ENGO 3) 
 
Factual and experiential learning also occurred when policy-makers were ex-
posed to potential unintended consequences. Dialogues with stakeholders such as en-
vironmental NGOs and consumer groups equipped them with new perspectives that 
were outside their usual sources. This exposure to new aspects of policy that had not 
been a considerable factor in previous decision-making triggered learning via shifting 
policy design beliefs when individuals did not only reflect on the input, but as a con-
sequence also changed these beliefs and adapted them to the new frame. Especially 
repeating the same message proved successful (EC 22; EC 24; EC 25; ENGO 5) to get 
individual policy-makers to change their fundamental position on the policy in the 
long-run and to take into account environmental considerations: 
 
You keep talking to people and slowly, slowly it sinks. Some people turn around 
and we have seen some officials in DG AGRI that over the years have come from 
not even knowing what the environment is to at least understanding that they have a 
role to play and caring about it, trying to make a difference. With other people you 
never get through.  
 
(ENGO 3) 
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In the CAP negotiations, individuals working for the Commission also engaged 
in experiential learning when they reflected on their experiences throughout the poli-
cymaking process and arrived at conclusions relevant for the next negotiation round: 
 
I would say we need to much more look into simplifying the complex scientific ba-
sics because just stating something like “Permanent grassland is good” (…) were 
taken apart by lobbyists and the people briefed, they couldn’t counter specific ar-
guments because they didn’t have the background knowledge so the information 
then needs to be much more relayed, transferred, explained.  The Parliament [was] 
(…) lacking a lot of technical explanations so that’s where we tried to come in. 
 
(EC 19) 
 
Especially individuals holding deeper beliefs that were normatively aligned with 
their policy objectives, in this case climate policy integration, but did not belong to the 
respective interest group, had a strong influence on the policy outcome when they 
were also in positions that allowed them to steer the policymaking process in order to 
align the policy outcome with their deeper beliefs. This however does not indicate a 
change in beliefs and thereby constructivist learning. It rather points towards factual 
and experiential learning regarding strategies how to most effectively manipulate the 
policymaking process. 
In consequence, how much individuals learned in the policymaking process de-
pended on their existing knowledge, experience and beliefs. Overall, the learning 
curve of individuals at the European Commission was not as steep as the learning 
curve of the Members of the European Parliament that were first involved in the CAP 
reform, except for those individuals who were new to CAP negotiations. By continu-
ously being involved in the CAP reform process over decades and by beginning to 
prepare the next CAP reform once the previous one had been decided, the civil ser-
vants at DG Agriculture and Rural Development did accumulate more experience in 
reforming the CAP, but they only added marginally to their already vast experience 
and especially expertise. Especially CAP reform towards a public-goods model is still 
a topic that remains the domain of a hand full of experts inside the European Commis-
sion’s directorate General of Agriculture and Rural Development. By integrating cli-
mate considerations the circle of experts widened, however the key individuals in oth-
er directorate generals involved with CAP aspects moved from key positions within 
DG Agriculture to their current posts (e.g. EC 20; EC 22; EC 25). The three European 
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European Commissioners that were involved with the most ‘radical’ reform proposals 
in favour of strengthening environmental and climate aspects held strong correspond-
ing deeper and policy design beliefs before their concrete involvement began: 
  
I think a lot had to do with Fischler himself and that’s borne out by some of the 
roles that he’s taken since leaving the commission.  He’s kept his hand in some of 
this rural development and agriculture work so he obviously personally has been 
committed. 
 
(ENGO 9) 
 
This is also the case for Commissioner Ciolos in the 2014-2020 reform: 
 
That is clearly his personal conviction that this is necessary and needed for the 
European farm industry. It is his absolutely deep conviction. Yes, I think he prob-
ably always had this kind of conviction. It’s just the reality. He is a great expert in 
agriculture, he is an agronomist, so he knows about agriculture as a professional, 
and I think he also sees the reality out there that some elements of our policy have 
led to situations, which are hardly explainable. And we spent a lot of money for 
problems that we are having, so we need the instrument of the CAP, which is a very 
powerful instrument because of the money, to change direction. 
 
(EC 24) 
 
Thus, they did not change their beliefs during the drafting and negotiations of 
the proposal, but acted in line with their pre-existing beliefs as policy entrepreneurs to 
align the policy outcome with their own underlying beliefs. The activities of these key 
individuals at the centre of CAP reforms in the Agenda 2000, the Mid-Term Review 
of 2003 and the post-2013 greening of the CAP in line with the mainstreaming of cli-
mate action in the 2014-2020 EU budget will be examined more closely in section 7.3. 
 
 
Learning among representatives of Member States 
 
The civil servants and politicians negotiating on behalf of their member state via the 
Council working groups could be seen as similar experts to those in the European 
Commission with the limitation of national capacities and career structures. Some 
countries have a generalist civil service structure encouraging frequent rotations be-
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tween policy fields and making the development of a specialist culture difficult. The 
majority of the interviewed negotiators however had a similar track record of in-
volvement with agriculture policy like the civil servants at the European Commission. 
The key difference was the member state representatives’ specific expertise on the 
particularities of their home countries’ agricultural sector and their understanding of 
the likely positive or negative economic impacts of the European Commission’s pro-
posals. On the other hand, their knowledge on other countries’ agricultural sectors 
tended to be limited. Thus, much learning among member state representatives in the 
Council was factual learning regarding the agricultural sectors in other countries: 
 
So I think some of the arguments from those member states did influence our opin-
ion because you get to learn a bit more about exactly how different types of agricul-
ture work in other member states and therefore can see how some of the provisions 
might impact them in a way we wouldn’t have instinctively known about because 
we don’t really understand how agriculture in those member states works. So it cer-
tainly was a bit of learning to that extent. 
 
(NMS 10) 
 
As with industry lobbyists, the representatives of member states had to continue 
to represent their countries’ position in the negotiation regardless whether their per-
sonal underlying beliefs were aligned with their countries’ position or not. Thus, it is 
not possible to determine whether individual beliefs changed among the negotiators. 
 
 
7.2.2 Separating learning from the negotiation position  
 
It is important to differentiate between changes in underlying beliefs and changes in 
official negotiation positions as one points towards learning and the other towards al-
ternative explanations for policy change. These two aspects can be easily confused 
when changes in negotiation positions or any involvement of coalitions in the policy 
process are regarded as learning. There is a danger that analyses fail to acknowledge 
that learning can occur although there has not been a detectable change in negotiation 
positions or that negotiation positions can change without any learning but due to al-
ternative explanations. An individual can reflect on a new input, gain new knowledge 
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and experience and even change underlying beliefs. Whether this is transmitted to a 
change in the negotiation position, i.e. the position of the organisation that the indi-
vidual represents, depends on many different political factors that are at least partly 
beyond the individual’s control: 
 
It’s very difficult for one person in a realm like mine [to change positions, but] you 
can feed back [to your home country] on these sorts of things and send back reports 
and point to people (…). It could be someone from another member state doing the 
same thing, sending it back to their capital saying, ‘This is interesting. Does this 
mean that we might change our position on this?’ You’re likely to hit some sort of 
machine, which, if it doesn’t agree with what you say, then your idea’s not going to 
get very far. I think there are probably influential people who you can target and if 
you persuade them, you’re more likely to be persuasive overall.  
 
(NMS 9) 
 
Therefore, individual learning can occur without changes in the negotiation po-
sition, as this requires a multitude of beneficial circumstances including active policy 
entrepreneurs who successfully use windows of opportunity to convince others that it 
is in the organisation’s interest, i.e. in line with its existing beliefs, to adapt their offi-
cial negotiation position without negative political consequences in the short term: 
 
But it was with regard to sustainability, because ministers tend to have a short-term 
view related to the likely duration of their office and therefore seek to minimise dif-
ficulties for their constituencies in order to enhance their staying power and hand 
over the hottest potatoes to their successors. 
 
(Pirzio-Biroli 2008: 102) 
 
Defensive avoidance (Janis and Mann 1977) is the second factor besides politi-
cal interests that explains why individuals and subsequently their organisations fre-
quently cannot change their negotiation position, although they may have learned. 
This occurred not only in the Fischler reform, but is also an issue in the negotiations 
for the post-2013 CAP with its proposal for dedicating 30 per cent of the direct pay-
ments under pillar one to greening measures (EC 2011b). Defensive avoidance was 
defined in chapter 3 as alternative explanation to learning as ignoring evidence that is 
not in line with an individual’s deeper beliefs and has implications for adapting the 
policy design or policy detail beliefs. This is especially the case with representatives 
of the ‘status quo’ interest group representing the agricultural industries’ interests and 
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seeks to preserve the CAP in its traditional form with as little conditionality of pay-
ments upon greening and bureaucracy as possible. Particularly the lobbyists of the 
agricultural interest groups and representatives of several member states emphasised 
the importance of the CAP as instrument of income support to the farmers, food se-
curity and affordable food prices for the consumers. 
It is important to recognise that these individuals had to represent their em-
ployer’s position, regardless of their personal point of view. Thus, it was not possible 
to determine whether their personal opinion and beliefs regarding greening changed 
and therefore whether individuals engaged in constructivist learning as this may have 
been covered up by loyalty with their employer’s interests that prevent changes in the 
negotiation position: 
 
Because people believe or do not care about the evidence depending on their mind-
set and you see it with… I mean the people whose job is based on not understand-
ing the evidence will never understand it. You see it with the farm lobby and vari-
ous decision-makers that are controlled by the farm lobby. There is no amount of 
scientific evidence that you could ever present, it will not make any difference. Be-
cause, you know, if you are paid by people whose interest it is to do ‘A’, you can 
get all the published literature in the world showing that ‘A’ is bad, they will just 
keep saying that ‘no, it’s good’. Or try to find their own evidence or twist the inter-
pretation in order to say ‘but yes, that is only because you are looking at the bigger 
scheme…’. Yes, there are many ways to justify the unjustifiable. 
 
(ENGO 3) 
 
This was also emphasised by civil servants negotiating on behalf of the Euro-
pean Commission with the European institutions and on behalf of the EU in interna-
tional negotiations: 
 
As negotiator you address this issue [of agreeing with your organisation’s position] 
from an absolutely neutral perspective by trying to get the proposal adopted with as 
little changes as possible. Where the proposal of the Commission is met with re-
sistance you need to identify why and look for alternative solutions. 
 
(EC 23) 
 
Another aspect was how negotiators interpreted scientific input based on their 
specific interests. This indicates a political use of scientific knowledge (Rietig forth-
coming 2014 a): 
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You are not arguing on the same grounds because people are picking their argu-
ments very carefully and so the farmers will come with the study on something like 
the effects of the ecological focus area and we will come with the effects of the 
ecological focus area but it's not like we really discuss on the same basis because 
they interpret in one way, we interpret it in another way and then the Commission 
probably interprets in a third way, so. So there is (…) a lot of scientific data. 
 
(ENGO 2) 
 
Over the past 30 years, the farmer associations strongly defended the status-quo 
of production-based support in the CAP and were displaying a “massive opposition to 
reform” (Pirzio-Biroli 2008: 102). They formed their own coalition (Nedergaard 
2008) that was based on a “strong survival instinct of national ministers for agriculture 
and (…) scepticism in Mediterranean countries” (Pirzio-Biroli 2008: 102). Farmer as-
sociations tried to keep their policy design and policy detail beliefs aligned with their 
deeper belief of the necessity to protect European agriculture from international com-
petition and to focus primarily on food security and agriculture as an industry already 
faced with tough conditions (EP 3; Industry 1; Industry 5) and too much regulation, so 
that the additional ‘green tape’ of cross-compliance with environmental measures in 
the first pillar would cripple their competitiveness (EP 5). This position has hardly 
changed over three decades:  
 
In the Agriculture Committee of the Parliament, I see that a lot of my colleagues 
really are just saying what the agricultural lobby has said. (…) There is a kind of 
emotional drive for a lot of my colleagues to really support the farmers. That 
makes discussions far more political because the Commission’s arguments are 
not listened to. (…) And all the scientific knowledge that is out there and clearly 
showing that agriculture has a negative impact on environment, it’s just ignored. 
                                                                        
         (EP 5) 
 
However, a change can be identified in the rhetoric used by representatives of 
farm associations such as Copa-Cogeca, the largest farming association that predomi-
nantly represents the interests of intensive farming and industrial production (ENGO 
3; Industry 4; Industry 5). Given the overall consensus of policy-makers that in order 
to save the CAP it needs to be reformed to reflect a public-goods model, also the ‘sta-
tus-quo coalition’ needed to move and acknowledge the overall societal consensus. 
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The head of the Agriculture Cabinet at the European Commission pointed out that a 
few years after the Fischler reform  
 
the farm organisations in Europe today admit that the Fischler reforms saved the 
CAP for the time being, and recognise that if Fischler had given in to Chirac’s re-
quest to postpone reforms until after the WTO round, this could have meant the end 
of the CAP as we know it. Without reforms, not only would the EU have lacked a 
solid, credible base in order to actively participate in the Doha development round 
talks, but also the Brussels European Council agreement of 2002 would not have 
held up against the pressures of the ‘one per centers’ in connection with the 2007–
13 financial perspectives. 
 
(Pirzio-Biroli 2008: 108) 
 
It also recognised that its influence diminished due to the counter-balance pro-
vided by the environmental NGOs: 
 
I think it’s been a gradual process quite honestly. I mean [the Environmental NGOs 
have] (…) been there for a quite a long time and he’s always been quite vocal, but 
obviously the environment issue generally has taken more precedence in all de-
bates, has grown in that way, so I think the power of the environment is all there. 
Their influence has increased quite dramatically I would say. 
 
(Industry 5) 
 
Thus, the overall political negotiation position of the farm lobby has changed to 
accommodate the socio-political consensus for a public-goods model of the CAP, but 
they maintained their original position within that new policy framework. They still 
tried to minimise the ‘regulatory burden’ for farmers in the form of environmental and 
climate measures (EP 3; EP 8; EP 10; Industry 4; Industry 5) but recognised that they 
needed to change their ‘rhetoric’ towards a ‘green growth’ argument to remain rel-
evant in the changed policymaking climate attaching a high importance to public 
goods and greening (Industry 5). A key strategy was not trying to change member 
state’s positions, but to reframe the language to allow sufficient flexibility to interpret 
the negotiation outcome in a way favourable to the agricultural industry: 
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The best way of approaching (…) [member states] is actually to adopt the wording 
the opposition is using in a way that can be accommodated. I mean a good example 
is on something like coupled support payments where we fundamentally would 
oppose the coupled support payments, whereas a lot of the member states really 
like them, they want to keep them and I think by process of negotiation you arrive 
at the recognition that to some extent some flexibility is allowed, but with in the 
language you try to promote the positives around a decoupled support system as 
well and ultimately you accommodate both our interest and their interest. It's not 
quite negotiation because you know, actually trading concessions of each other, you 
just actually adapt to the language in a way that can accommodate different 
interests.  
 
(Industry 7) 
 
Yet there was no evidence pointing towards a change in the agriculture in-
dustries’ beliefs. This was supported by the thousands of amendments that were intro-
duced by Members of the European Parliament, mostly from the Agriculture Commit-
tee that carried the handwriting of the farmers associations either directly or in modi-
fied form (ENGO 1; ENGO 2; ENGO 3; EP 2; EP 5).  
In consequence, farmer’s associations and member states in the ‘status quo’ coa-
lition only adapted their political negotiation position to the overall framing of agri-
culture brought about by shifts in the socio-political landscape, but it was not possible 
to determine whether they engaged in constructivist learning as they had to represent 
their employer’s official position. It can be concluded however that none of the indi-
vidual learning experiences was sufficiently strong to enable or motivate individuals 
to diverge from their employer’s position in the research interviews or to report on 
their attempt to change their employer’s official position. Therefore, it remains diffi-
cult to separate individual and organisational learning in the case of the ‘status quo’ 
coalition. An additional reason is that the individuals representing lobbying groups or 
member states lacked the political power within their own organisations to bring about 
a detectable change in the organisations’ official negotiation position.  
Any changes that occurred in the rhetoric of farm organisations served to protect 
the unchanged deeper beliefs of maintaining the status quo and related political objec-
tives. Their primary motivation was to remain “at the negotiation table” (Industry 5) 
and not drift into opposition that would have been marginalised in the negotiations. 
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I think the fact that people are more concerned about the environment and there-
fore, if you take a view where you don’t care about it or you give the impression 
you don’t care about the environment, then you’re going to be out of the debate.  
 
(Industry 5) 
 
 Within the new framing of the CAP as public goods model however they main-
tained their deeper and policy design beliefs. Even the policy detail beliefs regarding 
technicalities such as instrument design did not change as they were still trying to 
maintain the status quo as far as possible and even to reverse previous greening 
achievements such as the 10 per cent set-aside for ecological focus areas, which was 
eliminated during the 2008 Health Check and was re-introduced in the post-2013 pro-
posal as 7 per cent set-aside area (ENGO 3; ENGO 9; EP 3; EP 8). An observer con-
cluded on the ‘public money for public goods’ debate and the inclusion of climate 
change objectives into the debate that it was being instrumentalised both by the Euro-
pean Commission and the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament to jus-
tify their wider objectives: 
 
The Commission uses the rhetoric [on greening and climate change] to justify the 
budgetary demands on an ambitious CAP budget for the future, you will hear that 
sort of range of arguments played into the Comm Agri debate [i.e. the Agricultural 
Committee in the Parliament]. As a way of justifying an ambitious budget, that's 
mostly what you tend to offer. It doesn't tend to delve much deeper in terms of the 
sort of scale need for which Environmental Committee that goes for, [which is] 
really related to failure to achieve the environmental targets.  
 
(EP 10) 
 
Overall, however, there were indications that particularly DG Agriculture and a 
high number of individuals within DG Agriculture changed their overall perspective 
on greening based on an increased exposure to debates on greening measures: 
 
DG Agri, when I started, they were totally in favour of farm interests and not green 
at all, now it’s a more mixed picture, and some see it as a way to protect their 
budget. Quite a lot of them are seeing it instrumentally. But some of them are also 
asking for more green arguments to support their positions. So yes, there is really a 
two-way trust relationship. It’s about trust; this is where relationships are incredibly 
important, if you don’t trust that person, you don’t share that information. 
 
(ENGO 5) 
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7.3 Learning on the Organisational level  
 
 
Individuals did learn while being involved in reforming the CAP, whereby their learn-
ing was predominantly experiential and factual. Beliefs changed over longer time pe-
riods together with the shifts in the socio-political landscape, but these belief changes 
towards greening can also be understood as strategic response to maintain the CAP. 
The following section examines the organisational level, which is crucial for learning 
to be reflected in the policy outcome, and the links between learning on the individual 
and on the organisational level.  
 
 
7.3.1 Links between learning on the individual and organisational level  
 
 
As outlined in chapter 3, the key forum for learning to be transmitted from the indi-
vidual level to the organisational level are committee meetings and other opportunities 
for exchanging views, forming common positions and attempts to convince the other 
side of one’s proposal. In the CAP reforms, there are several areas where learning on 
the organisational level occurred. It included forming a common point of view among 
individuals working within one unit or directorate within DG Agriculture or between 
the Cabinet of the European Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development 
and his Directorate General as well as between different Directorate Generals of the 
European Commission. It furthermore refers to changes in knowledge, experience and 
beliefs resulting from the interaction between representatives of the European Com-
mission and the European Parliament and Council as well as non-governmental stake-
holder groups such as the environmental NGOs or the agricultural lobbying organisa-
tions. The organisational learning literature focuses on factual and especially experi-
ential learning that can be transferred from the individual to the organisation (e.g. Kim 
1993; March and Olsen 1975) and even result in changed goals when the previous 
goal is judged to be inadequate upon reflection, what is referred to as double loop 
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learning (Argyris 1976; Argyris and Schön 1978). The third aspect presented in the 
section on learning levels (chapter 3) was constructivist learning on the organisational 
level, which would be evidenced by changes in the negotiation position of a gov-
ernmental or non-governmental organisation as result of a change in beliefs, particu-
larly normative beliefs related to an overall policy objective or the design of a specific 
policy instrument. The prerequisite is that the organisation reflected on new input, e.g. 
in the form of scientific studies such as the European Commission in standardised re-
flection processes: 
 
Those colleagues [of the European Commission] who are working on relevant 
aspects prepare and sometimes participate in the Council working groups. This is 
supported so that the Commission receives feedback [from the member states]. In 
the current phase this does not result in changes to the proposal, but it results in a 
constant reflection process in which we reconsider whether the proposal is realis-
tic, whether we have to talk to our hierarchy to adapt it and so on. This is a per-
manent reflection process, permanently. This is of course something that doesn’t 
leak to the outside. But we had a very intensive reflection phase during the first 
six months. I can show you how many hundred thousand pages were exchanged. 
 
(EC 22) 
 
Both the European Commission and particularly the member states came to the 
conclusion during various CAP reform negotiation processes that it is in their interest 
to adapt their position in the light of the new evidence (see similar conclusion by Eis-
ing 2002): 
 
We observed regularly that those positions originally taken by the member states 
resulted in legal problems and explained to them why and how their position re-
sults in legal and administrative obstacles. This usually resulted in a change in the 
member states’ negotiation position. Furthermore, when the Commission pointed 
towards practical difficulties in implementing the amendment, those who proposed 
it usually withdrew it subsequently. 
 
(EC 23) 
 
Such changes in negotiation positions among the member states in the Council 
were frequently a result of factual learning as opposed to constructivist learning when 
these gained new information and concluded that their core interests were better 
served by changing the negotiation position. 
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Learning in the trilogues between the European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission remained predominantly factual and experiential. Constructivist 
learning, which would be evidenced by changes in negotiation positions based on re-
flection on arguments and key actor’s accounts of changed beliefs due to convincing 
arguments, could not be detected on the organisational level. Particularly a change in 
the negotiation position could be evidence for factual, experiential or constructivist 
learning on the organisational level, depending on the reasons for this change. If the 
organisation reflected on other negotiation parties’ arguments and came to change 
underlying beliefs, this shift in the negotiation position could be regarded as construc-
tivist learning. If however the change in the negotiation position was a result of reflec-
tion on new information and an adjustment of the position to still achieve pre-set goals 
(i.e. correction of an error), it can be understood as factual learning. If the shift were 
based on the reflection on previous experience (e.g. with a policy in a member state), 
it would be experiential learning on the organisational level. Negotiators involved in 
the CAP emphasised the importance of trust and knowing each other facilitating a re-
flection on the arguments of the negotiation counterparts from other member states: 
 
We get to know them very well. (…) It can either make you think “oh they’ve actu-
ally got a point. I understand why they want that.” I’m more likely to agree with 
them now. Sometimes it can work the other way and you can understand why (…) 
it’s really important to them and think “well okay, that’s fine, but I’m going to want 
something”, but actually that doesn’t make any difference [to us] (…) whether they 
get it or not. But if we’re to agree with them, I’m going to want something in re-
turn. I think it’s always, talking to other member states and to colleagues, you can 
learn a lot which will help in negotiations. Sometimes it can actually hinder them, 
but you have to be careful you don’t say too much or make it seem (…) too impor-
tant because sometimes I think it can potentially lead to other member states think-
ing “well if it’s so important to them, I understand why, but I’m going to want 
something in return for agreeing to it.” It can work both ways. Sometimes it helps a 
lot. Sometimes it leads to a bit of playing games. 
 
(NMS 10) 
 
This kind of learning can be understood as factual learning on the organisa-
tional level, i.e. among member states, about each other’s position. The individual ne-
gotiators used this knowledge to determine the other member state’s negotiation mar-
gin on issues they might be able to agree on if the others made certain concessions. 
This strategising however falls into the category of ‘political learning’ described by 
Radaelli (2009) and May (1992) on how to use information and gain experience to 
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better manoeuvre through the negotiation process in order to achieve pre-set objec-
tives. The learning described by the negotiator NMS 10 however was limited to gath-
ering information about the other side’s negotiation margin and thus falls into the 
category of factual learning. It is important to analytically distinguish between an ad-
justment in the negotiation position based on the realisation that the previous position 
was based on incomplete information, normal negotiation behaviour and a genuine 
change in beliefs, which goes beyond an interest-based rationalisation via the incorpo-
ration of new values in the area of deeper beliefs. A key example would be the form-
ing of a consensus within DG Agriculture that it is important to consider climate ob-
jectives in the future reform rounds of the CAP. In the negotiations between the Euro-
pean Commission and the European Parliament and Council however constructivist 
learning remained rare and changes in negotiation positions could be rather under-
stood as bargaining in negotiations based on pre-determined interests: 
 
Partly the Commission succeeds in convincing its negotiation partners why the 
Commission proposal makes sense. In other areas this was not successful. (…) 
[The reason is that] the member states or the Parliament simply did not under-
stand the value added of the proposal, or if you want to interpret it this way, the 
Commission did not succeed in illustrating the value added. This is often the case 
in areas where there is existing legislation and it’s more advantageous for mem-
ber states to reject the Commission proposal and to maintain the status quo. 
 
(EC 23) 
 
This was confirmed by other interviewees in the CAP negotiations: 
 
 
I think at the beginning of a negotiation like that on greening everybody’s got very 
strong principles and everybody thinks ‘No we need greening that is meaningful, 
that delivers real environmental benefit.’ To be honest, towards the end of the nego-
tiations, then people [member states] accept things they just would not have done 
12 months ago. In the end, I think, all member states accepted things that other 
member states wanted, ultimately in return for getting the flexibility they needed. 
So there were some things that were agreed I think as part of greening that we 
would argue from an environmental point of view they don’t make a huge amount 
of sense and I think early in the negotiations we fought quite hard against them. Ul-
timately, when it comes to the end, you prioritise what’s important in your own 
member state and are more willing to accept things that other member states will do 
that you don’t necessarily agree with. So positions change quite a lot over the 
course of negotiations. People do become a little bit more flexible the further on we 
got, as long as they get what they feel they need in their own member states. 
 
(NMS 10) 
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Changes in the negotiation positions within the trilog on the post-2013 CAP 
however could be linked to alternative explanations instead of learning and thus be re-
garded as part of the negotiation process. Particularly informal methods of arriving at 
an agreement relatively quickly could be mistaken as constructivist learning: 
   
Someone in the Commission writes a compromise proposal, which officially does 
not exist. The Council Presidency presents that text as proposal of the Council 
Presidency. Where it has been written is officially not known. (…) The presidency 
knows it, the advisors in the Parliament; this is an informal procedure in the 
trilogues. Then there is the trilog meeting in the parliament, where the Commission 
representatives arrive with their official negotiation mandate. The Commission rep-
resentatives can change their position, but this requires approval by the College of 
Commissioners. (…) Informal negotiations to find a compromise position also 
strongly depend on the level of trust between the negotiators. 
 
(EC 23) 
 
As in the drafting process, policy entrepreneurs also played an important role in 
the 2014-2020 negotiations. Particularly the set-up of the trilog negotiation that only 
included a very limited number of negotiators was conducive to knowledgeable policy 
entrepreneurs determined to achieve their objectives. Particularly the representative of 
the Council Presidency was seen as such an individual, especially due to his back-
ground as former Member of the European Parliament: 
 
He has a strong capacity to convince people. As a minister he tries to convince per-
sonally. He is very much personally involved in the negotiations. I noticed how he 
was with the fisheries, working until four o’clock in the morning, running around 
and discussing with colleague ministers.  He is very much involved. He shows a 
deep involvement and that it is in combination with [his experience as] (…) a 
member of European Parliament (…). The Irish have a very good capacity to be 
very practical, to be very open, honest, and very pragmatic. They bring with them a 
culture of wheeling and dealing so I think they very much have the capacity to 
come up with a deal and what I said about [the lead negotiator] (…), he is I think 
the only minister in the Agricultural Council from the 27 member states who has a 
life experience in European Parliament and he knows the ways of how these guys 
operate.  He knows them personally so that gives him in my view an extra capacity 
to work with them and to come up with a deal. 
 
(NMS 4) 
 
Learning was not necessarily transferred from the individual level to the organi-
sational level due to psychological hindering factors, particularly the fear of making 
mistakes. There were indications that this may have resulted in the tendency in some 
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cases to place following orders and bureaucratic path-dependencies over reflection on 
the feasibility of measures such as sacrificing animal welfare over compliance with 
identification requirements. This was exacerbated by the economic and Euro crisis: 
 
The Commission is very terrorised by [the fear of making mistakes]. And they are 
getting, they get of course auditors and they can have a better audit, they can't have 
an error rate beyond the certain percentage and all of these things are making them 
really afraid of doing something because they are in a financial crisis and Euro is 
going to fall up but also tells them probably everyday that if (…) something goes 
wrong, it's another reason to kill the European Union, you know, UK will go out 
and Greece will go out and they can't have it. So, they need to make sure that eve-
rything goes well, no bad press, no problems. But in all of that, they lose basically 
the creativity and the possibility for them to make a real difference. 
 
(ENGO 2) 
 
In conclusion, reflection did occur on the organisational level, which is crucial 
for the progress of the negotiations between the policymaking organisations and the 
policy outcome. However, factual and experiential learning remained dominant in the 
CAP negotiations, whereby it could also be mistaken for constructivist learning if the 
reasons for changing (negotiation) positions are not explored sufficiently: 
 
I think people involved in the negotiations [from the Commission side] generally 
learn from each other. They do reflect, they go to the meetings, we certainly learn, 
we think, but there is also a lot of defending either the status quo which we under-
stand, or national interests, that’s very very powerful. 
 
(ENGO 5) 
 
 
7.3.2 Preserving the CAP by responding with the public goods rationale 
 
 
A key aspect of learning on the organisational level is whether policy-makers in the 
European Commission reflected on the information that a socio-political consensus 
has been formed in favour of CAP reform towards a public-goods model: 
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[Integrating environmental considerations] is an insight that occurred and suc-
ceeded globally, whether you take the Agenda 2000 or the Rio Process. This is a 
global reflection process that of course developed here as well. 
 
(EC 21) 
 
 
This was also emphasised by another key actor from the European Commission: 
 
 
It is several factors. When the EU signs an international commitment, it has to act 
accordingly. (…) Then there were many activities of environmental interest groups 
around the Rio and Kyoto [UNFCCC summits]. (…) These environmental groups 
increased their pressure (…) via stakeholder consultative forums we have here at 
DG Agriculture. (…) I came to realise that you can’t make policies against public 
opinion, not too long. I mean, you don’t need to make policy according to the 
public opinion, but you can’t go against existing trends that are getting stronger for 
too long. You have to justify yourself.  
 
(EC 22) 
 
 
This threat of overwhelming political pressure based on the ‘scrap the CAP’ coa-
litions’ potential ability to convince the public of its unacceptability resulted in a 
change of policy-beliefs among key decision-makers in the European Commission 
and in some member states. They realised that it would be necessary to reform the 
CAP before the political pressure to abandon it would become too strong: 
 
What we have to do in the CAP is, yes, we have to change, this is what we believe 
in if this policy is to have a future, yes it will have to adapt. The question is always 
do you want to sit in the driving seat with the industry, do we want to do it our-
selves as being responsible for the policy, or do we wait until the public pressure 
and the pressure from climate change, and environment, until every soil is de-
stroyed in Europe, do we wait until then until we are forced to do these changes. 
And the choice the Commission has made is let’s take the initiative as long as we 
had the right to take the initiative. 
 
(EC 24) 
 
Based on this rationale, Commissioner Ciolos emphasised the link between 
greening and climate policy integration in a key statement sketching out the path 
of the next CAP reform while also asking for input on a multitude of questions 
related to sustainable agriculture in a wide public consultation (EC 2010): 
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The first communication of our Commissioner Ciolos when he came in the Com-
mission in 2010 he made this speech on I think April 12, 2010 in the European Par-
liament in which he said societal justification of the huge amount of money which 
is spent yearly on CAP is something we need and that was for him to signal the 
greening policy (…). That is a major step towards bringing in line CAP with socie-
tal desires and bringing in the concept of societal justification of the money spent 
on the agricultural policy. 
 
(NMS 4) 
 
Policy design beliefs point towards the overall architecture of a wider policy pro-
gramme and are represented by opinions of how a policy programme should look like 
(see chapter 3). In the example of agricultural policy this would be the CAP overall as 
a common policy among all member states of the EU. Policy detail beliefs concern the 
question whether the CAP should have a multi-annual budget and the policy direction 
of continuous reforms over the past 30 years to adapt the policy to changing demands 
in the economic, social and environmental framework conditions. Further policy detail 
beliefs concern major structural decisions such as the impact-model of price support 
and maintaining high levels of food production versus a public-goods model that em-
phasises public value for subsidies such as the protection of the environment and so-
cial cohesion by supporting rural development. In the CAP such policy detail beliefs 
are represented by the introduction of the second pillar on rural development and the 
overall shift towards a public-goods model.  
Policy-makers at the European Commission acknowledged the outside pres-
sures by the coalition in favour of ‘scrapping the CAP’ (Nedergaard 2008; Pirzio-
Biroli 2008; Syrrakos 2008). They reflected on this information, i.e. that continuing 
with ‘business as usual’ was not an option and that in order to maintain their objec-
tives of an agricultural policy that is carried by all member states and based on public 
support to farmers, they would need to adjust the policy to reflect the changed policy 
design beliefs of society. This can be regarded as factual learning among the involved 
policy-makers, especially in the European Commission, but also in some member 
states. During the 1990s, these policy-makers came to adjust their policy design be-
liefs to reflect the changes in the socio-political landscape: the CAP needed to change 
to reflect the changing realities of environmental degradation and food safety, or it 
would loose its public support (Moehler 2008; Pirzio-Biroli 2008; Swinnen 2008b).  
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At the DG for Agriculture, several of us concluded that if we wanted to preserve 
the CAP, we needed to change it; if we wanted to succeed in changing it substan-
tially, we needed to just about guarantee the historical support levels to European 
farmers and avoid a negative impact on their revenues. Yet, a reform package 
leaving the CAP budget unaffected (except for enlargement) had no chance of ac-
ceptance in the College of Commissioners unless we adopted a new approach, and 
took it by surprise. 
 
(Pirzio-Biroli 2008: 103) 
 
This group of like-minded policy-makers is referred to as the moderate reform 
camp, which formed its own coalition besides the ‘status quo camp’ of the farm asso-
ciations and most member states such as France, Spain, Germany and Italy; and the 
‘scrap the CAP’ coalition of market-liberals in the member states and environmental 
groups (Nedergaard 2008). Most policy-makers changed their policy design belief that 
the CAP needed to adapt in order to be preserved in the 1990s. Since then this has be-
come a stable, shared underlying belief among the members of the ‘moderate CAP re-
form’ coalition. This shared underlying belief has become a conviction and key ra-
tionale for the post-2013 CAP reform, as a key actor pointed out: 
 
The public consultation supported this but it were clearly two ideas: one is it is 
needed for the environment, for the soils, biodiversity, carbon leakage; it is needed 
for other environmental challenges. It is needed, this is our conviction, A. And B, it 
is needed because the public asks for goods by farmers that go beyond the food 
production. 
 
(EC 24) 
 
This shared belief was emphasised by all interviewees at the European Commis-
sion who were involved with CAP reform as key motivation for the continuing reform 
process, of which the post-2013 greening and climate policy integration proposal was 
one more step (e.g. EC 21; EC 22; EC 23; EC 24; EC 25; EC 14; EC 19; EC 20; 
Moehler 2008; Pirzio-Biroli 2008; Syrrakos 2008). 
It is important to recognise that the European Commission was not a neutral ac-
tor, but actively tried to transform its policy design belief of adapting the CAP to 
socio-political realities in order to save it into a concrete policy outcome. This is re-
flected in the policy proposals for CAP reform and the Commissions’ strategies dur-
ing the negotiations in the Council and more recently in the European Parliament, al-
though it is formally reduced to a facilitating and observing role (Craig 2010): 
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My understanding of [the European Commission’s activities] through the trilog 
process certainly is that they were very much negotiating as well and had their own 
negotiating strategy, had their own tactics for getting the things that really mattered 
to them. I mean there is a period in the negotiations where they sit back a little bit 
more and let member states argue it out amongst themselves, but I think ultimately 
it was very clearly they had their own negotiating priorities as well. (…) At the be-
ginning, they were very defensive about their proposals and it took a long time be-
fore they were willing to really discuss changes. It may have even been as much as 
a year before they explained their proposals in working groups but weren’t really 
willing to consider any changes. In the end, they became much more flexible be-
cause they frankly just had to be. 
 
(NMS 10) 
 
 The process of drafting a policy-proposal, negotiating a compromise within the 
European Commission between the different Directorate Generals and convincing 
both the Council and Parliament to adopt it with as few changes as possible has been 
unchanged over the past 30 years. Some actors among the ‘status quo’ coalition con-
sisting of farmers associations and some member states (Nedergaard 2008) have ad-
justed their rhetoric to reflect the socio-political consensus of the 1990s and 2000s in 
favour of the public-goods model. This move however could be regarded as a tactical 
move to ensure their political survival and protect them from having to change their 
deeper or policy design beliefs.  
As discussed in the section on learning on the individual level, neither individu-
als nor, as a consequence, their organisations adjusted their beliefs that the CAP must 
be preserved accordingly. Consequently, there was less constructivist learning among 
the ‘status quo’ coalition in terms of changes in underlying beliefs than could be ex-
pected at first glance. The coalition of the ‘scrap the CAP’ camp rather served as ex-
ternal pressure on the policy-makers within the European institutions, who predomi-
nantly belonged to the ‘safe the CAP’ coalition but drew their motivation and argu-
mentation from the more radical demands. Thereby, they actively influenced public 
opinion as a tactical move to gain political support and momentum. This was the case 
for the Fischler reforms in 2002 as indicated by Fischler’s Head of Cabinet Pirzio-
Biroli and confirmed by a member of the small team that prepared the proposal: 
 
CAP opponents seemed at times ready to scrap the CAP, which means throwing 
out the baby with the bath water. Scrapping the CAP is not an option. European 
treasuries that may still dream of it should think twice before opting for short-
term gimmicks. Their simplistic and narrow budgetary view was fought by 
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Fischler’s more systemic approach seeking internal compromises among, and cor-
responding mentality changes by, the various stakeholders. Fischler sought to find 
new allies in support of both the conservation and renewal of the countryside 
(…). [Fischler’s] compromise approach was expected to make the policy more 
acceptable internally as well as internationally, in particular to farmers (through 
simplification and by re-establishing a certain confidence in their future), rural 
people and society at large. Nevertheless, Fischler advocated a tectonic shift in 
CAP support over time. 
 
(Pirzio-Biroli 2008: 104) 
 
The process and objective did not change for the Ciolos reform when the 
Commissioner and his Cabinet initiated a public consultation process and thereby 
demonstrated the overwhelming public support for strengthening the greening and 
climate policy integration components. On the contrary, it rather confirmed the pre-
existing position that more greening and climate policy integration was needed: 
 
The Commission’s position coincides since several years rather with our posi-
tion. I know the Head of the Agriculture Cabinet, I don’t want to say well, but 
we met several times and I know reliably that the Commission wants to go into 
this direction. Because of that there are also the ecological focus areas, which 
the Commission itself proposed. 
 
(NMS 4) 
 
 
7.3.3 European Commissioners acting as policy entrepreneurs  
 
 
The European Commission does not only act on behalf of shifting public opinion and 
overall societal consensus, but it also takes an active role in manufacturing this very 
public consensus as a justification for its policy proposals and as a tactic to convince 
the member state’s ministers in the Council: 
 
Throughout all of the reform talks, Council reluctance had been addressed by 
Fischler and a ‘green team’ with one spokesman for each member state drawn from 
the cabinet and the DG for Agriculture informing the relevant stakeholders and 
public opinion. Fischler and his staff went on the offensive, participating in literally 
hundreds of conferences and in interviews by all sorts of national and regional me-
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dia, as well as through contacts with non-governmental organisations. The aim was 
to let reluctant ministers realise that society at large demanded a less bureaucratic 
and more environmentally-friendly agricultural policy, and a shift from market-
distorting support towards rural conservation and renewal. 
 
(Pirzio-Biroli 2008: 108) 
 
 
Fischler and the ‘Fischler reform’ 
 
This quote from Fischler’s Head of Cabinet illustrates that especially European Com-
missioners took on an active part in the reform process and in order to succeed also 
acted as policy entrepreneurs. Especially Franz Fischler is frequently portrait as out-
standing example of a policy entrepreneur who acted as a key architect by using vari-
ous negotiation strategies and tactics to ensure the success of ‘his’ reforms, the Ag-
enda 2000 reform and the 2003 Mid-Term Review, which is widely known as the 
‘Fischler Reform’ (Feindt 2010; Nedergaard 2008; Swinnen 2008a). A member of 
Fischler’s team commented on the Commission’s reaction to their drafting process by 
pointing out Fischler’s strategic role in avoiding large controversies within the Euro-
pean Commission: 
 
The first thing to say is that the reform was prepared, I would not say in secret, but 
certainly … it was prepared in a very smooth, quiet way. (…) Now, I think in terms 
of the Commission it played out in the process quite well in relation to the main ac-
tors involved. DG Environment had been doing communications on environmental 
integration and internalisation, externalities and so on, I think the approach that was 
taken was very well in line with that and I think there was a good working relation-
ship with DG Environment and DG Trade I suppose. Clearly, in relation to trade and 
cross compliance, there were many different DGs who saw different issues they were 
concerned about, reflected in the regulatory framework, but certainly there was not a 
big battle, it was a reform that had broad support, but I think this was also down to 
Fischler, who had a very strong role in the Commission. 
 
(EC 25) 
 
Fischler had a reputation as reformer. He was an agricultural economist who had 
been a long-serving Austrian minister for agriculture and negotiated Austria’s EU ac-
cession. He had extensive expertise on agricultural policy and by his second term of 
office he had considerable experience in negotiating CAP reforms (EC 25; Pirzio-
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Biroli 2008: 102). To avoid early opposition from the ‘status quo’ coalition, Fischler 
prepared the 2003 Mid-Term Review in a close-knit team of six experts that included 
his head of cabinet Pirzio-Biroli, a member of his cabinet, and three experts from DG 
Agriculture. Fischler managed to gain an unanimous vote among the European Com-
missioners in favour of his proposal before the agriculture ministers from the member 
states, who were predominantly opposed to the proposal, had time to regroup and pre-
pare their counter-arguments (Pirzio-Birroli 2008: 106). Before the vote of the Coun-
cil, Fischler made a deal with Tony Blair to convince Spain to withdraw from the 
blocking minority of reform-critical countries, which was led by Jacques Chirac, who 
had played a key role in ‘watering down’ the Agenda 2000 CAP reform and tried to 
prevent Fischler from being re-elected for a second term as European Commissioner 
for Agriculture (Pirzio-Biroli 2008: 105ff; Syrrakos 2008: 118; Swinnen 2008b). 
Fischler used policy-entrepreneurial negotiation tactics and his own expertise to push 
his reform proposal through the Council against strong French opposition: 
 
 
On the 26th of June 2003, during the last night of negotiations in Luxembourg, the 
commissioner refused any suggestion of a further postponement, because he feared 
the creation of a new blocking minority (for example, with Italy replacing Spain). 
(…) During the last night ‘finish’, all experts were asked to leave the negotiating 
room, while ministers were asked to stay there without interruption, and it was 
made clear that no more written compromise papers would be tabled by the Greek 
presidency and Commission until an agreement was in sight. This allowed Fischler 
to submit his personal compromise proposals on all outstanding issues orally, such 
that they could not be leaked to capitals, and to ask for oral ministerial reactions on 
the spot: ‘yes or no, and if no, why not’. 
 
(Pirzio-Biroli, 2008: 107) 
 
 
This strategy was only possible because Fischler possessed the necessary exper-
tise to defend the proposal himself. He put himself into a negotiation advantage by 
blocking off the agricultural minister’s contact to the capitals since their staff could 
have provided them with arguments and expert knowledge. He was also at an advan-
tage because the agricultural ministers had not been ‘in the loop’ during the drafting 
process of the CAP proposal, what would have allowed them the necessary time to 
prepare counter-arguments and corresponding studies (Swinnen 2008a). A major fac-
tor for the successful adoption of the 2003 Fischler reform was him taking on the role 
of a policy entrepreneur with strong beliefs (in Fischlers case, that the CAP needed to 
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be saved; Pirzio-Biroli 2008) and who made use of all available strategies to steer the 
political negotiations towards a desired policy-outcome that is in line with deeper and 
policy design beliefs: 
 
Fischler has been portrayed by both supporters and detractors as admirably indefati-
gable, persuasive and possessing a mind that understood every technical detail while 
forgetting nothing, sheer lasting power (while in this case seemingly necessary) was 
certainly not sufficient to get the measure passed in the Council.  
 
(Syrrakos 2008: 123) 
 
A key environmental lobbyist also confirmed Fischler’s key role in integrating 
greening objectives into the ‘institutional machinery’: 
 
I think a lot had to do with Fischler himself. (…) I think he was just an influential 
person generally. (…) [Countries] may send politically expedient choices but not 
necessarily people with big personalities and big ideas and Fischler over the last 20 
years has been one of those people and we saw that too because he was responsible 
for the fisheries reform in 2002 and although that didn’t have as much promise as 
we hoped at the time it was still a pretty important greening process officially and 
Austria’s not well known for its fishing fleet so it’s evidence again of somebody 
who just has passion and that’s the people around as well in his cabinet.   
 
(ENGO 9) 
 
While the changing socio-political landscape opened up a window of oppor-
tunity for Fischler to propose his ambitious Mid-Term Review, it was not the deci-
sive motivating factor:  
 
Fischer was extremely involved and he was a very active Commissioner. I 
remember in terms of the communication [i.e. the legislative proposal], well I mean 
he was right into it and he didn't delegate to this Cabinet. (…) He was certainly the 
guiding force in the reinforcement of agri-environment, on decoupling, and I think 
on cross-compliance, he was very active. (…) He was always somebody who was 
very involved in the detail, but I think this is part of his background, he was a 
specialist, he understood it all. And the second thing is he was not only a 
‘technician’, he had a very strong political sense. (…) It was very much his reform. 
It was ‘The Fischler Reform’. I remember, the communication went through 20 
drafts, and most of the drafts we discussed with him, so you see he made the 
investment. I think he had his ideas, and politicians are politicians. I think his 
reform was successful because the circumstances were favourable. 
 
(EC 25) 
 
 207	  
Greening the CAP – the ‘Ciolos reform’ 
 
The negotiation dynamics regarding the post-2013 CAP were fairly similar to the 
2003 CAP reform. The civil servants involved into this reform were predominantly 
the same individuals who already contributed to the Agenda 2000 and Fischler re-
forms with some involvement even dating back to the 1992 MacSharry reforms (EC 
21; EC 22; EC 24; EC 25). The European Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural 
Development Ciolos was the Rumanian minister of agriculture and acted based on his 
deeper beliefs and policy beliefs that greening and climate policy integration is crucial 
to maintain the CAP and use it to contribute to sustainable development as illustrated 
above (section 7.1). He decided to capture the socio-political consensus for strength-
ening the public-goods model of the CAP in the next reform with a wide-reaching 
public consultation that received more than 6000 submissions from all kinds of civil 
society and consumer organisations, environmental NGOs and farm lobbies.  
 
What is a new approach we have chosen in this reform, it all started with a big po-
litical debate and a big conference where we invited all the stakeholders, and not 
only the farmers, and this process has been ongoing now for two years. (…) We are 
not doing anything else than just translating the reality out there into policy. So it’s 
very difficult for a politician, for a minister, in any given member state to say ‘I am 
against greening’. ‘I am against the fact that farmers should deliver more public 
goods. I am against better standards for biodiversity. I am against better quality of 
soils I am against better quality of water’. It’s very difficult to say that for any poli-
tician at the moment in Europe. And we are not doing anything else. 
 
(EC 24) 
 
 
Participants in the CAP reform suggested that the public consultation was a stra-
tegic move by the Agriculture Cabinet to demonstrate the far-reaching public support 
for their greening objectives: 
 
Oh, I think that the head of cabinet is the thinker behind the Commissioner but that 
the Commissioner sketched out the direction. There was, this was tactically very 
skilled by the Cabinet, this relatively early integration of all groups in this stake-
holder process, where was asked before any proposals were made by the Commis-
sion, what society expects from agriculture policy. (…) Then there was a big con-
ference in Brussels around March 2010 where everyone had another opportunity to 
make a statement. Then they analysed the contributions and it was cleverly orches-
trated in this case that they were able to develop their ideas out of the question cata-
logue and set their mandate. Yes, the overwhelming majority of the European citi-
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zens, associations and organisations would like to see a shift in agriculture policy 
towards nature, climate and environmental protection. So, there is a demand for 
greening agriculture policy. This is what [the Agriculture Cabinet] concluded from 
this huge stakeholder process. And this was of course done very sophistically. 
Therefore, because you asked me about who had more influence, I think it was 
both, but the head of cabinet, when you talk to him you notice that he has thought 
things through. He is really fascinating. And since he is from Austria, I think this 
comes not at a surprise as the Austrians have always been the most progressive in 
implementing agri-environmental measures. 
 
(NMS 4) 
 
This strategy facilitated the negotiations with the member states and the oppos-
ing ‘status quo’ coalition. The ‘CAP reform’ coalition within the European Commis-
sion thus demonstrated that there is a socio-political consensus in the wider public, 
collected the evidence via conferences, workshops and stakeholder consultations, and 
summarised it into the policy proposal (EC 2011b; EC 2011c). Representatives of the 
European Commission thus acted again as policy entrepreneurs to orchestrate conver-
gence on a common position that was as close as possible to their original proposal.  
A further motivation of both Commissioners Fischler and Ciolos was also to 
leave a legacy by putting their ‘mark’ on the CAP with the reform(s) what would be 
named after them. Franz Fischler commented on the motivation of leaving a legacy at 
a meeting of European Agricultural Economists: 
 
Franz Fischler was there and he described, paraphrasing, the [2014-2020 Ciolos] 
reform as a ‘compromise of a compromise, and if you get too many alterations of 
that compromise process, then it does get certainly into the danger of being too 
wishy washy and insignificant, and he [Ciolos] must be mindful of the importance 
of a Commissioner’s legacy, and I am sure Ciolos would want to leave his mark on 
the process of CAP reform and there is a big potential in greening and there is also 
the beginning of the budgetary conversion process and I guess his legacy would be 
partially dependent on the performance of these two negotiations’. 
 
(EP 10) 
 
Overall, the 2014-2020 Ciolos Reform of the CAP was not as successful in its 
greening components as hoped for by many key actors, particularly due to the domi-
nant role of the member states in their calls for flexibility: 
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You might criticize the Commission from an environmental perspective that the 
proposals were not going far enough.  DG Agri had a very clear approach to say 
“This is our approach.  We have a very sensitive balancing of everything” and 
maybe that might have been the mistake.  It’s also my personal opinion and obser-
vation that the Commission went in with too less negotiation material concerning 
the greening.  If you had put at 10	  per cent clause for example or 10	  per cent re-
quirement on focus area maybe they would have cut out it not so much.  If you had 
put some more cross-compliance requirements they would have cut it down but not 
everything but it was only a few additional ones so almost none remained.  This 
might have also been a reason but maybe or maybe not because as I said it was 
mainly the MFF problem with having much less money to spend and other much 
more important political issues like internal-external convergences which were ba-
sically overriding any in-depth discussion or more in-depth political fighting about 
the greening and this is also how it turned out.  
 
(EC 19) 
 
One reason why learning that took place during the drafting and negotiation 
process was not necessarily reflected in the policy outcome was the lack of a window 
of opportunity which would be comparable to the ‘perfect storm’ (Swinnen 2008a) the 
2003 Fischler-Reform benefitted from: 
 
2001 was the Swedish presidency, the Göthenburg Summit and Sustainable Devel-
opment Strategy so that had already been in the making for three years so 1998, 
1999, 2000. (…) So almost the zeitgeist at that time was moving in these directions 
and obviously you’ll have read that Sustainable Development Strategy in 2001 and 
there were parts of that that were quite modern. In 2002 we had the 10-year anni-
versary of the RIO in Johannesburg.  The climate then was quite a lot of business 
and industry was coming for the first time towards the sustainable development 
agenda. (…) There were signs, genuine signs, of concern at climate change, at re-
source issues.  The beginnings of them at least, and then the five year review of 
Sustainable Development Strategy was Austrian presidency 2006 so the Austrians 
took sustainable development pretty seriously. I think the other thing is that it’s a 
lot easier when you’re 12 members or 15 members than when you’re 25, 27, or 28 
member countries and I think that’s made a lot of difference in terms of effective 
change, leadership change.  I don’t think Ciolos could do today as easily at what 
Fischler could have done with a smaller group of member states. 
 
 
(ENGO 9) 
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The 20 per cent climate mainstreaming decision 
 
In parallel to the CAP reform, the Directorate General for Climate Action also intro-
duced the proposal to dedicate 20 per cent of the EU 2014-2020 budget to climate pol-
icy integration measures (EC 2011a). This decision in the College of Commissioners 
came about because the Commissioner for Climate Action can also be regarded as a 
key policy entrepreneur who buildt political momentum and convinced other decision-
makers with a combination of expertise, experience and passionate speeches: 
 
Oh she is a very strong person, with her own views and a lot of self-confidence, as 
most politicians have… she is very clever and hard-working and very energetic, 
(…) and she has integrity, has a drive, and she has political communication skills. 
 
(EC 16) 
 
The circle of individuals involved in the CAP climate policy integration com-
ponents within the European Commission was fairly small. Across all levels of the 
hierarchy, they were very dedicated, possessed high expertise and long-standing ex-
perience in agriculture, climate issues and environmental policy integration, and ac-
tively promoted the introduction of climate objectives into agriculture and the overall 
EU budget by using and extending their existing networks with their relevant counter-
parts inside the European Commission (EC 14; EC 15; EC 16; EC 17; EC 20). Co-
ordination and cooperation was crucial as climate policy integration was not a policy 
proposal in its own right, but consisted of interventions into other Directorate Gen-
eral’s resorts, what frequently results in resistance on the policy-drafting levels (EC 
14; EC 15). If these are not resolved, they are carried ‘up the hierarchy’ into the meet-
ing of the European Commissioners, the College of Commissioners without much op-
portunity for other policy-makers to reflect on the input and engage with the context: 
 
But we just pushed it through because we saw the political opportunity that this 
budget could look different if it had a headline target that sold it as a green, more 
modern, innovation based EU budget. It would sell well with the public and I think 
Barroso understood that. So we were talking more political than analytical. It was 
the best vehicle we could find for mainstreaming into other policies. (…). But the 
budget was a really big thing. Because it sets the parameters for the EU’s spending 
programmes until 2020. And given that we had a 2020 target and a 2020 strategy, 
we had to put that, we had to reflect that into the budget otherwise there was a dis-
connect. So this were the sorts of arguments we were using. And then, [the Euro-
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pean Commissioner for Climate Action] was persuasive in the College [of Com-
missioners], we got a lot of nervousness in the end whether they had put it in, but 
they did. But it was literally in the college meeting where it was decided. 
 
(EC 15) 
 
Consequently, the EU 2014-2020 budget was seen as an opportunity for cli-
mate policy integration by the Directorate General who is in charge of this issue area 
and that consequently used negotiation tactics to achieve its objectives with the help 
of passionate policy entrepreneurs. These policy entrepreneurs were crucial for policy 
outcomes to emerge, but in the negotiation process they were not necessarily ‘teach-
ing’ (Bomberg 2007) the other policy-makers about the importance of their proposal. 
Instead, they used bargaining tactics, rhetoric and their own passion and expertise to 
‘push their proposal through’ (EC 14; EC 15; EC 16; EC 24; EC 25; Moehler 2008; 
Pirzio-Biroli 2008). This however is not a negative indication; it only demonstrates 
that learning rarely occured on the organisational level, which is dominated by the 
policymaking machinery. This ‘machinery’ created a certain path-dependency in 
carrying policy proposals initiated by policy entrepreneurs, partly through following 
orders, what is different from defensive avoidance; and partly through the personal 
conviction of individuals. 
However, even if actors took on the role of ‘teachers’ (Bomberg 2007) in the 
negotiation process, it does not necessarily mean that they succeed and the counterpart 
‘learned’ by being convinced or at least gaining more knowledge. Not all actors ac-
cepted the rationale used by the European Commission that society required the CAP 
financial resources to support public goods such as the environment: 
 
It didn’t convince much of the people actually.  Of course it was farm ministries in 
the Council. We always were pointing out that the big bill comes in the end in 2020 
whether there’s a real justification.  It didn’t impress so much and especially some 
MEPs in the conservative party said “What you’re saying, public money for public 
goods, I don’t know where you got it from.  Maybe from some green NGOs but my 
people who elect me have a different opinion and I follow that opinion of the peo-
ple which elect me” which is rural area farmers for most of them.  So very clearly it 
didn’t impress very much. 
 
(EC 19) 
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The situation was similar in the Council: 
 
It’s so many different (…) issues, on some [the European Commission] persuaded 
member states a bit, but actually, if member states were unwilling to agree on 
changes to the status quo that would mean any additional burden, any additional fi-
nancial cost and I think even on issues where the Commission argued quite long 
and fiercely that this wouldn’t make much of a change to member states. Some of 
the new financial rules under the horizontal regulation, the member states weren’t 
convinced. Certainly on some things. I mean it’s just a whole mixed bag on some 
things the Commission’s argued on, but I think actually in the end, less than I 
thought might be the case. 
 
(NMS 10) 
 
 
7.3.4 The impact of learning on the policy outcome  
 
 
Especially the European Commissioners for Agriculture and Rural Development acted 
as policy entrepreneurs (Roberts and King 1991; Swinnen 2008a) and actively gath-
ered public support, tried to convince political decision-makers and very strategically 
orchestrated the political negotiation and bargaining process to push their policy pro-
posals through the European institutions. However, while some constructivist learning 
occurred on the individual level, constructivist learning on the organisational level 
was hardly present. As outlined in chapter 3, for learning on the organisational level to 
occur an overall reflection process within the European Commission and among the 
European institutions on greening and climate integration aspects would have em-
erged and resulted in changed positions among member states represented in the Euro-
pean Council, the overall negotiation mandate of the European Parliament for the 
trilogues or the European Commission’s proposal. For a change in beliefs to occur, a 
wider discussion would have been necessary among the different Directorate Generals 
of the European Commission and among the member states on the rationale of dedi-
cating 20 per cent of the European Union’s budget over the next seven years to cli-
mate measures, including greening the CAP. Yet this discussion did not occur as sev-
eral actors involved in the negotiations emphasised: 
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[The proposal on dedicating 20	  per cent of the EU Budget to climate action] didn’t 
have a huge amount to be honest. I mean in all the discussions, the EU, I don’t 
think I ever really heard anybody in the CAP reform negotiations refer to the 20	  per 
cent. I mean I think it’s clear that in the process member states were very good at 
saying “yes we all need to deliver real environmental benefit”, but then we spent a 
lot of time actually trying to limit the impact of the greening proposals. I mean (…) 
climate change was not regularly cited by many member states at all as a driving 
factor or an important reason behind one of their policy positions. I mean the 
Commission were perhaps a little bit better, but DG Agri didn’t refer to it that 
widely so I mean I don’t think there was a huge overlap between the two [propos-
als] and I don’t think there was a huge impact of that 20	  per cent figure on the CAP 
negotiations. 
 
(NMS 10) 
 
This was also pointed out by a representative of the European Commission: 
 
It’s a play of numbers and the use is very limited actually when you look at it in 
terms of result and this was also I think a criticism of the court of auditors anyway 
that they think too much expenditure-based and less result-based.  That’s why the 
real revolution of the CAP reform might be totally invisible.  It’s the indicators.  
Measuring the CAP’s success by indicators which means we have to look for cer-
tain results and we have to put them in figures and we have to present them in the 
end to justify the intervention logic and this approach is there.  The new thing is 
that not only the Second Pillar is now measured in indicators but the First Pillar too 
and we have some climate-related indicators there too and maybe these indicators 
will play a much bigger role than just expenditure targets which is just part of the 
whole puzzle. 
(EC 19) 
 
It would have required a reflection process among the member states and the Di-
rectorate Generals of how this approach could be implemented or strengthened in 
national budgets. Yet, there was no discussion of mainstreaming in the MFF negotia-
tions. Such discussion would have required the member states to form a position on 
the issue by reflecting on their national interests. Constructivist learning could have 
occurred as a result of changing their position based on a change in the underlying be-
liefs that such climate policy integration measures would be beneficial (or harmful) in 
the long run and could form part of their climate mitigation efforts. This wider process 
of changing underlying beliefs among member states, political party coalitions in the 
European Parliament or Directorate Generals of the European Commission however 
was not initiated as there was no reflection on the proposal in discussions or negotia-
tions. Instead, alternative explanations of negotiation tactics, political interests and co-
alition building remained dominant: 
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I didn’t see much learning to be honest. The Commission came forward with an ap-
proach which was very well balanced which was even criticized by NGOs before as 
saying it didn’t go far enough so we can consider it probably well balanced and the 
other two legislatures went in with maximum wishes. Christmas wishes I might call 
it and this is the old approach. You go into negotiations with maximum wishes and 
then you start trading wishes and you come out with some results. 
 
(EC 19) 
 
At the same time policy entrepreneurs ‘pushed’ their climate policy integration 
proposals through the decision-making arenas using conventional negotiation bargain-
ing tactics. This was evidenced when key actors referred to the standard-mode of poli-
cymaking: 
 
 
But I think by and large I would not see that much learning because this is a very, 
how should I call it, this is a machine which works for many, many years and it is 
always the same. In the council, you have different ministers but the principle is the 
same, the way we work with member states. I think all the players know each other 
extremely well, in this field, in this industry, there is a kind of a family, it is a large 
family, but it is a family. There are a lot of very strong personal relationships among 
the players, which also help to find solutions and they can open the talk without be-
ing always in a formal negotiations. So that’s the reason… I don’t think there is ne-
cessarily a learning process involved in this, it’s more about improving the proposals 
towards whatever is needed and showing the necessary flexibility to adapt. 
 
(EC 24) 
 
It could however be argued that the policymaking machinery perpetuated and 
re-inforced changes which may have been a result of learning. In the case of Franz 
Fischler, there is little doubt that his deeper beliefs, which also included rural devel-
opment and environmental protection, formed at some point in time before his active 
involvement as Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development. While in this 
role, he followed his ‘green’ beliefs and made use of the window of opportunity that 
was also referred to as ‘the perfect storm’ (Nedergaard 2006c; Swinnen 2008a) to re-
alise the greening aspects in the 2003 Mid-Term Review. At this moment, the CAP 
had achieved a new level of path-dependency, which set an improvement in the green-
ing aspects of the CAP on any future reform agenda. This explanation is capable of 
accounting for the references of individuals involved in the CAP reform who stress 
that it was an institutional machinery following a self-perpetuating process (EC 20; 
EC 21; EC 24). A very relevant aspect is that the European Commission was able to 
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take a longer-term view that goes beyond the time span of headlines in the press and 
the next election, what enables these policy-makers “to do the right thing” (EC 24). 
Due to this longer time horizon it was easier to reflect on policy proposals, take scien-
tific inputs into account and to translate the overall public consensus in favour of 
greening and climate action into a policy proposal.  
There was however a certain degree of experiential learning that perpetuated 
into the ‘institutional machinery’ of DG Agriculture. While deeper ‘green’ beliefs al-
ready existed among key individual actors and did not change or demonstrably diffuse 
to other actors during the policymaking process, they were instrumentalised on the or-
ganisational level to protect DG Agriculture’s (and the wider ‘moderate reform 
camp’s) deeper belief that the CAP must be maintained, which was also shared by the 
individuals acting on it’s behalf. This reflection on societal value change in the form 
of the ‘public money for public goods’-debate resulted in the key conclusion that 
greening the CAP is an appropriate step to maintain sufficient public and political 
support. This instrumentalisation of greening protected the overall status quo of the 
CAP as Europe’s largest public finance instrument and allowed to continue on an in-
cremental reform track in line with overall changes in the socio-political landscape. 
The policy entrepreneurs consequently did not convince the rest of their governmental 
organisation of the importance of greening or climate policy integration in its own 
right, but only of its relevance for achieving the already existing organisational objec-
tive of maintaining the CAP while allowing incremental changes to its policy design. 
Thus, there was a link between the individual level of the policy-maker, who al-
ready holds beliefs in line with the policy outcome of greening the CAP, and the or-
ganisational level that accepts an instrumentalisation of greening to continue to 
achieve it’s organisational objective (i.e. belief) of maintaining the CAP within a re-
form process. In consequence, neither the underlying beliefs of the policy entrepre-
neur on the individual level or DG Agriculture/ the European Commission or the 
member states on the organisational level changed. The only change that occurred was 
a change in the framing that agriculture needs to contribute to the public good of envi-
ronmental protection and climate mitigation, which was a reflection of long-term 
changes in the socio-political landscape. 
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7.4 Conclusion on learning in the CAP reform  
 
 
The previous sections drew a complex and detailed picture of different types of learn-
ing that occurred across the individual and organisational level over two decades. It 
also illustrated that learning on one level can coincide with policy outcomes, but these 
policy outcomes are not necessarily a result of learning as widely assumed by the pol-
icy learning literature (e.g. Koch and Lindenthal 2011; Schout 2009). It also demon-
strated the importance of individuals who act as policy entrepreneurs based on their 
underlying beliefs as agents of change to arrive at a policy outcome. Yet again, alter-
native explanations such as lobbying, power politics and bargaining in negotiations 
predominantly explain the policy outcome, not learning via changes in beliefs among 
the actors. Changes predominantly occurred in the form of policy-makers recognising 
shifting preferences in the socio-political landscape and within individuals in the form 
of increasing knowledge and gaining work experience with CAP reform. The main-
streaming and greening proposal of the 2014-2020 CAP reform appears as policy in-
novation. This is not the case when the modus operandi of 30 years of CAP reforms is 
taken into consideration. Then the latest CAP reform emerges as a logical next step 
towards a strong public-goods model in a long line of marginal adjustments of policy 
detail beliefs. The greening aspects of the CAP are built on developments dating back 
to the 1980s. Climate policy integration in the CAP is a further development from 
greening the CAP through the MacSharry (1992) and Fischler (2000/ 2003) reforms to 
increase the legitimacy of the subsidies paid to farmers (also suggested by Feindt 
2010; Swinnen 2008a). It was re-framed as ‘public money for public goods’, of which 
climate action and environmental protection are key elements. 
Which type of learning on the individual and organisational level occurred de-
pended on several factors. The key issues were the interplay of long-term learning in 
the form of shifting beliefs among wider society that set the political framework pa-
rameters. It also depended on whether individuals found the time to reflect on new in-
put and were subsequently able to convince their organisation of its importance and 
the resulting necessity to change the organisation’s negotiation position. The key dri-
vers for a successful policy outcome were policy entrepreneurs in key positions who 
had the opportunity, knowledge and personal drive as well as conviction to steer the 
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political process into their desired direction using predominantly conventional nego-
tiation tactics to ‘outsmart’ the other coalitions. Experts involved in developing a pol-
icy proposal did reflect on information presented to them by external experts and 
stakeholders, however they were in many cases already familiar with the information. 
On the same token most experts involved in European climate policy integration al-
ready held beliefs favouring environmental protection and increasing climate action, 
which did not change by being involved in reforming the CAP or the wider main-
streaming of climate objectives into the MFF 2014-2020. The following table pro-
vides an overview on the research findings for learning in integrating climate policy 
while designing and negotiating the legislative proposal for the CAP post-2013.  
 
Table 6. Learning in the policymaking process for the 2014-2020 Common Agricultu-
ral Policy. Compiled by the author.  
 
 Alternative        
explanations 
Factual 
learning  
Experi-
ential 
learning  
Constructivist learning  
Deeper 
beliefs 
No change:  
Farmers, member states, Eu-
ropean Commission, MEPs  
Policy 
design 
beliefs 
Change over longer term 
(1990s) in moderate reform 
coalition: accept that envi-
ronmental protection matters 
to public; CAP needs to adapt 
to maintain public accept-
ability 
No change in short-term 
Indi- 
vidual 
level 
Dominant:  
Members of CAP 
policy subsystem 
are experts holding 
strong beliefs  
(reforming the 
CAP/ budget as 
routine task) 
Limited:  
Some MEPs 
through 
stakeholders;  
Experts re-
flect on new 
scientific in-
put  
Limited:  
MEPs (first 
involve-
ment); 
Marginal 
for experts 
due to itera-
tive pro-
cess; ex-
perts learn 
from ex-
perience 
with past 
round of re-
forms 
Policy 
detail 
beliefs 
Change over long-term in 
line with policy core; 
No change in short-term 
Deeper 
beliefs 
No change 
Policy 
design 
beliefs 
Yes over longer term (1990s) 
in moderate reform coali-
tion: accept that envi-
ronmental protection matters 
to public; CAP needs to adapt 
to maintain public accept-
ability; 
No change in short-term 
Or-
ganisa-
tional 
level 
Dominant:  
Interplay of policy 
entrepreneurs, ex-
perts, institutional 
objectives and bar-
gaining-based 
policymaking pro-
cess (routine) to 
transfer shifts in 
the socio-political 
landscape into pol-
icy outcome, 
driven by strategic 
interest to maintain 
CAP; ‘EU machi-
nery’ and opposing 
political interests 
Yes:  
Increase in 
knowledge 
due to reflec-
tion on emer-
ging scien-
tific consen-
sus on nega-
tive envi-
ronmental 
impacts of 
CAP; influ-
ence of cli-
mate change 
debate as pol-
icy frame 
Limited:  
Iterative 
process 
(policy-
reform) 
Policy 
detail 
beliefs 
Change over long-term in 
line with policy core; 
No short-term change  
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The data indicates that some learning occurred, especially factual and experi-
ential learning through reflection on scientific evidence and involvement in policy-
making. However, constructivist learning in the form of changes in underlying beliefs 
only occurred via the socio-political landscape over the long term with the change in 
perspective that the CAP must also serve environmental and climate concerns with a 
‘public money for public goods’ rationale that was taken on by key individuals as ar-
gument to preserve the CAP. Thus, these beliefs on the wider CAP objective changed 
among actors in the ‘moderate reform’ coalition on the individual level in a long-term 
perspective to reflect the overall societal consensus for a public-goods model. From 
the individual level, they were transferred onto the organisational level that represents 
the ‘policymaking machinery’ between the different Directorate Generals of the Euro-
pean Commission, the European Parliament and the Council.  
For many actors it however served the primary function to justify the con-
tinued existence of the CAP as Europe’s largest subsidy programme and thus the 
‘public goods’ narrative also points towards alternative explanations to constructivist 
learning, which remain dominant on the organisational level. These include political 
interests, lobbying and bargaining in negotiations. Policy entrepreneurs (who learned 
beforehand) played crucial roles in the negotiation processes for the success of the 
policy proposal. They used ‘conventional’ negotiation tactics and strategies expected 
by intergovernmentalist perspectives (Moravcsik 1993; Slapin 2008). The findings re-
garding the socio-political landscape indicate that it can be a driver for learning when 
a long time frame is chosen for the analysis such as reaching back three decades. The 
following chapter compares these findings to the findings of the Renewable Energy 
Directive case study and draws wider lessons on learning. 
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Chapter 8  
Comparing across cases:  
Discussion of findings on learning  
 
 
 
 
There is a difference between factual, experiential and constructivist learning in Euro-
pean policymaking. Furthermore, alternative explanations such as power politics, the 
institutional machinery and defensive avoidance can have a similar explanatory power 
for policy change compared to learning. The first section of this chapter compares 
learning in greening the Common Agricultural Policy with learning in European re-
newable energy policy, including the cross-cutting case of biofuels. The next part ana-
lyses the three emerging key determinants for learning to occur on the organisational 
level: policy entrepreneurs, pre-existing beliefs and institutional culture. These factors 
determine whether individuals, the institution and/or wider society reflect on the input 
provided and arrive at a re-evaluation and potential change in their beliefs, i.e. 
whether constructivist learning occurred. The findings from the in-depth case studies 
are compared with findings in the academic literature regarding learning in European 
climate policy and the theoretical framework.  
Crucial determinants for learning are what kind of beliefs each coalition of ac-
tors holds and if these beliefs are compatible with the other coalition’s beliefs and 
thereby their policy objectives. The time factor also matters, i.e. when key actors 
formed their deeper and policy design as well as policy detail beliefs. Depending on 
the time frame, learning can be included or excluded as a factor for policymaking (see 
Radaelli 2009). There is also a link between the European Commission as ‘collective 
policy entrepreneur’ and individual policy entrepreneurs, who either act according to 
pre-existing deeper beliefs, change them as a result of wider developments in the so-
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socio-political landscape or change their beliefs as a result of input provided during 
the policymaking process. If this policymaking process is a long-term reform process, 
learning is more likely to occur in the long term but only ‘normal’ learning in the 
sense of additional knowledge or experiences can be detected in the short term.  
 
 
 
8.1 The socio-political landscape as driver for learning and policy 
change  
 
 
Wider changes in how society perceives environmental, economic and social challen-
ges as well as subsequent changes in political framework conditions played an im-
portant role as driver for learning. Nilsson (2005; Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007) and 
Feindt (2010) focused in their empirical analysis on changes in the wider policy 
frames on what can be regarded as the socio-political landscape, for example from 
‘energy as risk’ to ‘energy as market’ (Nilsson 2005) and outline wider societal sup-
port for changes in policy. They used shifts in the way energy policy is framed as evi-
dence of learning. Similarly, Feindt (2010) concluded that learning occurred in the 
overall process of introducing greening aspects into the CAP. The findings point to-
wards shifting policy frames over three decades that were influenced by wider socio-
political perspectives and overall shifts. In that sense, Nilsson’s (2005) findings can be 
compared to the analytical dimension of the socio-political landscape in this thesis, 
which accounts for overall shifts in how society and the wider political spectrum, in-
cluding dominant economic actors and voters, see and frame the issue and determine 
framework conditions as well as entry points for learning among individuals and gov-
ernmental organisations to occur.  
In both case studies, policy-makers’ perceptions of societal changes and shift-
ing public preferences provided the driver for policy development. Interviewees 
pointed towards hallmark events on the international level such as the 1972 Stock-
holm Summit/ UN Conference on the Human Environment (Biermann, Davies, and 
Grijp 2009) as the origin of integrating environmental aspects into agriculture and en-
 221	  
ergy policy. This coincided with a bottom-up movement of environmentalists, green 
political parties and the founding of many major environmental NGOs that subse-
quently entered the political sphere to represent environmental interests (Olper 2008). 
The next big push towards environmental and climate considerations came from the 
international level with the 1987 Brundtland Report and the 1992 Rio ‘Earth Summit’ 
where governments agreed on the Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development. They furthermore established the United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, which agreed on the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 (Wijen and Ansari 2007). This 
resulted in pressure on the EU to implement its international commitments by setting 
up climate policies. The EU needed to ‘save face’ by delivering on the international 
commitment and leadership role it had taken on (Jordan et al. 2010; Schreurs and 
Tiberghien 2007). Both civil servants at the European Commission and political deci-
sion-makers pushed for renewable energy policy and began to develop policy propo-
sals for what became the Renewable Electricity Directive (EU 2001) and the Biofuels 
directive (EU 2003a) with an indicative target of 5.75 per cent by 2010.  
An important driver for greening in the CAP was the more formalised and pro-
fessionalised political representation of environmental interests since the 1990s, which 
provided a balance to the interests of established actors such as industry, both in the 
agricultural and the energy/ transport sectors. In the case of the CAP, environmental 
actors’ influence increased to a point where they counter-balanced the agricultural 
lobby in some aspects that until the late 1990s was seen as the most powerful and in-
fluential actor due to its close links to agricultural ministries in the European member 
states and the ‘revolving doors’ of political representation on the European Parlia-
ment’s Committee on Agriculture (ENGO 1; ENGO 2; ENGO 4; ENGO 5; ENGO 8; 
ENGO 9). The environmental NGOs influenced public opinion via the media, spec-
tacular protest and scare campaigns as well as networked themselves into political de-
cision-making circles as ‘green lobbyists’, thus becoming an important actor capable 
of countering the agricultural lobbies influence to a certain extent (as pointed out by 
EP 4; Industry 1; Industry 2; Industry 3; Industry 4; Swinnen 2008a). The activities of 
environmental NGOs, the political success of green parties, emerging food scares of 
the 1990s such as BSE and increasing awareness of and public support for animal 
welfare accumulated to an impression among the political decision-makers that there 
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is an overall societal support for greening agricultural practises and demand to deliver 
on public goods. Key public goods are preserving the landscape, providing envi-
ronmental services and supporting sustainable development in a manner that preserves 
critical environmental capital for future generations. At the same time, there was 
strong criticism of agricultural intensification and wasteful use of tax money for a pol-
icy that was distorting world food markets and required even more financial resources 
to dispose of overproduction (EC 24; Swinnen 2008b: 142). Environmental actors also 
facilitated the increasing public support for renewable energy policies. They however 
only played a secondary role in their early development between the 1970s and 1990s.  
Renewable energy policy was also motivated by wider developments in the 
socio-political landscape and overall support. Renewable energies were framed by de-
cision-makers predominantly as alternative energies to fossil fuels, which carried the 
hope for reducing the high dependency on politically unstable alliances with OPEC 
and former Soviet-Union states. Renewable energies also promised local economic 
development as their deployment was of a more local character than the import of fos-
sil fuels. These two factors, in combination with the fact that renewable energies faced 
less major opposition such as nuclear power, prompted the European Commission to 
conclude on a wider societal consensus in favour of their overall desirability (EC 1). 
This perception of a wider consensus also had a positive effect on local decision-
makers, who were supportive of policies that facilitated the uptake of renewable ener-
gies and grouped together in city-level initiatives such as the Covenant of Mayors and 
ICLEI, which were also supported by the European Commission (EC 1). Biofuels and 
biomass, which were used as alternative fuel in agriculture since the 1980s, played a 
special role as means of local economic development and energy security.  
Consequently, the greening of agricultural policy emerged as a necessity in the 
1980s and especially 1990s to sustain public support for Europe’s largest transfer pro-
gramme of public funds. Policy-makers felt the pressure to adapt the CAP before the 
public pressure to ‘scrap the CAP’ became too strong. This was regarded by many 
interviewees as the most important external driver induced by the socio-political land-
scape for policy development towards greening in the CAP. The pressures in renew-
able energy were very similar, although the window of opportunity was defined more 
by understanding renewables as opportunity for economic development and means of 
improving energy security.  
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It is important to note that both policy areas existed due to other motivations 
than climate mitigation. Only later, as climate change became a strong public concern, 
i.e. it was reflected in the public mood (or referred to as ‘national mood’ by Kingdon 
1995: 146-149), renewable energy and greening measures in agricultural policy were 
re-framed as contributions to climate mitigation via low emission energy production 
and increasing green vegetation as carbon sink. The socio-political consensus that 
climate change needed to be addressed via reducing greenhouse gas emissions em-
erged in the mid-2000s during a window of opportunity. The economic situation was 
seen as favourable enough to allow ‘low politics’ such as the environment and climate 
change to enter the political agenda. Policy entrepreneurs such as Al Gore with his 
movie ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ were successful in raising public awareness of climate 
change (Guggenheim 2006). The IPCC report (IPCC 2007) and the Stern review 
(Stern 2006) provided the scientific and economic evidence to act on climate change 
rather earlier than later. These and further developments resulted in a major shift in 
the wider policy landscape in support of climate change policies and thus opened up a 
window of opportunity for reforms in the CAP and European renewable energy policy 
to take these changed political and social framework conditions into account.  
Similar to Nilsson’s policy frames (2005), these empirical findings illustrate 
that the European socio-political landscape evolved over the past 30 years from an en-
ergy security frame towards a sustainability frame that allowed a re-framing of renew-
able energy not as a matter of energy security, but as a key instrument in addressing 
climate change. In that sense, the empirical findings of this thesis match with Nils-
son’s (2005) policy frames that shift over time and provide wider societal support for 
policies as well as facilitate the emergence of and shift in policy goals. However, the 
empirical findings and the methodological approach in determining learning across 
also the individual and organisational level and furthermore the inclusion of factual, 
experiential and constructivist learning goes far beyond Nilsson’s (2005) observation 
that over a 25-year time frame wider societal goals change in favour of integrating en-
vironmental objectives into other sectors. Certainly, this is also a form of learning, but 
it can rather be regarded as a basic prerequisite to initiate a policy process. Within this 
policy process, learning could happen as a result of those wider drivers – but there can 
also be alternative explanations for a policy outcome.  
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In conclusion, the motivation for policies can frequently be found in the socio-
political landscape. It includes the policy-maker’s perception of wider public opinion, 
political or societal consensus in support of a certain policy option and wider windows 
of opportunity such as overall support for climate change policies due to a higher 
awareness of the problem and willingness to accept regulation. A further determinant 
in the socio-political landscape is the political power of certain political parties and 
groups representing interests of specific non-governmental actors. These findings in 
themselves are not new but rather confirm the drivers for policymaking emphasised in 
the ‘classic’ public policy literature and confirmed by empirical studies, also within an 
EU context (Ackrill, Kay, and Zahariadis 2013; Zahariadis and Allen 1995; Zahariadis 
2013). Kingdon (1984) arrived almost 30 years ago at the conclusion that a mixture of 
external events, the public mood and its perception of what problem deserves more 
political attention matters strongly for the problem steams to merge and a window of 
opportunity to open up. The wider drivers for policy change can include developments 
in the socio-political landscape such as new actors, overall public support for renew-
able energies, changing social demands and new areas of public concern including 
climate change. These shifts in the socio-political landscape are a motivation for ac-
tors to reflect on the changed framework conditions and to subsequently adapt exist-
ing policies or to design new policies – but they are not necessarily learning. 
 
 
 
8.2 When and why learning occurs among decision-makers  
 
 
Of those contributions that examined learning among individual policy-makers and 
learning on the organisational level, the majority examined learning types that could 
be summarised as factual and experiential learning including political learning among 
individuals (e.g. Braun 2009; Dunlop 2009; May 1992; Montpetit 2009) and instru-
mental/ governance learning on the organisational level (e.g. Dunlop 2010; Eising 
2002; Feindt 2010; Heikkila and Gerlak 2013; Koch and Lindenthal 2011; Radaelli 
2009; Schout 2009). The following section discusses the missing link between shifts 
in the socio-political landscape and learning on the individual/ organisational levels. 
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8.2.1 Factual and experiential learning on the individual level 
 
 
There are different models of factual and experiential learning among policy-makers. 
The pre-existing knowledge and experience determines how steep the learning curve 
of the policy-maker is. Civil servants at the European Commission were frequently 
technical experts who often had decades of working experience in the policy field and/ 
or a related educational background that was evidenced by postgraduate degrees in the 
policy area including PhDs or even postdoctorate research. Their learning curve thus 
remained incremental as they were adding to an already vast pool of expertise. The 
learning curve was much steeper for politicians such as the Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs), particularly in the CAP where they were involved via co-decision 
for the first time (Costello and Thomson 2013). They pointed out the time and work-
load constraints they were under and the resulting inability to acquire expert know-
ledge on the issue. In this sense, the individual learning among MEPs was very similar 
to the way individuals in management positions at the European Commission learned 
who had limited previous knowledge and experience in the policy field. These indi-
viduals predominantly learned by being involved in the process, listening to their 
technical experts in meetings with representatives of other European institutions or ex-
ternal actors. Learning among ‘managers’ and ‘technical experts’ was thus different. 
While the technical experts added to their knowledge and experience by reading de-
tailed technical scientific studies for example on carbon accounting, specifications for 
technologies such as heat pumps and were engaged in energy modelling exercises 
themselves, the managers called on their experts to represent the European Commis-
sion in meetings with other policy-makers. By being involved in the negotiations and 
listening to their experts, the managers gained experience and also accumulated fac-
tual knowledge around the technical and political arguments as well as rationales for 
proposing a certain course of action. Consequently, it can be concluded that individu-
als did engage in factual and experiential learning while being involved in the policy-
making process, having to argue and defend their position and also discussing with 
other actors the scientific basis of reports and studies.  
The biofuels aspect of the Renewable Energy Directive demonstrates how the 
degree to which scientific knowledge was contested also influenced individual learn-
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ing. The contested knowledge resulted in a more intense factual and experiential 
learning process among the individuals involved as they needed to find scientific stud-
ies to back up their (politically pre-determined) arguments and to defend their pro-
posed course of action using and explaining scientific data to the opposing coalition. 
With the first reform to the RED in the form of a proposal on remedying negative ef-
fects of biofuels in terms of indirect land use changes, the actors involved in this pro-
cess continued to debate the technical details of carbon accounting and land use chan-
ges. The debate was less focused on broader political considerations but on know-
ledge-based aspects. This required policy-makers to understand the methodology be-
hind the scientific studies, which provided different results depending on the model-
ling approach taken. Thus, they were involved in an intensive factual and experiential 
learning process that was described by a key member of the policymaking community 
as “going to the University of Biofuels” (EC 5).  
These differences in how individuals learn in policymaking based on their 
roles and positions have been widely neglected in the relevant literature on learning in 
EU policymaking. The literature predominantly focused on learning on the organisa-
tional level (e.g. Dunlop 2010; Feindt 2010; Koch and Lindenthal 2011; Radaelli 
2009; Schout 2009), on management reforms and its administrative consequences 
(Bauer 2008) or on comparative survey research (e.g. Montpetit 2009). Only Page and 
Wouters (1994) provided details on educational backgrounds of EU policy-makers in 
their study on political leadership and bureaucratic politics in Brussels. Dunlop (2009) 
and Montpetit (2009) compared learning among policy-makers in the EU and in the 
US, yet without particular attention on how their role influenced their learning.  
 
 
8.2.2 Political and Instrumental learning cloaked as constructivist learning 
 
 
Deeper beliefs, policy design beliefs and policy detail beliefs were more difficult to 
change than an addition in knowledge or experience and can thus be regarded as fairly 
stable. Individuals even went as far as to engage in factual and experiential learning as 
well as political manoeuvring to avoid having to change deeper and policy detail be-
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liefs, but to protect these by engaging in factual learning to satisfy society’s wider pol-
icy preferences. These findings match with the academic literature on the advocacy 
coalition framework, which emphasises how virtually impossible it is for deep core 
beliefs to change (Sabatier 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Weible, Sabatier, 
and McQueen 2009). ‘Deeper’ beliefs however are weaker than ‘deep core’ beliefs but 
stronger than ‘policy’ beliefs. The empirical data suggests that there is a category of 
beliefs between the absolutely stable deep core beliefs, i.e. a person’s fundamental 
understanding of the world, and how overall policies should look like to address a 
specific policy problem. There are beliefs that are ‘deeper’ than this, which are based 
on a person’s opinion on whether global problems such as climate change matter 
(deeper belief) and whether they should be addressed via policies (policy design be-
lief) and what exact policy instrument should be used, e.g. emissions trading (policy 
detail belief; see chapter 3).  
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) also pointed out that individuals rather 
change their policy detail beliefs to protect their deeper beliefs. One dimension is ‘in-
strumental learning’, as discussed in the previous section, when actors adapt their pol-
icy detail beliefs to changing wider socio-political circumstances to protect their pol-
icy design and deeper beliefs. The other dimension of constructivist learning on the 
individual level is the extent to which deeper and policy design beliefs are formed 
over the long term and how they change in parallel to wider changes in society’s pol-
icy preferences and deeper shifts in beliefs within the socio-political sphere.  
This is the key link that was missing in the previous contributions that concep-
tualised learning as shifts in the socio-political landscape (Feindt 2010; Nilsson and 
Persson 2003; Nilsson 2005; Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007). Mere shifts in the public 
mood and wider political, problem and politics stream (Kingdon 1995) can be less in-
terpreted as learning themselves but rather as a drivers for learning. These shifts in the 
socio-political landscape can however result in individuals’ changes of beliefs and 
thus constructivist learning provided that the individual reflects on these inputs. What 
frequently happened however is that the driver in the socio-political landscape did not 
result in constructivist learning but instead in political and instrumental learning that 
appeared to be constructivist learning.  
In line with overall shifts in the socio-political landscape, key actors pointed 
out in the interviews that they had reflected on the evidence provided by the IPCC and 
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publicised by Al Gore’s movie ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ (Guggenheim 2006). His key 
message was that climate change exists and is an increasing problem that needs to be 
urgently addressed by policies. This can be understood as the formation of a policy 
design belief on the individual level that ‘something’ needs to be done about climate 
change. This rather abstract conviction increased policy-maker’s willingness to reflect 
on policy detail beliefs regarding the exact policy design. Yet it is important to keep in 
mind that agricultural and transport policy only have limited inherent links to climate 
policy with their primary objectives of providing sufficient quantities of food or facili-
tating the transport of people and goods at a reasonable price and quality. There was 
pressure both on DG Agriculture and DG TREN/ Energy to integrate climate objec-
tives into agriculture and energy policy due to overall societal demands, which can be 
interpreted as the ‘national mood’ already described by Kingdon (1984).  
In the case of the CAP, key actors pointed out that it was important to take 
‘pre-emptive’ steps to maintain an overall social and public acceptability of Europe’s 
largest subsidy programme. This required them to listen not only to the demands of 
farmers, but also of environmental and social NGOs representing citizens, i.e. taxpay-
ers’ and consumers’ interests. Key actors thus understood the importance of changing 
the policy to satisfy the interests ‘of the other 97 per cent’ (EC 21; EC 24). This can 
be understood as a change in policy detail beliefs among key actors: Policy-makers 
changed their perspective on how a specific policy instrument should look like and 
which stakeholder group it should primarily benefit. In the RED, the overall re-
framing of renewable energy as climate mitigation placed new demands on the policy-
makers who understood renewable energy as equally serving the objectives of energy 
security, economic development and climate mitigation. 
This seemingly constructivist learning on the individual level in terms of 
changing policy detail beliefs is rather ‘instrumental’ learning, as the overall policy 
design belief of policy-makers did not change because they were still primarily wor-
ried about having a policy framework that facilitates agricultural production, food se-
curity and the secure provision of affordable energy. Although most key actors devel-
oped a policy design belief since the 2000s that ‘something needs to be done about 
climate change’ and were thus more willing to integrate climate objectives into their 
own policy area as long as it is not contradictory to their actual policy design beliefs, 
this policy design belief did not emerge as dominant driver. Key actors pointed out in-
 229	  
stead that it was important to integrate environmental and climate objectives to main-
tain enough public legitimacy and acceptability for the continued existence of the 
CAP and to strengthen renewable energy policy. Thus, the change in policy design be-
liefs over the medium term to integrate environmental and climate objectives into the 
CAP and energy policy can be attributed to instrumental learning undertaken to pre-
serve Europe’s largest and oldest subsidy programme as primary motivation and as 
conflict in policy design beliefs among renewable energy policy-makers who regarded 
energy security and rural development as equally important to climate mitigation. 
This may be a particularity of the climate policy integration focus inherent to 
the selection of case studies. In all cases, governmental organisations were required to 
integrate climate and environmental objectives into their ‘core business’. In the 
biofuels case, the objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions was followed as 
long as it coincided with the objective of improving energy security and supporting 
economic development, the other two but equally important objectives. After the sci-
entific evidence regarding the mixed climate performance emerged and the envi-
ronmentally focused coalition changed their policy detail beliefs in line with their 
deeper beliefs of principled environmental and climate objectives, the underlying but 
diverging deeper beliefs resurfaced beyond the shared policy design beliefs that cli-
mate mitigation is important. Faced with a choice, the economic development minded 
coalition re-focused on their other two core objectives of energy security and (rural) 
economic development, which were still uncontested and could be furthered with a 10 
per cent target of renewable energies in transport, even if it was a ‘de facto’ target of 
10 per cent biofuels given technological limitations.  
Ultimately, these findings confirm what Radaelli (2009) and Koch and Linden-
thal (2011) discovered when they concluded on instrumental and political learning in 
the European Commission as response to the requirement to take into account the 
findings of Regulatory Impact Assessments (Radaelli 2009) or comply with demands 
for Environmental Policy Integration (Koch and Lindenthal 2011). Particularly the 
similar findings of Radaelli (2009) on the use of Regulatory Impact Assessments to 
inform policy choices and May’s (1992) accounts of the dominance of political learn-
ing resulting in policy failure in several case studies across policy areas indicate a 
wider relevance of these findings beyond climate policy integration towards other pol-
icy areas that are faced with conflicting objectives. 
 230	  
 8.2.3 Comparison of case study findings with the academic literature 
 
 
These findings on factual and experiential learning among individuals and the Euro-
pean institutions are neither surprising nor groundbreaking and confirm the hypothe-
ses brought forward by the existing empirical literature (especially Braun 2009; 
Dunlop 2010; Eising 2002; Feindt 2010; Koch and Lindenthal 2011; Montpetit 2009; 
Radaelli 2009; Schout 2009). Instead, they indicate that the research design and meth-
ods used in this thesis were appropriate in their choice and application as well as pre-
cise in their analysis, thus leading to independent results that match with the expecta-
tions from the theory-based and especially the empirical literature that is also situated 
in the EU context and partly examines case studies in the area of climate policy inte-
gration. Earlier contributions that examined aspects of the case studies predominantly 
before 2003-2013 focused on the 2001 Renewable Electricity Directive (Eising 2002), 
the implementation of the 2003 Biofuels Directive in the UK (Dunlop 2010) and the 
Fischler Reforms of the CAP (Feindt 2010) and wider aspects of environmental policy 
integration in the European Commission (Koch and Lindenthal 2011). In the case 
studies examined in this thesis, especially experiential and factual learning among in-
dividuals was dominant due to their involvement in the policy process. Constructivist 
learning as changes in beliefs based on experiential or factual learning remained rare.  
Koch and Lindenthal’s findings (2011) could be interpreted as suggesting that 
the Directorate Generals (DGs) for Energy and Transport (DG TREN) as well as DG 
Enterprise engaged in non-learning and experiential learning when they were con-
fronted with DG Environment’s increasingly institutionalised environmental policy 
integration measures that invaded and partly contradicted the other Directorate Gen-
eral’s core measures. Actors refused to reflect, ignored orders or engaged in lip ser-
vice and following orders. These findings are closely related to defensive avoidance 
explained in detail by Janis and Mann (1977) and political learning to protect core and 
policy beliefs emphasised by Sabatier (1987; 1998) and subsequent literature reviews 
(Bennett and Howlett 1992; Zito and Schout 2009).  
The findings by Dunlop (2010) on dominant single-loop learning, which was 
used and conceptualised accurately linking back to the Organizational Learning litera-
ture (Argyris and Schön 1978), were confirmed by the interviewees involved in the 
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biofuels controversy that evolved from 2007 onwards after Dunlop’s time frame of 
analysis ended. They emphasised experiential and factual learning individually and on 
the organisational level, including getting better at using tactics to defend their objec-
tives against the other coalition in the decision-making process within the European 
Commission and among the European institutions. Dunlop (2010) offered an interest-
ing interpretation to the UK’s Department for Transport’s decision to ignore the scien-
tific evidence on the negative climate effects of first generation biofuels by justifying 
this behaviour as (single-loop type) learning by doing to grow the biofuels industry 
and thus gain a competitive advantage on more climate-friendly second and third gen-
eration biofuels from non-food crops. She also pointed out that this type of single-loop 
learning is more feasible for governmental organisations than the disruptive double-
loop learning of changing objectives.  
The empirical findings of the biofuels controversy 2007-2013 however show 
that this is only the case as long as there are no competing coalitions as a result of one 
group changing its goals and policy detail beliefs about policy instrument design 
based on the new scientific evidence. This reluctance on the side of the economic de-
velopment minded coalition to act on the new scientific evidence (and thus to engage 
in what Dunlop refers to as double-loop learning) led to the controversy that required 
the Secretary General of the European Commission as policy broker to intervene and 
force a policy outcome – which was thus not the direct result of learning. In turn, the 
policy outcome of the RED resulted in the need to reform the biofuels component in 
2012 by limiting the indirect land use changes of first generation biofuels. This be-
came more difficult in 2012 than in 2008/ 2009 as in the meantime member states 
heavily invested in biofuels, farmers found a lucrative side-business to food produc-
tion and the biofuels industry has a stronger lobby to defend its interests with the sup-
port of the agriculture lobby. This time delay thus resulted in a path-dependent policy 
favouring the continued use of first generation biofuels as vested interests formed. 
In consequence, had constructivist learning occurred between 2004 and 2007 
when the new scientific evidence emerged, the policy outcome might have been dif-
ferent enough to avoid the strong uptake of first generation biofuels by the industry 
and the strong economic interest in maintaining first generation biofuels given the 
heavy investment by member states, farmers and the grown biofuels industry. The im-
plications of the case study on biofuels are thus that Dunlop’s normatively good ‘sin-
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gle-loop learning by doing’ contributed to a politically delicate situation and contro-
versy that strengthened the path-dependency of the 2003 Biofuels directive and made 
a change in policy outcomes very difficult in the future due to the strengthened vested 
interests in maintaining the now ‘status quo’ of first generation biofuels. In other 
words, learning by doing led to a lock-in into the first generation biofuels and hind-
ered progression to the second and third generation biofuels with expectedly less 
negative impact on climate mitigation. Thus, there are links to what Levin et al. 
(2012) refer to as ‘sticky’ policies, yet on the side of unintended consequences. 
Eising’s (2002) contribution pointed to policy learning as a hypothesis and al-
ternative explanation for intergovernmental bargaining and political interests in the 
development of the Renewable Electricity Directive. Although he made an interesting 
and valid theoretical argument, the policy learning aspect was not sufficiently concep-
tualised to allow closer comparison. Similarly, Feindt’s (2010) focus on wider shifts 
in the CAP make a comparison with the findings on the individual and organisational 
level difficult as this aspect was not included in his empirical findings. This makes the 
discussion of the expert background of key actors in the CAP and their relevance for 
learning a novel contribution. The contributions in Swinnen (2008a) pointed towards 
the importance of policy entrepreneurs, but did not link their behaviour to learning. 
 
 
8.2.4 Conclusion on ‘normal’ learning 
 
 
Overall, factual and experiential learning among individuals can be regarded as part of 
the European policymaking process in both the RED with its biofuels component and 
in the greening of the CAP. It is however rather a ‘normal’ or ‘routine’ occurrence 
that is rather trivial for the policy outcome (Rietig and Perkins 2013). Yes, individuals 
did learn, and the more expertise they had and the deeper their understanding of ma-
noeuvring through the policymaking machinery was, the better they were able to in-
fluence the policymaking process in line with their political objectives. But in that 
sense, learning remained instrumental to achieve a certain objective such as develop-
ing a policy proposal and riding the rapids of the political decision-making process 
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well enough to fulfil one’s job description. Most of the policy learning literature is fo-
cused on this aspect of learning when it talks about ‘instrumental learning’ (May 
1992), ‘political learning’ (Radaelli 2009), ‘social learning’ (Feindt 2010), ‘gov-
ernment learning’ (Bennett and Howlett 1992) or compliant/ non-compliant single-/ 
double loop learning (Koch and Lindenthal 2011). The commonalities of this domi-
nant learning type in the policy learning literature is the strategic use of knowledge 
and experience to achieve one’s policy objective without the necessity to reflect on the 
input or change one’s underlying beliefs. The occurrence of this type of learning in the 
policymaking process has also been confirmed by this research. However, there is 
more to learning in policymaking than simply learning ‘how to play politics better’. 
The next section thus examines the conditions under which learning is transferred to 
the organisational level and potentially reflected in the policy outcome as key contri-
bution of this research. 
 
 
 
8.3 Conditions for constructivist learning 
 
 
The empirical findings point towards a number of conditions for learning that match 
the key expectations from the meta-theoretical framework presented in chapter 3. 
Learning can occur in the complex interactions of the individual and organisational 
level, which are further influenced by wider developments and major shifts in the 
socio-political landscape. For constructivist learning to occur in the policymaking pro-
cess, the policymaking conditions need to support reflection on input and a change in 
perspectives. This can be hindered by several factors such as defensive avoidance, 
bargaining tactics and power politics. It can also be hindered by an organisational cul-
ture that does not support reflection and changing perspectives or is not open to chan-
ges based on the input by individuals who have learned. Thus, the link between the 
individual and organisational level is very important for learning to be transferred into 
the policy outcome. If there is a disconnect between those two levels, individuals may 
well have learned, but the organisation and ultimately the policy outcome do not re-
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flect this change in beliefs, including policy detail beliefs on how a policy instrument 
should be designed. It is normal that individuals who are involved in a policymaking 
process learn in terms of acquiring new knowledge and experience, thus engaging in 
factual and experiential learning. In some cases this may be sufficient to result in a 
policy change, while in other cases only constructivist learning in the form of changed 
deeper, policy design and policy detail beliefs is carried on to the organisational level, 
where it results in a policy proposal that is adopted by the other governmental institu-
tions. However, especially constructivist learning can result in policy change if the 
modified individual beliefs spill over the organisational level as key actors consider-
ably influence the policymaking.  
It was important to differentiate in the empirical analysis between pre-formed 
deeper beliefs and newly formed policy design beliefs and to control for pre-existing 
beliefs, green or otherwise. Key actors in the CAP and the RED case study maintained 
their beliefs and subsequently tried to align the policy outcome with their pre-existing 
beliefs. Therefore, the time frame of analysis is important. In a long-term time frame 
beginning in the 1970s, individuals learned and changed their deeper beliefs parallel 
to the changes of what society regarded as important in the socio-political landscape. 
The overall concern about energy security in the 1970s in the face of shortages had an 
impact on society and policy-makers alike, which resulted in a willingness to search 
for alternative fuels. The shift towards the public goods model in the CAP also co-
incided with strong public concern about food safety and environmental degradation 
in the 1990s, which also marked the entry of environmental nongovernmental organi-
sations. Policy-makers reflected on these wider socio-political changes and also 
changed their individual beliefs accordingly. The third major instance was the mount-
ing scientific evidence on climate change and its emergence onto the socio-political 
landscape between 2006/ 2007 marked by Hurricane Katrina, the Stern Review (Stern 
2006) on the economic costs of climate change, Al Gore’s movie (Guggenheim 2006), 
the publication of the IPCC report (IPCC 2007) and the award of the Nobel Peace 
Price to the IPCC and Al Gore for raising awareness on climate change.  
These shifts in the socio-political landscape also illustrate the importance of 
windows of opportunity. These were further conditioned by outside factors such as the 
economic situation. Many interviewees emphasised that the window of opportunity 
for climate policy and climate policy integration closed with the economic and euro-
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zone crisis as member states were pre-occupied with more immediate economic con-
cerns including increasing unemployment, resulting in a strengthening of the eco-
nomic development minded coalition. This resulted in a lower priority for envi-
ronmental and climate change concerns as they were less tangible for many policy-
makers and voters confronted with threats to the survival of (environmentally pollut-
ing) industries and higher costs associated with integrating climate objectives. Never-
theless, key aspects such as the conditionality of 30 per cent of farm payments on 
compliance with greening measures and the dedication of 20 per cent of the European 
Union’s 2014-2020 budget to co-benefits on climate measures were maintained in the 
policy outcomes and thus point to path-dependencies of policymaking beyond those 
windows of opportunity. 
The time frame is linked to a further crucial condition for learning to occur and 
to be transferred into the policymaking process and ultimately the policy outcome. 
This depends on the political feasibility of actors’ ‘new’ policy detail beliefs within 
the dominant coalition. If these actors encountered a window of opportunity and used 
it to gather the necessary political support for their policy proposal, the learning was 
likely to be reflected not only in the policymaking process, but also in the policy out-
come. Learning can thus be regarded as not trivial for the policy outcome. A further 
condition to be examined was what deeper beliefs the decision-makers held at the be-
ginning of the timeframe.  
This research illustrated that constructivist learning in the sense of changes in 
beliefs should be free of any normative judgement regarding its desirability. It also 
showed that pre-held deeper beliefs can also have a strong result on the policy out-
come. Some of the actors within the not environmentally minded coalition held pre-
existing green deeper beliefs, which were formed early on in their personal develop-
ment. These can be based on a childhood in the countryside and thus intensive expo-
sure to nature and animals, what led these individuals form deeper beliefs on the in-
trinsic value of preserving the environment. Especially a high number of key actors in 
agricultural policy emphasised that they grew up on farms or were farmers them-
selves, some of them still maintaining their farm on a part-time basis. The deeper be-
liefs of these individuals could be characterised as attaching a high importance to en-
vironmental sustainability as prerequisite to safeguard the conservation of natural re-
sources for future generations and sustainable farming practises to ensure soil fertility.  
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The second group formed its deeper beliefs in favour of environmental sus-
tainability in the 1970s when they participated in environmental and anti-nuclear 
movements, participated in the academic debates surrounding the ‘limits to growth’ 
debate or were participating the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development. If 
learning was analysed within a long-term frame, and these individuals did not fall into 
the first group, their deeper beliefs most likely changed from a neutral/ indecisive 
point of view towards green beliefs. Their professional career may have led them sub-
sequently into positions that were aligned with these green deeper beliefs, i.e. within 
the environmentally minded coalition in policymaking. If they however were working 
for an organisation or governmental department that had other objectives not always 
co-beneficial for the environment, individuals with green deeper beliefs also ended up 
in key decision-making positions within these not primarily ‘green’ organisations. 
This was partly the case in the greening of the CAP during the 2000s reforms and es-
pecially in the post-2013 negotiations on the side of the European Commission. Indi-
viduals in the first and second group, who were already holding deeper beliefs, also 
aligned their policy design and policy detail beliefs to reflect their deeper beliefs and 
thus shaped the policy proposal to reflect wider consensus in favour of greening – 
what also coincided with their own beliefs. 
The third group were individuals who changed or formed their beliefs based 
on the evidence on climate change presented to them between 2006 and 2007, espe-
cially if they had no prior involvement with environmental or climate policy. Some 
members of the ‘economic development focused’ coalition in the Renewable Energy 
case study and of the ‘status quo’ as well as the ‘moderate reform’ coalition in the 
CAP can be regarded as having formed or changed their deeper beliefs following the 
overall change in the socio-political landscape towards concern about climate change. 
They thus engaged in constructivist learning by having reflected on the evidence on 
climate change provided to them by the media and the IPCC and having come to the 
conclusion that climate change existed and was a problem (deeper belief), and that 
something needs to be done about it in the form of policies (policy design belief), with 
specific ideas forming on how this policy should or should not look like (policy detail 
beliefs). In this case, constructivist learning occurred on the individual level as a result 
of changes in the socio-political landscape.  
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There were enough co-benefits for members of the economic development 
coalition in the Renewable Energy Directive to support climate change objectives, 
especially as these also matched their other policy design beliefs on energy security 
and economic development. Only when the scientific evidence on the negative climate 
performance of some biofuels emerged, the economic development minded coalition 
could not change their policy detail beliefs as they would have conflicted the policy 
design beliefs on energy security and economic development, which emphasised the 
benefits of first generation biofuels. This misalignment in beliefs led key members of 
this coalition to engage in defensive avoidance to protect their policy design and pol-
icy detail beliefs. In the case of greening the Common Agricultural Policy, the key ac-
tors at the European Commission within the non-environmentally focused coalitions 
already held green deeper beliefs and the policy design belief that they also needed to 
do something about environmental degradation and climate change – while also trying 
to preserve and justify the continued existence of the CAP. The key individual’s green 
deeper beliefs resulted in an intrinsic drive to green Europe’s agricultural sector via 
policy instruments in the form of introducing greening mechanisms into the CAP. 
Consequently, both learning and the content of the policy change was not purely in-
strumental or in reaction to external pressures, but coincided with these intrinsic fac-
tors in a ‘win-win’ constellation.  
These findings illustrate that constructivist learning of individuals needs to be 
‘benchmarked’ against the deeper beliefs of individuals and not against an externally 
imposed objective such as a principled priority of environmental protection, climate 
mitigation, economic development or social objectives, which is the dominant ap-
proach in the literature (e.g. see Feindt 2010; Koch and Lindenthal 2011; Nilsson and 
Eckerberg 2007). Consequently, constructivist learning on the individual level can 
have an impact on the policy outcome and can be measured based on how well the 
policy outcome reflects the deeper beliefs of individuals. Another aspect is the ‘role’ 
an individual played (or was paid to play) on the wider organisational level and how 
well learning on the individual level was transferred to the organisational level, where 
the policy outcome was negotiated and decided. In that sense, the link between those 
levels is crucial for connecting learning to a policy outcome as illustrated by March 
and Olsen (1975). 
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8.4 Transmission of learning into the policymaking process: the key 
role of policy entrepreneurs  
 
 
 
The findings indicate a high relevance of policy entrepreneurs to facilitate or hinder 
learning, which is more closely discussed in this section. In the Common Agricultural 
Policy reforms policy entrepreneurs played a key role in getting decisions in favour of 
climate policy integration adopted in the European Commission. These were actors in 
high positions that held strong personal convictions in support of environmental ob-
jectives and climate mitigation (as pointed out by EC 14; EC 15; EC 16; EC 17; EC 
18; EC 21; EC 22; EC 24). In the European biofuels policy, a policy entrepreneur was 
highlighted from a normative environmentalist perspective as example of how an in-
dividual (EC 9; ENGO 1; discussed in detail by Sharman and Holmes 2010) can ‘push 
through’ decisions that are not necessarily beneficial for the environment. Yet, the 
evidence suggests that policy entrepreneurs achieved their outcomes without ‘teach-
ing’ other actors (Bomberg 2007) and thus persuading them (Risse 2000; Riddervold 
2011), but rather due to their sophisticated strategising and steering in the policy pro-
cess. This section discusses how the findings match with the expectations of the em-
pirical literature on learning in the EU, which has so far paid little attention to the role 
of individuals acting as policy entrepreneurs as well as their central role in both trans-
ferring learning from the individual to the organisational level and in bringing about a 
policy outcome that may be owed to alternative explanations than learning. 
 
 
8.4.1 Policy entrepreneurs in European policymaking 
 
Policy entrepreneurs proved to be crucial factors for the transfer of learning from the 
individual to the organisational level as well as for achieving a policy outcome. In the 
CAP case study, the European Commissioners and their senior staff were the key ac-
tors that developed the policy proposal and steered it through the policymaking pro-
cess as indicated by one of these key actors, the former Head of Cabinet Pirzio-Biroli 
(2008; Swinnen 2008b). In the case of the RED, key individuals within the economic 
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development minded coalition emerged as policy entrepreneurs who also guided the 
policy process towards its outcome, what confirms the key findings of Sharman and 
Holmes (2010). Numerous actors were involved in the policymaking process such as 
experts, lobbyists (businesses, unions, NGOs), civil society, other government de-
partments from the national, state and local level, Members of Parliaments and politi-
cal parties (Bomberg 2007; Stone 2000; 2001; Zito 2009). Some of these actors had 
well-developed networks and acted as policy entrepreneurs as they were personally 
convinced that their policy proposal was ‘the right thing to do’ and they possessed the 
necessary expertise and credibility to persuade other actors – or at least the network to 
call upon such experts. Here the central importance of knowledge in policymaking be-
came visible as also emphasised by Dunlop (2009) Radaelli (1995) and Zito (2001). 
Policy entrepreneurs were crucial for the policy outcome and either supported 
or hindered learning, also depending on their leadership style. They had the option to 
support learning on the organisational level by trying to ‘teach’ the other actors by 
convincing them with arguments and trying to change their beliefs (Bomberg 2007). 
Yet, no empirical evidence was found in the case studies to support this expectation 
from the literature. In the CAP key actors rather steered the policymaking process 
using negotiation tactics to ‘push through’ a proposal of which they were convinced 
that it was the ‘right thing to do’ (Swinnen 2008a; EC 16; EC 17; EC 24), but there 
was no evidence that they actively tried to persuade other actors of their policy propo-
sal. Furthermore, the key policy entrepreneurs did not act as ‘neutral’ policy brokers, 
but as members of an advocacy coalition (see Sabatier 1998; Tallberg 2004; Warntjen 
2008; Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009). Thus, there was no empirical evidence 
to conclude on ‘learning brokers’. The evidence instead pointed towards the domi-
nance of ‘traditional’ negotiation and bargaining tactics as well as a strategic steering 
of the policy process based on the policy entrepreneur’s experience with the subtleties 
of the policymaking process (Braun 2009; Howard 2001; Krause 2003; Pirzio-Biroli 
2008). Especially the target of ‘mainstreaming’ climate objectives into the EU 2014-
2020 budget put forward by DG Climate Action and the subsequent adoption of this 
objective in the EU budget (European Council 2013) could be seen as an instance 
where policy-makers learned based on DG Climate Action’s role as learning broker. 
However, the decision to propose a 20 per cent target for climate policy integration in 
the EU budget was only successfully introduced into the European Commission’s 
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budget proposal at the final decision-making stage in the College of Commissioners, 
partly also due to the leadership skills of the respective European Commissioner and 
her ability to ‘be very convincing’ (EC 6; EC 14; EC 15). 
The example of Commissioner Fischler’s introduction of stronger greening 
measures into the CAP (Nedergaard 2008a; Pirzio-Biroli 2008) and the European 
Commissioner for Climate Action’s push for dedicating 20 per cent of the EU budget 
with the CAP as largest component to mainstream climate objectives also demon-
strated how policy entrepreneurs can embed a new objective into the ‘institutional 
machinery’. In that specific instant, not much learning occurred among other indi-
viduals involved when the policy entrepreneur ‘simply pushed things through’: 
 
But I think by and large I would not see that much learning because this is a very, 
how should I call it, this is a machine which works for many, many years and it is 
always the same. In the Council, you have different ministers but the principle is 
the same, the way we work with member states. I think all the players know each 
other extremely well, in this field, in this industry, there is a kind of a family, it is 
a large family, but it is a family. There are a lot of very strong personal relation-
ships among the players, which also help to find solutions and they can open the 
talk without being always in a formal negotiations. So that’s the reason. I don’t 
think there is necessarily a learning process involved in this, it’s more about im-
proving the proposals towards whatever is needed and showing the necessary 
flexibility to adapt to situations.   
                                     
(EC 24) 
 
This provides a link to the organisational level: It can be regarded as construc-
tivist learning on the organisational level over the medium term if the policy entrepre-
neur is successful in changing policy design beliefs on the organisational level. In the 
empirical example, the European Commissioner Franz Fischler is regarded by all ac-
tors involved as the decisive policy entrepreneur who embedded greening and envi-
ronmental objectives into the CAP. This resulted in a new policy objective, originated 
by the policy entrepreneur, which persists even after this individual has left office. 
Thus, a decade later, it appears as if not “that much learning” (EC 24) happened as the 
institutional machinery has adapted to the earlier integration of learning via the policy 
entrepreneur. Once embedded into the organisational level, the course is being con-
tinued in a certain path-dependency as part of the ‘institutional machinery’ or even an 
additional institutional objective. The individuals involved in the next policy reforms 
either changed their underlying beliefs or were simply following the path set out by 
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the policy entrepreneur in one of the earlier policy reform rounds. In any case, the 
change in policy design beliefs within the institution results in a new path-dependency 
and stable policy equilibrium. The next section focuses on other tactics of policy en-
trepreneurs to achieve a policy outcome that is not necessarily linked to learning. 
 
 
8.4.2 Instrumental use of expertise to ‘outsmart’ the opposition  
 
As on the individual level, factual and experiential learning can be used stra-
tegically to ‘outsmart’ other actors in the decision-making process. These findings 
confirm the instrumental use of knowledge and experience in the European Commis-
sion and other European institutions in the policymaking process suggested more or 
less explicitly by Koch and Lindenthal (2011) and Radaelli (2009). Especially the 
European Commission plays a leading and even a steering role in the negotiations 
within the European Parliament and the Council of the EU working groups (Braun 
2009) that goes beyond its treaty-based role (Craig 2010; Hix 2005; Nugent 2001; 
Sabathil, Joos, and Kessler 2008) as neutral observer providing knowledge-based sup-
port to the European Parliament and the member states. After the publication of the 
European Commission’s proposal, it has a de-facto steering role that opens up win-
dows of opportunity to influence and even steer the decision-making process.  
In the drafting and negotiation of the European Emission Trading Scheme, fac-
tual and experiential learning was used to serve exactly this purpose, to ‘push through’ 
the legislative proposal (Braun 2009). They achieved this by gaining support from 
member states and Members of the European Parliament in favour of a policy propo-
sal that was drafted with the input of key stakeholders by the group of civil servants 
responsible for climate policy at the European Commission. These were very know-
ledgeable and had learned from the experience shared by stakeholders who had previ-
ously implemented this type of market-based policy instrument (Braun 2009: 478). It 
is however also important to note that these individuals, predominantly at DG Envi-
ronment, gained most of their knowledge on emission trading between 1997 and 2003 
by inviting experts to share their experiences from emission trading pilot projects. 
These activities enabled them to “organise the necessary political majorities among all 
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the relevant stakeholders (…) [whereby] these individuals repeatedly found ways to 
speed up the policy process, to expand the room for manoeuvre and to create new lati-
tude for other actors” (Braun 2009: 482). Braun’s (2009) findings confirm the empiri-
cal findings of the case studies. Given that only a few key individuals were in charge 
of developing a policy proposal, thereby gaining deep expertise and taking on an offi-
cially consulting role in the subsequent policymaking process, they became powerful 
negotiation partners based on their knowledge and especially feeling of ‘ownership’ of 
the policy proposal they had developed. Their objective was frequently to come for-
ward with a proposal that is as close to the negotiated final deal as possible, thereby 
taking into account stakeholder concerns rather earlier than later in the process.  
At the same time it is important to keep in mind that both the climate policy 
integration into energy policy in the form of the RED and the European Emission 
Trading Scheme were a result of the UNFCCC negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, 
what took a market-based approach to reducing emissions. The EU accepted the ‘deal’ 
of introducing market-based mechanisms with the objective of persuading the United 
States to sign up to the international treaty. Regardless of the US withdrawal from the 
Kyoto Protocol, the EU decided to implement emissions trading following the failure 
of the European carbon tax (Braun 2009: 472). This example illustrates that both de-
velopments in the socio-political landscape, which includes wider developments on 
the global level such as the UNFCCC negotiations, and key policy-makers that act in 
line with their beliefs, had a decisive role in achieving policy change and that this is 
not limited to the specific case of climate policy integration but can also be confirmed 
for single-purpose policies. 
 
 
8.4.3 Conclusion on the role of policy entrepreneurs  
 
Policy entrepreneurs had a central role in steering policy proposals towards their ad-
option. Learning depended on how those policy entrepreneurs acted and whether they 
tried to persuade other actors by ‘teaching’ them of the importance of the specific pol-
icy proposal as emphasised by Bomberg (2007) – or if they steered the proposal 
through the policymaking process without ‘taking the other actors along’, but simply 
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‘pushing things through’ with power politics, political horse-trading and making use 
of their expert knowledge of how they can best influence the political process 
(Biermann 2002; Perkmann 2007; Roberts and King 1991; Stone 2004). The case 
studies illustrated that especially the latter was dominant. It was based on previous 
experiential and factual learning of the policy entrepreneur and potentially a previous 
change in deeper beliefs with a subsequent alignment of policy design and policy de-
tail beliefs. The case studies suggest that policy entrepreneurs rather make strategic 
use of their knowledge of political dynamics and of the institutional machinery to get 
their policy proposal adopted than engaging in a mutual learning process to persuade 
and teach the other actors by trying to change their beliefs. This finding is also sup-
ported by Pirzio-Biroli (2008) and Swinnen (2008b), who contributed in-depth ac-
counts of the rationales behind the 2003 Fischler-Reforms of the CAP but did not 
mention learning as an intervening variable except that Fischler reflected on the ex-
perience with the previous Agenda 2000 reform and subsequently adjusted his politi-
cal strategy (Swinnen 2008b: 157). The empirical findings indicate a methodological 
aspect widely neglected in the literature: Other than the policy-specific learning dis-
covered by Braun (2009), individuals frequently had their ‘learning experience’ long 
before they acquired the ability and opportunity to act as policy entrepreneurs in the 
specific policy process under analysis. Thus, there is a close link between previous 
learning and current power politics as well as political strategising, which appear as 
alternative explanations for policy change – although it is based on learning in previ-
ous rounds of policymaking and would not necessarily be ‘counted’ as learning in the 
case under analysis. 
 
 
 
8.5 What new have we learned about learning in policymaking?  
 
 
So how do these comparative findings contribute to the academic literature on learn-
ing theories and empirical studies of learning in policymaking? In other words, what 
is new compared to the learning literature focused on policymaking in the EU? This 
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section discusses how the empirical findings, which can be analysed using the meta-
theoretical framework on learning developed in earlier chapters, improve our under-
standing of theoretical frameworks on learning in policymaking within the EU. Learn-
ing frameworks have been developed in the US context with US case studies, both in 
policy learning and in organisational learning. The EU literature began to integrate 
learning conceptualisations relatively late, mostly out of engagement with the policy 
transfer literature and the separate stream of diffusion theories as well as the ‘new 
governance’ debates of the late 1990s.  
 
 
8.5.1 Uniqueness of the European Union – does it matter for learning? 
 
 
The EU-focused literature predominantly applied US-based theoretical frameworks on 
learning, but hardly developed its own frameworks. These are mostly a synthesis of 
Argyris and Schön’s (1978; Argyris 1976) single and double-loop learning labelled as 
‘organisational learning’, Sabatier’s policy-oriented learning (1988), Etheredge’s 
(1981) governmental learning and May’s (1992) ‘political learning’, and to a lesser 
extent Hall’s (1993) first, second and third order changes labelled ‘social learning’ by 
Bennett and Howlett’s (1992) influential review article. The most EU-specific learn-
ing type that does not explicitly originate from a US-based learning theory is ‘instru-
mental learning’ in terms of learning about the content of new policy instruments used 
by Nilsson (2005), Radaelli (2009) and Schout (2009). This learning about the content 
and function of more recently used policy instruments however is a very common as-
pect of learning, which we would expect to find in most policymaking processes ori-
ented at a efficient provision of public goods. Most of the literature that examines 
learning at the example of EU case studies draws on US-based conceptualisations of 
learning and did not develop an EU-specific framework to learning. Comparative 
work found that learning in the EU is similar in its mechanisms to learning in the US. 
Thus, there are few relevant differences between the learning literatures. Empirical 
comparative studies of learning in the EU and North America suggest that the EU is 
also moving towards an adversarial policymaking system and that policy entrepre-
neurs do play a role in learning (Montpetit 2009):   
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Policy actors are inclined to learn, whether they belong to the EU or not. The re-
sults of the three tests presented in this article call for a significant revision of 
the theories suggesting that governance in the EU is particularly conducive to 
policy learning. In fact, policy development in nation states, including North 
American states, features policy learning in much the same way as in the institu-
tions of the EU.  
 
(Montpetit 2009: 1199) 
 
Do we need an EU-specific framework to identify learning? Given that the 
meta-theoretical framework developed in this thesis based on the wider public policy 
and policy-learning literature satisfactorily identifies learning as demonstrated in the 
climate policy integration case studies, there is little need for an EU-specific frame-
work. On the contrary, the looming ‘so what?’ question rather points towards the ad-
vantage of being able to apply the meta-theoretical framework to any policymaking 
process than to impose unnecessary geographical limitations on it.  
 
 
8.5.2 Addressing gaps in the policy learning literature 
 
The previous sections discussed the gaps in the existing literature that aimed to contri-
bute to policy learning. This section links the in parts not coherently used terminology 
back into the meta-theoretical framework developed in this thesis and demonstrates 
where gaps remained that were addressed by this contribution. A key finding is that 
the existing literature rarely explicitly connected the individual level of learning with 
the organisational level or the socio-political landscape. Contributions usually im-
plicitly limit their theory development and empirical analysis to one level with most 
contributions focussing on the organisational level. Mainly the ‘classics’, the contribu-
tions made by Argyris and Schön in the 1970s (Argyris 1976; Argyris and Schön 
1978) as well as the model developed by March and Olsen (1975) illustrate the link 
between learning on the individual level with the organisational level, i.e. when learn-
ing is transmitted from the individual policy-maker to the governmental organisation 
and thereby enters the sphere of policymaking with the opportunity of a different pol-
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icy outcome from the status quo. This link however has rarely been taken up and been 
systematically integrated into theoretical frameworks of policy learning.  
The second key finding, which is closely related to the first one, is the role of 
changing beliefs in policymaking. Most of the literature focused on what can be re-
garded as ‘normal’ learning and labelled in the meta-theoretical framework as factual 
and experiential learning on the organisational level (e.g. Dunlop 2010; Gerlak and 
Heikkila 2011; Heikkila and Gerlak 2013; Koch and Lindenthal 2011; Radaelli 2009; 
Schout 2009). At the same time, there is a rich literature focusing on beliefs and 
power in the regime-theoretical and constructivist tradition (e.g. Keohane and Nye 
1987; Haas 2000; 2004 Levy 1994; Nye 1987; Wendt 1992). The ‘normal’ learning 
literature includes the empirical contributions that link back to Bennett and Howlett 
(1992) and May (1992) and try to conceptualise or empirically apply learning theories 
labelled ‘instrumental learning’, ‘policy learning’, ‘political learning’, ‘government 
learning’, ‘governance learning’ and ‘social learning’. Social learning (Heclo 1974) 
emphasises the importance of changing beliefs and values. Yet, there are very differ-
ent beliefs of varying stability and only examining shifting beliefs results in low accu-
racy. The public policy literature based on Sabatier (1988) highlights different types 
of beliefs and provides theoretical foundations that served as inspiration for the as-
pects on changing beliefs introduced in this meta-theoretical framework on learning 
(see chapter 2 and 3). Deeper beliefs are the most stable and frequently individuals or 
groups use all kinds of tactics to protect their deeper beliefs and to ideally align their 
policy design beliefs and policy detail beliefs. Sabatier (1988) describes this kind of 
learning as ‘problem-based learning’, which has been found to occur frequently dur-
ing the policymaking process and was labelled ‘political learning’ by other contribu-
tions (e.g. May 1992; Radaelli 2009; Schout 2009; Zito and Schout 2009). Hall (1993) 
provided a similar taxonomy of first/ second/ third order changes, which however 
provides less accuracy and applicability as there is no clear separation of the policy 
process from the policy outcome.  
This thesis modified the notion of changing beliefs based on Sabatier’s (1988) 
categorisation of deep beliefs, policy beliefs and secondary beliefs. Sabatier’s distinc-
tion of beliefs has, compared to Hall (1993), the advantage of referring to an objective 
(i.e. an belief that a policy should make use of certain instruments or serve certain ob-
jectives) and thus allowing an analysis of the process and the outcome, while Hall 
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(1993) refers to the outcome, thus falling short of providing for a key interim step of 
learning. Thus, the specific contribution of this thesis in the area of changing beliefs 
as learning is the consolidation of the literature into the further development of ‘con-
structivist learning’ that asks about changes in deeper, policy design and/ or policy de-
tail beliefs on both the individual level, the organisational level and shifting wider be-
liefs in the socio-political landscape, which in turn can be a driver for learning. 
The third novelty provided by this thesis is to link the importance of policy en-
trepreneurs for policymaking with learning theories. The specific learning literature 
underestimates the importance of individuals who take on leading roles as policy en-
trepreneurs (Kingdon 1995), policy brokers (who play a central role for Sabatier 1988; 
Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009; Weible and Sabatier 2009) or policy middle-
men (Heclo 1974) in steering the policy process and bringing about specific policy 
outcomes. These policy entrepreneurs are not only ‘teachers’ as suggested by Bom-
berg (2007), but they can also bring about an outcome without ‘teaching’ the other 
actors and ‘bothering’ to convince these by changing their policy design or policy 
detail beliefs. The literature on policy diffusion provides the key link to introducing 
policy entrepreneurs as conditioning factors for learning and an emerging policy 
outcome. Especially contributions by Page (2003), Stone (2004) and Zito (2001) il-
lustrate how relevant individuals and small epistemic communities are in policy trans-
fer. The key determinant is to ask the counterfactual question: would the policy out-
come be different without learning? In most cases, it would not be very different, as 
multiple alternative explanations also play an important role. However, in most cases 
the answer would be ‘yes, the outcome would be very different’ if it had not been for 
a policy entrepreneur whose dedication, knowledge and clever use of windows of op-
portunity resulted in policy change that set a policy off into a new direction. Franz 
Fischler’s involvement in the 2003 CAP reform is a key example (Pirzio-Biroli 2008).  
Yet, most interviewees at the European Commission emphasised the ‘collec-
tive policy entrepreneurship’, a key link between the individual and the organisational 
level that facilitates a policy outcome. This alternative explanation for the policy out-
come, which to a certain extent may contain learning on the individual level depend-
ing on when the individual learned and formed underlying beliefs, has also been wide-
ly neglected in the policy learning literature. Following an interview that centred on 
the question of learning and policy entrepreneurs, a high-level key actor at the Euro-
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European Commission and individual policy entrepreneur at the heart of European 
climate policy humbly concluded: 
Well, these are exciting stories now, even for me. But of course, you know, it’s a 
process, its not a person, you must remember that, and so there isn’t an instigator 
of anything, it’s got to be done with the blessing of your hierarchy, it’s got to be 
done with the support of people in the DG working with you. 
 
(European Commission 2012) 
 
It is this combination of determination, shared deeper beliefs and policy design 
beliefs towards deeper integration, sustainable development and serving the European 
public together with the experience of manoeuvring the political process in a team ef-
fort that makes the European Commission a special collective policy entrepreneur. 
Together with the diffuse power distribution among the European institutions similar 
to the US federal system as emphasised by Ackrill, Kay, and Zahariadis (2013; 
Zahariadis 2007), the European Commission and its Directorate Generals/ Cabinets sit 
at the ‘centre of the storm of policymaking’ and are not only key actors and collective 
policy entrepreneurs, but also have the potential to be ‘teachers’ given their vast 
knowledge and expertise. Particularly this combination of experience, expertise and 
factual knowledge makes the European Commission a powerful political body at the 
intersection of moderating and steering given the ability to ‘outsmart’ the European 
Parliament with fewer resources and some of the smaller member states. 
Particularly the role of the European Commission raises the question to what 
extent the findings on learning are unique for the EU. When zooming out of the EU as 
a very unique governance system – which at sufficient detail every other state, federal 
system or intergovernmental organisation is as well – this particular role of the Euro-
pean Commission can be interpreted as aspect of wider organisational culture within 
the EU that both covers the particular legal role of the European Commission and its 
policy entrepreneurial behaviour that goes beyond its formal role in the treaties (Craig 
2010) as political actor who furthers its institutional interests of deepening European 
Integration. In that sense, the role of a strong executive that steers policy proposals 
through the decision-making process and has a considerable impact on the policy out-
come can be either a facilitating or hindering factor for learning, which ultimately de-
pends on the organisational culture. Overall, the theoretical framework allows to con-
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trol for the activities of policy entrepreneurs in influencing the policy outcome and to 
analyse their specific role in facilitating or hindering learning as a key variable. 
8.6 Conclusion on key contributions to the literature 
 
 
This chapter discussed how the empirical findings from the three case studies pre-
sented in chapter 6 and 7 match with the expectations from the academic literature and 
determined what key factors matter for learning to occur, to determine which type of 
learning it is and to understand how learning impacts on the policymaking process as 
well as on the policy outcome. The case studies confirmed a number of expectations 
from the academic literature regarding the occurrence of individual learning especially 
in the area of factual and experiential learning, which is all-evident in the policymak-
ing process. However, as emphasised in the theoretical framework, it is important to 
‘raise the bar’ for what can be regarded as learning in policymaking. Thus, factual and 
experiential learning can be labelled as ‘normal’ learning as policy-makers always di-
gest new information and accumulate experience (Rietig and Perkins 2013).  
The specificity of this research is the European Commission as particular col-
lective policy entrepreneur who resides in a particular position of power based on its 
entrepreneurial spirit, shared deeper beliefs of its civil servants towards deeper eco-
nomic integration and sustainable development in the area of climate policy integra-
tion, as well as its unique wealth of knowledge and experience paired with a political 
objective. This finding influences learning in the EU as it is particularly dependent on 
the actions of the European Commission, i.e. whether key actors choose to ‘teach’ the 
other actors and persuade them, or whether they choose to use their advantage to ma-
noeuvre their policy proposal through the political decision-making process using 
‘conventional’ negotiation tactics – or if they choose not to act as policy entrepreneurs 
for various reasons. Hooghe described this unique powerful role of the European 
Commission as “the world’s most powerful international executive” (2012: 88). 
We would however have expected a connection between constructivist learn-
ing and the policy outcome. A key finding is that the temporal aspect of the analysis 
matters strongly for ‘measuring’ so that the pre-existing beliefs of policy-makers must 
be taken into account. A further important determinant is the kind of beliefs any 
member of a coalition holds. If policy-makers hold deeper, policy design and policy 
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detail beliefs that are shared by their coalition, then they would be expected to have 
changed their beliefs and engaged in constructivist learning if they hold different be-
liefs at the end of the policy process. As the case of the CAP illustrated it is however 
possible that key individuals, who also act as policy entrepreneurs, hold deeper beliefs 
that are aligned with the opposing coalition that aims to integrate their objectives and 
thereby deeper beliefs into the first coalition’s policy area. If the key actors’ beliefs 
and the climate policy integrating coalition’s objectives match, the policy process is 
likely to be less controversial. The likelihood for a policy outcome that is aligned with 
the key actor’s beliefs is also higher.  
How well beliefs of key actors are aligned with the proposed policy also has 
an effect on the level of conflict in the policy process and the policy outcome. Here a 
key distinction between policy integration and single purpose policies becomes evi-
dent: in single purpose policies, the beliefs of policy-makers at the European Commis-
sion are aligned with the policy proposal. The reason is that the climate policy direc-
torate was in charge of a climate policy instrument, which is its sole responsibility. It 
thus remained ‘in the driving seat’, i.e. in charge of the policymaking proposal and the 
subsequent ‘consulting’ role in the European Parliament and the Council. The level of 
conflict remained low in the greening of the CAP as the key actors at DG Agriculture 
already held green beliefs that were not in contradiction to their other policy beliefs of 
rural development and maintaining the CAP. This positive alignment of political ob-
jectives and beliefs enabled these individuals to play leading roles and also to act as 
policy entrepreneurs towards an outcome they regarded as desirable.  
The biofuels case within the Renewable Energy Directive illustrated what 
happens when the beliefs of the key actors (DG TREN/ Energy) are in conflict with 
the climate policy integration objective. The policy outcome of the RED (EU 2009a) 
is aligned with the beliefs of the key individual policy entrepreneurs that were ‘in the 
driving seat’ and whose objective was to maximise energy security, economic devel-
opment and climate mitigation. After the new evidence regarding the mixed perform-
ance of some biofuels emerged, the economic development focused coalition and its 
policy entrepreneurs regarded the evidence as insufficient and lacking scientific con-
sensus to grant them principled priority over the other two objectives of energy se-
curity and especially (rural) economic development, which were still fulfilled. The 
policy outcome is thus in line with the beliefs of the dominant policymaking coalition. 
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The changes to the RED via the Fuel Quality Directive (EU 2009b) can be traced back 
to be in line with the beliefs of the environment focused coalition, which was in 
charge of the Fuel Quality Directive. It was able to influence the RED via the links be-
tween these directives. 
These cases illustrate the additional challenges that are inherent to the ap-
proach of integrating climate objectives into other policy areas. As long as the climate 
objectives match with the beliefs of the policy-makers in charge of the policy proposal 
- be it due to individual serendipitous alignment or co-benefits of the respective policy 
area with climate mitigation - climate policy integration is more likely to succeed. If 
however climate mitigation does not or only partly match with the beliefs of the re-
sponsible policy-makers, it is more difficult for environmentally minded coalitions to 
influence the policymaking process as the policy entrepreneurial decision-making 
structures in European policymaking are likely to work against the climate policy 
integration objectives as the biofuels case illustrates.  
Climate policy integration requires a higher degree of coordination from all ac-
tors involved than a focus on single-objective policies such as emissions trading. Yet 
the higher level of coordination also results in more communication among the key 
actors. Thus, we would have expected more ‘arguing’ and ‘persuasion’ in the policy-
making process (Risse 2000; Risse and Kleine 2010) and more changes in policy de-
sign and policy detail beliefs. However, actors rarely were persuaded by better argu-
ments and consensus was rarely reached – where there was agreement, this was due to 
shared pre-existing beliefs across coalitions. In the biofuels case, a controversy em-
erged as the policy detail beliefs became misaligned. Instead of arriving at a common 
position in the process of negotiating and discussing the findings, policy brokers had 
to resolve the situation with a compromise solution. This points towards conventional 
theories of the policymaking process that emphasise ‘policy brokers’ (Sabatier 1988; 
1998), ‘policy middlemen’ (Heclo 1974) and ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Kingdon 1995) 
as key mediators in bringing about a policy outcome and thus towards the dominance 
of alternative explanations for policy outcomes whereby learning plays a minor role. 
The following conclusion provides an overview of the findings, discusses the theoreti-
cal implications for European public policy as well as the lessons of policy analysis. 
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Chapter 9  
Conclusion on learning in European policymaking 
 
 
 
 
This conclusion chapter reflects on the analytical tools available to determine learning 
in European policymaking from a wider angle that goes beyond the case of climate 
policy integration. Following a summary of key findings that determine factual, ex-
periential and constructivist learning in European policymaking, it examines the wider 
implications of the empirical and theoretical contributions for research on policy with-
in the European institutions. This chapter thus zooms out of the climate policy integra-
tion frame to illustrate routes for further research on learning in public policy using 
the theoretical framework developed in this thesis. 
 
 
 
9.1 Summary of key findings on learning in European policymaking 
 
 
The research on learning in European policymaking makes three distinct contribu-
tions. The first contribution is to clarify what learning means – what types and catego-
ries of learning are we referring to when talking about ‘learning’? The second contri-
bution is a framework how we can identify different learning types. Finally, the em-
pirical analyses of learning in European climate policy integration in the areas of agri-
cultural, energy and transport policy illustrate that learning does occur in policymak-
ing alongside alternative explanations for policy change. This points towards the ques-
tion of when learning matters in achieving a policy outcome, i.e. is the policy different 
because learning occurred or did we arrive at a policy outcome despite learning: was 
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learning trivial for the outcome as it would have materialised anyway due to the 
dominance of alternative explanations? The fourth contribution is an answer to the re-
search question under what conditions learning occurs and matters for the outcome. 
 
 
9.1.1 What  role does learning play in public policymaking? 
 
 
Which type of learning on the individual and organisational level occurs depends on 
the influence of the socio-political landscape and the pre-existing beliefs of policy en-
trepreneurs. The key factors that determine which type of learning occurs in the poli-
cymaking context are the previous expertise and knowledge of a decision-maker, the 
culture of information exchange within the organisation, institutional capacity, objec-
tives embedded in the institution and political interests. Experts involved in develop-
ing a policy proposal do reflect on information presented to them by external experts 
and stakeholders. In many cases they are however already familiar with the informa-
tion. On the same token most experts involved in European climate policy integration 
hold deeper beliefs favouring environmental protection and increasing climate action, 
which did not change by being involved in either of the policies examined.  
Yet it is important to include the temporal factor and ask whether these deeper 
beliefs pre-existed or whether they were formed in the 1970s or 2000s when envi-
ronmental and energy challenges resulted in shifting perspectives in the socio-political 
landscape. Renewable energy emerged as energy security objective after the 1970’s 
oil crises and was reframed in the late 1990s/ 2000s as core measure to mitigate cli-
mate change. Climate policy integration in the Common Agricultural Policy is a fur-
ther development from greening the CAP through the MacSharry (1992) and Fischler 
(2002/ 2003) reforms to increase the legitimacy of the subsidies paid to farmers 
(Feindt 2010; Swinnen 2008a). Its justification was re-framed as ‘public money for 
public goods’, of which climate action and environmental protection were the most 
significant.  
The empirical findings indicate that in both case studies some learning occurred, 
especially factual and experiential learning through reflection on new scientific evi-
dence and involvement in policymaking. A few key policy entrepreneurs embedded 
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the greening aspects into the ‘institutional machinery’. However, constructivist learn-
ing among individuals only occurred as a response to changes in the socio-political 
landscape over the long term, but less via being persuaded by policy entrepreneurs. 
Alternative explanations for the policy outcome remained dominant on the organisa-
tional level. This finding points predominantly to more ‘standard’ theories of public 
policy that do not specifically emphasise learning as the findings can also be ex-
plained with the Multiple Streams Framework (Ackrill, Kay, and Zahariadis 2013a; 
Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 2007) or the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Both have 
been adapted and applied to EU case studies and results pointed towards their ability 
to explain policy outcomes (Ackrill, Kay, and Zahariadis 2013; Sabatier 1998; 
Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009) and they emphasised the dominant alternative 
explanations of policy entrepreneurs (or policy brokers in the case of the biofuels pol-
icy), windows of opportunity and shifts in the wider socio-political landscape that 
provided an external driver for policy change and particularly pre-formed political in-
terests, lobbying and bargaining in negotiations as means of realising and protecting 
the coalition’s political interests.  
Policy entrepreneurs - who learned beforehand - played a crucial role in the ne-
gotiation process for the success of the policy proposal as they had the potential to fa-
cilitate learning among other actors. However no evidence in support of that assump-
tion could be identified. In both cases policy entrepreneurs were crucial for the suc-
cess of the policy proposal, however they used ‘conventional’ negotiation tactics and 
strategies. The findings regarding changes in the socio-political landscape indicate 
that learning is a long-term process over several years or even decades, which was 
suggested by Sabatier (1988) and confirmed by Radaelli (2009), as repeating ‘com-
mon sense’ arguments had a major impact on policy change in both cases. One major 
finding on the organisational level is that learning can be confused with the technicali-
ties of policymaking in the EU in general, but especially with the ‘institutional 
machiery’ of the European Commission (EC 24). It is also crucial to separate learning 
from bargaining in the negotiations that accompany policymaking in the EU and from 
lobbying by various stakeholders involved. Decision-makers can learn on the individ-
ual level by reflecting on new information and being involved in the process, which 
can even result in changed beliefs or values regarding the policy. However, this is fre-
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quently not transferred on the organisational level due to political interests of member 
states and powerful vested interests. 
In conclusion, learning does occur in policymaking. However, it is crucial to 
separate ‘normal’ learning, which can be reasonably expected from every individual 
involved in policymaking in the form of additional information and experience, from 
constructivist learning, which requires not only a reflection on the input and a resul-
ting increase in knowledge or experience. It furthermore requires individuals to 
change their underlying beliefs. Only if individuals change their beliefs, we can talk 
about learning that goes beyond ‘normal’ learning. Previous studies widely failed to 
explicitly account for pre-existing beliefs and to establish a ‘base line’ from which 
knowledge and experience increased or beliefs changed. We can mistake learning 
easily if the time span, pre-existing knowledge, experience and beliefs are not bench-
marked (see chapter 3). It is important to take alternative explanations for learning in-
to account and to include those into the analysis. The following section will turn to the 
method to identify learning in policymaking, the prerequisite for analysing learning in 
a given policymaking context. 
 
 
9.1.2 How can we identify learning in policymaking?  
 
Identifying learning is strongly based of what is being regarded as learning. A review 
of different definitions of learning (see definitions provided by Argyris and Schön 
1978; Kim 1993; May 1992; Sommerer 2011; Zito and Schout 2009) identified ele-
ments common to most learning conceptualisations. The following definition pre-
sented in chapter 2 consolidated the diverse understandings of learning and provided 
an overall conceptual basis for the analysis. Learning was defined in this thesis as  
 
reflection and judgment based on an input, which leads the individual and/ or or-
ganisation to select a different view on (1) how things happen, i.e. additional 
knowledge or (2) what course of action to take, i.e. the reflection on individual or 
collective experience or advise from others on such previous experiences. The 
judgement can lead to an individual or collective change in beliefs. Policy out-
comes can either be a result of learning or of alternative explanations. 
 
(Chapter 2) 
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The empirical analysis process traced the development of two best-case exam-
ples. These included the Renewable Energy Directive adopted in 2009 and the 2014-
2020 Common Agricultural Policy proposal with its components on mainstreaming 
climate action and increasing greening aspects. Learning in these policies was process 
traced (George and Bennett 2005; Tansey 2007) predominantly with in-depth elite in-
terviews of those policy-makers directly involved in the development, drafting and 
negotiation of the policies and supplemented with document analysis. This research 
was based on 72 interviews with 66 key decision-makers at the European Commission 
(DG/ Cabinet Agriculture and Rural Development, DG/ Cabinet Energy, DG Envi-
ronment and DG Climate Action), in the European Parliament and the Council (mem-
ber states) as well as non-governmental actors. For the case study on learning in the 
development of the EU Renewable Energy Directive several individuals have been in-
volved in both case studies, thus the total of numbers of interviews was higher than 
the total number of interviewees (see chapter 4 and appendix 2). This research focused 
on interviewing the key actors, whose population was very limited. The scope of the 
sample included all individuals that the author could contact (some were retired and 
had left no contact addresses or deceased), and who did not decline the interview re-
quest. The interviews were semi-structured and lasted on average 60 minutes.  
To identify learning, it needed to be determined whether communication be-
tween the individuals occurred, whether the individual received the information such 
as scientific studies and whether the individual reflected on the information, and as a 
consequence experienced an increase in knowledge, added a practical experience con-
nected to a concrete policy action to his/her base of experiences, and/or changed un-
derlying beliefs. This process-tracing approach has the advantage that it is well-
established and accepted in the public policy and governance literature as most em-
pirical studies on learning overall followed this process-tracing approach based on 
interviews (Dunlop 2010; Eising 2002; Farrell 2009; Koch and Lindenthal 2011; 
Radaelli 2009), what improves validity and reliability (Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wicki 
2008b; Yin 1994; 2009).  
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9.1.3 Under what conditions does learning occur? 
 
 
 
Learning occurs in the complex interactions of the individual and organisational level, 
which are further influenced by wider developments and major shifts in the socio-
political landscape. For learning to occur in the policymaking process, the policymak-
ing conditions need to support reflection on input and a change in perspectives. This 
can be hindered by several factors such as defensive avoidance, bargaining tactics and 
power politics. It can also be hindered by an organisational culture that does not sup-
port reflection and changing perspectives or is not open to changes. Thus, the link be-
tween the individual and organisational level is very important for learning to be 
transferred into the policy outcome. If there is a disconnect between those two levels, 
individuals may well have learned, but the institution and ultimately the policy out-
come do not reflect learning.  
It is important to distinguish between pre-formed deeper beliefs and newly 
formed beliefs and to control for pre-existing beliefs, green or otherwise. Key actors 
in the Common Agricultural Policy and the Renewable Energy Directive case study 
maintained their beliefs and subsequently tried to align the policy outcome with their 
pre-existing beliefs. Therefore, the time frame of the analysis is important. Shifts in 
the socio-political landscape also illustrate the importance of windows of opportunity. 
These were further conditioned by outside factors such as the economic situation. 
Many interviewees emphasised that the window of opportunity for climate policy and 
climate policy integration closed with the economic and euro zone crisis as member 
states are pre-occupied with more immediate economic concerns. Nevertheless, key 
aspects such as the conditionality of 30 per cent of farm payments on compliance with 
greening measures and the dedication of 20 per cent of the European Union’s 2014-
2020 budget to co-benefits on climate measures were maintained and thus point to the 
influence of actors and path-dependencies of policymaking beyond those windows of 
opportunity. Whether learning is transferred into the policymaking process and ulti-
mately to the policy outcome depends on the political feasibility of actors’ ‘new’ be-
liefs within the dominant coalition. If these actors encounter a window of opportunity 
and use it to gather the necessary political support for their policy proposal, the learn-
ing is likely to be reflected not only in the policymaking process, but also in the policy 
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outcome. However, this also illustrates that constructivist learning should be free of 
any normative judgement regarding its desirability. It also illustrates that pre-held 
deeper beliefs can also have a strong result on the policy outcome. As a consequence, 
constructivist learning of individuals needs to be ‘benchmarked’ against the deeper 
beliefs of individuals and not against externally imposed objectives. Constructivist 
learning on the individual level can have an impact on the policy outcome and can be 
identified based on how well the policy outcome reflects the individual’s and organi-
sation’s beliefs.  
 
 
9.1.4 Conclusion on findings and contributions 
 
 
The findings demonstrate that for learning to occur in the policymaking process and 
for learning to have an impact on the policy outcome, the crucial angle of analysis is 
to determine whether and when individual key policy-makers, who acted as policy en-
trepreneurs on the organisational level, changed their beliefs. Whether their individual 
learning is transferred into the policy outcome depends on how well these policy en-
trepreneurs manoeuvre the political machinery and how much political support they 
can build. Learning is rarely translated into a consensual, deliberative decision-
making process that results in an uncontroversial policy outcome as hypothesised by 
deliberation theory (Risse 2000; Risse and Kleine 2010; Riddervold 2011). Learning 
on the organisational level is more likely to be instrumental in order to achieve a cer-
tain political goal that is aligned with the key actor’s beliefs.  
These findings on policy entrepreneurs, windows of opportunity, pre-formed 
beliefs and the socio-political landscape as driver for policy development point to-
wards the compatibility of the theories of the policy process (see discussions in 3.1) 
and indicate that the policy learning literature widely ignored the key aspects of win-
dows of opportunity opened by supportive driving forces in the socio-political land-
scape and the crucial role of policy entrepreneurs in achieving a policy outcome (ex-
ceptions are Braun 2009 and Nilsson 2005). In contrast, policy entrepreneurs, win-
dows of opportunity and political interests have been analysed and confirmed by dif-
ferent authors for the EU and beyond as key explanations for policy outcomes 
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(Ackrill, Kay, and Zahariadis 2013a; Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis and Allen 1995). 
However, this side of the policymaking literature rarely examined the role of learning 
as central intervening variable. It furthermore hardly provides a clear distinction be-
tween beliefs as suggested by Sabatier (1988), who in turn focuses on policy-oriented 
learning as a form of protecting beliefs instead of changing them. In the advocacy coa-
lition framework, learning has a minor role as political learning with aspects of lipser-
vice, following orders and political power plays. In conclusion, this combination of 
learning and alternative explanations for policy outcomes in the policy process is a 
novel contribution to the learning literature and to the policymaking literature alike as 
it allows a fresh perspective on learning in the policymaking process and the role of 
individual policy-makers therein, while reconciling existing contributions. 
 
 
 
9.2 Lessons of policy analysis 
 
 
A number of policy implications emerge from the empirical findings. There is a dan-
ger that these findings on learning could be misinterpreted as no learning going on in 
European policymaking. In fact, much learning is happening in places where we 
might not expect it, but learning is also not always as relevant in arriving at a policy 
outcome as some of the literature may suggest. However, learning can speed up the 
policymaking process by reducing the number of incremental reform steps necessary 
to arrive at a policy outcome that does not immediately drive key actors to reform the 
policy and withdraw central outcomes. Especially the reliability of policy outcomes is 
a major concern to industry, business and the financial sector providing necessary in-
vestments in renewable energies as the likelihood of changing economic incentives 
and regulatory regimes means a high uncertainty and financial risk to them. Thus it 
would be desirable to arrive at a policy outcome that provides a certain stability with a 
low likelihood of major changes within a short time frame.  
Especially the biofuels component of the RED introduced uncertainty for ac-
tors in the biofuels industry, who planned their investments and business operations 
 260	  
based on the expectation of a ten per cent target of renewable energies in transport, 
what includes first generation biofuels from food crops (Dunlop 2010; Sharman and 
Holmes 2010). The expectations generated from the 2009 RED make a subsequent re-
form towards discouraging first generation biofuels more difficult as the original di-
rective created a considerable lobby of biofuel producers who have a vested interest in 
maintaining the current policy regime. A policy reform means a significant economic 
risk and potential loss to their investments, which were based on expectations of pol-
icy stability. Thus, learning can facilitate a policy outcome that reduces the likelihood 
of frequent, incremental reforms if a policy outcome that satisfies the majority of key 
actors is achieved in the first instance. In the case of the RED this could have been 
achieved by taking the emerging scientific evidence or at least the uncertainty regard-
ing the mixed climate mitigation capabilities of first generation biofuels into account 
during the policymaking process via adhering to the precautionary principle.  
The key issue in the RED was that sufficient scientific evidence on the mixed 
performance of biofuels only became available after the heads of states had decided 
on the target of ten per cent renewable energies in transport by 2020, what given tech-
nological limitations became a de facto ten per cent target of first generation biofuels 
(Sharman and Holmes 2010). A policy implication resulting from the biofuels case 
would be to create mechanisms that allow key actors to ‘back up’ when they cornered 
themselves in ‘one way streets’, i.e. to admit that they acted without having con-
sidered all information or that the situation changed following the formation of sig-
nificant scientific doubts, so that in the light of the new scientific evidence or experi-
ence a change of course is acceptable. This would allow them to save face without 
negative consequences for their careers.  
Two factors are decisive here: the institutional culture and arriving at a ‘learn-
ing organisation’ (Coopey 1995; Easterby-Smith and Lyles 2005), what should not be 
confused with organisational learning (Easterby-Smith 1997; Lyles 1985). The or-
ganisational culture is a key determinant as all actors and their actions are embedded 
in the organisational culture and judged against this norm. While in the Anglo-
American culture failure of entrepreneurs at their first business and subsequent learn-
ing from failure is regarded as a ‘badge of honour’, Asian and to a large extent conti-
nental-European cultures regard admitting to an error as a loss of face with a subse-
quent loss of reputation and credibility. They strive not to repeat such ‘mistakes’ in 
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the future. This organisational culture is not ‘set in stone’, but as it is lived every day 
(Easterby-Smith and Lyles 2005), it can also be changed if key individuals begin to 
embrace a culture of reflection and learning from mistakes in a sense of ‘lessons 
learned’ or lesson drawing (Rose 1991; 1993). This could happen via de-briefings and 
non-judgemental reflections on the policymaking process instead of immediately 
moving on to the next project as suggested by a key actor in the biofuels case study. 
This is where the ‘learning organisation’ could be a useful model. The case 
studies illustrated that individuals do engage in learning that is not ‘trivial’ as they re-
flect on their policymaking experience and come to change their willingness to do 
things differently in the future. This adds up to an ‘institutional memory’ of lessons 
learned from what the organisational culture widely regards as ‘mistakes’ (Easterby-
Smith and Lyles 2005). If however the individuals involved move on to other posi-
tions after a few years, either into other directorate generals, in their member states, or 
when they retire, this institutional memory is lost. Currently information is rarely sys-
tematically collected and stored by individuals involved in policymaking so that it 
could easily be passed on to their successors. This could be achieved via debriefings 
that enter some kind of database with experiences of previous policymaking. This way 
it is likely that ‘mistakes’ that happened in the past are not repeated as the origin of 
the incident is recorded and it is no longer unclear to successors why and how the in-
cident occurred. Currently, there is frequently not enough knowledge to reflect on 
how the situation was handled in the past and why actions led to the known result. 
Therefore, it would greatly facilitate learning in the European Commission as well as 
improve accountability if a feedback- and debriefing loop was introduced at the end of 
a policymaking initiative. This could record and encourage reflection on the experi-
ences, how scientific input was handled, and who had decisive influence in shaping 
the outcome and the rationales behind this. At the same time, individuals in leadership 
positions need to actively support an atmosphere of collegiality and openness that is 
non-judgemental and focused on improving the policymaking process in the future in-
stead of punishing individuals for their actions in the past.  
Learning also has a normative aspect: the use of the institutional machinery to 
arrive at the biofuel component of the RED could be labelled ‘bad’ learning as it is 
opposed to the environmental coalition’s beliefs, but whether this is actually ‘bad’ de-
pends on value judgements of the actors affected by the policy. In any policymaking 
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process, there are winners such as in this case farmers, large agri-business and the bio-
fuels industry, as well as losers such as environmentalists and small-scale/ organic 
farmers. Each group has a different cost-benefit calculation and value system to judge 
whether the policy is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, i.e. good or bad for them and their key interests.  
The findings on policy entrepreneurs’ power and ‘lack’ of learning point to-
wards a seemingly democratic and accountability deficit in the European Commission. 
However, the results of this research should not be interpreted as generalisable il-
lustration of a democratic deficit in the European Commission. It does have large 
powers based on its particular institutional role and knowledge base, but this type of 
power is also necessary to design policies that serve the public good with a longer 
time horizon than the next election or currently popular demands. 99.5 per cent of the 
cases in policymaking rather benefit from the medium-/long term time horizon and 
political neutrality of policy officers/ civil servants at the European Commission and 
their ability to act as policy entrepreneurs (EC 12). The biofuels case study however 
represents the 0.5 per cent where the ongoing disagreements between actor coalitions 
result in the overall conclusion that there is a democratic deficit in the EU due to its 
closed-door decision-making and the large power of policy entrepreneurs who were 
very persuasive to their hierarchy and held a negotiation advantage based on their ex-
pert knowledge. Thus it is necessary to have checks and balances that hinder civil ser-
vants from playing defining roles that may lead to unintended consequences and to al-
low for correctional mechanisms in the case of defensive avoidance. 
 
 
 
9.3 Implications for public policy theory and further research 
 
 
The meta-theoretical framework on learning developed and tested in this thesis is a 
contribution to the public policy literature and the policy learning literature as it clari-
fies the role of learning in the policymaking process. Overall facilitating conditions 
for learning are the existence of policy entrepreneurs who try to educate the other ac-
tors and convince them, windows of opportunities due to a favourable ‘public mood’ 
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and demand for a policy outcome based on policy-maker’s perceptions of shifts in the 
socio-political landscape, shared deeper, policy design and policy detail beliefs across 
coalitions and an ‘institutional machinery’ that encourages individuals to reflect on 
their experiences and to critically evaluate knowledge-based input. The likelihood of a 
policy outcome increases if key individuals are convinced that a policy objective is 
‘the right thing to do’, if they are in powerful positions – or capable of influencing 
powerful actors; if they actively engage in the policymaking process by strategically 
putting together coalitions with decision-making powers and if they possess the neces-
sary knowledge to play a leadership role based on their expertise. However, construc-
tivist learning neither always occurs, nor necessarily needs to occur.  
If policy entrepreneurs were also to take on the role of ‘teachers’ and convince 
other actors of their policy objectives (Bomberg 2007) instead of using strategies and 
power politics to realise their political objectives (Kingdon 1995; Moravcsik 1993; 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), wider learning on the organisational level could 
occur as more actors change their beliefs instead of following orders from these policy 
entrepreneurs. While elements of these findings are discussed in the literature, this 
contribution specifically bridged the gap between these literatures by providing a syn-
thesised meta-theoretical framework and two case study analyses that illustrate the 
importance of alternative explanations besides learning. Therefore, it allows a fresh 
perspective on a well-developed literature that has become so complex that several re-
cent contributions are confusing labels and conceptualisations.  
A key question for further research is the role of the European Commission as 
policy entrepreneur ‘qua treaty’. In the Treaty of Lisbon (Craig 2010) and previous 
European treaties, the European Commission plays a central role due to its privilege 
of proposing legislation. Yet the empirical findings of this thesis and many other case 
studies of European policymaking indicate that the European Commission can be re-
garded as a political actor in its own right with its own political objectives (Braun 
2009; Krause 2003; Laffan 1997). Furthermore, the European Commission can hardly 
be seen as one unitary actor, but rather as multiple actors in the different Directorate 
Generals and Cabinets of the European Commissioners (also indicated by Koch and 
Lindenthal 2011) where bureaucrats find opportunity structures to take on the roles of 
individual policy entrepreneurs. In combination with the finding that the learning of 
policy-makers in the EU and in the US is fairly similar (Montpetit 2009), the question 
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emerges to what extent learning in the European Commission and between the Euro-
pean institutions remains a ‘special’, ‘unique’ case and whether there are not wider 
lessons for intergovernmental institutions or national administrations. In this sense, 
the especially powerful role of the European Commission can be regarded as feature 
of the EU’s particular organisational culture, which also includes its constitutional 
foundations. To answer the emerging question of to what extent the organisational cul-
ture matters and not only whether it matters or not as in this thesis, comparative case 
studies between the EU and non-EU states would be useful as would be studies across 
multiple levels of governance from the local to the global level. These were not at-
tempted in this PhD thesis due to practical time and budget limitations as well as the 
higher number of actors involved who would need to be controlled for in the process 
tracing. For the sake of parsimony, it was more feasible to take a nested case study 
approach that allowed comparisons across energy, transport and agriculture policy 
within climate policy integration for a first test of the meta-theoretical framework. 
The other question that remains is whether the findings are specific to the area 
of climate policy integration. First of all, this is a fairly wide area as it theoretically 
includes all policy fields that are not primarily targeted at reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions but whose activities contribute to climate change or will be affected by its 
consequences. In a narrower conceptualisation comparative studies of different policy 
areas within the EU would also be helpful to gain a better understanding of the speci-
ficity of these findings to the area of climate policy integration. If seen as inherent 
learning process, learning in other policy areas should be lower. The conflict in the 
biofuels case study however suggests that climate policy integration is a more difficult 
terrain than single-purpose policies due to the competing competencies and possibly 
conflicting policy objectives of short-term economic growth and long-term sustaina-
bility, making it a field of crucial importance to address climate change and strengthen 
long-term sustainability. However, it also requires key actors that are willing to 
‘teach’ the other actors and to invest their political capital: 
 
We did extremely well. But it was the high point. I think 2011 was an extremely 
good year for mainstreaming in the Commission. But I also used a lot of political 
capital getting it. And I am now the most unpopular guy in Brussels. (…) Because I 
am interfering with other people’s portfolios, telling them how to do their job. Peo-
ple don’t like that. So it’s difficult. But I can survive. 
 
(European Commission 2012) 
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Appendix 1: Codebook for data analysis 
 
 
 
 
Key concepts and aspects of learning 
 
 
Code 
 
Definition 
 
Inclusion  
criteria  
 
Exclusion 
criteria 
 
Examples 
Corre-
sponds to 
learning 
type 
 
Receive in-
formation 
Be provided with 
an input in terms of 
additional informa-
tion, awareness of 
this specific knowl-
edge, received in 
written or spoken 
form  
Reference to be-
ing provided 
with policy 
relevant infor-
mation 
Not be provided 
with information, 
relying on own 
knowledge base 
‘we were given 
studies by stake-
holders’; ‘someone/ 
experts pointed to-
wards evidence for 
…’ 
Prerequi-
site for 
any 
learning 
Reflection Think about the in-
put, actively engage 
with input and criti-
cally examine its 
relevance/ value 
Engage with in-
formation and 
think about it 
Only receive infor-
mation without fur-
ther engaging with 
it/ thinking about it 
‘I thought about it’, 
‘it came to my at-
tention’, ‘I looked 
into the issue’ 
Prerequi-
site for 
any 
learning 
Change Difference in 
amount of knowl-
edge, experience or 
altered believes/ 
values between 
time t1 and time t2 
Any increase or 
decrease in 
knowledge/ ex-
perience or be-
lief different 
from the status 
quo at t1 
Same as at previous 
time t1 
‘I worked on the is-
sue over 10 years’, 
‘We received new 
studies proving the 
contrary, that 
changed our per-
spective’ 
Prerequi-
site for 
any 
learning 
Individual 
level 
One person or small 
group of people 
working in a team 
within one organ-
isational unit 
Interviewee; 
Immediate col-
leagues of the 
interviewee s/he 
worked closely 
together with 
Overall organisa-
tional objective, 
communication that 
involves a large 
number of people 
across different or-
ganisations with dif-
ferent objectives; 
wider society involv-
ing the media/ public 
opinion 
‘This new data real-
ly changed my 
opinion on the cli-
mate performance 
of biofuels’,  
‘Me and my col-
leagues in Unit A.2/ 
in DG CLIMA…’  
Any 
Organisa-
tional level 
Policymaking that 
involves different 
Directorate Gener-
als of the European 
Commission, or 
policymaking be-
tween the EC and 
the Parliament/ 
Council 
Overall organisa-
tional objective, 
communication 
that involves a 
large number of 
people across dif-
ferent organisa-
tions with differ-
ent objectives 
Interviewee; 
Immediate col-
leagues of the in-
terviewee s/he 
worked closely to-
gether with; 
wider society in-
volving the media/ 
public opinion 
‘The Commission 
pushes for a xyz 
target’; ‘ There was 
a fight between DG 
Energy and DG 
Environment on the 
model used for bio-
fuel life-cycle anal-
ysis’ 
Any 
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Socio-
political land-
scape 
Stakeholder in 
wider society out-
side the immediate 
policymaking arena 
such as media, vot-
ers, politicians in 
local/ state/ national 
parliaments, NGOs, 
overall civil society 
and ordinary citi-
zens, policy-
maker’s perception 
of the public mood/ 
demands 
Policy-maker’s 
proxies to de-
termine prefer-
ences of wider 
society involv-
ing the media/ 
public opinion, 
frequently over 
longer time span 
(e.g. opinion 
polls, submis-
sions to public 
consultations)  
Interviewee; 
Immediate col-
leagues of the in-
terviewee s/he 
worked closely to-
gether with; 
Overall organisa-
tional objective, 
communication that 
involves a large 
number of people 
across different or-
ganisations with dif-
ferent objectives 
‘Everybody was 
moving in the same 
direction’, ‘the pub-
lic support for re-
newable energies 
was overwhelming’, 
‘people came to real-
ise the importance of 
acting on climate 
change’, ‘there is an 
overall demand in 
society that public 
money helps provide 
public goods’ 
 
 
Any 
Factual 
learning 
Reflection on new 
information and 
subsequent change 
in knowledge com-
pared to status quo 
References to 
knowledge, in-
formation, stud-
ies, evidence etc 
and that actors 
reflected upon 
the input and 
remember it 
Increase in experi-
ence, no reflection 
on and change in 
knowledge on is-
sue, also due to al-
ready very high 
level of individual 
expertise 
 
 
‘we incorporated 
the emerging evi-
dence on the un-
even GHG per-
formance of biofu-
els into our policy 
proposal’  
/ 
Experiential 
learning 
Reflection on expe-
rience related to 
policymaking and 
subsequent increase 
in experience (usu-
ally working expe-
rience) 
References to 
working on a 
policy (pro-
posal) over a 
certain time 
span, reflection 
on experience 
with conclusion 
to (not) modify 
behaviour in fu-
ture 
References to 
knowledge/ facts/ 
studies or changes 
in underlying be-
liefs 
‘through working 
on the RED I had a 
crashcourse on re-
newable energies’,  
‘by contributing to 
the work of the agri-
cultural committee in 
the Parliament I 
gained much experi-
ence’, ‘the Parlia-
ment is involved in 
co-decision-making 
on the CAP for the 
first time and gaining 
a great deal in expe-
rience’ 
 
 
/ 
Constructiv-
ist learning 
Changes in underly-
ing beliefs, values, 
how people see an is-
sue/ regard it as im-
portant, prompted by 
reflection on an in-
crease in knowledge 
or working experi-
ence on the issue 
 
References to 
changed opin-
ions, how peo-
ple saw the is-
sue, higher re-
gard for the is-
sue, shifts in 
value or belief 
system 
Person/ organisa-
tion already held 
belief that acting 
upon the issue is 
important before 
being involved with 
specific policy pro-
posal 
‘Al Gore’s movie put 
the problem of cli-
mate change in the 
public’s mind, peo-
ple came to under-
stand that it is impor-
tant to act on climate 
change’, ‘I refined 
my belief that all bio-
fuels are good’ 
 
 
 
/ 
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Learning  
(reflection on input and subsequent change) 
 
 
 
Code 
 
Definition 
 
Inclusion  
criteria  
 
Exclusion 
criteria 
 
Examples 
Corre-
sponds to 
learning 
type 
 
Knowledge Input to policymak-
ing by external 
sources via infor-
mation provision; 
frequently meant by 
interviewees when 
they use the word 
‘learning’ 
References to 
information; 
component of 
factual learning 
References to ac-
tivities or time 
spent working on a 
specific issue or to 
how they saw/ in-
terpreted the issue 
 
 
 
 
‘scientific stud-
ies’, ‘expertise’, 
‘research find-
ings’, ‘evidence’ 
Factual 
learning 
Experience Active engage-
ment with policy 
issue area by 
working on it 
References to 
activities or 
time spent 
working on a 
specific issue; 
component of 
experiential 
learning 
 
 
References to in-
formation or to how 
they saw/ inter-
preted the issue 
based on their val-
ues/ attitudes 
‘working experi-
ence’, ‘through 
working on the 
RED I had a crash 
course on renew-
able energies’ 
Experien-
tial learn-
ing 
Underlying be-
liefs 
Point of view held 
by individual, in-
stitution or society 
that also reflects 
values and frame 
of mind regarding 
an issue; norma-
tive judgments re-
garding a poten-
tially contested is-
sue 
References to 
how people/ or-
ganisation/ soci-
ety saw an issue 
also through their 
lens of previous 
attitudes and val-
ues, component 
of constructivist 
and deep-level 
governance learn-
ing 
References to ac-
tivities or time 
spent working on a 
specific issue or to 
specific information 
‘I really believe 
that renewable 
energies are a 
good thing/ the 
right solution to 
pursue’,  
‘It is important to 
consider the car-
bon footprint of 
an energy source’ 
‘We must also 
consider public 
goods such as the 
environment’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Construc-
tivist learn-
ing 
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Alternative explanation  
(reflection on input, but no change) 
 
 
Code 
 
Definition 
 
Inclusion  
criteria  
 
Exclusion 
criteria 
 
Examples 
Corre-
sponds to 
learning 
type 
 
Political  
interests 
Normative point of 
view regarding an 
issue based on pref-
erences of interest 
groups  
(political parties, 
business, powerful 
individuals) 
Reference to poli-
tics, political lev-
el, politicians, 
organisational ob-
jectives that are 
influenced by spe-
cial interest 
groups 
References to 
scientific evi-
dence, public 
good/ res pub-
lica, but also 
pure bargaining 
as regular part of 
the negotiation/ 
decision-making 
process 
‘I defend my or-
ganisation’s/ su-
perior’s political 
interests’, ‘they 
made a deal with 
X to get their 
agreement on an-
other issue’, ‘pol-
iticians pushed 
through their 
parties interests’ 
Alternative 
explana-
tion 
Following or-
ders 
Receiving an order 
from a superior/ or-
ganisation with le-
gal power to give 
orders, carrying out 
this order regardless 
of personal/ organ-
isational objectives 
Reference to de-
mands from Par-
liament/ European 
Council, Commis-
sioners, politicians 
in member states 
that were carried 
out/ policies de-
veloped in re-
sponse to that 
Reference to 
autonomous de-
cisions taken 
within the indi-
vidual’s unit, 
policy entrepre-
neurial activities, 
persuading supe-
riors, taking 
ownership/ lead-
ership in policy 
development 
‘the European 
Council tasked us 
with the devel-
opment of a di-
rective’,  
‘The Commis-
sioner asked our 
DG to formulate 
a proposal’ 
Alternative 
explana-
tion 
Institutional 
process of pol-
icymaking 
- Comitology 
- Interservice con-
sultations 
- Informal commu-
nication 
 
Description of 
formal and infor-
mal policymaking 
procedures, in-
formation ex-
change in regular 
meetings, institu-
tional culture of 
information ex-
change, gathering 
information and 
developing pro-
posals 
References to 
exceptions from 
procedure or 
strong individual 
input into the 
decision-making 
process 
‘This is how pol-
icy is made in the 
EU’,  
‘This process is 
being repeated 
every x years’ 
‘This is how the 
policymaking 
process works’ 
Alternative 
explana-
tion 
Negotiation/  
bargaining 
Policy-makers rep-
resent different po-
sitions on an issue 
trying to come to an 
agreement that is as 
close to their nego-
tiation optimum as 
possible, but at least 
within their nego-
tiation mandate  
References to rep-
resenting the in-
terests of an or-
ganisation in a ne-
gotiation setting 
that match not 
necessarily with 
the interviewee’s/ 
negotiator’s per-
sonal point of 
view 
References to 
negotiation set-
tings, exchange 
of positions car-
ried out between 
the European 
Commission and 
the Parliament/ 
Council, among 
member states 
and MEPs 
‘we have a nego-
tiation mandate 
that we have to 
represent’, ‘It 
was clear that the 
member states 
would never ag-
ree to this’‘we 
made a deal to 
get them to agree 
to our proposal’ 
Alternative 
explana-
tion 
 293	  
 
Lobbying 
 
Following the pro-
posals made by/ in-
put provided by 
non-governmental 
interest groups 
References to in-
put provided by 
business/ NGOs 
that was taken on 
by decision-
makers; amend-
ments provided by 
interest groups to 
MEPs  
References to 
the development 
of a policy based 
on scientific evi-
dence or previ-
ous policies, pol-
icy was devel-
oped independ-
ently from inter-
est group in-
volvement  
‘We [special in-
terest group] pro-
vide our input to 
the decision-
makers at meet-
ings and confer-
ences’, 
‘MEPs take on 
our proposals, 
modify them and 
introduce them as 
amendments’ 
 
Alternative 
explana-
tion 
 
Non-Learning  
(no reflection on input, no change) 
 
 
Code 
 
Definition 
 
Inclusion  
criteria  
 
Exclusion 
criteria 
 
Examples 
Corre-
sponds to 
learning 
type 
 
Defensive 
avoidance 
Not wanting to deal 
with the issue, ig-
noring evidence, 
avoid loss of face 
by acknowledging 
mistakes 
Reference to mis-
takes from a 
normative point 
of view but carry-
ing on with busi-
ness as usual 
Remarks that the 
key actors re-
flected on the is-
sue but decided 
not to pursue it 
for other reasons 
‘they just ignore 
all the evidence, 
bury it, they don’t 
want to reflect on 
it as they would 
realise that they 
were wrong’ 
 
 
Non-
Learning 
Group think Group of actors 
lives in their own 
‘bubble’ and acts 
according to their 
view of the world, 
avoid to acknowl-
edge/ ignore mis-
match between their 
view and external 
factors (e.g. laws, 
social norms) 
References to be-
ing detached 
from ‘real’ peo-
ple, living in the 
‘Brussels bubble’ 
without knowing 
the situation in 
the member states 
Remarks that 
demonstrate 
awareness of oth-
er stakeholders’ 
points of view 
and the situation 
of the people af-
fected by the pol-
icy 
‘I don’t think pol-
icy-makers in 
Brussels know 
how disastrous 
their policy will 
be for farmers’, 
‘Everyone in my 
network thought 
this was a great 
idea to pursue, 
but it turned out 
to have negative 
consequences’  
 
 
Non-
Learning 
External con-
straints 
Lack of time due to 
high work load/ 
overload 
References to 
material or tem-
poral constraints 
Remarks indicat-
ing that lack of 
resources/ time/ 
manpower is not 
a hindering factor 
‘I would like to 
read all studies and 
think about them, 
but as MEP I don’t 
have the time as 
my day only has 
24h’ 
 
 
Non-
Learning 
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Conditioning factors  
with positive/ negative effect on learning types 
 
 
Code 
 
Definition 
 
Inclusion  
criteria  
 
Exclusion 
criteria 
 
Examples 
Corre-
sponds to 
learning 
type 
 
Academic 
background 
Education of the 
individual 
References to 
education or aca-
demic training in 
a certain disci-
pline 
References to 
working experi-
ence 
‘I have a PhD in 
agricultural eco-
nomics’ 
‘I am a mechanical 
engineer by train-
ing’ 
Any 
Working expe-
rience on topic 
Individual has 
worked on the pol-
icy area for a cer-
tain time 
References to du-
ration of specific 
work experience 
in the policy field 
References to 
education and 
training 
‘I worked on ag-
ricultural policy 
for 15 years’ 
Any 
Leadership 
style of supe-
rior 
Approach of indi-
vidual of higher 
rank than the inter-
viewee to managing 
and steering the 
team 
References to 
way the superior 
communicates 
with the team, 
use of adjectives 
to describe lead-
ership style 
References to 
education or 
background of 
superior 
‘My head of unit 
is very suppor-
tive, he encour-
ages us to share 
our knowledge on 
the issue’ 
‘My boss creates 
a competitive at-
mosphere’ 
Any 
Network to 
other actors 
Regular contact 
with other relevant 
actors and exchange 
about key issues of 
concern 
References to 
regular meetings/ 
communication, 
knowing each 
other, informal 
sharing of infor-
mation/ experi-
ence  
References to iso-
lation from other 
actors engaged in 
policymaking, 
independent work 
‘We have regular 
meetings with 
colleagues from 
other DGs to co-
ordinate’,  
‘We negotiate 
regularly and I 
know my coun-
terpart well’ 
Any 
Policy entre-
preneur 
Individual that is 
pro-active, takes on 
relevant position, 
tries to convince 
other actors of new 
evidence 
Reference to indi-
vidual that is per-
sonally convinced 
that policy is the 
right thing to do 
and promotes per-
spective actively 
Reference to insti-
tutional machinery 
or no special role 
of individuals in 
the development 
of policy 
‘She really be-
lieves in what she 
does, ‘she is very 
persuasive and 
pushes the pro-
posal through the 
committee’ 
Any 
Institutional 
capacity 
Ability of institution 
to adequately address 
policy problem, not 
prohibitively con-
strained by time or 
resources (personnel, 
monetary, goods) 
References to re-
sources such as 
personnel, budget, 
time to develop 
policies/ review 
them and form a 
position 
 
References to in-
dividual capaci-
ties, e.g. in terms 
of knowledge or 
experience 
 ‘The budget is 
very limited, thus 
we cannot pay for 
external advisors, 
studies or consult-
ants’ 
Any 
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Appendix 2: List of interviews 
 
Interview number Code of interviewee 
EC = European Commission 
EP = European Parliament 
NMS = Northern European Member State 
SMS = Southern European Member State 
ENGO = Environmental NGO 
Industry = Industry representative (agricultural lobby/ energy industry) 
1 EC 1 
2 EC 2 
3 EC 3 
4 EC 4 
5 EC 5 
6 EC 6 
7 EC 7 
8 EC 8 
9 EC 9 
10 EC 10 
11 EC 11 
12 EC 12 
13 EC 13 
14 EC 14 
15 EC 15 
16 EC 16 
17 EC 17 
18 EC 18 
19 EC 19 
20 EC 20 
21 EC 21 
22 EC 22 
23 EC 23 
24 EC 24 
25 EC 25 
26 EC 26 
27 EC 27 
28 EC 28 
29 EP 1 
30 EP 2 
31 EP 3 
32 EP 4 
33 EP 5 
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34 EP 6 
35 EP 7 
36 EP 8 
37 EP 9 
38 EP 10 
39 NMS 1 
40 SMS 1 
 
41 SMS 2 
42 NMS 2 
43 NMS 3 
44 NMS 4 
45 NMS 5 
46 SMS 3 
47 NMS 4 
48 SMS 4 
49 SMS 5 
50 NMS 6 
51 NMS 7 
52 NMS 8 
53 NMS 9 
54 NMS 10 
55 NMS 11 
56 ENGO 1 
57 ENGO 2 
58 ENGO 3 
59 ENGO 4 
60 ENGO 5 
61 ENGO 6 
62 ENGO 7 
63 ENGO 8 
64 ENGO 9 
65 ENGO 10 
66 Industry 1 
67 Industry 2 
68 Industry 3 
69 Industry 4 
70 Industry 5 
71 Industry 6 
72 Industry 7 
 
